State of Louisiana v. Terrence Armstrong A/K/A Terrance Armstrong A/K/A Dugga

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-414

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

TERRENCE ARMSTRONG
AKA TERRANCE ARMSTRONG
AKA DUGGA

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NUMBER 358,446
HONORABLE GREG BEARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Charles G. Fitzgerald, and Ledricka J.
Thierry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

J. Phillip Terrell, Jr.
District Attorney
Lea R. Hall, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
Ninth Judicial District Court
Parish of Rapides
State of Louisiana
Post Office Box 7358
Alexandria, Louisiana 71306-7358
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Sherry Watters
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 58769
New Orleans, Louisiana 70158-8769
(504) 723-0284
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Terrence Armstrong a/k/a Terrance Armstrong a/k/a Dugga

WILSON, Judge.

Defendant, Terrence (“Dugga”) Armstrong, was convicted of the second

degree murder of Edwin Davidson, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. He was sentenced

to a mandatory life sentence without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence. Defendant appeals, seeking review of his conviction and sentence. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm both his conviction and sentence.

I.

ISSUES

Defendant asserts the following assignments of error:

1. The charging document violates Defendant’s “constitutional right
and due process as it purports to be an indictment but was not
properly filed.”

2. The trial court violated Defendant’s “right to a fair and impartial
jury by keeping the juror on the jury despite his acknowledged
violation of instructions and forcing the verdict, rather than ordering
further deliberation, when a juror expressed doubt during polling.”

3. The State failed to prove Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt “where the State’s evidence of specific intent was
insufficient.”

4. The trial court erred in allowing the admission of “prejudicial other
crimes evidence made in hearsay statements” and “irrelevant
photographs of firearms.”

5. The trial court erred in imposing “an excessive sentence that was not
warranted by [] [D]efendant’s minor role or the offender’s history.”
Defendant received “ineffective assistance at sentencing where
counsel did not file a motion for downward departure, did not
object[,] and did not file a Motion for Reconsideration.”

II.

ERRORS PATENT

We reviewed the record in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920 and

found no errors patent in this case.

III.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Seventeen-year-old Davidson was killed1 in a drive-by-shooting on October

20, 2020, in Alexandria, Louisiana, after he and Leon (“Lee Jack”) Anderson

(Anderson) allegedly shorted a purchase of Xanax by a group of Defendant’s friends.

That group consisted of Syria (“Kelsey”) Mahfouz (Mahfouz), Pamela Smith

(Smith), Blaine Milliman (Milliman), Kaitlyn Carlino (Carlino), Tyrone (“Noon”)

Compton (Compton), and Andrew Mayo (Mayo).

Defendant was charged with second degree murder. Following a jury trial in

March of 2023, Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to a mandatory

life sentence without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

IV.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Sufficiency of the Evidence

When a defendant raises issues on appeal regarding the sufficiency of the

evidence and other trial errors, the reviewing court must first resolve the sufficiency

issue. State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992). Accordingly, we address

Defendant’s third assignment of error first. He contends that the State failed to prove

that he is guilty of second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt because there

was insufficient evidence as to his specific intent and because the indictment charged

him with both specific intent to commit murder and a murder committed during a

drive-by shooting.

Appellate review of sufficiency of the evidence is well-settled:

1
Dr. Yen Van Vo (Dr. Vo), the forensic pathologist who performed the autopsy, testified
that the cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head. According to Dr. Vo, there was an
irregular entrance wound with no stippling or soot, which was consistent with an object being
between the muzzle of the gun and the surface of the victim’s body.
2

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the role of the fact finder to weigh the
respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the appellate court
should not second guess the credibility determinations of the triers of
fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. In order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the
record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371

(citations omitted).

Second degree murder is defined in La.R.S. 14:30.1, which provides in

pertinent part:

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great
bodily harm; or

(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted
perpetration of aggravated or first degree rape, forcible or second
degree rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated
kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by
drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree
robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to
juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict
great bodily harm.

The definition of principals is set forth in La.R.S. 14:24:

All persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether
present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act constituting
the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly
counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.

In State v. Tate, 01-1658, pp. 7–8 (La. 5/20/03), 851 So.2d 921, 930 (citations

omitted), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905, 124 S.Ct. 1604 (2004), the supreme court

discussed the mental element required to be found guilty as a principal:

Not all principals are automatically guilty of the same grade of the
offense; thus, a principal may be charged with and convicted of a higher
or lower degree of the crime, depending on the mental element proved
at trial. An individual may be convicted only for those crimes for which
3

he personally has the requisite intent. It is not enough that his
accomplice have the intent, the State must prove that the defendant had
the required mental element.

Specific intent is a state of mind that may be inferred from the
circumstances of the transaction and the actions of the accused. To
establish specific intent the state must show that the defendant pulled
the trigger, that he acted in concert with his co-perpetrator, or that he
actively acquiesced in the use of deadly force.

Smith, Carlino, Mayo, and Compton were charged as codefendants. As a

result of her part in the crime, Smith pled guilty to criminal conspiracy to commit

second degree murder in exchange for her truthful testimony against all involved in

the case. Carlino pled guilty to conspiracy and was awaiting sentencing at the time

of Defendant’s trial. Carlino testified that she was not told what to say and was

asked only for the truth. Mahfouz, Smith, Milliman, and Carlino testified at

Defendant’s trial.

Mahfouz testified that she had lived with Smith for about six months at the

time the murder occurred. Smith’s children, Smith’s father, and Smith’s boyfriend,

Compton, also lived there. According to Mahfouz, Mayo, her ex-boyfriend, and his

brother, Milliman, would hang out at Smith’s house. Carlino came to the house a

few times, either with Mayo and Milliman or by herself. Mahfouz had seen

Defendant, who was Compton’s friend, at Smith’s house about two or three times.

Mahfouz testified that on the day of the incident, Compton wanted to get some

Xanax, but he could not. Mahfouz and Mayo arranged to buy Xanax from Anderson,

a friend of the group. They made arrangements to buy thirteen bars for $90.00 and

to pick up the Xanax at the Smithville store. According to Mahfouz, Compton put

up the money for the purchase, and Carlino, Mahfouz, Smith, Compton, Mayo, and

Milliman all went in Carlino’s car to pick up the drugs. Once there, they met

Anderson. Davidson, whom Mahfouz knew, was in the car with him. Both Mayo

and Mahfouz got out of the car. Mayo handed Anderson the money, and Anderson
4

handed him the drugs in an opaque cigar package.2 Anderson and Davidson left.

Once Mayo and Mahfouz got back in their car, they dumped out the cigar package

and found that they did not receive the amount of Xanax for which they had paid.

According to Mahfouz, Compton was the angriest because he had put up the money.

