State of Louisiana v. Derrick T. Hills

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

23-629

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DERRICK T. HILLS

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APPEAL FROM THE
TWENTY-SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF ST. LANDRY, NO. 21-K-2310-B
HONORABLE ADAM GERARD CASWELL, DISTRICT JUDGE

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WILBUR L. STILES
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, D. Kent Savoie, and Wilbur L. Stiles,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 82389
Lafayette, LA 70598-2389
(337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Derrick T. Hills

Chad Patrick Pitre
Twenty-Seventh Judicial District Attorney
Alisa Ardoin Gothreaux
Assistant District Attorney
P.O. Drawer 1968
Opelousas, LA 70571
(337) 654-0935
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

STILES, Judge.

On June 23, 2023, a unanimous jury found Defendant, Derrick T. Hills, guilty

of the second-degree murder of his wife, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. On July 13,

2023, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant now appeals, asserting in

his sole assignment of error that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the

State to introduce at trial two letters allegedly written by him, which he claims were

extremely prejudicial and served only to depict him as having bad character or a

propensity for bad behavior or criminal conduct. For the following reasons, we find

that Defendant’s assignment of error is without merit and affirm his conviction and

sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant and his wife, Rachelle Arceneaux, were married for ten years and

lived together in a trailer in Opelousas. On the day of the incident, June 23, 2021,

Defendant had been home all day. Ms. Arceneaux’s daughter, Ladavian Willis, and

her seven-year-old son, Ashton, had also been staying in the trailer with Ms.

Arceneaux and Defendant and were there the day of the incident. Ms. Arceneaux

returned home from work that afternoon and spoke with Ms. Willis in the kitchen.

Ms. Willis then returned to her bedroom to watch a movie on her laptop.

While Ms. Willis was lying on her bed, Ms. Arceneaux came into the bedroom

and told Ms. Willis to have her phone ready to call 911 because Defendant had

thrown water in her face. Ms. Willis then saw Defendant in the doorway holding a

gun. She turned her head away from Defendant, at which time Defendant shot Ms.

Arceneaux multiple times. Ms. Arceneaux fell into the closet doorway in Ms. Willis’

bedroom and died.

Video taken from the doorbell camera at the front door of the trailer showed

Defendant leaving the trailer at 7:41 p.m. holding a rifle and driving off in Ms.

Arceneaux’s white pickup truck. Ms. Willis called 911 at 7:43 p.m. to report the

shooting. Cell phone records show that Defendant called his brother, Corey “Slug”

Ward, at 7:44 p.m., indicating that “something happened” and he wanted to turn

himself in. Mr. Ward met Defendant in the parking lot of St. Francis Cabrini Hospital

in Alexandria. They then drove in Mr. Ward’s vehicle to the Rapides Parish Sheriff’s

Office, where Defendant turned himself in. The white pickup truck was located in

the hospital parking lot, but the rifle used in the shooting has not been found.

On September 20, 2021, a grand jury indictment charged Defendant with the

second-degree murder of Rachelle Arceneaux, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. While

in jail awaiting trial, Defendant allegedly wrote two letters to his brother, Mr.

Ward—one on May 31, 2023 and the other on June 8, 2023. Those letters were

intercepted by the mail clerk at the jail, who reviews all mail and correspondence

coming into and going out of the jail.

On June 14, 2023, the State filed a State’s Motion for Pretrial Admissibility

of Evidence and Alternatively, the State’s Pretrial Notice to Introduce Other

Acts/Crimes Evidence Pursuant to La.Code Evid. Art. 404(B), stating its intention

to introduce the two letters at Defendant’s trial. A hearing on the State’s motion was

held on June 20, 2023. After hearing testimony and considering the letters at issue,

the trial court granted the State’s motion, allowing the letters to be admitted at trial.

Defendant’s jury trial began on June 21, 2023. On June 23, 2023, the jury

unanimously found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder. On July 13, 2023,

defense counsel filed a motion for new trial, which was denied by the trial court that

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same day. Defendant was then sentenced on July 13, 2023 to life in prison without

benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant has appealed, asserting one assignment of error:

The trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to
introduce two letters allegedly written by Derrick Hills in evidence in
this case. This 404(B) evidence was extremely prejudicial, serving only
to depict Mr. Hills as having bad character or a propensity for bad
behavior or criminal conduct.

