State of Louisiana v. Zachary Markey Adams A/K/A Zachary Adams A/K/A Zachary Batiste

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 24-352

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ZACHARY MARKEY ADAMS, AKA ZACHARY ADAMS, ZACHARY
BATISTE

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 186559
HONORABLE MICHELE S. BILLEAUD, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

LEDRICKA J. THIERRY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Ledricka J. Thierry, and Wilbur L. Stiles,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Donald Landry, District Attorney
Frederick L. Welter, Assistant District Attorney
15th Judicial District
Parish of Lafayette
800 S. Buchanon Street, 6th Floor
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 232-5170
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Douglas Lee Harville
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 52988
Shreveport, LA 71135-2988
(318) 222-1700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Zachary Markey Adams

THIERRY, Judge.

On March 28, 2022, Jalen Anthony Walker was shot and killed in or near the

driveway of Rontravon Bernard’s home. Defendant, Zachary Adams, was Bernard’s

neighbor. The shooting was captured on video; though Defendant maintains “it is

impossible to identity who shot Mr. Walker solely from the video.” When the police

arrived, Bernard was brought to the station and questioned. Eventually, Defendant

was indicted for the second degree murder of Walker pursuant to La.R.S. 14:30.1.

On February 6, 2024, a jury trial commenced, and on February 8, 2024, a jury

unanimously found Defendant guilty as charged. On March 13, 2024, the trial court

sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence.

Defendant now timely appeals his conviction and sentence, asserting in one

counsel filed assignment of error that there was insufficient evidence to prove he

was guilty of second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also

asserts several pro se assignments of error.

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence.

In his sole counsel-filed assignment of error, Defendant claims that the

evidence was insufficient to prove he was guilty of second degree murder beyond a

reasonable doubt. Specifically, Defendant argues the State failed to prove beyond a

reasonable doubt that he shot and killed Jalen Walker. In his third pro se assignment

of error, Defendant also argues against the evidence adduced at trial. Since

Defendant’s claims are interrelated, we will address the issues simultaneously.

Standard of Review

The analysis for insufficiency of the evidence claims is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on
appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444
U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195, 62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex
rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State
v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393
So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the
credibility determinations of the triers of fact beyond the
sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d 559
(citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In
order for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the
record must reflect that the state has satisfied its burden of
proving the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d
1367, 1371. It is the factfinder’s role to weigh the respective credibility
of the witnesses, and the reviewing court will not second-guess the
credibility determinations of the factfinder beyond the sufficiency
evaluations under the Jackson standard of review. State v. Richardson,
425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983). The testimony of a single witness, if
believed, and absent internal contradictions or irreconcilable conflicts
with physical evidence, is sufficient to support a conviction. State v.
Pierre, 14-1071 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/15), 170 So.3d 348, writ denied,
15-1151 (La. 5/13/16), 191 So.3d 1054.

A conviction based on insufficient evidence cannot
stand as it violates Due Process. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIV; La. Const. art. I, § 2. The constitutional standard for
testing the sufficiency of the evidence, as enunciated in
Jackson, requires that a conviction be based on proof
sufficient for any rational trier of fact, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, to
find the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt. See La. Code Crim. P. art. 821(B); State
v. Ordodi, 06-207 (La. 11/29/06), 946 So.2d 654, 660. In
conducting this review, we also must be expressly mindful
of Louisiana’s circumstantial evidence test, which states
in part, “assuming every fact to be proved that the
evidence tends to prove,” every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence is excluded. La.R.S. 15:438; State v. Wright,
98-0601 (La.App. 1 Cir. 2/19/99), 730 So.2d 485, 486,

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writs denied, 99-0802 (La. 10/29/99), 748 So.2d 1157, 00-
0895 (La. 11/17/00), 773 So.2d 732. When a case involves
circumstantial evidence and the trier of fact reasonably
rejects the hypothesis of innocence presented by the
defendant’s own testimony, that hypothesis falls, and the
defendant is guilty unless there is another hypothesis that
raises a reasonable doubt. State v. Captville, 448 So.2d
676, 680 (La. 1984).

State v. Coleman, 17-1045, p. 6 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/13/18), 249 So. 3d
872, 877, writ denied, 18-830 (La. 2/18/19), 263 So.3d 1155.

