State of Louisiana v. Sidney Myers

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-409

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

SIDNEY MYERS

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 119690-F
HONORABLE CHUCK R. WEST, DISTRICT JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Shannon J. Gremillion, and Van H. Kyzar,
Judges.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

Beau James Brock
Lori Palmentier
Brock & Palmintier Law LLC
4608 Bluebonnet Blvd
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
(225) 999-1100
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Sidney Myers

Mark D. Plaisance
Marcus J. Plaisance
Plaisance Law, LLC
PO Box 1123
Prairieville, LA 70769
(225) 775-5297
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Sidney Myers

Honorable Trent Brignac
Thirteenth Judicial District Attorney
Chauncey J. Hesnor
Jacob B. Fusilier
Assistant District Attorneys
P. O. Drawer 780
Ville Platte, LA 70586
(337) 363-3438
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

GREMILLION, Judge.

Defendant, Sidney Myers, appeals his conviction of three counts of indecent

behavior with a juvenile, a violation of La.R.S. 14:81, and his sentences of five years

at hard labor on each count, which the trial court ordered be served consecutively.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On March 24, 2021, Defendant was charge by bill of indictment with the

following offenses:

Count #1: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, committed the offense of Sexual Battery by committing a
sexual battery upon Juvenile K.S. (DOB: 2.08.2006)1

Count #2: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, committed the offense of Felony Carnal Knowledge of a
Juvenile, and being a person who is seventeen years of age or older had
sexual intercourse, with consent, with a person who is thirteen years of
age or older but less than seventeen years of age, when the victim is not
the spouse of the offender and when the difference between the age of
the victim and the age of the offender is four years or greater

Count #3: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, being a person over the age of seventeen, did intentionally
entice, aid, solicit, or permit any child under the age of seventeen to
perform any sexually immoral act.

Count #4: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, committed the offense of Indecent Behavior with Juveniles
upon Juvenile K.S. (DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the
intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person,
of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any
child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of
greater than two years between the two persons

Count #5: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, committed the offense of indecent Behavior with Juveniles
upon Juvenile K.S. (DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the
intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person,
of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any
child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of
greater than two years between the two persons

1
In accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W), we use the initials of the victim and her family
to protect the victim’s identity.

Count #6: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, committed the offense of Indecent Behavior with Juveniles
upon Juvenile K.S. (DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the
intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person,
of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any
child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of
greater than two years between the two persons

Count #7: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, committed the offense of Indecent Behavior with Juveniles
upon Juvenile K.S. (DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the
intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person,
of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any
child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of
greater than two years between the two persons

Count #8: Sidney Myers, on or between January 1, 2020 and November
12, 2020, committed the offense of Indecent Behavior with Juveniles
upon Juvenile K.S. (DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the
intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires of either person,
of any lewd or lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any
child under the age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of
greater than two years between the two persons

contrary to the law of the State of Louisiana and against the peace and
dignity of the same.

On May 1, 2023, the day Defendant’s trial was to begin, an amended bill of

indictment charged Defendant with:

Count #1: IN THE PARISH OF EVANGELINE, the defendant, Sidney
T Myers, on or between August 1, 2020 and October 30, 2020,
committed the offense of Sexual Battery by committing a sexual battery
upon Juvenile K.S. (DOB: 2.08.2006)

Count #2: IN THE PARISH OF EVANGELINE, the defendant, Sidney
Myers, on or between April 15, 2020 and October 30, 2020, committed
the offense of Indecent Behavior with Juveniles upon Juvenile K.S.
(DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the intention of arousing
or gratifying the sexual desires of either person, of any lewd or
lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the
age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two
years between the two persons

Count #3: IN THE PARISH OF EVANGELINE, the defendant, Sidney
Myers, on or between May 15, 2020 and October 30, 2020, committed
the offense of Indecent Behavior with Juveniles upon Juvenile K.S.

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(DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the intention of arousing
or gratifying the sexual desires of either person, of any lewd or
lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the
age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two
years between the two persons

Count #4: IN THE PARISH OF EVANGELINE, the defendant, Sidney
Myers, on or between June 1, 2020 and October 30, 2020, committed
the offense of Indecent Behavior with Juveniles upon Juvenile K.S.
(DOB: 2.08.2006), by the commission, with the intention of arousing
or gratifying the sexual desires of either person, of any lewd or
lascivious act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the
age of seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two
years between the two persons

This May 1, 2023 trial resulted in this court declaring a mistrial. In State v.

Myers, 23-275 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/5/23) (unpublished writ), Defendant sought review

of the trial court’s denial of a mistrial because the State posed a hypothetical question

to venire members during voir dire. The trial was halted while Defendant sought

supervisory relief. This court held that the hypothetical question was not appropriate.

We granted Defendant’s request for a mistrial and remanded the case for further

proceedings.

Thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to quash the indictment on the grounds

that continued prosecution subjected him to double jeopardy. This motion to quash

was denied. Defendant then sought writs to this court, which were denied, as were

writs to the Louisiana Supreme Court. State v. Myers, 23-469 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/3/23)

(unpublished writ), writ denied, 23-1035 (La. 8/4/23), 368 So.3d 1099.

Trial commenced on August 7, 2023. On the second day of trial, a controversy

arose regarding a prospective juror, Rachel Mendel Ardoin, a registered nurse

working at a dialysis center, who had treated K.S.’s grandfather three days a week

for several years. She knew K.S.’s parents “pretty well.” K.S. and her son “played

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ball together.” Mrs. Ardoin had heard rumors involving indecent behavior that

involved K.S. However, she believed she could be fair.

The defense traversed Mrs. Ardoin. She understood that K.S.’s grandfather

would be in the courtroom during trial. Counsel asked:

If you saw someone sitting over here okay, he was charged with
something and someone who over here like yourself was a potential
juror who cared for the wellbeing of -- of that persons [sic] family do
you think that, would you want someone like you sitting on a jury
judging some of your family?

Mrs. Ardoin replied, “Not necessarily but I do know some of the defense’s

family too. I don’t know the defendant but I know some of the people that he has in

the courtroom with him also.” She admitted that her relationship with the family

might possibly impair her ability if she had to sit through the testimonies of the

family members she knew.

The traversal continued in the trial court’s chambers. Again, Mrs. Ardoin said

her impartiality might be affected. “I think it would affect my working ability with

my patient. . . . Not from me I can be fair and impartial, but I think if I went the way

he didn’t want me to, he would have a problem.”

The trial court was swayed by the fact that K.S.’s grandfather was only one of

twelve patients Mrs. Ardoin would treat at a time. In the end, however, Mrs. Ardoin

affirmed that she could be fair and impartial. Defendant moved that Mrs. Ardoin be

stricken for cause, which the trial court denied. Supervisory writs to this court were

denied. State v. Myers, 23-502 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/10/23) (unpublished writ).

During trial, K.S.’s parents (henceforth Mr. S. and Mrs. S.) informed the State

that K.S. had sought counseling from a second mental health professional.

Defendant moved for a mistrial on the basis of the State violating its discovery

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obligations. This motion was denied, and writs of supervisory review were sought.