The group drove around trying to find Anderson and Davidson but were

unsuccessful and returned to Smith’s house. Mahfouz testified that when they got

back to Smith’s house, Mayo and Compton went inside and retrieved pistols. Mayo

had Smith’s pistol, and Compton had Milliman’s pistol. Defendant joined the group3

and had a gun as well, but his gun was a rifle, which Mahfouz had seen him with

before. In her statement to police, Mahfouz said that she did not fully hear the

conversation of the three armed men. But, at trial, she testified that she heard them

talking about shooting up someone’s house. Mahfouz said that when she heard this,

she told Compton, Mayo, and Milliman that it was not a good idea and asked them

to stay. Mahfouz testified that she and Milliman then went inside, took some of the

Xanax, and played video games. The group left. Mahfouz testified that when the

group returned, they said nothing about what occurred. The next morning, either

Compton or Smith showed Mahfouz a posting indicating that Davidson had been

killed.

Milliman confirmed that he, Mayo, Compton, Smith, Carlino, and Mahfouz

arranged to buy some Xanax from Anderson on the night of the murder. When they

met up with Anderson, he had a passenger in the car with him, but Milliman did not

know the person. Milliman testified that after realizing they were shorted and having

2
Lieutenant Cody Griffith of the Pineville Police Department testified that he obtained the
store’s video footage, which verified that Mahfouz and Mayo got out of the car and engaged in a
transaction with two people in an SUV identified as belonging to the victims. This video footage
was later inadvertently erased.
3
Mahfouz testified that she thought that Defendant joined the group at Compton’s request.

5

no luck finding Anderson, the group returned to Smith’s house, where Compton

made a phone call. Defendant walked over immediately thereafter. Milliman

testified that Defendant was armed with a rifle, that Mayo had Compton’s pistol, and

that Compton had Milliman’s pistol. According to Milliman, it was Compton’s and

Carlino’s idea to go to the Orchard Loop residence, not Defendant’s. Milliman and

Mahfouz remained inside the house while the group left the house with Smith

driving and Carlino in the front passenger seat. Mayo, Compton, and Defendant

were also in the car. Milliman testified that about thirty minutes later, the group

returned, anxious and talking about shooting up a house.

Smith testified that she knew Defendant as being a mutual friend of Mayo and

Compton. She testified that Defendant occasionally hung out with the group of

friends at her house, and when he did, he brought his gun with him.

Smith testified that everyone was angry after they were shorted Xanax pills.

After an unsuccessful attempt to find the sellers, the group returned to her house.

Defendant was called and later arrived with his gun. According to Smith, Mayo was

armed with her gun, a Ruger nine millimeter, which she had reported stolen. She

believed that Compton stole the gun from her and gave it to Mayo. Smith testified

that she drove with Defendant seated behind her, Compton in the middle, and Mayo

in the hatchback area. Mayo directed her to Davidson’s house. Smith testified that

the plan was for a confrontation and that a shooting was not discussed, at least not

with her. Her intent was to stop in front of the Orchard Loop house and let the guys

out of the car, but before they reached the front of the house, she heard multiple

gunshots from the back of the car, and she panicked. Smith initially testified that

she did not actually see Defendant shooting. When reminded of her testimony from

a previous trial, she confirmed that she did:

6

Yes. The [sic], from behind me, the back window. I, at that
point, as, as I realized shooting was happening I did see him behind me
out the window, like peripheral vision at the moment of the shooting.
Like as soon as the shooting started and my attention was, at that
moment I did, yes.

Smith confirmed that she did not see either Mayo or Compton shoot. She

stated that she heard enough shots to be certain that multiple guns were being fired.

After the shooting, the group returned to her home where things were crazy, and a

lot of different emotions were being exhibited. She testified that the group removed

the different sized shell casings from Carlino’s car while Defendant was “ranting

and raving about if anybody, if anybody snitches, consequences.” According to

Smith, Defendant made it clear that if anyone told, “their fate would be the same.”

Smith told police that Defendant said, “come on, y’all, I got y’all, I’ll handle

this.” On redirect, Smith confirmed that Defendant said, “let’s go send a message

they can’t just rob us.” Finally, Smith confirmed that she told police that it was

Defendant’s idea and that Defendant said those things.

Carlino was seventeen when this crime was committed. She knew Defendant

as being a friend of Smith and Compton, and she saw him at their house three times,

including this incident. Carlino testified that she was “pretty sure” that each time

she saw Defendant, he had a rifle with him.

Carlino testified that she put in $40.00 for the purchase of the Xanax and that

Smith and Compton covered the rest of the $90.00 purchase price. After being

shorted on their purchase, the group returned to Smith’s house, where they divided

the Xanax. Carlino testified that she left to change clothes and that when she

returned to Smith’s house, Defendant showed up with his gun. When everyone

went outside to the parking lot, she was told that they were going to get either the

pills or the money. She, Smith, Compton, Mayo, and Defendant got in the car to

leave. She testified that she was not in a position to overhear anything from
7

Defendant. She confirmed that Compton and Mayo had pistols and that Defendant

had his own gun. Carlino was in the front passenger seat because she was “messed

up.” Defendant sat behind her in the back seat, Compton was behind the driver’s

seat, and Mayo was in the hatchback area. When they reached their destination,

Smith was instructed to drive in front of the house; and as soon as she did, Carlino

heard gunshots. Carlino testified that she saw Mayo and Compton shooting out of

the back driver’s side window. She did not see Defendant fire a weapon, but, during

the time that neither Mayo nor Compton were firing, she still heard gunshots. This

is how she knew that Defendant was firing, noting that a rifle sounds much different

than a smaller gun.

Sergeant Vincent Deville (Sergeant Deville) of the Pineville Police

Department was one of the first officers to arrive on the scene. He observed

Davidson lying on the ground in a pool of blood, which was mostly around his head

and also saw bullet holes in the front of the house, through the front and garage

doors, and inside the house. Two young children were found in the home and were

taken to a neighbor’s apartment.

Pineville Police Sergeant Jared Bennett (Sergeant Bennett), who was a crime

scene investigator at the time of the incident, testified that he observed bullet holes

in the residence and projectiles and casings in the roadway. Among the casings

found were rifle casings, either a 5.56 millimeter or a .223 caliber, as well as pistol

cartridge casings. Sergeant Bennett collected approximately $790.00 from

Davidson’s body.

Detective Will Smith (Detective Smith) of the Pineville Police Department

testified that after Defendant was arrested, Defendant was questioned regarding his

involvement in the shooting. Defendant admitted to knowing Compton and said that

8

he refused when Compton came by on the evening in question and asked him to go

with him to do something.

On appeal, Defendant contends that he had no problem with anyone living in

the Orchard Loop house and that he had not been involved in the drug purchase

shortage. Additionally, Defendant notes that the witnesses at trial offered differing

accounts as to why they were going to the house on Orchard Loop, some said to talk

to the drug dealers, others said to confront them about the Xanax shortage, but none

said to shoot at them. Defendant contends that the only evidence of a plan of

“shooting the [Orchard Loop] house up” was elicited through the improperly

admitted hearsay testimony of Mahfouz. Defendant notes that Carlino was in and

out of consciousness on the night of the shooting and that Smith was heavily

intoxicated and that because Smith was driving, she could not see anyone shooting.

Defendant contends that the State’s evidence failed to show that he had a revenge

motive or specific intent to shoot someone. Additionally, Defendant contends that

the State failed to show that he fired a rifle at the scene of the drive-by shooting.