State v. Simmons, 23-661, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/20/24), 381 So.3d 1033, 1036–

37, writ denied, 24-510 (La. 12/27/24), ___ So.3d ___.

In State v. Bright, 98-398, pp. 22–23 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147, the

supreme court discussed the law regarding identification:

When a key issue at trial is whether the defendant was the
perpetrator of the crime, the State is required to negate any reasonable
probability of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 430 So.2d [31] at 45
[(La.1983)]; see also State v. Brady, 414 So.2d 364, 365 (La.1982);
State v. Long, 408 So.2d 1221, 1227 (La.1982). The fact-finder weighs
the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and this court will generally
not second-guess those determinations. State ex rel. Graffagnino v.
King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983). However, we are mindful that the
touchstone of Jackson v. Virginia[, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781
(1979),] is rationality and that “irrational decisions to convict will be
overturned, rational decisions to convict will be upheld, and the actual
fact finder’s discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of
law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d [1305] at 1310 [ (La.1988)].

Second Degree Murder

In the instant case, Defendant was convicted of the second degree murder of

Jalen Walker. Louisiana Revised Statutes 14:30.1 defines second degree murder as

the killing of a human being when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to

inflict great bodily harm. Specific intent is defined as the “state of mind which exists

when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively desired the prescribed

criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.” La.R.S. 14:10(1).

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Defendant’s Argument in Brief

Defendant argues the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

murdered Jalen Walker. First, Defendant claims even though the shooting was

captured on video, it is impossible to identify the shooter. Second, Defendant

contends that the State’s eyewitness, Rontravon Bernard, admitted at trial that he

never saw a gun or the shooter. According to Defendant, Bernard did not identify

Defendant as the shooter until he watched the video. Third, Defendant asserts that

Bernard previously identified someone other than him as the shooter and admitted

to previously lying for his own benefit. As such, Defendant asserts Bernard’s

testimony is “completely incredible.” Defendant argues the State introduced

circumstantial evidence that placed him near the scene of the shooting; however,

Defendant claims the evidence failed to overcome the fact that Bernard identified

someone else as the shooter. Therefore, Defendant asserts that no rational trier of

fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of murder and,

as such, his conviction should be reversed.

State’s Argument in Brief

In opposition, the State argues that it proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Defendant shot and killed Jalen Walker. The State summarizes its argument as

follows:

The direct evidence in this case alone is sufficient that any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the
crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt, thereby satisfying the Jackson
v. Virginia standard. Eyewitness Rontravon Bernard clearly and
unequivocally identified the defendant as the shooter, and pointed out
on the Real Time Crime System surveillance video who the people were
at the scene of the shooting. The jury was able to see the actual shooting
and the victim falling to the ground, then the defendant running away
from the scene back to his car. The Real Time Crime Camera System
video then showed the victim’s car leaving the Pee Wee Park parking

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lot and heading east on Carmel Drive, which was corroborated by the
CellHawk video and license plate reader cameras.

The State also argues that “defendant’s flight to avoid apprehension indicated

a consciousness of guilt,” pursuant to State v. Davies, 350 So.2d 586 (La.1977).

Thus, the State argues that it “proved beyond a reasonable doubt, with overwhelming

evidence, that the defendant, Zachary Adams, intentionally shot Jalen Walker in the

face and killed him on March 28, 2022.”

Testimony Adduced at Trial.

During the two-day trial, the jury was presented with physical, photographic,

documentary, and testimonial evidence. Deputy Larry Guidry of the Lafayette

Sheriff’s Office testified on March 28, 2022, he received a call regarding a “shooting

in progress” at the Bridgewood Mobile Home Park located at 1912 Carmel Drive in

Lafayette, Louisiana. Deputy Guidry stated when he arrived at the scene, he saw a

black male—who was later identified as Jalen Walker—lying on the ground in a

pool of blood in front of Lot 18. According to Deputy Guidry, life saving measures

were performed on Walker to no avail. Deputy Guidry said after noticing a gunshot

wound to Walker’s face, he taped off the area and secured the crime scene. Deputy

Guidry stated he later transported a witness by the name of Rontravon Bernard to

the Criminal Investigations Divisions (CID) building for questioning.