The application was denied:

STAY DENIED; WRIT DENIED: Defendant filed a writ application
with this court seeking supervisory review of the trial court’s August
16, 2023, denial of Defendant’s “Motion to Request Mistrial Under
La.C.Cr.P. Art. 775, the United States Constitution and the Louisiana
Constitution.” The defense asserts the State suppressed information
and violated discovery by providing the information too late for the
defense to alter its strategy. Mistrial for a discovery violation is a
drastic remedy, and there has been no showing of a discovery violation
on behalf of the State. See La.Code Crim.P. arts. 718, 719, and 729.3;
see also, State v. Andrews, 19-68 (La. 1/14/19), 260 So.3d 1202.

Defendant further requests a mistrial based upon the argument
that the late provision prejudiced the defense. “A mistrial may be
ordered, and in a jury case the jury dismissed, when: . . . [t]here is a
legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment
entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law . . . .” La.Code
Crim.P. art. 775(3). The defense argues its inability to access the
counseling records at issue prejudiced its pretrial preparation, voir dire,
opening statement, and cross-examination of witnesses. As noted by
the trial court, the information about the victim’s counseling shows no
discussion or counseling about the facts of the case and, therefore, no
impeaching, inculpatory, or exculpatory remarks. As there has been no
showing of a suppression of material evidence, there has been no
violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963). See
State v. Brown, 16-998 (La. 1/28/22), 347 So.3d 745, cert. denied, ___
U.S. ___, 143 S.Ct. 886 (2023). Thus, there has been no showing of
legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment
entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law.

Therefore, this court finds no error in the trial court’s ruling.
Accordingly, Defendant’s writ application is denied.

State v. Myers, 23-525 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/17/23) (unpublished writ).

Defendant was ultimately found guilty as charged for the three counts of

indecent behavior with juveniles and not guilty of sexual battery. Defendant filed

motions for new trial and for post-verdict judgment of acquittal, both of which were

denied prior to sentencing. On December 4, 2023, the trial court sentenced

Defendant to five years at hard labor on each of the three counts of indecent behavior

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with juveniles; additionally, the trial court ordered that the sentences run

consecutively.

On December 13, 2023, Defendant filed a “Motion to Reconsider Sentence”

in which he asked that his sentences be run concurrently, arguing his age and the

fact the crimes “were perpetrated upon the same person, and were part of a common

plan or scheme concerning the minor.” On January 8, 2024, Defendant filed a

“Motion for New Trial” on the grounds that one of the six jurors in his case, Joseph

Fontenot, testified during voir dire that he did not know anyone in law enforcement

and that he himself was not in law enforcement despite being a member of the

Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s Posse, which entitled him to carry a commission card

and badge.

A hearing on both motions was held on March 29, 2024. The trial court denied

the “Motion to Reconsider Sentence” before hearing testimony regarding the

“Motion for New Trial.” Prior to Mr. Fontenot testifying, he was informed that lying

under oath was perjury, a felony offense, and informed of his rights to an attorney

and to avoid self-incrimination; however, the State explicitly stated it would not

charge him with perjury. Following testimony in which Mr. Fontenot claimed that,

because the jury questionnaire asked if anyone in his “immediate family” was in law

enforcement, he answered no because he did not think the question was referring to

himself, only to his family member, the trial court denied the “Motion for New

Trial.” The trial court specifically noted that the question being argued over was

number twelve on the jury questionnaire and clarified that the question was “do any

of your immediate family members work in law enforcement or in the court system?”

Due to the wording, the court found that Mr. Fontenot did not commit any omission

“intenti[on]ally or otherwise.”

6

On appeal, Defendant raises six assignments of error: (1) the prosecutor

improperly vouched for the credibility of his witnesses, (2) the trial court improperly

denied his challenge for cause as to juror Rachel Ardoin based on her status as a

dialysis nurse who treats the victim’s grandfather, (3) Defendant’s second trial

should have been barred by double jeopardy since the first mistrial was based on the

State’s misconduct during voir dire, (4) the trial court erred in denying Defendant’s

request for a mistrial when the victim’s evidence disclosed additional information to

the State after trial had begun, (5) Defendant should have received a new trial

because juror Joseph Fontenot did not disclose his membership in the Evangeline

Parish Sheriff’s Posse during voir dire, and (6) there was insufficient evidence to

support his convictions.

ANALYSIS

Law of the Case Doctrine:

Defendant has sought relief from this court from the trial court’s rulings on

his original mistrial, the trial court’s refusal to quash the indictment after mistrial,

and after the trial court refused to strike Mrs. Ardoin for cause. Because these issues

are raised in this appeal, it behooves us to discuss the doctrine of law of the case.

The doctrine of law of the case applies at the trial and appellate court levels.

With regard to an appellate court, the “law of the case” refers to
a policy by which the court will not, on a subsequent appeal, reconsider
prior rulings in the same case. This policy applies only against those
who were parties to the case when the former appellate decision was
rendered and who thus had their day in court. Among reasons assigned
for application of the policy are: the avoidance of indefinite relitigation
of the same issue; the desirability of consistency of the result in the
same litigation; and the efficiency, and the essential fairness to both
parties, of affording a single opportunity for the argument and decision
of the matter at issue.

Nevertheless, the law-of-the-case principle is applied merely as
a discretionary guide: Argument is barred where there is merely doubt

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as to the correctness of the former ruling, but not in cases of palpable
former error or so mechanically as to accomplish manifest injustice.
Further, the law-of-the-case principle is not applied so as to prevent a
higher court from examining the correctness of the ruling of the
previous court.

Day v. Campbell-Grosjean Roofing & Sheet Metal Corp., 260 La. 325, 330–31, 256

So.2d 105, 107 (1971) (footnotes omitted).

In Davis v. Jazz Casino Co., L.L.C., 03-276 (La. 6/6/03), 849 So.2d 497, the

supreme court reversed a court of appeal’s dismissal of an appeal on the issue of the

certification of a class after a separate panel denied writs on the same issue. In a per

curiam, the supreme court held:

The court of appeal erred in holding its earlier writ denial
resolved the issue presented on appeal. In Bulot v. Intracoastal Tubular
Services, Inc., 02-1035 (La. 6/14/02), 817 So.2d 1149, we held that
once a court of appeal declines to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction
by denying the writ, the court was without jurisdiction to affirm, reverse
or modify the judgment of the trial court. Thus, any language in the
court of appeal’s earlier writ denial purporting to find no error in the
trial court’s certification ruling is without effect.

Id. at 498. We note, however, that in deciding whether to exercise supervisory

jurisdiction in a matter, this court conducts a thorough review of the issues presented.

Thus, any statements that follow the declination of jurisdiction reflect language akin

to dicta, which can be persuasive authority. Moreover, just as a law review article,

treatise, or official comments regarding code articles may technically be “without

effect,” writ language may still possess the ability to elucidate, explain, or convince.