We find that the evidence presented by the State at trial was sufficient to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant, armed with his rifle, actively participated

in the drive-by shooting that resulted in Davidson’s death. Witnesses placed

Defendant in the vehicle, armed with his rifle, actively shooting with codefendants,

at the house where Davidson was located. Although Defendant was not part of the

initial drug purchase which prompted the retaliation, the State proved that Defendant

possessed specific intent to kill by his statements that provoked and/or further

provoked the group’s act of retaliation for being shorted in their earlier drug

purchase. This assignment of error has no merit.

Grand Jury Indictment

9

In his first assignment of error, Defendant contends that reversal of his

conviction is required due to the State’s failure to proceed by grand jury indictment

for a crime punishable by death or life imprisonment.

On January 26, 2021, Defendant, along with other codefendants, was charged

by grand jury indictment with the first degree murder of Davidson, in violation of

La.R.S. 14:30, the attempted first degree murder of Anderson, in violation of La.R.S.

14:27 and 14:30, and conspiracy to commit first degree murder of Davidson, in

violation of La.R.S. 14:26 and 14:30. On May 25, 2021, the State filed an amended

grand jury indictment charging Defendant and his codefendants with the second

degree murder of Davidson, the attempted second degree murder of Anderson,

conspiracy to commit second degree murder of Davidson and Anderson, conspiracy

to commit attempted second degree murder of Davidson, and conspiracy to commit

assault by drive-by shooting with a firearm. The amended indictment was signed by

the grand jury foreperson and assistant district attorney. On February 23, 2023, the

State filed an indictment in the clerk’s office alleging that on May 25, 2021, the

grand jury charged that Defendant was a principal to the offense of second degree

murder in that he did kill with the specific intent to kill and inflict great bodily harm

while engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an assault by drive-

by shooting.

Defendant acknowledges that the State has the right to amend an indictment

to charge lesser offenses but argues that, in this case, the State charged Defendant

as a principal alleging this was a specific intent and great bodily injury crime and

added the drive-by shooting alternative element to second degree murder. He notes

that the grand jury did not include the assault by drive-by shooting as an element of

second degree murder and limited it only to the conspiracy count. The final charging

instrument added that Defendant had the specific intent to kill and inflict great bodily
10

harm and while engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an assault

by drive-by shooting. Accordingly, Defendant contends that the State acted beyond

its authority in indicting him for second degree murder by drive-by shooting. The

State contends that it has complete authority to amend indictments both as to form

and substance any time before trial.

In State v. Neslo, 433 So.2d 73, 81–82 (La.1983), the supreme court addressed

a similar claim as follows:

By this assignment of error, defendant complains that the trial
court erred in allowing the assistant district attorney to amend the first
degree murder indictment immediately prior to trial. Defendant
contends the amendment could only be made by the grand jury and that
the amended indictment violated C.Cr.P. 464 which requires a plain,
concise and definite written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged.

On the morning of trial the assistant district attorney amended
the indictment to read (underlining indicates new language):

“. . . committed first degree murder of one SUE
THERIOT, while in the perpetration of an attempted
aggravated kidnapping, while in the perpetration of an
attempted aggravated rape, while having the specific
intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm on more than one
person, . . .”

....

This court has held that the prosecutor may make substantive
amendments to a grand jury indictment before trial begins. State v.
Lovett, 359 So.2d 163 (La.1978); State v. Sheppard, 350 So.2d 615
(La.1977); State v. Bluain, 315 So.2d 749 (La.1975). Where the
defense can show prejudice as a result of the amendment, the court
should grant a motion for a continuance. C.Cr.P. 489. In this case, the
amendment to the indictment conformed the indictment to the state’s
answer to defendant’s motion for a bill of particulars. There was no
surprise to the defendant that the state was relying on R.S. 14:30(1) and
(3) as the aggravating circumstances. The trial court properly allowed
the amendment to the indictment, and did not err in denying defendant’s
motion for a continuance.

C.Cr.P. 465(A)(31) provides that the proper short form
indictment for first degree murder is “A.B. committed first degree
murder of C.D.” Section B provides that the short form indictment
“may also include a statement of additional facts pertaining to the
11

offense charged. If this is done it shall not affect the sufficiency of the
specific indictment form authorized by this article.” C.Cr.P. 486
provides that unnecessary allegations in an indictment may be
disregarded as surplusage. As this indictment, both before and after the
amendment, contained the allegations required by the Code of Criminal
Procedure, the indictment is not defective and may serve as the basis
for a valid prosecution.

In the present case, the State’s allegations of specific intent and great bodily

injury committed during the perpetration of a drive-by shooting provided more

details to the charges contained in the indictment. There is no indication in the

record that Defendant moved for a continuance due to surprise. Accordingly, we

find that the trial court did not err in allowing the amendment to the indictment.

Jury Issues

In his second assignment of error, Defendant contends that Juror Michael

Rachal’s misconduct by researching the case during the voir dire stage of trial

requires a new trial, adding that Mr. Rachal’s assertion of his ability to be impartial

was insufficient. Additionally, Defendant complains that the uncertainty as to the

verdict expressed by juror Tina Johnson when the verdict was returned requires a

new trial.

Mr. Rachal was on the second panel of prospective jurors. They were

instructed not to listen, read, watch, or review any news about the case from any

source as the case must be decided based only on evidence presented in the

courtroom. The following morning, Mr. Rachal was asked if he knew anything

about the case other than what he was told in the courtroom. He responded, “[l]ast

night I looked online and found a Town Talk article.” When asked if there was any

reason he could not serve as a juror, Mr. Rachal responded, “[n]o, sir.” Later, Mr.

Rachal was questioned out of the hearing of the other prospective jurors. He said

that he read an article on the Town Talk’s website but confirmed that, based on what

12

he read, he had not formed an opinion as to Defendant’s guilt. The following

exchange then occurred:

THE COURT: And based upon what you’ve read from the Town Talk
website, can you put any of those, that information and only make a
decision based upon the evidence in the case that you hear in the
courtroom?

MR. RACHAL: Yes. I would have to base my decision on the
evidence in the courtroom. That article, you know, was just stating that
there was a trial that was gonna occur.

Defense counsel challenged Mr. Rachal for cause, but the trial court denied

the challenge, stating:

He had stated that he was in the courtroom. That, I, as the Court,
gave the instructions on not to look, watch, read, like that. He said he
was not aware of it. That he did not hear the Judge say that. However,
we asked him what he did read, that there was a trial ongoing. That
jury selection was taking place. The scene of the event and the victim.
Those are general descriptors as far as the case is concerned that has
been out there. I don’t believe that that is any kind of evidence for or
against either side. It’s just general evidence that people can have even
before jury selection. He did say that he has not based – has not formed
any opinion. And that he could base . . . his decision on the evidence
in the courtroom. The Court will take Mr. Rachal at his word. And
then we’ll give instructions to the jury again of not to do that as far as
looking up, seeing, staying away from that. So at this time, the
challenge for cause will be denied.
This challenge was re-urged by the defense but denied by the court, and Mr.