Rontravon Bernard testified at the time of the incident he resided at 1912

Carmel Drive, Lot 18. Bernard stated that he knew both Jalen Walker and Defendant

because they were also residents of the trailer park. Bernard noted that Defendant

was his next door neighbor, and Walker lived a few trailers away. According to

Bernard, he and Defendant were close friends.

Regarding the incident, Bernard testified as follows:

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Q Do you remember -- first of all, let’s talk about that day, March
28, 2022. So[,] the early evening, did you come in contact with
Zachary Adams that day?

A I think I went to his house with my cousin. I’m not really sure[,]
but I think I did.

Q Okay. And now we’re talking about after dinnertime, 6:00 p.m.
Between -- after 6:00. Did you see Zachary Adams anywhere?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A To [sic] my house.

Q Had you -- how did that happen?

A I think he text [sic] or called me how far. I text [sic] how far to
see where he was to pull up on me [sic].

Q So[,] you knew he was coming?

A It was either I knew he was coming or -- yeah, I knew he was
coming, the phone and all that [sic].

Q Got you. All right. So[,] at some point he arrived at your trailer?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened next?

A Him [sic] and Jay started arguing[,] I guess.

Q So[,] him and Jalen Walker?

A Yes, sir.

Q Jalen Walker came near your trailer?

A Yes, sir. He was -- he was walking his dog.

Q Okay. And they started arguing?

A Yes, sir.

Q And after they argued, what happened?

A When they was [sic] arguing, my padnuh [sic] rode away.

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Q I’m sorry?

A Weedy rode away and then he -- [1]

Q You said he rode away?

A Yeah, he drove away.

Q He got in his car?

A Yes, sir.

Q And he drove out of the trailer park?

A Yes, sir.

Q And what happened after that?

A He came from the park from between the trailers back to my
house.

Q Is that the Pee Wee Park?[2]

A Yes, sir.

Q Okay. So[,] how did he come back from the Pee Wee Park to
your house?

A I saw him walking.

Q Walking? All right. And what happened when he arrived back at
your trailer?

A Him [sic] and Jalen started arguing again.

Q And then what happened?

A I was picking up rocks throwing [sic] and then I heard a shot and
Jalen [sic] body fell.

Q And who fell?

A Jalen.

1
Bernard referred to Defendant as “Weedy.”
2
The official name of the park is Dalton “Pee Wee” Leblanc Park.

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Q Okay. How --

A Jalen --

Q -- far away were You when that happened?

A About here to probably there.

Q To where?

A Probably a little bit further to where she is. Like --

Q Would You say You were within 15 feet of where the shooting
occurred?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did You see a gun?

A I didn’t see a gun. I didn’t see no [sic] gun.

Q When You -- You said You were picking up a rock?

A And throwing it.

Q And then You heard a gunshot?

A And I looked up.

Q And what did You see?

A Weedy coming towards me and then he left. And Jay [sic] body
on the ground bleeding.

Q Did You actually see Jalen fall to the ground?

A Not really but like -- no, not -- I don’t think I did. I don’t think
so. Like not fall but like --

Afterwards, the State showed Bernard the camera footage from the day of the

incident. The State asked Bernard to identify everyone in the video and to describe

everyone’s actions. Concerning the shooting, Bernard said:

Q What did You just see in the tape?

A I saw a flash come from Weedy and Jay [sic] body fall.

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Q And that was when You were bending over picking up a rock?

A Yes, sir.

Q And after Jay’s body fell, what did Weedy do?

A He came [sic] told me something and ran to the park.

The State then showed Bernard a copy of the text messages exchanged

between him and Defendant on the night of the shooting. Bernard said he told

Defendant, “You forgot about the cameras.” To which Defendant responded,

“Fuck.” According to Bernard, Defendant called him later that night, but Bernard

indicated that he did not want to be involved in the matter. Bernard further identified

Defendant’s car as the blue Buick LaSabre shown in State’s Exhibit 5.

Bernard later reiterated that Defendant was the one who shot Walker, stating:

Q . . . You testified absolutely who shot Jalen Walker in front of
your trailer, didn’t you? You testified earlier in the video, you
testified who shot Jalen, or Jay?