Therefore, simply because the words following the denial are not binding, that does

not mean, as Defendant urges, that this court “should not give any credence to any

language accompanying the denial”; we cannot pretend the words do not exist. Yet,

we must review the writ denials at least to the extent that they do not demonstrate

palpable error or accomplish manifest injustice.

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Assignment of error 3:

We will first address Defendant’s assignment of error regarding double

jeopardy. Defendant contends, “A person whose initial trial is reversed because of

prosecutorial misconduct cannot be tried a second time.” Defendant argues that

because his first trial ended in a mistrial based on the State’s use of an improper

hypothetical during voir dire, he is immune to prosecution a second time under the

principle of double jeopardy. As noted, this issue was addressed pre-trial, wherein

this court rejected Defendant’s argument. See Myers, 23-469. As discussed in the

prior assignment of error, this court has already addressed this issue, and Defendant

neither alleges the ruling was “clearly erroneous” nor provide any argument that this

court’s ruling was wrong.

Defendant again raises the argument he raised pretrial, namely, that the State’s

improper hypothetical caused his mistrial, so he should be immune from

prosecution. This is despite acknowledging that “[w]hile [Oregon v.] Kennedy[,

456 U.S. 667, 102 S.Ct. 2983 (1982),] and the few cases from Louisiana that have

considered this issue remain in favor of the re-trial approach[.]” His only argument

is that the fourth circuit affirmed the grant of a motion to quash where the prosecutor

intentionally brought out impermissible other crimes evidence, resulting in a

mistrial. See State v. Johnson, 95-2626 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/27/96), 684 So.2d 554.

The Johnson court simply stated, “The trial judge did make a factual finding that the

prosecutor’s conduct was intentional and not an inadvertent error. We cannot say

he abused his discretion.” Id. at 557. Defendant does not allege that the prosecutor

in the instant case intentionally caused the mistrial; instead he poses the hypothetical

claim that “[o]therwise, the State could see its case falling apart, trigger a mistrial

by ‘accident,’ and force an unlimited number of successive retrials.”

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Despite filing a reply brief to address the State’s argument on this issue,

Defendant still does not allege that the State intentionally posed an improper

hypothetical but instead continues to argue that any time the State causes a mistrial,

the defendant should be free from retrial. Simply put, Defendant cites a case where

the court found the prosecutor’s actions were intentional and thus barred retrial, to

argue that this court should ignore the question of whether the prosecutor’s actions

were intentional. This argument is illogical and asks this court to ignore established

jurisprudence just to benefit him. After reviewing the arguments by Defendant, we

conclude that no manifest injustice will occur by relying on the ruling in Defendant’s

writ; thus, we decline to revisit the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to

quash.

Assignment of error 6:

Defendant contends in his sixth assignment of error that the evidence was

insufficient to support his convictions. Because a determination in Defendant’s

favor on this issue would obviate the remaining assignments of error, we will shift

our analysis to it. See State v. Hearold, 603 So.2d 731 (La.1992).

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised
on appeal, the critical inquiry of the reviewing court is
whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); State ex rel.
Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559 (La.1983); State v.
Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v. Moody, 393
So.2d 1212 (La. 1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibilities of the witnesses, and
therefore, the appellate court should not second guess the
credibility determinations of the trier of fact beyond the
sufficiency evaluations under the Jackson standard of
review. See Graffagnino, 436 So.2d at 563, citing State v.
Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983). To obtain a

10

conviction, the elements of the crime must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Freeman, 01-997, pp. 2–3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/12/01), 801 So.2d
578, 580.

Furthermore, the testimony of a single witness is sufficient to
support a conviction “[i]n the absence of internal contradiction or
irreconcilable conflicts with physical evidence.” State v. Dixon, 04-
1019, p. 12 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/15/05), 900 So.2d 929, 936. The trier of
fact may accept or reject the testimony of any witness, and the
determination of the credibility of that witness, in whole or in part, is
left to its sound discretion and “will not be re-weighed on appeal.” Id.
at 936.

State v. F.B.A., 07-1526, pp. 1−2 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/28/08), 983 So.2d 1006, 1009

(alteration in original), writ denied, 08-1464 (La. 3/27/09), 5 So.3d 138. In order to

assess the sufficiency of the evidence, we must recount the evidence adduced.

The State’s first witness was Deputy Duane Jorden of the Evangeline Parish

Sheriff’s Office. Deputy Jorden, a detective when the initial complaint against

Defendant was made in 2020, was assigned to investigate. According to Deputy

Jorden, he spoke with K.S.’s parents first, then contacted the Child Advocacy Center

(CAC) in Alexandria, Louisiana, which is responsible for conducting forensic

interviews of juveniles, to schedule an interview of K.S.

K.S. was fourteen at the time of the complaint and interview. Deputy Jorden

observed the CAC interview via video while it occurred but found it hard to

understand K.S. because she was wearing a mask, per “pandemic protocols.”

Deputy Jorden testified that he spoke with K.S. at the sheriff’s office the day

after the CAC forensic interview to address his inability to understand K.S. during

the video interview. Deputy Jorden noted that K.S.’s parents were present during

the interview at the sheriff’s office but did not believe they were attempting to coach

her or dictate her answers.

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After the second recorded interview, Deputy Jorden visited the victim’s

family business, where the offenses were alleged to have occurred. Deputy Jorden

testified that the back end of the family’s property contained sheds for storage of the

victim’s father’s planes and farming equipment, noting that the victim’s father was

a farmer and crop duster.

While reviewing photographs that he took at the family’s property, Deputy

Jorden pointed out that of the sheds that held a plane and an RV, which K.S. later

told them was the location of one of the incidents between herself and Defendant.

The photographs were accepted as State’s Exhibit 1 in globo.

Deputy Jorden then moved to an area referred to by the victim’s family as “the

gully,” stating that it was on a dirt road behind the family property. While Deputy

Jorden was at the gully with the parents, the victim joined them on a side-by-side.

K.S. showed Deputy Jorden multiple places where Defendant, whom K.S. called

“Mr. Johnny,” would go and drink. Deputy Jorden gave the following description

of the area:

It’s a dirt area with gullies and in the gullies, I did see a turtle
trap and when you walk a little bit further down, it’s a wooded area. []
inside the wooden [sic] area it’s like a -- appeared to be a -- tracks, []
and that’s where the -- Mr. Johnny would park his vehicle, his four-
wheeler.

Deputy Jorden identified a number of photographs that he took of the gully

area, including a few showing beer bottles from Defendant and tire tracks that he

described as consistent with an ATV. Deputy Jorden testified that neither of K.S.’s

parents attempted to influence his investigation while examining the scene.

According to Deputy Jorden, no rape kit or DNA was collected from the victim due

to the delayed reporting. Deputy Jorden noted that it was possible to see Defendant’s

home, located down a dirt road near the gully, from certain parts of the wooded area.

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According to Deputy Jorden, K.S. seemed nervous and reluctant to speak with

strangers during her CAC interview; however, when she met with him the following

day, she was a little more comfortable. He described her as “a lot more

comfortable[]” when he spoke with her at the gully area. Deputy Jorden testified

that he interviewed K.S. an additional time alongside Deputy Casey Johnson, a

female officer. Again, K.S.’s parents were present, although not in the same room.