Defendant specifically presents two issues for review by this court: (1) did the

trial court err in finding Defendant authored the letters, State’s exhibits 6-A and 6-

B; and (2) did the trial court err in finding State’s exhibits 6-A and 6-B to be

admissible at trial?

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, this court reviews all appeals

for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

is one error in the sentence imposed and one error in the trial court’s failure to

observe the twenty-four-hour delay required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 873.

First, we find that the trial court failed to impose Defendant’s sentence at hard

labor, simply stating, “I hereby sentence Derrick Hills to serve the rest of his life in

prison without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.” A sentence

for second-degree murder must be imposed at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:30.1. Thus,

Defendant’s sentence is illegally lenient. State v. Perkins, 13-245 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/6/13), 124 So.3d 605. Although the authority to correct an illegally lenient

sentence is granted to this court and discretionary under La.Code Crim.P. art. 882,

we find that no action should be taken as the issue of the illegally lenient sentence

has not been raised as an error by either party. See also State v. Brown, 19-771 (La.

10/14/20), 302 So.3d 1109.

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Second, we note that the trial court sentenced Defendant immediately after

denying Defendant’s motion for new trial. The trial court received the motion for

new trial on the day of sentencing, July 13, 2023. The motion was denied after the

trial court found that no grounds for a new trial were alleged. The trial court then

stated, “All right. We’ll now turn to sentencing in this matter.” After making sure

Defendant signed the written advisement of his post-conviction relief rights, the trial

court sentenced Defendant to life in prison without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. Defense counsel then filed a motion for appeal and the

hearing was concluded.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 873 provides:

If a defendant is convicted of a felony, at least three days shall
elapse between conviction and sentence. If a motion for a new trial, or
in arrest of judgment, is filed, sentence shall not be imposed until at
least twenty-four hours after the motion is overruled. If the defendant
expressly waives a delay provided for in this article or pleads guilty,
sentence may be imposed immediately.

In State v. Kisack, 16-797 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1201, cert. denied, 583

U.S. 1160, 138 S.Ct. 1175 (2018), the supreme court found that the waiver in

La.Code Crim.P. art. 873 must be express, not implicit. Distinguishing between the

two types of waivers, the court explained that merely participating in the sentencing

hearing would be considered an implicit waiver. Id. Although announcing a

readiness for sentencing had been considered an implicit waiver by some appellate

courts, the supreme court explained that such a waiver should really be considered

an express waiver. Id. Subsequently, in State v. Boyd, 17-1749 (La. 8/31/18), 251

So.3d 407, the supreme court found an express waiver was made when the defense

responded that it had no objection to proceeding with sentencing.

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When addressing this issue, this court has found that defense counsel’s

response of “Yes, Your Honor,” when asking if the defendant was ready to be

sentenced, was an express waiver of the La.Code Crim.P. art. 873 delay. State v.

Samuel, 19-408 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/20), 291 So.3d 256, writ denied, 20-398 (La.

7/24/20), 299 So.3d 77. On the other hand, this court has found that simply failing

to object and participating in the sentencing hearing does not constitute an express

waiver of the delay. State v. Charles, 18-222 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/1/19), 270 So.3d 859.

In this case, defense counsel remained silent after the trial court denied the

motion for new trial and did not indicate in any way that Defendant was waiving the

twenty-four-hour sentencing delay contained in La.Code Crim.P. art. 873. We

therefore find that defense counsel’s actions in this case did not constitute an express

waiver of the delay.

Nevertheless, the supreme court made it clear in Kisack, 236 So.3d 1201, that

an Article 873 violation may still be considered harmless. This court recently stated

the following about the harmless error analysis in Kisack:

Prior to the supreme court’s ruling in Kisack, “errors in failing to
observe La.Code Crim.P. art. 873’s mandatory sentencing delay were
found harmless where a mandatory life sentence was imposed or when
the defendant did not challenge his sentence on appeal and did not claim
prejudice due to the lack of the delay.” State v. Holden, 19-867, p. 8
(La.App. 3 Cir. 7/15/20), 304 So.3d 520, 525, writ denied, 20-1016 (La.
2/9/21), 310 So.3d 174. Since Kisack, courts have continued to find
harmless error where a mandatory life sentence is imposed or when the
defendant does not challenge his sentence on appeal and does not claim
prejudice due to the lack of the delay. See State v. Deville, 22-317
(La.App. 3 Cir. 10/19/22), 349 So.3d 1158; State v. Williams, 20-605
(La.App. 3 Cir. 11/3/21), 329 So.3d 938, writ denied, 21-1798 (La.
4/12/22), 336 So.3d 85; and State v. Chester, 19-363 (La.App. 5 Cir.
2/3/21), 314 So.3d 914, writ denied, 21-350 (La. 6/8/21), 317 So.3d 321.
In the present case, Defendant neither challenges the sentences imposed

5

nor claims he was prejudiced by the lack of a delay. Thus, we conclude
the error to be harmless under these circumstances.

