State of Louisiana v. Sterling Terrel Brown

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 24-191

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STERLING TERREL BROWN

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 352,866
HONORABLE WILLIAM GREGORY BEARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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CANDYCE G. PERRET
JUDGE

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Court composed of Shannon J. Gremillion, D. Kent Savoie, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Hon. Phillip Terrell, Jr.
9th Judicial District District Attorney
Lea R. Hall, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
Kenneth A. Doggett, Jr.
Assistant District Attorney
P. O. Box 7358
Alexandria, La 71306-7358
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Paula Corley Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 82389
Lafayette, LA 70598-2389
(337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
Sterling Terrel Brown

Sterling Terrel Brown
Louisiana State Penitentiary
Camp C - Bear 2
Angola, LA 70712-3029
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT

PERRET, Judge.

Defendant, Sterling Terrel Brown, was charged by indictment filed on

November 16, 2021, with the second degree murder of his father, Sean Henderson,

a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. After trial, a jury returned a guilty verdict on

September 29, 2023, for which Defendant was subsequently sentenced to serve life

at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Prior to trial, Defendant filed a Notice of Intent to Use Evidence of Other

Crimes Pursuant to Louisiana Code of Evidence, Article 404(B), seeking to use the

victim’s criminal record. After arguments and taking the matter under advisement,

the trial court denied Defendant the use of the victim’s criminal record. Defendant

is before this court on appeal asserting that the trial court erred in denying his request

to introduce the victim’s prior drug convictions. For the following reasons

Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

Defendant lived with the victim, Sean Henderson. On December 5, 2019,

Defendant reported a home invasion by three masked men who kicked in the door,

and then proceeded to beat and zip tie him and Henderson. When police arrived,

Henderson was deceased with his hands zip tied behind his back. Testimony from

Dr. Christopher Tape, the forensic pathologist who performed the victim’s autopsy,

described the manner of death as blunt force injuries to the head, strangulation and

smothered due to assault. However, despite the house appearing “ransacked,”

officers testified at trial that it was “ransacked in a way where nothing was broken,”

except for one dresser drawer, and nothing of value appeared to be taken. The

officers also found no evidence of forced entry. Ultimately, Defendant was

convicted of murdering Henderson.

DISCUSSION:1

In his only assignment of error, Defendant contends that the trial court

deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense by denying his request

to introduce the victim’s prior convictions as evidence. Defendant asserts that the

victim’s prior convictions support his defense that intruders had a motive to enter

the home.

Defendant filed a “Notice of Intent to Use Evidence of Other Crimes Pursuant

to Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404(B)” on September 25, 2023. 2 Therein,

Defendant sought to introduce evidence of the victim’s three prior convictions: 1)

October 2, 2006, possession of cocaine; 2) April 3, 2006, aggravated battery; 3) May

5, 1997, possession of a schedule II controlled dangerous substance. At the hearing

on the issue, the State alleged that the purpose of introducing the victim’s prior

convictions was to paint the victim as a drug dealer to substantiate the allegations in

1
In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for errors patent
on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find no errors patent.
2
While Defendant’s motion sought to introduce evidence of the victim’s prior crimes under
La.Code Evid. art. 404(B), the subsequent arguments fit more appropriately under subsection (A).
In fact, the trial court referenced La.Code Evid. art. 404(A), in its ruling.

[T]he issue involves the . . . criminal history of the victim in this matter, the
deceased, as laid out in the Notice of Intent and also the argument of counsel. Under
Article 404, in essence not necessarily a (B) or talk about Section A, the character
of - - part two is character of the victim.

....

. . . Reviewing a prior case similar in nature, State v. Hicks, [16-462 (La.App.
5 Cir. 2/8/17), 213 So.3d 458, writ denied, 17-445 (La. 11/13/17), 230 So.3d 205] . . .
a second degree murder case dealing with evidence of the victim’s felony criminal
record where a self-defense claim was not made. In that case, that Court of Appeals
ruled that, that evidence is not admissible based upon Article 404(A)(2) . . . . So,
this matter then - - for the defense, the Notice of Intent for those of the victim’s
criminal record will be denied at this time.