A Right.

Q And did you have any idea that that was about to happen?

A No, sir.

Q Did you have anything to do with it?

A No, sir.

Q And how certain are you that it was Weedy that shot Jay?

A Kinda positive looking at the video.

On cross-examination, Bernard admitted that he lied to the detectives about

the identity of the shooter, as he previously told the detectives that “Black” was the

shooter. To his defense, Bernard stated that at the time, he and Defendant were

friends, so he lied to the detectives because he did not want Defendant to get into

any trouble. Nonetheless, Bernard later testified that he sometimes referred to

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Defendant as “Black” even though he stated that he always referred to Defendant as

“Weedy.” Bernard further stated that he did not actually see Defendant come from

the park prior to the shooting. Instead, Bernard testified, “I mean if I -- I seen [sic]

when he was coming across. I didn’t see him come from the park[,] but I seen [sic]

him from the trailer from, you know, that he walked from, walking towards my yard.

I could sit on the porch and see across the street[,] but I can’t see where the parking

lot is in the park.” Bernard also mentioned that Defendant told him not to call the

cops after shooting Walker. Bernard ultimately testified that Defendant was the

person who shot Walker.

Detective Lindsey Gautreaux, a crime scene investigator with the Lafayette

Parish Sheriff’s Office’s Metro Crime Scene Unit, testified that on March 28, 2022,

she received a call regarding a homicide at 1912 Carmel Drive. Detective Gautreaux

said once she arrived at the scene, she photographed the area and collected evidence.

Detective Gautreaux noted that while she was canvassing the area, she found a .40

caliber spent cartridge that appeared as though it had been “recently fired.”

Detective Gautreaux also stated she processed a blue Buick LaSabre registered to

Defendant in connection with the case.

Doctor Christopher Tape, an expert in the field of forensic pathology, testified

he performed an autopsy on Walker. Dr. Tape explained Walker’s injuries as

follows: “There’s a gunshot wound. I describe it fully as a gunshot wound to the

head at face and neck. And what I mean by that is the entry is on the face at the right

chin and the exit’s on the back of the right neck.” According to Dr. Tape, the gunshot

fractured Walker’s jaw, damaged his carotid artery and jugular vein, and

subsequently caused blood to seep into his airway, which caused him to bleed to

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death. Dr. Tape determined Walker’s cause of death to be a gunshot wound to the

face and neck and Walker’s manner of death to be a homicide.

Willis Zeno, a vehicle mechanic, testified on March 28, 2022, he received a

call from Defendant inquiring if he was available to work on Defendant’s music

system. According to Zeno, Defendant had a wiring issue with his speakers. Zeno

said shortly after speaking with him, Defendant appeared at his hotel in a blue Buick

LaSabre. Zeno stated that after Defendant arrived, he and Defendant went to a truck

stop so he could complete a repair on an eighteen-wheeler. According to Zeno, he

completed the repair within a few hours, noting that he started around 11:00 p.m.

and did not finish until around 1:00 or 2:00 a.m. Zeno stated once he finished

repairing the eighteen-wheeler, he went back to his hotel with Defendant so he could

rewire Defendant’s speakers. Zeno testified that whenever they arrived back at the

hotel, he went inside, but Defendant stayed in the car. Zeno stated that whenever he

went back outside, Defendant was gone, so he moved Defendant’s car to the back of

the hotel and left it there. According to Zeno, Defendant asked him for a ride to

Houston, Texas, before leaving, but Zeno refused. Zeno ultimately claimed that he

did not know anything about the murder and indicated that he only intended to fix

Defendant’s car that night.

Captain Sonny Stutes, an expert in cellular records mapping and analysis,

testified he assisted in locating Defendant after the shooting. According to Captain

Stutes, he obtained Defendant’s cellphone records from AT&T and used software

called CellHawk, which maps out a person’s cellphone records, to show Defendant’s

movements before and after the shooting. Captain Stutes said he also utilized the

Real Time Crime camera videos to verify the information shown in the cellphone

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records. Captain Stutes stated that he eventually found Defendant in Houston,

Texas.