The State then published State’s Exhibit 3, K.S.’s first CAC interview, to the

jury.

The video of K.S.’s first interview was from November 16, 2020, when she

was fourteen, and lasted twenty-eight minutes. When asked about why she was at

the CAC, K.S. referred to “Mr. Johnny Myers” and stated that it started with him

hugging her when he saw her at “the shop,” then he would kiss her on the head, then

it “expanded.” She clarified “the shop” was her father’s shop where he kept his

plane and farm equipment, noting Defendant was an employee of her dad. She stated

the first time she remembered Defendant kissing her on the head was around six or

seven months prior to the interview.

According to K.S., Defendant got hurt, then after he returned to work, he

kissed her on the lips while they were between two of the sheds on her family’s

property. K.S. stated that she had been riding around on a motorbike, and when she

stopped, Defendant came over and kissed her. She did not remember if he said

anything afterward. She then stated he said, “good night.” She stated that for four

or five days, they would meet on the farm road, and he would kiss her, and they

would talk. K.S. stated that Defendant began touching her breasts, noting once was

with her clothes on and twice were under her clothes. She stated these occurred on

different days.

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In describing the first time Defendant touched her breasts, K.S. stated that

Defendant was kissing her on her breast area and touching her under her clothes.

K.S. stated she took her shirt off while Defendant was trying to touch her under it,

that he then took his shirt off, then it ended, and she returned home. She stated he

did not have her do anything to his body. K.S. indicated that on another occasion

Defendant kissed her on the breast then “put his head” between her legs, both with

and without clothes. She clarified that he was kissing the inside of her legs/thighs.

Again, she stated Defendant had his shirt off, and all she did to him was kiss him on

the lips. She described the event as occurring around when the sun was setting. K.S.

stated that Defendant told her he “was fixed” and described his wife as “a bitch.”

K.S. stated that her parents found out about the relationship shortly before the

interview and stated the last time she saw Defendant was less than two weeks before

the interview. She stated that Defendant kissed her on her breasts on four or five

separate occasions and that he kissed her on the thighs on two occasions, once with

clothes on and once without. She claimed the only other place he touched her was

on her thighs. She stated Defendant never took off more than his shirt.

Deputy Jorden’s November 17, 2020 interview with K.S. was also published

to the jury. K.S. said that she did “not really” feel uncomfortable the first time

Defendant kissed her. She indicated that she would ride down the dirt road, and

Defendant would come meet her because he could see dust flying from where she

was riding. She stated that the first two times Defendant met her, he kissed her but

nothing else. Then the next time, she indicated that Defendant kissed her on her

breasts, on the skin, after she took her shirt off. She stated he did not touch her

anywhere else “that time.” K.S. stated that she and Defendant did not discuss sex.

She then indicated that “the next time,” she took all of her clothes off, on her own,

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and Defendant kissed her on her thighs. K.S. stated that Defendant never touched

her below the waist, aside from the kisses on her thighs.

Defendant told her he would treat her “like a queen” and that he would never

hurt her. She repeated that he never did any more than kiss her between her thighs

and on her breasts. She stated that when he was kissing her thighs, she told him to

stop, and he stopped without saying anything. K.S. stated that she told her sister and

another friend that Defendant had kissed her but that she did not go into any other

details. After her father mentioned her telling her parents about it, K.S. stated that

Defendant had at some point told her he was going to divorce his wife and marry

her.

Deputy Jorden testified that K.S. was much more open and talkative when he

subsequently met the family at their property to examine the areas where K.S. and

Defendant had met. Deputy Jorden testified that no one ever told him it would be

inappropriate to interview a juvenile victim multiple times or to send her for a second

CAC interview, which also occurred in this case. Deputy Jorden noted that, between

November 17, 2020 and subsequent interviews, he spoke with K.S.’s sister, her

brother, her friend, and her maternal grandmother. He reported that the grandmother

told him about catching Defendant hugging and kissing K.S.

K.S.’s second interview at the CAC was on March 19, 2021, roughly four

months after her initial interview. Again, K.S. reported that physical contact

between her and Defendant began with him hugging her every day, then progressed

to kisses on the forehead, to kisses on the cheeks, to kisses on the lips. This time,

however, K.S. stated that Defendant took her shirt off and began touching and

kissing her breasts. She also reported him touching her on the inside of her thighs.

15

K.S. then stated that she and Defendant went to the gully, where Defendant

removed her pants and kissed her thighs. She also stated that the first time this

happened, Defendant put his fingers inside her “private part.” According to K.S.,

on a separate occasion, Defendant put his fingers inside her “private part” then “put

his private part inside [hers].” K.S. stated that the last time she saw Defendant at the

gully, he just took her shirt off and touched and kissed her breasts. She also stated

that Defendant “kissed her under the shed” when she subsequently saw him at her

father’s shop. She also claimed that Defendant told her that he was “fixed,” could

not have kids, and that he could not get her pregnant. She also stated that Defendant

“pulled his pants down” on at least two other occasions. K.S. also noted that she

believed her grandmother, her “Mimi,” saw Defendant kiss her on another occasion

after he delivered hay. K.S. told the interviewer on that occasion that Defendant had

told her he “wanted to throw [her] on the hay and take all of her clothes off.” She

testified that incident was a few days before Defendant put his fingers inside her the

first time.

K.S. stated that the first time Defendant removed her clothes was at the

intersection between the shop and the gully. K.S. stated it was not a planned

meeting; he was just there when she was riding around the property. She stated that

she stopped her side-by-side to speak with Defendant, who then approached her,

took her shirt off, lifted her bra, and sucked on her breasts. She stated that he did

the same thing a few days later when he kissed on her thighs and put his fingers

inside her. A few days later, at the gully, Defendant again put his fingers inside K.S.

before putting his “private part” inside her as well. K.S. clarified that Defendant put

his penis inside her and that it was “uncomfortable.” K.S. testified that Defendant

stopped because he got a cramp “in his butt cheek,” and then both of them left the

16

gully area. She also stated this was the occasion where Defendant called his wife a

bitch and said he wanted to marry K.S.

K.S. stated that she was in her parents’ RV one day listening to music when

Defendant came inside, and they kissed on the lips. K.S. stated the first time

something happened was after Defendant had injured his ribs. She also claimed the

last time something happened was three days before her parents found out. She

indicated the relationship lasted around a year. She clarified that Defendant only put

his penis inside her on one occasion. According to K.S., she was wearing jeans and

a t-shirt the day Defendant put his penis inside her. She believes that on the other

occasion where he put his fingers inside her, she was wearing shorts. K.S. stated

that on the occasion where Defendant put his penis inside her, he took off her shirt

while she took off her pants and underwear all at once.

Afterward, K.S. noticed blood in her underwear, so she washed all of her

clothes. According to K.S., nothing came out of Defendant’s penis, nor did he have

anything on it.