Furthermore, after review, this court could not find jurisprudence wherein subsection (B)
applied to determine the admissibility of the victim’s prior crimes as evidence. Instead, subsection
(B) has repeatedly been applied to determine the admissibility of the defendant’s prior crimes as
evidence. Thus, our analysis will consider La.Code Evid. art. 404(A).

2

Defendant’s statement to police. However, the State argued that evidence of the

victim’s character, such as the propensity to possess cocaine, was not admissible to

prove he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Defendant argued

that the prior convictions were admissible to show a motive for why the events

occurred, and the plea to twelve years for possession of cocaine was relevant. The

trial court took the matter under advisement.

On September 27, 2023, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion. The court

cited La.Code Evid. art. 404 and noted there was no claim of self-defense or overt

act on the part of the victim. The trial court also discussed State v. Hicks, 16-462

(La.App. 5 Cir. 2/8/17), 213 So.3d 458, writ denied, 17-445 (La. 11/13/17), 230

So.3d 205.

On appeal, we review a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion.

State in Interest of A.J.J., 23-117 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/12/23), 368 So.3d 790. “As such,

absent an abuse of discretion, a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence

pursuant to La. C. E. art. 404(B)(1) will not be disturbed.” State v. Hunter, 22-742,

p. 8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 7/6/23), 371 So.3d 108, 115, writ denied, 23-1091 (La. 2/27/24),

379 So.3d 668.

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 404 provides:

A. Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person’s
character or a trait of his character, such as a moral quality, is not
admissible in a civil or criminal proceeding for the purpose of proving
that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except:

(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of his
character, such as a moral quality, offered by an accused, or by the
prosecution to rebut the character evidence; provided that such
evidence shall be restricted to showing those moral qualities pertinent
to the crime with which he is charged, and that character evidence
cannot destroy conclusive evidence of guilt.

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(2) Character of victim. (a) Except as provided in Article 412,
evidence of a pertinent trait of character, such as a moral quality, of the
victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut
the character evidence; provided that in the absence of evidence of a
hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the victim at the time
of the offense charged, evidence of his dangerous character is not
admissible; provided further that when the accused pleads self-defense
and there is a history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the
accused and the accused lived in a familial or intimate relationship such
as, but not limited to, the husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage
relationship, it shall not be necessary to first show a hostile
demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim in order to introduce
evidence of the dangerous character of the victim, including specific
instances of conduct and domestic violence; and further provided that
an expert’s opinion as to the effects of the prior assaultive acts on the
accused’s state of mind is admissible; or

(b) Evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor;

....

B. Other crimes, wrongs, or acts; creative or artistic
expression. (1)(a) Except as provided in Article 412 or as otherwise
provided by law, evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident, provided that
upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall
provide reasonable notice in advance of trial, of the nature of any such
evidence it intends to introduce at trial for such purposes, or when it
relates to conduct that constitutes an integral part of the act or
transaction that is the subject of the present proceeding.

....

(c) This Paragraph shall not be construed to limit the admission
or consideration of evidence under any other rule.

(2) In the absence of evidence of a hostile demonstration or an
overt act on the part of the victim at the time of the offense charged,
evidence of the victim’s prior threats against the accused or the
accused’s state of mind as to the victim’s dangerous character is not
admissible; provided that when the accused pleads self-defense and
there is a history of assaultive behavior between the victim and the
accused and the accused lived in a familial or intimate relationship such
as, but not limited to, the husband-wife, parent-child, or concubinage

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relationship, it shall not be necessary to first show a hostile
demonstration or overt act on the part of the victim in order to introduce
evidence of the dangerous character of the victim, including specific
instances of conduct and domestic violence; and further provided that
an expert’s opinion as to the effects of the prior assaultive acts on the
accused’s state of mind is admissible.

