State of Louisiana v. Braylen Marquez Leday

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-199

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

BRAYLEN MARQUEZ LEDAY

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APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 10157-22
HONORABLE ROBERT LANE WYATT, DISTRICT JUDGE

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WILBUR L. STILES
JUDGE

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Court composed of Gary J. Ortego, Ledricka J. Thierry, and Wilbur L. Stiles, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Edward K. Bauman
LA Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Braylen Marquez LeDay

Hon. Stephen C. Dwight
District Attorney, Fourteenth Judicial District
Karen C. McClellan
Assistant District Attorney
John E. Turner
Assistant District Attorney
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, LA 70601
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

STILES, Judge.

A unanimous jury found Defendant, Braylen Marquez LeDay, guilty on

March 3, 2023, of first degree rape. On April 28, 2023, the trial court sentenced

Defendant to life in prison, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of

sentence. Defendant has appealed his conviction. We affirm Defendant’s conviction

and sentence.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 21, 2022, a grand jury indicted Defendant with one count of first

degree rape, a violation of La.R.S. 14:42. The victim, J.A., was eleven years old at

the time.1 On August 24, 2022, Defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason

of insanity.2

Defendant’s trial began on February 28, 2023, and ended on March 3, 2023,

with the jury unanimously finding him guilty of the first degree rape of J.A.

On April 26, 2023, the trial court held a hearing regarding Defendant’s motion

for new trial. The court not only denied Defendant’s motion, but also, per the State’s

request, revoked Defendant’s probation on an unrelated prior conviction of

obscenity.

On April 28, 2023, the trial court sentenced Defendant to life in prison at hard

labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. Defendant

filed a motion to reconsider sentence on May 31, 2023, without requesting a

contradictory hearing. That same day, the trial court denied the motion on the merits.

1
The initials of the victim are used to protect her identity as per La.R.S. 46:1844(W).
2
The minutes show that Defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of mental defect.
However, this was a clerical error. According to the transcript of his August 24, 2022 plea,
Defendant pled not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. The trial court corrected this error
at the beginning of his trial.

Defendant timely filed the instant appeal on June 18, 2024, asserting one

assignment of error:

The evidence presented at trial, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, was insufficient to prove Braylen
Leday guilty of first degree rape beyond a reasonable doubt.

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, this court reviews all appeals

for errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find there

are no errors patent.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends that the evidence

presented at trial by the State was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

all of the elements of the crime of first degree rape. Defendant has given several

reasons why he believes the State provided insufficient evidence. First, although the

jury was presented with his confession, the State presented no direct or

circumstantial evidence connecting him to any crime. Second, Defendant notes that

neither he nor the victim testified at trial. Third, Defendant claims that although male

DNA was found in the victim’s vagina one or two days after the alleged incident, the

source of the DNA was never discovered since authorities failed to take a reference

sample from Defendant. Fourth, Defendant notes that although Detective Melanie

Veillon testified that she met with the victim, the report containing the information

she gained from that interview was not entered into evidence. And lastly, Defendant

argues that his confession alone should not be sufficient to convict him.

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Relevant Law

The analysis for insufficient-evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979); State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d
559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v.
Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the
appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations
of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the
Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d
559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order
for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect
that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

This court has further stated the following regarding appellate review in cases

relying on circumstantial evidence:

When the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence,
La.R.S. 15:438 provides that the state “must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence” in order to convict. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d
1207, 1209 (La.1984). “Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which elemental factors may be
inferred according to reason, experience and common sense.” State v.
Burns, 441 So.2d 843, 845 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983). However, La.R.S.
15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than
the rational juror’s reasonable doubt standard. The statute serves as a
guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence. On appeal,
the issue is whether a rational trier of fact, when viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded. State v. Williams,
13-497 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d 1236, writ denied, 13-2774
(La. 5/16/14), 139 So.3d 1024.