K.S. stated that she had not seen Defendant since her parents found out about

the relationship. She stated that her parents found out because she had told a friend

about the interactions with Defendant, and the friend’s mother looked through her

phone. K.S. stated that Defendant kissed her on the lips inside the rice tractor during

rice season. K.S. stated that she felt Defendant kissed her every couple of days. She

recalled Defendant putting his tongue in her mouth once, before the incidents at the

gully. She also stated he had one hand under her shirt and his other arm around her

waist.

K.S. stated that Defendant gave her a bottle of strawberry wine as a gift, which

he hid behind some things in the refrigerator at the shop so she could drink it. She

17

said that Defendant claimed he would have slept with her at her house if he had been

allowed to do so during the hurricane; however, he did not sleep at the house. K.S.

related a story about Defendant telling her that his wife was going to be at work for

three days and inviting her to go to his house and shower with him, but she did not

go. According to K.S., Defendant would always remove her shirt and bra when he

felt her breasts, noting it happened more than twice.

On cross-examination, Deputy Jorden acknowledged that his rank had been

demoted from Captain at the time of the initial complaint to Sergeant at the time of

trial. Deputy Jorden testified that he spent about seven years in the criminal

investigation division before switching to traffic, noting that although he

investigated a few juvenile sex crimes prior to the instant case, he was never given

any training on interviewing juvenile victims. Deputy Jorden also acknowledged

that when he interviewed K.S.’s older sister, she told him that K.S. always said that

she was joking about Defendant and also that K.S. would make up stories that were

impossible and could not have happened.

Deputy Jorden testified that he again interviewed K.S. on November 18. And

that, K.S.’s parents took her for a medical examination the next day. He noted,

however, that neither he nor anyone else from the Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s Office

attended the examination. Deputy Jorden also acknowledged that the report

prepared by the nurse practitioner indicated that K.S. had reported no prior sexual

activity, and the nurse found no evidence of prior sexual activity.

Deputy Jorden acknowledged that, after Defendant posted bail on the initial

charges for which he was arrested on November 19, 2020, he sought a new arrest

warrant to increase the charges against Defendant. He acknowledged that the

affidavit for arrest was virtually identical to the original warrant and that no

18

additional information had been obtained between the initial arrest and the

subsequent arrest, he simply added additional counts.

In response to defense counsel’s questions about the November 18, 2020

interview, Deputy Jorden identified State’s Exhibit 6, a recording of the interview

conducted by himself and Deputy Casey Jorden on November 18, 2020, which was

published to the jury.

In State’s Exhibit 6, K.S. stated the relationship between herself and

Defendant began with him hugging her, then a few weeks later, he started kissing

her on the head. Later, it progressed to him touching and kissing her breasts with

her clothes off. She stated the incidents where she took her clothes off happened at

the gully. She stated Defendant would also take his shirt off. She then noted that

she would take her pants off, and Defendant would kiss the inside of her thighs. She

also stated that he stuck his fingers inside her “private part,” which she clarified was

her vagina. She then stated that he put his “private part” inside her vagina but

stopped because it was uncomfortable. She stated they never tried that again. She

also claimed that he kissed her once inside the truck while her dad was driving a

“dozer.” K.S. told the officers that Defendant always gave her a “regular” kiss, that

he did not open his mouth or put his tongue in her mouth.

She again told the story that Defendant had put a bottle of wine in the shop

refrigerator for her. At Deputy Johnson’s prompting, K.S. claimed that Defendant

would ride in the tractor with her while harvesting rice and would kiss her while

touching her thigh whenever her father’s combine was facing away from them. She

also confirmed a story her father had related to law enforcement about a time when

she was driving the truck, with Defendant inside. They were behind her dad,

19

following slowly, and she clarified it was because she stopped the truck for

Defendant to kiss her.

K.S. claimed that the incident where Defendant put his penis inside her

occurred about a month before the interview. She told Deputy Jorden that nothing

happened between her and Defendant at the RV aside from him, kissing her. She

also stated that Defendant, when he met her at the gully, would hide his four-wheeler

so that her parents could not see that he was there. K.S. also repeated the claim that

Defendant called his wife “a bitch,” and that her Mimi saw Defendant kiss her on

the lips when he delivered hay and told her he wanted to throw her on the hay and

take off all her clothes, although he did not do it.

K.S. clarified that Defendant kissed her on the thighs, while her clothes were

on. Once, she stated, Defendant kissed her on the thighs without her clothes, put his

fingers inside her, and put his penis inside her all on the same occasion.

The State’s next witness was K.S. A hearing was conducted pursuant to

La.Code Evid. art. 601 to determine her competency. Her testimony was

substantively consistent with the interviews she gave at CAC and to Deputies Jorden

and Johnson. In addition to the pertinent details of the Defendant’s behavior, K.S.

admitted to lying to her grandmother about her and Defendant, as well as her younger

sister. She admitted that she did not tell the nurse who examined her about

Defendant.

On cross-examination, K.S. testified that she sometimes talked about boys

with a friend and one of her sisters; during those conversations she would talk about

what happened between herself and Defendant but would always claim she was

joking when pressed by the other girls. She acknowledged that Defendant never told

her to keep the relationship a secret.

20

Scott Fontenot, the Chief Deputy of the Evangeline Parish Sheriff’s Office,

testified that he became involved in the case when he sat in on a recorded interview

between Deputy Jorden and Defendant, which was subsequently published to the

jury.

In the interview, Defendant confirmed that his name is Sidney John Myers but

acknowledged that “Johnny” was his nickname. Defendant began by stating that he

and K.S. “were friends” but that they did not have a “relationship.” He stated that

he went to the gully area “almost every day.” He and K.S. would just sit and talk

when she met him. According to Defendant, he would park his four-wheeler in the

woods because he did not like leaving it where people could see it; however, he

struggled to identify anyone, other than the family, who might be near the area.

Defendant claimed that he never went to the gully to meet K.S., that he was

often there before she was. Deputy Jorden then told Defendant that he “was seen”

with K.S. with indecent behavior happening. When asked about described by K.S.,

Defendant said “absolutely nothing” happened during many of them. He did,

however, admit that he “got a hug” and maybe a kiss on the cheek when he delivered

hay to K.S.’s grandmother. Defendant told Deputies Jorden and Fontenot that the

only physical contact between himself and K.S. was hugs and kisses on his cheek.

Deputy Jorden then told Defendant that “someone” had reported seeing him

touching K.S. on the legs, her breasts, and having sex with her. The deputies

repeatedly told him that he was facing twenty-five to ninety-nine years in prison.

Defendant outright denied most of the things that K.S. claimed he said or did and

maintained that he was falsely accused. Defendant claimed that he “wasn’t the

predator”; he “was the one being stalked.” He claimed that every time he went

somewhere during work, K.S. would follow him.

21

On cross-examination, Deputy Fontenot testified the interview of Defendant

was the only interview in which he participated in the instant case.

Corporal Tib Guillory, an agent with the Department of Wildlife and Fisheries

Enforcement Division, testified that he was familiar with the setting and operating

of turtle traps. Agent Guillory testified that he often received calls from private

citizens to check on possible illegal hunting, fishing, and trapping. In November of

2020, he received such a call from Mr. S. regarding turtle trapping on his property.