Rachal was seated as the twelfth juror. Defense counsel chose not to use his one

remaining peremptory challenge, bringing his total used during voir dire to eleven.

In State v. Koon, 96-1208, p. 17 (La. 5/20/97), 704 So.2d 756, 767 cert.

denied, 522 U.S. 1001, 118 S.Ct. 570 (1997), the supreme court stated:

However, we need not reach the issue of whether failure to
dismiss Ms. Meyers for cause was error because the defense did not use
all its peremptory challenges. As we stated in State v. Mitchell, in order
to prove error warranting reversal of a conviction and sentence, the
defendant must show (1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause
and (2) the use of all peremptory challenges. 94–KA–2078 (La.
5/21/96), 674 So.2d 250, 254, cert. denied, [519] U.S. [1043], 117 S.Ct.
614, 136 L.Ed.2d 538 (1996) (citing State v. Cross, 93–1189 (La.
6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683). Because the defense failed to use all its
peremptory challenges, this assignment of error lacks merit.
13

Accordingly, we find that this claim lacks merit because Defendant did not

exercise all of his peremptory challenges.

Defendant additionally claims the trial court erred in failing to either order

continued jury deliberation or declare a hung jury when during polling, Juror Tina

Johnson expressed uncertainty as to her verdict.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 812 provides:

A. The court shall order the clerk to poll the jury if requested by the
state or the defendant. The poll shall be conducted in writing by
applying the procedures of this Article, and shall be done in open court.

B. (1) The procedure for the written polling of the jury shall require
that the clerk hand to each juror a separate piece of paper containing the
name of the juror and the words “Is this your verdict?” Each juror shall
write on the slip of paper the words “Yes” or “No” along with his
signature. The clerk shall collect the slips of paper, make them
available for inspection by the court and counsel, and record the results.

(2) If a sufficient number of jurors as required by law to reach a
verdict answer “yes” the clerk shall so inform the court. Upon
verification of the results, the court shall order the clerk to record the
verdict and order the jury discharged. If an insufficient number
required to find a verdict answer “Yes,” the court may remand the jury
for further deliberation, or the court may declare a mistrial in
accordance with Article 775. The polling slips may be placed under
seal upon order of the court, which shall state the specific reasons for
placing the polling slips under seal. If so ordered the polling slips shall
not be released to the public without a subsequent order of the court
authorizing their release. If the court orders the release of the polling
slips, the names of the jurors shall be redacted.

In the present case, after the jury returned with its verdict of guilty of second

degree murder, the court found the verdict to be in proper form. Defense counsel

requested polling. Polling slips were provided to the jurors, and they were asked to

make sure the polling slip that they received had their name on it, circle either yes

or no, and place their signature on the slip. The following exchange occurred:

JUROR TINA JOHNSON: I’m just not sure.

14

THE COURT: What you don’t know? Just please answer the
question . . . on your polling slip. Make sure you have your one with
your name on it[,] and then you just answer the question[,] and the
question on the piece of paper is, is this your verdict? And you just
circle either yes or no. After you have finished, look up, and the bailiff
will take your piece of paper from you.

MR. ARMSTRONG: This is crazy.

THE COURT: Ms. Johnson, I need to return your piece of paper
to you so you can answer the question, please. Thank you. Mr. Lacour,
Mr. Hall?

Counsel reviewed the polling slips, and then the court handed the polling slips

to the clerk to be placed under seal and noted that “it is proper as to form.” The court

ordered that the jury verdict be recorded. Each attorney responded that they had

nothing else to add, and the jury was dismissed.

Defendant contends that when Ms. Johnson expressed uncertainty, the court

had the option to either order that the jury continue deliberating or accept a hung

jury. It did not have the option of insisting that Ms. Johnson reach a verdict with

everyone watching. Defendant contends that this method coerced Ms. Johnson to

make a decision on the spot and change her vote.

This court has found that the failure to contemporaneously object to the

procedure used to poll the jury prohibited review of the issue on appeal. State v.

Lamb, 458 So.2d 996 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1984). The defense urges this court to view

Defendant’s statement that “this is crazy” as a pro se objection.

Addressing a similar issue in State v. James, 99-1858, pp. 5–9 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/3/00), 761 So.2d 125, 129–31, writ denied, 787 So.2d 1010 (La. 3/23/01), this

court stated:

. . . Defendant argues that the trial court erred in interrogating a juror
regarding her “no” vote during the written polling of the jury, in
violation of La.Code Crim.P. art. 812. The State responds that defense
counsel failed to make a contemporaneous objection to the trial court’s
polling procedure and, alternatively, that any error was harmless.

15

At the close of deliberations, the six-person jury presented its
verdict forms for each charge. The trial court then ordered that the jury
be polled in writing. On the charge of unauthorized entry of an
inhabited dwelling, the written poll revealed a unanimous vote for
conviction. On the charge of second degree battery, however, Juror
Braden[] indicated on her polling card that she did not vote to convict.
Under La.Code Crim.P. art 782(A), the concurrence of all six jurors is
required to render a verdict in this case.

....

Q. I have asked all of the jurors to complete this card and
write out was that their verdict. Did they concur with that
verdict at the time the vote was reached as a yes or a no.
And your card said no.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Alright. At the time that ya’ll a [sic] took a vote on the
guilty of Second Degree Battery you voted no?

....

A. We talked about it and I felt like there was no proof
saying that he actually did do it. But I felt out voted,
so that’s why we agreed on the yes.

Q. Okay. And at the conclusion of your deliberation and
votes did you eventually vote yes, then?

A. Yes, sir.

....

Q. So, in preliminary discussions and please, it’s unusual
and I don’t want to misstate anything for the record. Do I
understand that in preliminary discussion that you
disagreed for the record and now, at this point when ya’ll
[sic] finally voted you had stated yes, is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay.

THE COURT: I’ll let that be noted for the record. And
thank you very much. You can have a seat. I’m going to
order that the jury polling cards be sealed and made a part
16

of the record. Be put in an envelope along with the ... not
sealed, but made part of the record with the responsive
verdict forms.

(Emphasis added.)

....

The trial court did not comply with [] article [812] because it
questioned one juror in open court rather than remanding the entire
panel for further deliberation or declaring a mistrial. The appellate
record contains an incomplete transcript of the trial court proceedings,
but a minute entry indicates that a bench conference was held
immediately before Juror Braden was interrogated and that defense
counsel later objected to the verdict as illegal. In State v. Bannister, 97-
48, p. 11 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/27/99); 726 So.2d 1135, 1142, the appellate
court presumed that defense counsel had entered a contemporaneous
objection to the trial court’s improper polling procedures, “given the
several bench conferences and obviously thorough argument on point.”
Similarly, we find that present defense counsel adequately preserved
this issue for appellate review.