State v Toby, 22-386, pp. 24-25 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/8/23), 358 So.3d 289, 304, writ

denied, 23-491 (La. 12/5/23), 373 So.3d 714.

In this case, a mandatory life sentence was imposed, and Defendant has not

challenged his sentence on appeal. We therefore find that the trial court’s failure to

abide by the La.Code Crim.P. 873 sentencing delay was harmless.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Defendant asserts in his sole assignment of error that the trial court erred in

admitting the two letters allegedly written by him on May 31, 2023 and June 8, 2023,

while he was in jail awaiting his trial, because (1) the State did not produce sufficient

proof that Defendant authored the letters, and (2) the prejudicial effect of the letters

outweighed their probative value.

Jacalyn Gettings testified at both the pretrial hearing on the State’s motion on

admissibility of the letters and the jury trial. Ms. Gettings is employed by the St.

Landry Parish Sheriff’s Office as the mail clerk at the jail. Her duties include

reviewing all inmate mail (except for legal mail, such as letters to/from attorneys

and the court) for contraband, threats towards a victim, “or anything like what [she]

found on the 31st.”

Ms. Gettings testified that on May 31, 2023, she received an outgoing letter

addressed to a Mr. Corey Ward at 6810 Aspen Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana.1 The

return address was to a Tyrone Johnson, A-Block, 108 South Market Street,

Opelousas, Louisiana. However, as Ms. Gettings testified, there was no inmate in

1
The May 31, 2023 letter identified by Ms. Gettings at trial was introduced into evidence
as the State’s exhibit 6-A.

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the jail at that time by this name. Ms. Gettings then reviewed the contents of the

envelope and saw there was an affidavit from a search warrant included with the

letter. The affidavit included an incident number which she discovered was linked

to Defendant. Ms. Gettings then checked Defendant’s booking sheet at the jail and

discovered that Corey Ward—to whom the letter was addressed—was listed as

Defendant’s emergency contact, with the same Baton Rouge address. The letter itself

started with “Wassum Slug.”

On June 8, 2023, Ms. Gettings received another outgoing letter, this time

addressed to Phaedra Ward at 6810 Aspen Drive, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, the same

address as the first letter.2 The return address this time, however, was to Defendant:

Mr. Derrick Hill, A-Block, 108 South Market Street, Opelousas, Louisiana, DOC

number 315229. Despite the different recipients written on the envelope, this second

letter also started with “Wassum Slug.”

Evidence that Defendant Wrote the Letters

Defendant argues that the State failed to prove that the two letters were written

by him.

To be admissible at trial, demonstrative evidence must first be
authenticated. [La.Code Evid.] art. 901; State v. Cosey, 97-2020, p. 3
(La. 11/28/00), 779 So.2d 678, cert. denied, 533 U.S. 907, 121 S.Ct.
2252, 150 L.Ed.2d 239 (2001). The authentication of evidence refers to
the process by which the proponent of the evidence proves that it is
what he claims it to be. Harges and Jones’ La. Evidence (4th Ed.), p.
346. The initial decision as to authentication is made by the trial judge,
using the standard set forth in [La.Code Evid.] art. 901 A: “The
requirement of authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.” State v. Frisard, 96-368, p. 16
(La.App. 5 Cir. 4/29/97), 694 So.2d 1032, 1039.

2
The June 8, 2023 letter identified by Ms. Gettings at trial was introduced into evidence
as State’s exhibit 6-B.

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State v. Taylor, 04-90, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 5/26/04), 875 So.2d 962, 969, writ

denied, 04-1649 (La. 11/19/04), 888 So.2d 193.

Defendant asserts that there was no evidence that Corey or Phaedra Ward, the

persons to whom the letters were addressed, ever received the letters, nor was there

sufficient proof that Defendant authored them. Defendant argues that he was never

seen in possession of either of the letters. Furthermore, the letters were never

subjected to a fingerprint or DNA analysis. The victim’s daughter, Ms. Willis,

testified at trial that she recognized the handwriting in the letters to be Defendant’s.