Agent Guillory testified that he and another officer found a single turtle trap in the

“gully” area that had been described by prior witnesses. According to Agent

Guillory, the trap they found was not connected to anything on the bank, as would

be typical; however, there was dry-rotted, nylon string attached to one of the trees.

Agent Guillory testified the trap was standing up as opposed to laying in the water,

so it would not have caught anything because nothing could get into it. He opined

the trap had likely been unattended “for weeks or maybe even months.” On cross-

examination, Agent Guillory testified based on its orientation and condition, no one

could have been trapping turtles with the trap he found.

Ms. Twila Trahan, Mr. S.’s former secretary, testified that K.S. often rode her

bike or four-wheeler to the office where she worked near the airplane hangar and

would chat with the employees. Ms. Trahan recalled an incident where K.S. gave

her a hug as she was leaving, and Defendant told K.S. she forgot something while

tapping his cheek, and K.S. gave him a kiss on the cheek.

The State then called K.S.’s maternal grandmother, who related the story of

the day Defendant drove a truck full of hay to her horse farm, noting that she,

Defendant, and K.S. were in the horse barn about fifty feet away from where other

workers were stacking the hay. K.S.’s grandmother started walking toward where

22

the hay was being stacked, then turned back around to find Defendant and K.S.

“embraced.” “They both had their arms both arms, around each other.” She also

testified that Defendant and K.S. were “giving each other a kiss” and that they

quickly disengaged when she turned around and looked at them. K.S.’s grandmother

testified that she “just thought it was odd” and spoke to K.S. about the situation.

K.S. told her that she and Defendant “give each other a kiss and a hug every day.”

She stated that she did not mention the episode to K.S.’s parents because K.S.

explained the situation satisfactorily.

During trial, an issue arose regarding K.S.’s counseling records. As a result,

a hearing was held outside the presence of the jury regarding K.S.’s counseling

history; specifically, the fact that her father informed the State during trial that K.S.

had seen a counselor regarding her relationship with Defendant. According to Mr.

S., the victim’s father, K.S. had begun to see Ms. Candase Martel in February of

2023. Mr. S. testified that K.S. saw Ms. Martel for “family counseling,” stating that

“I don’t even know what’s been talked about, to be honest with you.” He did note,

however, that he informed Ms. Martel of the issues with Defendant during intake.

He stated many times that the purpose of the counseling was to help K.S. with her

anxiety over her parents’ divorce. He also noted the counseling was for both K.S.

and her younger brother. Furthermore, he indicated that he disclosed to the State for

the first time during trial that K.S. had seen Ms. Martel. Mr. S. reiterated that K.S.

was not brought to counseling for sexual abuse but to deal with family issues arising

from his divorce.

Mrs. S., K.S.’s mother, was then called and testified that, as far as she was

aware, the only two counselors K.S. had spoken to were Mary Dean and Candase

23

Martel. She stated she did not know what type of therapy K.S. was receiving because

“[Mr. S.] did not consult [her].”

Prior to trial resuming, Defendant filed a motion for mistrial based on the

State’s disclosure, less than an hour after learning about the issue, that K.S. had

begun to see Ms. Candase Martel for family counseling in February of 2023.

Defendant argued the mid-trial discovery of additional counseling records for K.S.

created a legal defect which would render any trial outcome reversible as a matter

of law. Specifically, Defendant argued that knowing about the additional counseling

“would have changed our v[oi]r dire[,] we would’ve changed our opening, we would

have changed our cross examination techiniques [sic] in this matter to include these

issues.” The trial court ultimately denied the motion for mistrial, finding no

intentional suppression of evidence by the State and, furthermore, finding no

evidence that was material, exculpatory, or impeaching. Defendant sought review

with this court and, as previously noted, received no relief. Myers, 23-525.

Mrs. S. testified that she knew Defendant because he had worked for her

husband for roughly five years. At some point in 2020, she observed Defendant and

K.S. sitting in the back of a dusty truck and when K.S. stood up, Defendant began

“rubbing her butt and dusting off her backside.” Mrs. S. testified that she did not

confront either person but noted that “something wasn’t right about that. He should

not have felt comfortable enough to touch my daughter [sic] butt.” She believed the

incident took place sometime in June.

According to Mrs. S., as the summer went on, she noticed K.S.’s behavior

change, as K.S. spent large amounts of time bathing and sleeping, stopped eating

with the family, lost weight, and started having “black circles under her eyes.” Mrs.

S. also related a time when she was bathing and K.S. asked her questions about

24

whether a man could “be fixed” and told her Defendant had a conversation with her

in which he told her he was fixed “like her dad,” and that did not sit well with her.

Mrs. S. confronted Defendant about his relationship with K.S. She wore

K.S.’s favorite hoodie and drove K.S.’s side-by-side down the road leading to the

gully. Defendant showed up to meet her. She testified that Defendant denied any

relationship with K.S. Asked if she was angry, Mrs. S. responded, “I was angry and

I uh, I told him that I would -- that I would cut his [explicative] [explicative] off and

shove it down his own [explicative] throat and he just sat there and not -- didn’t say

anything, just looked at me. No explanation, nothing.” Mrs. S. testified that neither

she nor her ex-husband ever threatened or pressured the Sheriff to pursue charges

against Defendant.

On cross-examination, Mrs. S. acknowledged never relating the story about

Defendant touching K.S.’s butt to law enforcement prior to trial. She stated that no

one ever asked her to give a recorded or written statement. She disagreed with

defense counsel’s characterizations of her “interrogating” K.S. or “flanking her in

an interview.” Mrs. S. testified that she was not present when K.S. told a nurse that

she had no prior sexual activity.

Although Mrs. S. attributed K.S.’s withdrawal during the summer of 2020 to

a relationship with Defendant, she acknowledged that she and her husband’s

marriage was dissolving and there were serious conflicts within the family.

Mrs. S. acknowledged that, prior to trial, K.S. met with members of the

District Attorney’s Office several times to prepare, both at the office and at the

family home. Mrs. S. testified that K.S. made a mistake when she testified that she

had never been to counseling, as she had seen two counselors; however, she

attributed K.S.’s mistakes to defense counsel’s questioning. Mrs. S. testified that

25

the family had on-going family counseling but that they saw the counselor

separately, so she could not say what K.S. spoke to her counselors about.

The defense then recalled K.S. for recross-examination. She testified that she

met with members of the District Attorney’s Office “two or three times” about her

testimony prior to trial. She acknowledged that she had incorrectly stated that she

never went to counseling, claiming that she “froze up” during questioning. K.S. then

testified that she discussed “what happened to [her] with Mr. Johnny” with her first

counselor, Ms. Mary Dean. Defendant then renewed objections regarding being

surprised about counseling during trial and sought a mistrial, which was denied. The

State and Defendant then entered a stipulation that “there is no evidence, no record

at all” of K.S. receiving counseling for sexual abuse during her sessions with either

Ms. Mary Dean or Ms. Candase Martel.