State v. Baumberger, 15-1056, pp. 10-11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 200 So.3d 817,

826-27, writ denied, 16-1251 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 859, cert. denied, 583 U.S.

950, 138 S.Ct. 392 (2017).

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First degree rape is defined in La.R.S. 14:42, which provides, in pertinent part:

A. First degree rape is a rape committed upon a person sixty-five
years of age or older or where the anal, oral, or vaginal sexual
intercourse is deemed to be without lawful consent of the victim
because it is committed under any one or more of the following
circumstances:
....

(4) When the victim is under the age of thirteen years. Lack of
knowledge of the victim’s age shall not be a defense.

Evidence Presented at Defendant’s Trial

Riikeja Anderson, the victim’s mother, testified at trial that she considered

Defendant her boyfriend and that they had discussed getting married. He would

spend the night at her home several nights a week, but although he slept in her bed,

the two were never intimate with one another. Sometimes when Ms. Anderson had

to work late, Defendant would “grab a pizza” or pick her two daughters up from

school. Her daughter J.A., the victim, was eleven years old at this time and her

younger daughter was nine years old.

Ms. Anderson testified that on April 1, 2022, she came home to find

Defendant sleeping in her daughters’ room. Seeing two distinct shapes under the

covers in J.A.’s bed, Ms. Anderson pulled out her phone and took a picture. She then

pulled back the blankets, saw Defendant in bed with J.A., and took another picture.

These two pictures were introduced into evidence at trial and presented to the jury.

They show Defendant and J.A. in bed, hugging. Ms. Anderson testified that once

she woke up Defendant, she demanded an explanation from him. He told her that he

must have been sleepwalking and thought he was in Ms. Anderson’s room.

The next day, April 2, 2022, Ms. Anderson allowed Defendant to take her

daughters to his family’s get-together while she was at work. Before allowing them

to go, Ms. Anderson called Defendant’s aunt and confirmed that other children

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would be there. However, during her shift, Defendant’s aunt appeared at her job. His

aunt told her that she needed to leave work immediately and go check on her children.

Ms. Anderson called the Calcasieu Sheriff’s Department and asked them to meet her

at her home.

Ms. Anderson testified that, upon entering her home, she heard water running,

coming from separate bathrooms. She saw a pile of clothes on the floor, leading her

to believe that Defendant had either engaged in sexual intercourse with J.A. or was

about to do so. When Ms. Anderson confronted Defendant, he fled the house. J.A.

also ran away and did not return for several hours.

On April 3, 2022, Defendant checked himself into the emergency room at

Christus St. Patrick’s Hospital, asking to be tested for the STD chlamydia and

claiming to have heard voices. Sommer Rachal, an emergency room psychiatric

nurse working there at the time, performed his psychiatric assessment. Ms. Rachal

testified that when she interviewed Defendant, he told her he had been doing things

with an eleven-year-old girl. When questioned about his claim that he was hearing

voices, Defendant told Ms. Rachal that he was hearing voices at the time of the

incident with the girl; however, he was not hearing them as he was being assessed.

Ms. Rachal testified that Defendant denied any mental health history, past diagnosis,

or admissions into in-patient mental health facilities. He also had never seen a mental

health provider. Ms. Rachal further testified that Defendant exhibited no symptoms

or signs of psychosis.

Based on Defendant’s report about his relations with an eleven-year-old girl,

Ms. Rachal called the police. The Lake Charles Police Department sent Corporal

Raymond Ford. Corporal Ford testified that he interviewed Defendant at the hospital,

which was recorded on his body cam. The footage of the interview was played for

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the jury. During the conversation with Corporal Ford, Defendant initially denied any

type of sexual contact with the victim other than kissing. However, he eventually

admitted that the two had sexual relations recently.

With Defendant’s permission, Corporal Ford took possession of his iPhone.