However, Defendant argues that Ms. Willis was not a handwriting expert, and, in

fact, no handwriting expert testified that the letters were written by Defendant.

Defendant concludes that the trial court therefore erred in finding that he authored

the letters.

In response, the State refers to the reasons given by the trial court at the

hearing on the State’s pretrial motion for finding that the letters were authentic:

Interestingly enough, the second letter, which clearly has a return
address of Derrick Hills, A Block, 108 South Market, begins, “I’m
writing to you in regards to my situation. I don’t know what happened
with my other letter that was written to you.” He acknowledges he sent
another letter. Don’t know what happened, but anyway, how it went
down, and it goes on to say what it says. It is clearly an indication that
the author of these two letters, which for the life of me, I can’t imagine
it being anyone other than Mr. Hills, to have this kind of information,
submit the Probable Cause Affidavit associated with his original arrest
and is requesting, as I read it, for Mr. Ward to change his previous
testimony, or his previous statement, or statements. He’s wanting Mr.
Ward to advise the wife, so she won’t be caught off guard. . . .

Regarding the credibility of Ms. Willis, who identified the handwriting in the

letters as Defendant’s, the State asserts that La.Code Evid. art. 901(B)(1) provides

that authentication may be provided by a witness with personal knowledge. Ms.

Willis was the daughter of the victim, Defendant’s wife, Ms. Arceneaux. She also

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lived next door to them. She testified that she recognized the handwriting on both

the envelopes and letters as Defendant’s. She also identified Corey Ward in open

court and confirmed that she knew his nickname was “Slug.” The State concludes

that the letters were self-evident, demonstrating clearly that Defendant wrote them,

especially given that Defendant’s probable cause affidavit was attached to one of the

letters and Ms. Willis’ testimony tied Defendant to the letters.

In State v. Coleman, 12-1408, pp. 22-23 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/8/14), 133 So.3d 9,

25, the fourth circuit examined the authentication of an “alibi” letter allegedly

written by the defendant:

In this case, the testimony of Jameelah and Sgt. James Tyler
authenticated the “alibi” letter. Jameelah was shown the letter and
identified it as being the one she received from Mr. Coleman. She
identified the return address on the letter as being “Latrell Coleman
2274647, OPP B1C2 3000 Perdido Street, New Orleans, La. 70119.”

Sgt. Tyler of the Orleans Parish Sheriff Office testified
concerning the requirements for outgoing inmate mail. In addition to
his name in the return address, an inmate must include his unique folder
number, his location in OPP by tier and cell number, and the Orleans
Parish Prison address of 3000 Perdido Street. Sgt. Tyler testified that
he researched the defendant’s location history and folder number while
he was incarcerated and verified that that [sic] the information he
retrieved was the same as that contained in the return address of the
letter addressed to Jameelah.

Additionally, we note that the content of the letter further
supported that it was written by Mr. Coleman. The letter contained
information—names of witnesses at the scene, specifics of the fight and
shooting—that only a person who had been present at the scene would
have known.

Considering the foregoing, the trial court did not err by finding
that the “alibi” letter was properly authenticated.

In the instant case, the State provided two witnesses to authenticate the letters:

Ms. Gettings, whose testimony established the origin of the letters; and Ms. Willis,

who identified the handwriting as Defendant’s. The content of the letters, including

9

the attached probable cause affidavit in the first letter, related directly to Defendant.

The trial court considered all these facts when finding that Defendant was the author

of the letters:

All right. First of all, with regard to the identity of the letters, the author
of the letters, while the first letter purports to be from a Tyrone Johnson
in A Block, 108 South Market, it’s addressed to Mr. Corey Ward, 6810
Aspen Drive, Baton Rouge. It clearly is a discussion by the author of
the letter to Corey Ward, about conversations that supposedly took
place between Derrick Hills and Corey Ward, and it also discusses
some requests that the author of the letter is making of Mr. Ward.
Interestingly enough, the second letter, which clearly has a return
address of Derrick Hills, A Block, 108 South Market, begins, “I’m
writing to you in regards to my situation. I don’t know what happened
with my other letter that was written to you.” He acknowledges he sent
another letter. Don’t know what happened, but anyway, how it went
down, and it goes on to say what it says. It is clearly an indication that
the author of these two letters, which for the life of me, I can’t imagine
it being anyone other than Mr. Hills, to have this kind of information,
submit the Probable Cause Affidavit associated with his original arrest
and is requesting, as I read it, for Mr. Ward to change his previous
testimony, or his previous statement, or statements. He’s wanting Mr.
Ward to advise the wife, so she won’t be caught off guard, and tell her
to say what I told you, and then he discusses whether or not the jail
phones have audio; and in one of the letters, he tells Mr. Ward to study
this like it’s a test. It is clear from me [sic], without having it signed by
Mr. Derrick Hills, that when you read the content of the letter, I can’t
imagine there’s somebody else out there that would know so much
about Mr. Hills’ case and Mr. Hills’ brother and sister-in-law, that he
could write with this kind of detail and be asking for all of these things
on behalf of Mr. Hills, if it ain’t Mr. Hills.

We agree with the trial court’s reasoning and find that it did not commit any

error in concluding that Defendant was the author of the letters. Defendant’s

argument that the State failed to prove the letters were written by him is therefore

without merit.

Whether the Letters Were Extremely Prejudicial

Defendant next argues that the trial court should not have allowed the letters

to be admitted at trial because they were extremely prejudicial to him.

10

There is a “substantial risk of grave prejudice” to a defendant arising out of

inadmissible other crimes evidence. State v. Prieur, 277 So.2d 126, 128 (La.1973).

Defendant acknowledges, however, citing State v. Silguero, 608 So.2d 627

(La.1992), that when such evidence tends to prove a material issue and has

independent relevance other than showing the defendant is of bad character, it may

be admitted pursuant to certain statutory and jurisprudential limitations.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B) provides exceptions to the general

rule that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible, stating that such

evidence may be admissible “as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,

plan, knowledge, identity, and absence of mistake or accident[.]” However, even if

the evidence is relevant, it “may be excluded if its probative value is substantially

outweighed by the dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading

the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or waste of time.” La.Code Evid. art.

403.

Defendant argues that the letters were highly prejudicial and had minimal

evidentiary value. He maintains that the trial court erred in finding the letters were

admissible as the prejudicial effect far outweighed any probative value of the letters.

The State has provided two alternative theories for why the two letters were

admissible and relevant at trial: (1) the letters were a statement against interest under

La.Code Evid. art. 804(B)(3); and (2) the letters constituted other crimes evidence

relevant to the issue of identity under La.Code Evid. art. 404(B).

First, the State argues that the statements made by Defendant in the letters to

Mr. Ward fall under the La.Code Evid. art. 804(B)(3) hearsay exception for

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statements against interest, which provides that “[t]he following are not excluded by

the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness:”3

A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary
to the declarant’s pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to
subject him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by
him against another, that a reasonable man in his position would not
have made the statement unless he believed it to be true. A statement
tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating
circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.

The State argues that Defendant’s statements in the letters to his brother, Mr.

Ward aka “Slug,” showed his guilty conscience and his efforts to conceal his guilt

by coaching his brother on how to alter his testimony. In support of this argument,

the State refers to excerpts from the first letter, which opens with “Wassum Slug”:

Lil Brutha, if I ever needed a favor, I need one na. I need for u to say
that I called and said, They killed Rachelle, and that he went through
the woods, and that I was circling the area trying to catch him. . . . Study
this like its a test, Lil Brutha.

The State notes that Mr. Ward submitted to an audio interview with a Rapides Parish

detective the night of the incident. When this audio interview was played for the jury

during the trial, it did not match the version of facts Defendant was attempting to get

Mr. Ward to attest to via the letter.

The State then looks to the second letter, which, although addressed to

Phaedra Ward, opens with the same “Wassum Slug”, and again contains instructions

directing his brother, Mr. Ward, on how to testify: “I don’t know what happened

with my other letter that was written to you? But anyway, how it went down. I called

you and asked you to come to Opelousas, and to bring your weapon….”

3
The State argued at the hearing on its pretrial motion for admissibility that Defendant was
unavailable as a witness because he has the right not to take the stand.