The State then called Mr. S. as a witness. Mr. S. testified that Defendant

helped build the family house in 2010 before going to work directly for Mr. S. for

about five or six years. According to Mr. S., the RV kept in the shed near the farm

equipment and plane was “always unlocked.” He related an incident that occurred

in 2020 where he was talking with his workers about what needed to be done that

day, noting that they were talking for thirty to forty-five minutes. He testified that

he saw K.S. come out of the rear of the RV “with a worried look on her face.” After

fussing at K.S. and sending her back to the house, he noticed Defendant, whom he

did not even realize was present that day, by the front of the RV. He testified that

he was concerned because he was there for about forty-five minutes and did not see

either of them during that time.

Mr. S. testified that he first learned about the allegations from his wife. He

and Mrs. S. went to the Sheriff’s Office the next day. After describing the location

26

of the gully, Mr. S. noted that the gully is concealed so that someone at his house

could not see if someone was at the gully. Despite Ms. Martel’s intake notes

indicating that Mr. S. told her K.S. had seen a counselor for sexual abuse counseling,

Mr. S. testified that he did not know of any counselor K.S. had ever spoken to

regarding sexual abuse.

The State’s next witness was Dana Batts, a nurse practitioner. Ms. Batts

testified that she saw K.S. in 2020 for a wellness visit. She noted that the initial

intake and history collection was done by an intake nurse, not herself. She noted

that on the day of the exam, the intake nurse recorded K.S. as reporting she was not

sexually active. She testified that no questions were asked relating to contact

between Defendant and K.S. because that information had not been related to her

prior to the wellness exam.

The State then rested.

Janice Myers, Defendant’s wife, was called as his first witness. She testified

that Defendant worked different jobs throughout their marriage, noting that he

eventually obtained a residential contractor’s license and operated a business

building homes. In February of 2014, Defendant had a total knee replacement, then

had multiple aneurysms near the end of his recovery. According to Mrs. Myers, the

surgery to fix Defendant’s aneurysms left him impotent. She testified that Defendant

did not take medicine to treat his impotence because his doctors told him doing so

could harm him or potentially kill him.

Mrs. Myers and Defendant had not had sex since 2014, and she has not seen

Defendant attain an erection since. As a result of the aneurysm, Defendant did not

work for three years, until he went to work for Mr. S. Mrs. Myers noted Mr. S.’s

27

airplane hangar “is about three quarters of a mile from where [she and Defendant]

used to live.”

Mrs. Myers testified that while working for Mr. S., Defendant typically went

to work between 6:00 and 6:30 a.m. and typically got home by 5:00 p.m. during the

winter; however, during the summer he was typically not home until 7:00 or 8:00

p.m. According to Mrs. Myers, she and Defendant would typically take care of their

animals and discuss their days when he got home, then Defendant would go check

his turtle traps in the bayou. She could not give a definitive answer to how often

Defendant checked on the traps, although she indicated it was at least weekly. She

testified that Defendant was typically dirty and smelly when he returned from the

traps, particularly when he caught turtles or rebaited the traps.

Mrs. Myers testified that she found out about the allegations against

Defendant on November 12, 2020, the day she buried her mother. She testified that,

after Mr. S. and Mrs. S. confronted Defendant at the gully about the allegations, he

came home upset, angry, and hurt. Mrs. Myers testified that later, Duane Jorden and

another officer came to her home looking for Defendant, who was out hunting.

When Defendant got home, he went to the Sheriff’s Office without an attorney

to give a statement at which time he was arrested; Mrs. Myers was informed by

Duane Jorden that Defendant had been arrested. Mrs. Myers testified that she filed

for divorce:

Because the officers lead [sic] me to believe that he -- they had hard
evidence, they had video evidence, there is [sic] cameras that had
caught him in the act of doing things to this little girl, [] and that he had
uh a full confession. It was recorded, it was documented and that he
did not want to speak to me or my family or even see us.

28

Mrs. Myers testified that she halted the divorce proceedings once she realized law

enforcement had been lying to her. She testified that she and Defendant were still

married and living in a new home.

Defendant testified on his own behalf. He believed he went to work for Mr.

S. at the end of 2015. Defendant noted that, while working for Mr. S., he worked

both in the airplane hangar and with farm equipment. Defendant testified that he

would check his turtle traps two or three times a week, unless the gully was too

flooded to reach them. He noted that, due to the fields all around the gully being

flushed, the gully often flooded even without heavy rain. Defendant testified that

the last time he checked his traps, they were not left in the condition in which Agent

Guillory had found and photographed them.

According to Defendant, on the night they buried his mother-in-law, he went

to check his turtle traps. He was leaving when Mrs. S. drove up on a side-by-side,

got in his face, and started yelling at him about the things she claimed he did to K.S.;

he noted Mr. S. was in his truck and had followed Mrs. S. to the gully.

Defendant testified that the victim’s family kept horses behind the shed and

that whoever was feeding them, typically K.S., would feed them from a bucket

“under the shed.” Although he often spoke with K.S. when she was feeding the

horses, Defendant testified, the conversations were typically “five minutes maybe at

the most” because he was working. He acknowledged that he would sometimes give

her a hug or kiss on the cheek.

Defendant testified that his turtle traps were about one hundred yards back

from the farm road. He also stated that K.S. would sometimes come back to where

he was near the farm road but not all the way back to where his traps were.

According to Defendant, he would typically talk with his wife after work, feed

29

animals, eat dinner, then go check his traps; he noted he almost always “had a cold

Budweiser in hand” when he did so. He would drive his four-wheeler to the gully

to check the traps. Defendant testified that he kept pliers, string, and a crawfish sack

in a tray attached to the front of his four-wheeler for when he checked his traps.

Defendant testified that he never did “anything inappropriate” with K.S. and

that he did not touch her privates or allow her to touch his. He acknowledged that

the incident Mrs. S. reported happened but claimed he was touching K.S. purely to

get the dust off her shorts. Defendant testified that he had not achieved an erection

since his aneurysm-related surgery.

On cross-examination, Defendant acknowledged that K.S. was the only one

of the family’s five children whom he had ever hugged or kissed. Defendant did not

know if K.S. always using the same ATV because there were multiple side-by-sides,

multiple four-wheelers, and “everything was green.” He did not recall if Mrs. S. was

wearing a teal-colored hoodie when she confronted him, nor did he recall if K.S.

often wore a teal-colored hoodie. He testified that when he delivered hay to K.S.’s

grandmother, K.S. gave him a hug and a kiss on the cheek when he arrived but stated

that his arms were not around her. Defendant denied that he and K.S. would “meet

up” at the gully.

Defendant acknowledged that when he went to the gully, he would park his

four-wheeler in the woods to keep it off the road. Defendant testified that he did not

initiate the hug and kiss from K.S. in the presence of Twila Trahan. Defendant stated

that he felt K.S. was stalking him like a predator because she was always following

him around.

Defendant testified that the red flagging found nears the trees by the gully was

his and was there to indicate where the traps were; however, he did not tie the string

30

from the trap to the same branches as the flagging, stating the string “would have

been tied closer to the gully.” He did not see any string in the pictures taken by

Agent Guillory.