In Bannister, 726 So.2d at 1141, the trial court determined that
the results of a written poll did not reflect a legal verdict, at which time
a juror blurted out, “I have the tally right here . . . you all have to vote
the same way–you all voted upstairs.” The trial court stopped that juror,
repeated its instructions, and polled the entire panel again. After two
bench conferences, the trial court polled the jury a third time before it
pronounced a legal verdict. The appellate court noted the error of not
returning the panel for deliberation, but found it harmless, as the record
did not indicate that the comments of the juror influenced any of the
others to change their votes. In State v. Amato, 96-606 (La.App. 1 Cir.
6/30/97); 698 So.2d 972, writ denied, 97-2626 (La. 2/20/98); 709 So.2d
772, one juror wrote “no” on a written ballot, but after questioning from
the trial court stated that he probably misunderstood the written form
and that he meant to respond “yes.” Additionally, the jury foreman
stated that the vote was unanimous at the time the verdict was reached.
The appellate court found no error where “the record show[ed] beyond
a reasonable doubt that the verdict on Count 1 was unanimous.” Id. at
688-89.

In the present case, Juror Braden readily admitted that she voted
to convict during deliberations. Although she may have initially
expressed some doubt, she changed her mind and voted with the
majority. The record does not reveal that she was pressured into
changing her vote, other than she was “out voted.” Although proper
procedure would have been to remand for further deliberation, we do
not find that noncompliance with Article 812 was reversible error in
this case. By questioning Juror Braden, the trial court did determine
that all six jurors voted to convict Defendant of second degree battery.
This assignment of error lacks merit.
17

In the present case, as in James, the trial court’s actions were not coercive but

were simply an effort to clarify the return of a proper verdict by asking Ms. Johnson

to indicate what her vote was. The record does not support a finding that Ms.

Johnson was coerced to change her vote. We find that this assignment of error has

no merit.

Other Crimes Evidence

In his fourth assignment of error, Defendant challenges the court’s admission

of other crimes evidence consisting of hearsay statements about drugs and a

conspiracy. He additionally claims that the trial court improperly allowed the

admission of irrelevant photographs of Defendant’s association with weapons. He

claims that these two errors deprived him of a fair trial and that a new trial is required.

First, Defendant contends that statements made by Mayo and Compton were

improperly admitted through the testimony of others under the conspiracy exception

to the hearsay rule, noting that Defendant was not charged with conspiracy. He

claims that many of the statements occurred before he arrived on the scene or was

aware of the “bad drug deal” that occurred. Defendant concedes that although the

statements at issue could, in fact, be considered in making the preliminary

determination of whether there was a prima facie case of conspiracy, the State was

required to provide other evidence that was independently admissible to support the

prima facie case of conspiracy. Defendant claims that the State presented no

testimony establishing his involvement with the earlier drug deal or his participation

in the planning of the subsequent drive-by shooting. Further, he contends that the

events were not immediately occurring. Essentially, he claims that the contested

hearsay evidence did not fall under the conspiracy exception to the hearsay rule (non-

hearsay) because the State did not establish a prima facie case of conspiracy.

18

The State asserts that that it established a prima facie case of conspiracy

through Smith’s testimony that she went with others to purchase Xanax from

Anderson but that they did not receive all the bars they purchased. She confirmed

that Defendant said, “come on, they robbed y’all. Let’s go get the money back.

Let’s go send a message. Let’s go show them that they can’t just rob anybody.”

Also, she confirmed that he said, “come on y’all, I got y’all, I’ll handle this.” No

objection was lodged during this testimony. Further, the State contends that it did

not have to charge Defendant with conspiracy for the conspiracy exception to apply.

See State v. Woodard, 03-636 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/03), 847 So.2d 629.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 801 provides, in pertinent part:

D. Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not
hearsay if:

....

(3) Relational and privity admissions. The statement is
offered against a party, and the statement is:

....

(b) A statement by a declarant while participating in a
conspiracy to commit a crime or civil wrong and in furtherance of the
objective of the conspiracy, provided that a prima facie case of
conspiracy is established[.]

It is unnecessary that a defendant be charged with conspiracy for this

evidentiary rule to be utilized. State v. Gutter, 393 So.2d 700 (La.1981). The

challenge here, the adequacy of the State’s prima facie showing, was discussed by

this court in State v. Howard, 04-499 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/17/04), 888 So.2d 375,

(footnote omitted) writ denied, 04-3216 (La. 4/8/05), 899 So.2d 13.

In State v. Matthews, the second circuit held:

A prima facie case of conspiracy is presented when
the state introduces evidence which, if unrebutted, would
be sufficient to establish the facts of the conspiracy. State
v. Nall, 439 So.2d 420 (La.1983). The statements of the
19

declarant may be considered by the trial court in making
the preliminary determination of whether there is prima
facie evidence of a conspiracy. However, the statements
by themselves will not establish a prima facie case of
conspiracy. State v. Myers, 545 So.2d 981 (La.1989). The
state must provide other evidence that is independently
admissible to support the prima facie case of conspiracy.

The standard for determining the admissibility of
statements made by co-conspirators is less than that
required to convict a defendant of conspiracy to commit
an offense. Such statements, if admissible, only constitute
evidence which the jury may consider in reaching its
conclusion as to whether a defendant did or did not
unlawfully participate in a conspiracy to commit an
offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, a trial
court’s determination as to the admissibility of such
evidence, i.e., whether the state has made a prima facie
showing of a conspiracy as to make the co-conspirators’
statements admissible or inadmissible under LSA–C.E.
Art. 801(D)(3)(b), will not be overturned absent clear
error. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739 (La.1992), remanded
on other grounds.

Howard, 888 So.2d at 380–81

In this case, there are several sections of testimony challenged by Defendant.

The first is as follows:

1. Syria “Kelsey” Mahfouz’s testimony that after the five in the car
were shorted in their drug purchase, they talked and got guns. While
she could not hear the males talking, she “knew” what they were
talking about. . . . She “thinks” Noon went to get the defendant then.
The first objection was sustained but the second was overruled. . . .
When they returned, she heard them talking about “shooting the
house up.” The defendant’s objection was overruled when the State
claimed a “conspiracy” exception. . . .

Mahfouz testified that after the group was shorted in their drug purchase,

Milliman, Mayo, and Compton talked, and then they retrieved guns. Mahfouz said

that she did not hear what was discussed but that she made an assumption based on

the group subsequently retrieving guns from the house. There was no objection

raised during this testimony. It was when Mahfouz subsequently said that she had

an idea about what was being discussed that an objection was raised based on

20

speculation. The objection was sustained. The testimony progressed, and when

Mahfouz was asked if she knew why Defendant arrived and joined the group, she

said that she believed that Compton went and got him. Another objection based on

speculation was sustained. The question was rephrased to ask whether she knew if

Compton went to get Defendant, and Mahfouz responded that she was “pretty sure”

that he did. This objection based on speculation was overruled. She then testified

that Compton left and that when he returned, Defendant appeared. Finally, Mahfouz

testified that after the shooting, she overheard something about shooting a house up.

The objection to this testimony was overruled as being a conspiracy exception to the

hearsay rule, which is the crux of the issue in this assigned error. Contrary to

Defendant’s argument, the State did establish a prima facie case of conspiracy.

Although Defendant was not involved in the initial purchase of drugs, during which

the purchasing group was “shorted,” testimony presented through Milliman and

Smith established that Defendant arrived at Smith’s house, armed with a rifle, after

having been contacted. Defendant got into the car with the group who was going to

the Orchard Loop house for a confrontation with the seller(s). Milliman testified

that this was Compton’s and Carlino’s idea, not Defendant’s.