12

The State’s second and alternative theory is that the letters constitute “other

crimes evidence,” per La.Code Evid. art. 404(B),4 and as such are relevant to the

issue of identity. The State argues that the letters act as evidence of Defendant’s

obstruction of justice,5 show that Defendant attempted to alter the outcome of the

trial against him and identify him as the murderer. Additionally, the State submits

that the contents of the letters do not relate to any crime other than the one that was

before the jury. The contents show Defendant sought to conceal his identity as the

shooter by encouraging his brother to falsely testify. Thus, the letters are also

admissible under La.Code Evid. art. 404(B).

Defendant has argued in his brief that the prejudicial effect of the letters

outweighs their probative value. No evidence was presented that either Corey or

Phaedra Ward had any knowledge of these letters. In fact, the jail confiscated them

before they could be mailed to the recipients. Neither Corey Ward nor Phaedra Ward

4
Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B)(1)(a):

Except as provided in Article 412 or as otherwise provided by law, evidence of
other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, the
prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the
nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it
relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or transaction that is the subject
of the present proceeding.
5
Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:130.1 provides, in pertinent part:

A. The crime of obstruction of justice is any of the following when
committed with the knowledge that such act has, reasonably may, or will affect an
actual or potential present, past, or future criminal proceeding as described in this
Section:
....

(4) Inducing or persuading or attempting to induce or persuade any person
to do any of the following:

(a) Testify falsely or, without right or privilege to do so, to withhold any
testimony.

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testified because the parties stipulated that Mr. Ward’s audio interview would be

admitted at trial in lieu of him testifying before the jury. That interview was

conducted the night of the incident, almost two years before the letters were written.

Defendant acknowledges that had he testified at trial, the letters would have been

admissible on cross-examination by the State. He argues, however, that without the

testimony at trial of himself, Corey Ward, or Phaedra Ward, the letters should not

have been admitted.

The State has cited State v. Smith, 96-261 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/30/96), 687

So.2d 529, writ denied, 97-314 (La. 6/30/97), 696 So.2d 1004, wherein the trial court

admitted as evidence letters written by the defendant. In Smith, this court found that

the statements made by the defendant in his letters were admissions and contained

statements against interest, had independent relevance, and were not admitted for

the purpose of portraying the defendant’s bad character. Thus, they were not

erroneously admitted.

There are other cases in which the courts have allowed letters written by the

defendant to be admitted as evidence at trial. In State v. Odenbaugh, 10-268 (La.

12/6/11), 82 So.3d 215, cert. denied, 568 U.S. 829, 133 S.Ct. 410 (2012), the

supreme court upheld the admission of two letters written by the defendant, one in

which the defendant implicitly admitted to shooting the victim and expressed a

desire to escape from jail and finish the job. In State v. Everett, 11-714 (La.App. 4

Cir. 6/13/12), 96 So.3d 605, writs denied, 12-1593, 12-1610 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d

77, the fourth circuit upheld the introduction of the defendant’s letter to his

grandmother, which established the defendant’s residence at the address where the

search warrant was executed. And in State v. Campbell, 46-888 (La.App. 2 Cir.

3/14/12), 86 So.3d 204, writ denied, 12-1059 (La. 10/26/12), 99 So.3d 641, the

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second circuit upheld the trial court’s finding that the defendant’s letters to the victim

contained no prejudicial reference to other crimes evidence, reasoning that, in

context, the defendant’s comments regarding putting his hands on the victim related

to the crime at hand and, therefore, was not a reference to “other” crimes, wrongs,

or bad acts.

In this case, the trial court gave the following reasons for finding that

Defendant’s two letters were admissible as evidence at trial:

Certainly, any time there’s 404(B) evidence offered, there is prejudice,
otherwise there wouldn’t be a need to have a hearing. That’s why we
have them. We know they’re prejudicial, that’s why the State wants to
use them. The question is, is there probative value? There certainly is
probative value any time you have someone accused of the crime for
which Mr. Hills is accused of, and you have these types of
correspondence to family members of the defendant requesting that
they now alter, either alter previous statements, or make statements that
weren’t made before, to argue that this correspondence was to refresh
their memory. Yes, I can argue that the Probable Cause Affidavit might
be, but not when the letters point out something completely different
from the Probable Cause Affidavit that is requested by the author. So I
find that the probative value does, in fact, outweigh the prejudicial
effect, and I rule both Exhibits A and B that were submitted here today,
to be admissible for the trial of this matter.

Again, we find that the trial court’s reasoning is correct. As such, we find that

the trial court did not err in finding the letters to be admissible at trial and

Defendant’s assignment of error is without merit.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Derrick T. Hill’s conviction and

sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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