Ultimately, Captain Stutes testified that he opined that Defendant’s cell phone

was in the area of the crime scene shortly before and after the shooting, stating:

Q So[,] you testified about shortly before the shooting you watched
videos and then at 7:20 the vehicle goes into the trailer park?

A Yes, Sir.

Q At about 7:38 it exits the trailer park?

A Yes, sir.

Q It goes into the Pee Wee Park?

A Yes, sir.

Q And then at 7:50 you see the vehicle leave through the --

A Correct.

Q And can you tell us where the first phone call after the phone was
reactivated?

A The first connected phone call was at 7:51, I believe it’s Line 107
on the phone records.

Q And do you know who that was to through your investigation?

A We were able to determine that phone call -- sorry -- phone
number called belonged to Rontravon Bernard, one of the
witnesses in this case.

Q And we were able, through CellHawk, you testified that at some
point while the vehicle was still in the trailer park, the cell phone
disconnected from the network?

A From the cell phone records, yes. I was able to determine that
the phone call was not -- the phone, the device was not on the
network because it went straight to voicemail for a period of
about 14, 15 minutes.

Q Fourteen minutes?

A Yes.

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Q And then shortly after the car came out of the Pee Wee Park,
that’s when the phone went back on?

A Yeah. The device reconnected to the network with a phone call.

Analysis.

We find after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that Defendant was guilty of

second degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, the State had an

eyewitness, Rontravon Bernard, who identified Defendant as the individual who shot

Jalen Walker. Bernard’s identification of Defendant as the shooter should be

considered direct evidence of Defendant’s guilt:

Generally, direct evidence consists of testimony from a witness
who actually saw or heard an occurrence, proof of the existence of
which is at issue; whereas, circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main
fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience. State
v. Austin, 399 So.2d 158 (La.1981). Where there is direct evidence, the
trier of fact weighs the credibility of evidence and the reviewer under
Jackson defers to that trier of fact, assuming the proven facts most
favorable to the State. Where an essential element of the crime is not
proven by direct evidence, La.R.S. 15:438 applies. That rule restrains
the fact finder, as well as the reviewer on appeal, to accept as proven
all that the evidence tends to prove and then to convict only if every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. State v. Shapiro, 431
So.2d 372 (La.1983) (on rehearing).

State v. Lilly, 468 So.2d 1154, 1158 (La.1985).

Although Defendant attacks the credibility of Bernard’s testimony and claims

that he is “an admitted liar,” this court should not second guess a fact-finder’s

credibility determination. State v. Kennerson, 96-1518 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695

So.2d 1367. Moreover, “[a] jury may ‘accept or reject, in whole or in part,’ any

witness’s testimony.” State v. Hypolite, 04-1658, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/05), 903

So.2d 1275, 1279, writ denied, 06-618 (La. 9/22/06), 937 So.2d 381. Thus, in this

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case, the jury heard and accepted Bernard’s testimony that Defendant shot and killed

Jalen Walker.

Additionally, Captain Sonny Stutes testified that Defendant’s cellphone

records placed him at the crime scene prior to, during, and after the shooting, which

corroborated Bernard’s testimony that Defendant shot and killed Jalen Walker.

Moreover, the State is correct in its assertion that Defendant’s flight to Houston,

Texas, after the shooting should be an inference of his guilt of the crime. Therefore,

when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any

rational trier of fact could have found Defendant intentionally shot and killed Jalen

Walker. Accordingly, Defendant’s assignment of error lacks merit.

II. Illegality of Sentence.

In his first pro se assignment of error, Defendant argues that his sentence is

illegal according to La.Code Crim.P. art. 872, which states “[a] valid sentence must

rest upon a valid and sufficient indictment,” because the indictment was defective.

Specifically, Defendant asserts the indictment was insufficient because it did not

state any essential elements or facts in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 464.

In State v. Draughn, 05-1825, pp. 60–61 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 623–

24, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1012, 128 S.Ct. 537 (2007), the Louisiana Supreme Court

stated:

The time for testing the sufficiency of an indictment or bill of
information is before trial by way of a motion to quash or an application
for a bill of particulars. State v. Gainey, 376 So.2d 1240, 1243
(La.1979). A post-verdict attack on the sufficiency of an indictment
should be rejected unless the indictment failed to give fair notice of the
offense charged or failed to set forth any identifiable offense. State v.
Williams, 480 So.2d 721, 722, n. 1 (La.1985); La.C.Cr.P. art. 465,
Official Revision Comment (a). . . .