According to Smith, Defendant threatened consequences to anyone who

snitched, and he also told the group, “come on,” “I got y’all,” “I’ll handle this,”

“[l]et’s go get the money back,” “[l]et’s send a message,” and “[l]et’s go show them,

that they can’t just rob anybody.” Carlino testified that she was told that they were

going to either get the pills or the money, and she got in the car with Smith, Compton,

Mayo, and Defendant and went to the Orchard Loop house. The State clearly

established a prima facie case of conspiracy.

Additionally, with respect to Defendant’s argument that the conspiracy was

no longer ongoing, we note that:
21

The conspiracy is presumed to continue unless or until the
defendant shows his withdrawal from or the termination
of the conspiracy. United States v. Walker, 796 F.2d 43,
49 (4th Cir. 1986). To prove withdrawal, a defendant must
show affirmative actions made by him that are inconsistent
with the object of the conspiracy. United States v. United
States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57
L.Ed.2d 854 (1978). Such affirmative actions include
making a clean break through confession to the authorities
as well as notification to the co-conspirators of
abandonment or withdrawal. United States v. Patel, 879
F.2d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016,
110 S.Ct. 1318, 108 L.Ed.2d 494 (1990).

State v. Dyess, 18-241, p. 8 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/18), 258 So.3d 1095, 1100, quoting

State v. Woodard, 03-636, pp. 3–4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/30/03), 847 So.2d 629, 632.

Defendant has not shown he withdrew from the conspiracy or that the

conspiracy was terminated. Accordingly, we will not overturn the trial court’s

determination concerning the admissibility of this evidence.

2. Blaine Milliman[’s] testimony that when the others returned, “they”
said they “just got done shooting up the house.” . . . According to
Milliman, they all went inside, including the defendant, where the
“talked about what they did.” . . .

3. Based on the ADA’s instruction, Kaitlyn Carlino said “They told me
we were going to get the Xanaxes or the money. I didn't know which
one. I wasn’t sure. They just told me that they talked about it with
them and it was okay, that the deal was fine. They were just going
to make up for it because they were friends with Kelsey.” . . .

These statements were not objected to at trial when made by Carlino and

Milliman. Accordingly, the question of their admissibility was not preserved for

appellate review. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841; State v. Vice, 22-512 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/19/23), 365 So.3d 155, writ denied, 23-669 (La. 11/21/23), 373 So.3d 457; State

v. Day, 14-708 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/23/14), 158 So.3d 120.

4. The defendant’s objection to Kaitlyn Carlino’s recounting of
Mayo’s statement that “there were only five Xanaxes in there” was
overruled under the “conspiracy” exception. . . . The statement was
the whole basis for the State’s theory that this was a revenge
incident.

22

During Carlino’s testimony, she said that Mayo opened the package and told

them that there were only five Xanax. Mahfouz provided similar testimony

regarding the shortage, additionally noting that Compton was the angriest of the

group as he had put up the most money to purchase the drugs. If “hearsay evidence

is improperly admitted at trial, the appellate court must decide whether the evidence

contributed to the verdict. If the inadmissible hearsay evidence is merely cumulative

or corroborative of other testimony introduced at trial, its admission is

considered harmless.” State v. Williams, 35,911, p. 12 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/18/02), 828

So.2d 180, 188. Here, the evidence is corroborative of other testimony introduced

at trial. The State established a prima facie case of conspiracy, and any error in its

admission was harmless.

Social Media Posts

Defendant contends that the admission of three photographs depicting five

firearms associated with Defendant was improper and that a new trial is required.

Specifically, Defendant argues that the pictures were improperly admitted as

La.Code Crim.P. art. 404(B)(1) evidence and that the probative value did not

outweigh the prejudicial effect. He claims that it was the State’s mission to portray

Defendant as the “older guy” of whom everyone was afraid and who was called in

as the “enforcer.”

The State contends that the social media posts of Defendant holding firearms

did not constitute other crimes evidence, and even if they did, the testimony

regarding the guns was adduced and admitted prior to the admission of the

photographs, the evidence at issue in this assignment of error. Simply put, the State

contends that the photographs corroborated the prior testimony to which there was

no objection.

23

Detective Smith of the Pineville Police Department testified that after

Defendant was arrested, he was questioned regarding his involvement in the

shooting. Statements provided by codefendants indicated that Defendant possessed

a long gun or rifle. Then, Detective Smith looked at Defendant’s social media

account and saw pictures of firearms. Defendant told Detective Smith that the guns,

which he had purchased online, were fake. When Detective Smith testified that they

appeared to him to be real, an objection was lodged by defense counsel based on

speculation. The trial court overruled the objection, stating: “[h]is perception as far

as looking, overruled.” Detective Smith confirmed that there was at least one

photograph in which Defendant was pictured with a weapon similar to an AR-15.

On cross-examination, Detective Smith confirmed that there was no scientific

evidence recovered that tied Defendant to this case. He also acknowledged that the

photos of the firearms that he saw could depict either fake or real guns. On redirect

examination, the photos of the firearms were admitted in evidence as State Exhibit

52 in globo. Defense counsel objected on the basis that he had just received the

photographs as he sat down from the podium and thus had not prepared. The trial

court stated that it would “take [his] argument a little later,” but it overruled the

objection and allowed the admission of the photographs at that point. Defense

counsel was then given the opportunity to conduct re-cross examination to address

the photographs. During this examination, defense counsel asked whether

Defendant’s face appeared in any of the photographs, and Detective Smith

responded that it did not; however, he confirmed that in one of the photographs, the

person was wearing a mask. Detective Smith also confirmed that none of the

weapons pictured were recovered from Defendant’s home, and none were tied to this

case. Defense counsel asked whether the pictured guns had any bearing on this case

or how the arrest was made. He responded, “I mean, just in the sense that it, it shows
24

that there, there seems to be some kind of association to Mr. Armstrong and firearms.

That was all I could conclude.” After Detective Smith was released as a witness, the

court allowed defense counsel to argue his objection:

MR. LACOUR: . . . the State’s discovery made mention of those
photos. Okay, last week I met with Mr. Hall in his office and his
secretary to make sure I had everything. And then we worked on a
stipulation. But to provide me with those, maybe if he would have gave
even to me yesterday, but to provide them to me the moment I walk
down from the podium to then say I’m going to use them, which he
brought the photos up first. I was just asking whether or not they could
be real or fake. He said they could be either way, because he had
previously testified that they appeared to be real. Of course that was an
assumption, but to, and, and I won’t go as far to say that Mr. Hall blind
sided me. He didn’t. I knew that they existed, but why they hadn’t
been provided for me? . . . [T]his case is three years old. That should
have been in discovery[,] and it wasn’t. Okay? And then I just had to
cross on the fly not really prepared that those photos were going to be
introduced into evidence. . . . [D]iscovery should be given in a timely
manner. Have I been surprised with discovery before or doing [sic],
sure. Sure, it happens, but it’s usually something nobody knows about
or something that has just come to light. We’ve been knowing about
these photos or the State did for three years. And this morning is when
they decide to say we’re going to introduce it into evidence. . . . I’m
objecting that, you know, there’s a procedure we should follow. I
should have [] had those photos or at least yesterday. Give . . . them to
me yesterday when I’m leaving court. Maybe I can go home and work
on them some. I had no time to prepare that. Thank you.