On appeal, Defendant asserts that La.Code Evid. art. 404 does not prohibit the

use of the victim’s prior drug convictions to support his contention that third parties

had a motive to commit the crime. He argues that the prior convictions lend

“credence to the assertion that there was money in the home or intruders may have

broken in thinking there was money.” Defendant notes that the victim’s last offense

was in 2006, he was incarcerated as late as 2012 for possession of twenty-eight to

one hundred grams of cocaine, and, to Defendant’s knowledge, the victim had no

job. Defendant suggests his fundamental right to present a defense cannot be

superseded by evidentiary rules, and that a defendant may always assert that

someone else committed the crime. In support of his claims, Defendant cites State

v. Wilson, 17-908 (La. 12/5/18), 319 So.3d 262, writ denied, 17-1025 (La. 2/18/19),

265 So.3d 770; State v. Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074 (La.1989); and State v. Van

Winkle, 94-947 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d 198.

However, the State asserts that the trial court did not prevent Defendant from

presenting a defense but merely excluded evidence of the victim’s convictions,

which were thirteen and twenty-two years old, irrelevant, and could lead to jury

confusion. The State notes Defendant was aware the victim had been arrested in the

past. Moreover, the jury heard testimony that the victim had narcotics in his system

at the time of his death. The State cites Hicks, 213 So.3d 458, in support of its

argument.

In Van Winkle, 658 So.2d at 202, the supreme court stated:

5

Evidentiary rules may not supersede the fundamental right to
present a defense. In State v. Gremillion, supra, the defendant
attempted to introduce evidence that third parties, rather than the
defendant, had killed the victim. The evidence consisted of a statement
that the victim had made to a sheriff’s deputy who investigated the
crime. The statement was that he had been attacked and beaten by three
white males. The trial court and the Court of Appeal both held the
statement was inadmissible hearsay. We agreed that the statement was
hearsay and that it did not meet any applicable exception (res gestae,
dying declaration, business records). However, we concluded that
normally inadmissible hearsay may be admitted if it is reliable,
trustworthy and relevant, and if to exclude it would compromise the
defendant’s right to present a defense. See Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. [284,] 302, 93 S.Ct. [1038,] 1049 (1972). Exclusion of the
statement in Gremillion impermissibly impaired the defendant’s
fundamental right. 542 So.2d at 1079, citing State v. Washington, 386
So.2d 1368 (La.1980).

Similarly, in State v. Vigee, [94-947 (La. 6/30/95), 658 So.2d
198], we held that hearsay evidence supporting the defendant’s theory
of the case and undermining the State’s lead witnesses was relevant;
excluding it mandated reversal. The defendant may always assert that
someone else committed the crime. Chambers v. Mississippi, supra;
State v. Ludwig, 423 So.2d 1073 (La.1982).

The facts here are quite simple. A 12–year–old boy was
murdered at home; his body appeared to be penetrated anally, and his
underwear was stained with blood. Analysis of the oral and anal swabs
yielded, in our view, confusing results. The defense showed that
Darrell was an unrelated male living in the victim’s home, was not
sexually involved with the boy’s mother and was present at the time of
the murder. From this the defendant theorized that he is homosexual
and that he, along with a homosexual partner, killed the boy. The
defense tried to show from the autopsy that the victim was the target of
homosexual activity. It also tried to show that Darrell frequented gay
bars, and successfully placed him in such a bar on numerous occasions
in the company of and leaving with another adult male. A defense
witness testified that he saw this other adult male leaving the victim’s
apartment on the morning of the murder.

Relevant evidence is evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence. La.C.Ev. art. 401. On this record, we are constrained to find
that the contested portions of Ms. Van Winkle’s questioning of Ms.
Williams, the State’s chemist, Dr. Garcia, the deputy coroner, and
Darrell Hurst, the lead fact witness, were relevant to establishing her
defense theory. By abridging the cross examination of these witnesses,
the trial court impaired Ms. Van Winkle’s constitutional right to present

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a defense. Chambers v. Mississippi, supra; cf. State v. Mosby, [595
So.2d 1135 (La.1992)].