Notwithstanding the procedural bar to the claim, the Louisiana
Constitution of 1974 provides that an accused shall be informed of the

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nature and cause of the accusation against him. La. Const. Art. I, § 13.
That requirement is implemented by La.C.Cr.P. art. 464, which
provides:

The indictment shall be a plain, concise and definite
written statement of the essential facts constituting the
offense charged. It shall state for each count the official or
customary citation of the statute which the defendant is
alleged to have violated. Error in the citation or its
omission shall not be ground for dismissal of the
indictment or for reversal of a conviction if the error or
omission did not mislead the defendant to his prejudice.

La.C.Cr.P. art. 465 authorizes the use of specific short form
indictments in charging certain offenses, including first degree murder.
The constitutionality of short forms has been consistently upheld by this
Court. State v. Baylis, 388 So.2d 713, 718–19 (La.1980); State v. Liner,
373 So.2d 121, 122 (La.1979). When those forms are used, it is
intended that a defendant may procure details as to the statutory method
by which he committed the offense through a bill of particulars. Baylis,
388 So.2d at 719; State v. Johnson, 365 So.2d 1267, 1270–71
(La.1978); La.C.Cr.P. art. 465, Official Revision Comment (a).

Considering Draughn, we must first review the charging document to

determine whether it complied with the requirements of La.Const. art. 1, § 13, by

informing Defendant of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

In the instant case, the State charged Defendant by a bill of indictment, which

read in pertinent part:

ZACHARY MARKEY ADAMS
AKA ZACHARY ADAMS, ZACHARY BATISTE
...

at the Parish of Lafayette on or about March 28, 2022

in that Zachary Markey Adams, on or about March 28, 2022, committed
second degree murder of Jalen Anthony Walker, in violation of R.S.
14:30.1. (Second Degree Murder-Felony)

A review of the bill of indictment reveals that Defendant was informed of the

nature and cause of the crime. Moreover, the bill of indictment complies with the

short form as set out in La.Code Crim.P. art. 465(A)(32), which states: “Second

15

Degree Murder--A.B. committed second degree murder of C.D.” Accordingly,

Defendant was notified of the nature and cause of the crime he was accused, so

Defendant’s post-verdict attack on the sufficiency of the indictment is rejected.

III. Lack of Jurisdiction.

In his second pro se assignment of error, Defendant claims that since he did

not attend a formal arraignment and did not have a preliminary examination, the trial

court never acquired legal or competent jurisdiction.

Jurisdiction refers to a court’s authority to hear and decide a case. A district

court has original jurisdiction over all criminal matters and exclusive original

jurisdiction of felony cases. See La.Const. art. 5, § 16(A).

Arraignment

First, Defendant alleges that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he

never went to an arraignment. A review of the record shows that Defendant was

present in court via Zoom on July 19, 2022, where he was represented by his trial

attorney, who waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty on his

behalf. Moreover, proceeding to trial without objection constitutes a waiver of

formal arraignment. La.Code Crim.P. arts. 551, 555; State v. Domingue, 298 So.2d

723 (La.1974). Therefore, this argument lacks merit.

Preliminary Examination

Next, Defendant asserts that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because he did

not have a preliminary examination. According to Defendant, a preliminary

examination was required for the court to decide on whether there was enough

probable cause to hold him over for trial.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 292 requires that the trial court

shall order a preliminary examination if requested by the state or the defendant in

16

felony cases unless the defendant has been indicted by a grand jury. However, after

the defendant has been indicted by a grand jury, the preliminary examination is

limited to the perpetuation of testimony and the fixing of bail. La.Code Crim.P. art.

296. In this case, a preliminary examination was not required because Defendant

was indicted by a grand jury. Accordingly, this argument lacks merit.