....

MR. HALL: Yes, sir. I agree with Mr. Lacour in that they were
referred to in the reports. It was not a secret. It was known. I would
ask that the Court take note of the fact that I did not put them out in my
direct examination. Mr. Armstrong’s statements had many problems
with it in that there was a lot of other crimes evidence. That’s why I
didn’t use the recording and was trying to gently put forth as much that
I felt like incriminated him as I could without stepping on other areas.
That’s why I chose not to use them. However, when the decision was
made to cross to go into fake guns I felt like it was necessary for the
jury to know at that time. And that is when that decision was made[,]
and that’s why they were sent to Mr. Lacour’s phone at that time. Had
he left the issue alone, I would not have done that, but he did not. He
asked about photos of Mr. Armstrong holding firearms and could they
had [sic] been fake. They’re very obviously real in the photographs,
and that’s what the issue was. There was no intent to ambush or
anything like that. I was trying to take a ticklish issue of a statement
with many issues in it and deal with it fairly. And I think that in light

25

of the fact that the photographs have been known by both sides for three
years is certainly fair. And so that is the basis why I did what I did.

....

MR. LACOUR: Real or fake came up in direct. . . . Detective
Smith clearly said Mr. Compton responded by saying the guns [were]
fake. He thought that they could be real. I didn’t bring up fake first.
That’s his statement. And I appreciate it. I know what Mr. Hall was
trying to do, because I know that statement is full of 404(b) malice, but
I didn’t open the door to all of that. The State brought this stuff up.
They . . . brought it up by referencing his statement to police. So I
follow up with what they had already brought out. They opened the
door to it, okay, not me. But all I’m getting him to reiterate is a picture
of guns could either be real or fake. And he couldn’t say that they were
real definitely either. What I’m just saying is how did these photos
come in? . . . [D]iscovery’s pretty clear, Judge. I [ ] should have [] had
them. Even if they didn’t intend to use them, I should have them. I
should have everything that they have from the police. I should have it
already, not walking down from a podium. That’s not how you do that.
Thank you.

THE COURT: . . . [T]he photo issue was brought up when Mr.
Hall was questioning the detective, photo of the picture with the AR.
And Mr. Lacour had the opportunity to cross that, which he did, as far
as whether they were fake or not. Also . . ., both sides agree that the
discovery mentioned the photos which is way before today[.] . . . So
they’re inside of the discovery of which both the State and the defense
have had an opportunity for. Bringing it up today, short notice what it
is, the photos were already [] known by the defense. Which the only
surprise would have been probably the publication of them. Court has
already, when the jury was present, overruled the objection to the non-
admissibility of the photos. The Court will stand by that and allow
those photos to have been admitted and also published to the jury.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B) prohibits the use of other crimes,

wrongs, or acts, providing in pertinent part:

[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove
the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by
the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable
notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such evidence it intends
to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it relates to conduct that
constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject of
the present proceeding.

26

The objection raised at trial was based on the late disclosure of the evidence,

not that it was the type of evidence prohibited by art. 404(B).

In State v. McCoy, 16-948, pp. 15–16 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/10/17), 219 So.3d

538, 548–49, writ denied, 17-1151 (La. 5/25/18), 242 So.3d 1232, this court

addressed a similar issue:

From our review of the record in this case, it appears that the
defendant and the State were both provided with the Louisiana State
Police Crime Laboratory’s firearm’s analysis for the St. Landry Parish
evidence completed on February 6, 2014, which linked the gun used to
shoot White with the gun the defendant fired on January 22, 2014, in
Lafayette Parish. The State argues that it was not aware of the
connection and filed its 404(B) motion as soon as it learned of it.
However, the State learned of the connection on April 7, 2016, six days
after the trial court’s April 1, 2016 hearing deadline for 404(B) motions.
On April 1, 2016, the trial court set a Prieur hearing for April 8, 2016.
It was at this Prieur hearing that the trial court ruled that the State did
not provide reasonable notice for the other crimes evidence related to
the gun. On April 27, 2016, after the hearing was continued from April
13, 2016, the trial court reversed its previous ruling and found that any
problems with reasonable notice had now been cured because the
“defendant has now been given time to prepare” and ruled that the other
crimes evidence was admissible.

The supreme court has held that a “district court’s ruling on the
admissibility of other crimes evidence will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion.” State v. Taylor, 16–1124, 16–1183, p. 18 (La.
12/1/16), 217 So.3d 283, 2016 WL 7030750. Furthermore, the supreme
court in State v. Blank, 04-204, p. 40 (La. 4/11/07), 955 So.2d 90, 123–
24, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 994, 128 S.Ct. 494, 169 L.Ed.2d 346 (2007)
(footnote omitted), stated the following regarding the effect of late
notice on other crimes evidence:

[E]ven assuming that the state’s notice of its intent
to introduce the other crimes evidence was not filed in a
timely manner, not every violation of pre-trial procedures,
including Prieur violations, requires reversal. Before a
defendant can complain of such a violation, he must show
prejudice. State v. Sanders, 93-0001, p. 14 (La. 11/30/94),
648 So.2d 1272, 1284 (citing State v. Hooks, 421 So.2d
880 (La.1982)); State v. Strickland, 398 So.2d 1062
(La.1981). Prieur speaks of the “substantial risk of grave
prejudice” to a defendant arising out of inadmissible or
surprise admission of other crimes evidence, but does not
presume that prejudice. [State v.] Prieur, [277 So.2d 126],
128 [ (La.1973) ].

27

Considering all of this, we find that the trial court’s decision to
admit the other crimes evidence was not an abuse of discretion. The
defendant failed to allege with any specificity how he was prejudiced
by this late notice or what about his trial strategy was changed because
of the admission of the other crimes evidence.

Finally, out of an abundance of caution, we note State v. Garcia,
09-1578, p. 55 (La. 11/16/12), 108 So.3d 1, 39, cert. denied, ––– U.S.
––––, 133 S.Ct. 2863, 186 L.Ed.2d 926 (2013) . . . :

Finally, the erroneous admission of other crimes evidence
has long been held subject to harmless error review.
La.Code Crim. Proc. art. 921; State v. Johnson, 94-1379,
pp. 14-15 (La. 11/27/95), 664 So.2d 94, 100–01 (errors
leading to improper admission of evidence subject to
harmless-error analysis; error harmless if verdict “surely
unattributable” to error)(quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182
(1993)).