We are also constrained to find a reasonable possibility that the
excluded evidence might have contributed to the conviction, and its
exclusion was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 22–23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705
(1967). Given the equivocal nature of Ms. Van Winkle’s statements
and of the forensic evidence, the State’s case was circumstantial; the
defense theory, if properly presented, may well have been sufficient to
plant reasonable doubt in the jury’s mind. For these reasons, the
conviction must be reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
Because Ms. Van Winkle was previously convicted of manslaughter,
she may not be retried for any greater offense. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957); State v. Clark, 231
La. 807, 93 So.2d 13 (1957); State v. Magouirk, 539 So.2d 50
(La.App.2d Cir.1988), recalled in part, appeal after remand 561 So.2d
801 (La.App.2d Cir.), writ denied 566 So.2d 983 (1990).

The cases cited by Defendant address the admissibility of hearsay statements,

not evidence of prior convictions, and are therefore distinguishable.3 We find the

fifth circuit’s decisions in Hicks, 213 So.3d 458, which the trial court relied on, and

State v. Garrison, 19-62 (La.App. 5 Cir. 4/23/20), 297 So.3d 190, writ denied, 20-

547 (La. 9/23/20), 301 So.3d 1190, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 2864

(2021), to be more pertinent to the issue presented herein.

In Hicks, 213 So.3d 458, the defendant was convicted of second degree

murder. On appeal, he alleged that the trial court erred in denying his request to

admit evidence of the victim’s prior convictions, which included drug distribution.

The defendant argued that the record tended to support the defense that other

individuals may have had motive to kill the victim, and the victim’s prior convictions

would further support that theory. Thus, since his defense was that he did not kill

anyone and this was not a claim of self-defense, the defendant asserted that it was

3
Wilson, 319 So.3d 262, discussed the admissibility of the initial suspect’s alleged
statement to a witness, and Gremillion, 542 So.2d 1074, focused on the victim’s statement to police.

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error to prohibit him from presenting the prior convictions evidence. The defendant

claimed that the victim was a convicted felon with a long record of narcotics

distribution, a notoriously violent activity, and that, at the time of his death, he was

carrying cocaine packaged for retail distribution and was intoxicated on the drug.

The defendant further argued that the trial judge’s ruling excluding this evidence

violated his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. In addressing the issue,

the fifth circuit stated:

Both the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, § 16 of the Louisiana Constitution guarantee a criminal
defendant the right to present a defense. State v. Lirette, 11-1167 (La.
App. 5 Cir. 6/28/12); 102 So.3d 801, 813, writ denied, 12-1694 (La.
2/22/13); 108 So.3d 763. This right does not require a trial court to
permit the introduction of evidence that is inadmissible, irrelevant, or
has so little probative value that it is substantially outweighed by other
legitimate considerations in the administration of justice. Id. The trial
court is accorded great discretion in evidentiary rulings and, absent a
clear abuse of that discretion, rulings regarding the relevancy and
admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed on appeal. State v.
Sandoval, 02-230 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/25/03); 841 So.2d 977, 985, writ
denied, 03-853 (La. 10/3/03); 855 So.2d 308.

La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2) governs admissibility of character
evidence of a victim and states, in pertinent part:

(2) Character of victim. (a) Except as provided in Article
412, evidence of a pertinent trait of character, such as a
moral quality, of the victim of the crime offered by an
accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the character
evidence; provided that in the absence of evidence of a
hostile demonstration or an overt act on the part of the
victim at the time of the offense charged, evidence of his
dangerous character is not admissible.

In State v. Brown, 46,669 (La. App. 2 Cir. 2/29/12); 86 So.3d
726, writs denied, 12-0724 (La. 9/14/12); 97 So.3d 1016 and 14-0321
(La. 10/24/14); 151 So.3d 593, the defendant argued that the trial court
erred by prohibiting him from presenting a full defense. He contended
that critical to his defense was his ability to prove, through pertinent
character traits of the victim and the victim’s criminal record, that other
people had a motive to kill the victim. The appellate court found that a
review of the record indicated that the trial court ruled that the
defendant could not admit evidence concerning the criminal history of

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the victim unless he first laid a foundation supporting the relevance of
such character evidence. The appellate court further found that the trial
court did not prevent the defendant from presenting a defense, because
the defendant failed to lay a foundation sufficient to support the
admission of the victim’s criminal record. Id., 86 So.3d at 734–35.