IV. Alleged Fraudulent Statements by Prosecutor.

In his fourth pro se assignment of error, Defendant asserts that the prosecutor

made fraudulent statements during closing arguments. According to Defendant, the

prosecution stated that “he proved that Zachary Markey Adams showed specific

intent to kill Jalen Walker when Mr. Adams walked up to Mr. Walker and pointed a

gun and shot Mr. Walker in the face.”

We note defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor’s statement made

during closing arguments. Thus, Defendant is precluded from asserting any claims

regarding the prosecutor’s statement on appeal. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841; State v.

Young, 344 So.2d 983 (La.1977).

V. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

In his fifth pro se assignment of error, Defendant alleges that his trial counsel

was ineffective. Ineffectiveness of counsel requires a showing of both deficient

performance by counsel and prejudice to defendant’s case. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984). Generally, a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel is relegated to post-conviction proceedings, unless the record

permits definitive resolution on appeal. State v. Miller, 99-192 (La. 9/6/00), 776

So.2d 396, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1194, 121 S.Ct. 1196 (2001). The benchmark for

judging a claim of ineffectiveness is whether the attorney’s conduct so undermined

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the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be considered

to have produced a just result. Strickland, 466 U.S. 668.

Defendant claims his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to impeach the

State’s witness, Rontravon Bernard, at trial and by failing to show the jury the video

evidence of Bernard stating that “Black” shot Jalen Walker. We find the issue

presented can be resolved based on the record before the court. Although the video

was not played for the jury, the record is clear defense counsel cross-examined

Bernard and specifically asked him about “Black.” Therefore, Defendant cannot

meet his burden of proving counsel was deficient under Strickland.

VI. Alleged Tampering of Evidence.

In his final pro se assignment of error, Defendant claims that the trial court

tampered with evidence by instructing a witness not to testify about any drug activity

and by mentioning general intent when providing the jury with instructions.

Defendant fails to reference the record pages on which these events occurred

or set forth any legal citation to support his claims in accordance with Uniform

Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2‒12.4. Therefore, Defendant failed to properly brief

this assignment of error, and this assignment of error is deemed to be abandoned.

VII. Errors Patent.

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, there is one error

patent involving the trial court’s advisement of the time period for filing post-

conviction relief. Additionally, the minutes of sentencing are in need of correction.

First, the trial court did not accurately advise Defendant as to the time period

for filing post-conviction relief. Defendant was advised that he had “two years from

the date [his] sentence becomes final” to file for post-conviction relief. According

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to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(A), the time period for filing post-conviction relief is

“two years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final[.]”

(emphasis added). Thus, the advice given at sentencing was only partially accurate.

The trial court’s failure to accurately advise Defendant as to the time period for filing

post-conviction relief, however, has no bearing on the sentence and is not grounds

to reverse the sentence or remand for resentencing. Further, La.Code Crim.P. art.

930.8 does not provide a remedy for an individual defendant who is not told of the

limitations period.

This court, as has been done by the first, second and fifth appellate circuits,

will have this opinion serve as notice to Defendant of the correct time limitation for

filing an application for post-conviction relief. State v. Folse, 23-1299 (La.App. 1

Cir. 9/20/24), __ So.3d __, __ (2024 WL 4245979); State v. Franklin, 23-524

(La.App. 5 Cir. 8/28/24), ___ So.3d ___ (2024 WL 3963967), clarified on reh’g, 23-

524 (La.App. 5 Cir. 9/19/24) (unpublished opinion) (2024 WL 4247537); State v.

Green, 54,955 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/5/23), 361 So.3d 546.

Additionally, the minutes of sentencing fail to reflect the trial court’s

imposition of the life sentence at hard labor. A conflict between the transcript and

minutes is to be resolved in favor of the transcript. See State v. Wommack, 00-137

(La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797

So.2d 62. Accordingly, we order the district court to amend the minutes of

sentencing to correctly reflect the trial court’s imposition of the sentence at hard

labor.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

This court advises Defendant that, pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 930.8(A), no

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application for post-conviction relief shall be considered if it is filed more than two

years after the judgment of conviction and sentence has become final under the

provisions of La.Code Crim.P. arts. 914 or 922. Additionally, this court orders the

district court to amend the minutes of sentencing to correctly reflect the trial court’s

imposition of the sentence at hard labor.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2–16.3.

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