We find that even if the trial court erroneously admitted the other
crimes evidence, considering the other evidence admitted at trial[,] the
error was harmless. For these reasons, this assignment of error lacks
merit.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs at

issue. Even though he contended that the photographs were not timely provided,

Defense counsel admitted that he knew of their existence. The photographs

corroborated the earlier testimony of Detective Smith regarding what was depicted

in them, to which the only objection was speculation regarding the authenticity of

the guns. Defendant has failed to allege specifically how his trial strategy was

changed because of the admission of this evidence. Finally, any error in the

admission of these photographs was harmless error considering the overwhelming

evidence of Defendant’s guilt presented at trial. This assignment of error has no

merit.

Excessive Sentence Claim

Defendant contends that, although defense counsel made no motion for a

downward departure from the statutorily required life sentence in this case, an

28

appellate court must consider whether the sentence is constitutionally excessive. He

contends that the sentence is excessive considering that the court did not state that

Defendant had any criminal history, and there was no consideration of mitigating

factors, such as his minor role in the incident and his lack of involvement in the

initial drug deal. He further contends that the trial court improperly focused on

sending a message and societal concerns, rather than tailoring a sentence for him.

Finally, Defendant contends that his defense attorney’s performance at sentencing

was deficient in that he did not object to the trial court’s intention to use him as an

example to send a message. He additionally notes that counsel did not ask for a

presentencing investigation report, did not present mitigating circumstances, made

no motion for downward departure, and did not file a motion to reconsider sentence.

Thus, he contends that his sentence should be vacated and the case remanded for

resentencing.

At sentencing, the court detailed the facts of the case and then explained that:

The court should review the defendant’s personal history, that being his
age, family ties, health, along with any criminal record and seriousness
of the offense, the likelihood that he would commit other crimes, and
the potential for rehabilitation through correctional services. Also, in
any sentencing, the court looks to the goals of sentencing.
Rehabilitation. The protection of the public and society. The victim.
And the punishment and deterrence. The first consideration is
rehabilitation. Can this defendant be rehabilitated? Does he have
sufficient education, training, and life experience to rehabilitate
himself? He has no high school diploma. He has a work history.
However he needs life skills and training. By law the sentence for
second degree murder is life imprisonment. Given the defendant’s age,
he needs a structural, custodial environment to help him develop those
life skills. The second consideration is society. What sentence today
would serve as a general deterrence for the community as a whole. The
defendant has been convicted of second degree murder, a crime of
violence. Deterrence to society is a strong consideration. The societal
issue herein is the escalating epidemic of young males with guns, many
that lead to senseless deaths. The sentence today should have an effect
on that problem. We have to send out a message of some kind of the
[sic] signal that when someone commits a crime such as this, this is
what’s going to happen. Alexandria has had several murders this year,
three just in this last week, on March seventeenth, all in one day and
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then another shooting, a drive by, in the middle of the day on March
ninth where an eleven year-old was hit by a bullet. The general public
is concerned with the use of firearms in criminal activity. Third
consideration is the victim. How the crime has affected the victim.
Edwin Davidson was only seventeen years of age at the time he was
shot and killed, way before the prime of his life. With a newborn child
he never saw, nor held, nor raised, so justice demands that the defendant
be sentenced accordingly. The fourth consideration is punishment.
What sentence should be given to specifically deter the defendant from
future criminal conduct? How long of a sentence should the defendant
serve as just penalty for the crimes he’s committed? The legislature has
decided that sentence. A life sentence. Where there is a mandatory
sentence, one that is legally required to be imposed, the court need not
justify the sentence under the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure
Article 895.1 [sic] wherein the court looks at the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances.

Defendant was asked if he had any statement to make or evidence to present,

and he responded that he did not. The court then imposed life imprisonment at hard

labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

In State v. Little, 50,776, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/10/16), 200 So.3d 400,

403 (citations omitted), writ denied, 16-1664 (La. 6/16/17), 219 So.3d 341, the court

stated:

It is within the legislature’s prerogative to determine the length
of the sentence imposed for the crimes classified as felonies, and the
courts are charged with applying these punishments unless they are
found to be unconstitutional. The decision to assess mandatory life
sentences is within the prerogative of the legislature.

When there is a constitutional mandatory sentence, a trial court
need not justify, under La. C. Cr. P. art. 894.1, a sentence it is legally
required to impose.

In rare circumstances, a downward departure from a mandatory
sentence may be warranted if the defendant shows, by clear and
convincing evidence, that he is exceptional, namely, that he is a victim
of the legislature’s failure to assign sentences that are meaningfully
tailored to the culpability of the offender, the gravity of the offense, and
the circumstances of the case. Although courts have the power to
declare a mandatory minimum sentence excessive under Article 1, § 20
of the Louisiana Constitution, this power should be exercised only in
rare cases and only when the court is firmly convinced that the
minimum sentence is excessive.

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In State v. Griffin, 21-452, pp. 10–11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/2/22), 351 So.3d 385,

390–91, (footnote omitted) writ denied, 22-600 (La. 6/1/22), 338 So.3d 496, this

court addressed a claim of ineffective assistance based on counsel’s failure to seek

a downward departure from a mandatory life sentence:

Claims of ineffective assistance are analyzed using the two-
pronged test in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052,
80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, Defendant must show his counsel’s
performance was deficient, and second, he must show the deficiency
prejudiced him. If Defendant cannot prove that a downward departure
from the mandatory life sentence for first degree rape was warranted,
he cannot prove prejudice. State v. Monceaux, 17-1052 (La.App. 3 Cir.
5/9/18), 2018 WL 2138289 (unpublished opinion). “To obtain a
downward departure from a mandatory life sentence, Defendant must
clearly and convincingly show that he is ‘exceptional’ by proving that
the imposed sentence is not meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the
gravity of the offense, and the circumstances of the case.” Id at 6. As
said earlier, Defendant has not presented any evidence to show that he
is exceptional or that his sentence was not meaningfully tailored to the
offense; therefore, Defendant has failed to prove that he deserves a
downward departure. Further, the remarks of the trial court regarding
the gravity of Defendant’s crime, its impact on the victim, and the trial
court’s opinion that a life sentence was “justly deserved” indicate that
even had counsel sought reconsideration, there is no reasonable
probability that the same could have been granted. We find no merit to
Defendant’s second assignment of error.

Since the trial court was required to impose a mandatory sentence of life

imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence, the only viable ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that counsel

failed to seek a downward departure from the mandatory life sentence required by

La.R.S. 14:30.1. Defendant has not proven that a downward departure was

warranted, and thus cannot prove prejudice. Defendant has not “clearly and

convincingly show[n] that he is ‘exceptional’ by proving that the imposed sentence

is not meaningfully tailored to his culpability, the gravity of the offense, and the

circumstances of the case.” Griffin, 351 So,3d at 390 (citing Monceaux at 6). The

trial court gave a lengthy recitation of the facts of the case and the factors he

considered in sentencing Defendant, remarking that justice demands that the
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defendant be sentenced to life. Accordingly, as in Griffin, even had counsel argued

for a downward departure, there is no reasonable probability that he would have been

successful. This assignment of error lack merit, and we affirm Defendant’s sentence.

V.

CONCLUSION

We find no merit to any of the arguments advanced by Defendant, Terrence

Armstrong. Accordingly, we affirm both his conviction for the second degree

murder of Edwin Davidson and the corresponding mandatory life sentence without

the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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