In State v. Keating, 00-51 (La. App. 5 Cir. 10/18/00); 772 So.2d
740, writ denied, 00-3150 (La. 10/12/01); 799 So.2d 494, the defendant
contended that the trial court violated his right to fully present a defense
when it refused to allow him to put on evidence of the victim’s criminal
convictions. This Court found that there was no evidence produced that
the victim made a hostile demonstration or committed an overt act
against the defendant at the time of the incident. Thus, this Court found
that the trial court did not err in refusing to allow evidence of the
victim’s prior convictions, citing La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2)(a). This Court
further found that even assuming that the trial judge erred by excluding
such evidence, the defendant was not prejudiced by the ruling since the
jury heard testimony regarding the victim’s violent propensities as well
as his criminal record. Id., 772 So.2d at 746–47.

In State v. Young, 99-1054 (La. App. 5 Cir. 2/16/00); 757 So.2d
797, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by not allowing him
to introduce evidence of the character of Willie Henderson, a friend of
the victim who was present at the time of the offense, particularly his
propensity for violent behavior, pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2).
This Court found that a violation of the statute in question did not create
a specific victim, but that even if Mr. Henderson was considered a
victim for purposes of Article 404, the requirements for admission of
character evidence under that article were not met. This Court stated
that the testimony indicated that it was the defendant who committed
the initial hostile act. It asserted that the trial court did not err in
excluding the character evidence and that the defendant was not
prejudiced by the ruling. This Court noted that the defendant testified
that Mr. Henderson had been involved in several shootings and armed
robberies and that Mr. Henderson had a gun with him every time he
saw him. This Court found that the jury heard the defendant’s
testimony and apparently rejected it. Id., 757 So.2d at 800–01.

In the instant case, as in Brown, Keating, and Young, there was
no evidence admitted at trial showing that the victim made a hostile
demonstration or committed an overt act against Defendant at the time
of the incident pursuant to La. C.E. art. 404(A)(2)(a). . . .

Therefore, we find that the trial judge did not err by refusing to
allow evidence of the victim’s prior convictions.

Id. at 465–67 (added footnote omitted).

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Additionally, in Garrison, 297 So.3d 190, the court was called on to review

the trial court’s denial of the defendant’s request to introduce the victim’s prior

manslaughter conviction as an attempt to show the victim had a substantial number

of enemies who may have wished him harm. In Garrison, the defendant was

prosecuted for second-degree murder and armed robbery. The fifth circuit found

evidence of the victim’s prior conviction was irrelevant, and the defendant’s right to

present a defense was not infringed. In reaching its decision, the court noted that no

evidence was offered to show that the victim made a hostile demonstration or

committed an overt act against the defendant at the time of the shooting incident, the

defendant did not argue self-defense, and the manslaughter occurred twelve years

before the defendant committed the offenses.

Based on the rulings in Hicks and Garrison, we find that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in finding the victim’s prior convictions inadmissible. Defendant

did not raise self-defense, and there was no evidence of an overt act or hostile

demonstration by the victim. Defendant put forth a defense—three masked men

entered the home, beat both the victim and Defendant, and tied them both up—which

the jury rejected. The jury also heard Defendant’s statement to police in which

Defendant said he did not think the victim was employed, and the victim had been

arrested and had been in jail. Moreover, Dr. Tape, the forensic pathologist, testified

that the victim’s toxicology report showed there was morphine, codeine, and heroine

metabolites in the victim’s system.

For these reasons, Defendant’s assigned error lacks merit. We find no abuse

of discretion in the trial court’s finding that the victim’s prior convictions were

inadmissible.

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DECREE:

Considering the above, Defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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