The phone was given to Deputy Jared Abshire, a digital forensics investigator at the

Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Department. Deputy Abshire examined the phone’s

contents and generated an extraction report. At trial, the State had Deputy Abshire

read before the jury the search tags from his report. There were seventy-two searches

found on Defendant’s phone which the State considered to be relevant. The

following are a few examples of those searches tagged by the State:

Tag 1: “So I’ve been having sex with an eleven-year-old girl and
her mom trying [sic] to take her to doctor [sic], but I don’t want her to
find out.”

Tag 2: “I been [sic] fucking my girlfriend, but I don’t want her
mom to bring her to the doctor and find out I’ve been doing it with her.”

Tag 4: “My girlfriend is eleven years old and we’ve been having
sex and her mom taking [sic] her to the doctor to check her out, but I
don’t want her mom to find out. What can I do?”

Tag 16: “What age do females become sexually active?”

Tag 35: “If a man nuts an 11-year-old girl, what would happen?”

Tag 47: “Does lab work show if someone’s having sex with
daughter [sic] unprotected?”

Tag 56: “Can chlamydia cause stomach pain?”

Jennifer Moody also testified at Defendant’s trial. She is a registered nurse

working at Lake Charles Memorial Hospital, as well as a trained Sexual Assault

Nurse Examiner (SANE). Ms. Moody testified that during her examination of J.A.,

she noticed some marks, scratches, and bruising, but did not specify their exact

location. More significant, however, was the positive alternative light source image

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that she located at the victim’s vaginal opening. Ms. Moody testified that this image

signified the existence of biological specimens. After swabbing the area, Ms. Moody

sent the swab to the police.

Kelsey Alexander, a DNA analyst for the Southwest Crime Lab, received the

swab taken by Ms. Moody. Ms. Alexander testified that she obtained one DNA

profile from the swab, which matched the victim’s profile. When asked by the State

whether she found any other DNA profiles, Ms. Alexander responded that she did

not find another one. However, she explained that there was an additional step in

their analysis which quantifies the amount of DNA in a sample. As a result of this

additional step, the sample taken from the victim exhibited male DNA. Whether this

male DNA belonged to Defendant, however, remained undetermined as the lab did

not perform that kind of testing. Thus, the conclusion of the lab was that, along with

the victim’s DNA, there was some male DNA present on the swab taken from the

victim’s vaginal area.

Melanie Veillon is a detective with the Calcasieu Parish Sheriff’s Department

assigned to the unit that investigates sex offenses and cruelty to juveniles. Detective

Veillon interviewed Defendant after he was arrested and placed in custody. The

recording of that interview was played for the jury. We have also reviewed that video

and note that Defendant again confesses to having vaginal sex with J.A. the day Ms.

Anderson came home and found them showering in different bathrooms. He also

confessed that he had oral sex with J.A. multiple times.

Discussion

In State v. Cruz, 455 So.2d 1351, 1355 (La.1984) (citations omitted), the

Louisiana supreme court noted that “[i]t is well settled that an accused party cannot

be legally convicted on his own uncorroborated confession without proof that a

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crime had been committed by someone;” that is, without direct or circumstantial

evidence.

Here, Defendant essentially argues that the prosecution did not present enough

direct or circumstantial evidence for the jury to corroborate his confession to having

sexual relations with an eleven-year-old girl. Noting the evidence given above, we

find that the State gave the jury enough evidence to decide whether Defendant did

what he confessed to.

Additionally, regarding Defendant’s argument that his confession was given

after he had been hearing voices, as well as the fact that he pled not guilty by reason

of insanity, we note La.Code Crim.P. art. 652, which provides, “The defendant has

the burden of establishing the defense of insanity at the time of the offense by a

preponderance of the evidence.” Defendant provided no evidence supporting his

defense of insanity. Consequently, the jury had no reason to doubt the validity of his

own statements confessing to having sex with J.A.

Thus, considering all of the evidence noted above, we find that the evidence

presented by the prosecution at trial was sufficient for the jury to find Defendant

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of first degree rape.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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