Amanda Chapoton was accepted, without objection, as an expert in the fields

of forensic interviewing and counseling. Ms. Chapoton testified that the purpose of

Child Advocacy Center interviews, to obtain an uninfluenced, unbiased interview

with a child, is best served by minimizing or eliminating anyone discussing the

allegations with the child before the interview takes place. Interviewing a child

multiple times is a big concern and should be highly structured, noting that

interviewers would often meet with the child without interviewing or questioning

just to build rapport, then the actual interview could take place at a subsequent

meeting.

Although Ms. Chapoton had some minor critiques of the initial CAC

interview of K.S., she felt typical forensic interview protocol was generally

followed. Ms. Chapoton testified that it is not unusual for a child, after a forensic

interview, to then disclose additional details, either because they remember more

things or because they were too nervous during the interview to reveal certain things.

However, she noted “the proper procedure is everybody is on the phone, we call the

CAC, we’re back in there, [] ASAP with exact same interviewer and we follow the

same procedure” as the first interview. Ms. Chapoton expressed concern about the

“why” of the second interview, why it took place at all, why it was at the Sheriff’s

Office and not the CAC. Although she felt forensic interviews should not be

conducted by someone in a uniform because it can give the impression the child is

in trouble, she noted that “being an officer in itself [] is not problematic if they’re

trained.” She was also confused by K.S.’s parents being present, noting that “parents

31

are never allowed in an interview [] at the Advocacy Center.” She testified that the

presence of parents during the interview can affect the child’s statement for various

reasons.

Ms. Chapoton noted that, in the interview K.S. gave at the sheriff’s office, she

was concerned and confused by Deputy Jorden jumping into questioning about the

same information that was discussed the day before during the CAC interview. She

was also concerned with the fact there was no mention of the prior day’s interview

at all. She also noted that Deputy Jorden repeatedly asked compound questions, did

not clarify which part of a question an answer applied to, then kept on firing

questions that were poorly worded, assumed information that had not been discussed

previously, and may have confused K.S. She testified that she was taken aback

when, without any discussion of sex prior or clarification as to what the term meant

to the child, Deputy Jorden just asked, “did he have sex with you?” during the

interview. She noted that, generally, K.S. was not allowed to give a narrative of

what happened because Deputy Jorden was leading the questioning. She

summarized the interview as having “more of an interrogation approach to it than a

forensic interview approach.”

Regarding the third interview, which was just two days after the first

interview, Ms. Chapoton again was concerned about why there was another

interview happening so soon, a question not answered during the interview. She was

also confused as to why the interview was in a different location and why a female

officer was introduced into the equation. She noted it greatly concerned her that

they started off doing a CAC interview then proceed to do multiple additional

interviews without any of the protocols utilized by forensic interviewers. Ms.

Chapoton took issue with Detective Johnson immediately interjecting the word

32

“naked” into the interview, something which was not mentioned in either of the first

two interviews. She noted, again, a failure to clarify words that were being used

during the interview, to clarify how K.S. knew something was what she said it was.

She was shocked by Detective Johnson introducing the term “vagina” into the

conversation, again without clarifying what she meant, or the word having been

mentioned during the two prior interviews.

Ms. Chapoton noted that Deputy Jorden then subsequently interjected “oral

sex” into the conversation without clarifying what that meant or checking to be sure

K.S. understood what he meant. She also noted the follow up questions were “very

leading, it was very suggestive.” She summed up the interviews:

I think it makes it very difficult to know what’s reliable
information, the integrity of all of the information now has been
jeopardized. [] [T]the reason we have protocols set up the way we do is
so that if something new is added or if there’s a difference again, we’re
using a line of questions to qualify that, so if let’s say, [] the child had
gone home and as I stated earlier, can happen, and either remembered
something new or felt comfortable enough to, to disclose something
new, [] and she’s back in the interview, the interviewer would probably
make that part of the interview. Can you tell me, why you didn’t share
this with me yesterday, and she would say why. But, can you tell me
what reason you maybe had, she would clarify that again on film,
because we know, right, we’re trained to think like attorneys, we’re
trained to think like DCFS, we’re trained to think like all of the
professionals and what pieces of information are going to come into
question [] later. So, we want them to clarify, you didn’t tell me this
yesterday, yet you said to me that this was everything, now you’re
telling me -- because we know that’s going to come into question, so
we want to give her the opportunity to explain herself and none of that
was able to be done either.

Regarding the second CAC interview, held in March of the following year,

Ms. Chapoton was confused as to why investigators went back to utilizing the CAC

after previously ignoring protocol multiple times. She also noted that in the second

CAC video, it is clear from the video that the interviewer is being repeatedly spoken

33

to by Deputy Jorden, directing and interrupting the interview via earpiece, which

was not present in the first CAC interview. Her ultimate conclusion was that:

I think unfortunately in a situation like this and it’s very
disheartening that it becomes more difficult to be able to say reliably
where the truth begins and ends because some many [sic] things have
been tainted in the way that things were asked and the multiple times
over and over again and that’s unfortunate.

The defense rested its case after Ms. Chapoton’s testimony.

After a rebuttal focused entirely on trying to prove Mr. S. did not influence

the way the Sheriff’s Office handled the case, the jury heard closing arguments and

received the case. As will be discussed below, Defendant had an issue with the

State’s closing argument. After deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty

of sexual battery and three guilty verdicts regarding the indecent behavior with a

juvenile charges.

In a relatively recent case involving indecent behavior with a juvenile, the

Louisiana Supreme Court noted:

To prove defendant guilty of indecent behavior with a juvenile, the
State was required to prove defendant committed any lewd or lascivious
act upon the person or in the presence of any child under the age of
seventeen with the intention of arousing or gratifying the sexual desires
of either person. R.S. 14:81(A), (A)(1). The ages of defendant and the
victim are not in dispute. In dispute is whether the evidence, when
viewed in the light most favor [sic] to the State under the due process
standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61
L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), supports the jury’s determination that defendant
acted in a manner that was lewd or lascivious and intended to arouse
his or [the victim’s] sexual desires.

“The word ‘lewd’ means lustful, indecent, lascivious, and
signifies that form of immorality which has relation to sexual impurity
or incontinence carried on in a wanton manner.” State v. Prejean, 216
La. 1072, 1078, 45 So.2d 627, 629 (1950). “The word ‘lascivious’
means tending to excite lust, lewd, indecent, obscene, relating to sexual
impurity, tending to deprave the morals in respect to sexual relations.”
Id. All manner of obnoxious behavior has been held to constitute “lewd
and lascivious conduct.” See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 43,063, p. 8 (La.
App. 2 Cir. 2/13/08), 975 So.2d 853, 858 (defendant groped the victim,

34

called her “baby”, and commented that he could not help himself); State
v. Guillory, 07-0422, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 3 Cir. 10/31/07), 970 So.2d 670,
672 (teacher brushed a student’s legs with papers and asked her if it
tingled and how it made her feel “below”); State v. Forbes, 97-1839,
pp. 3-4, 6-7 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/29/98), 716 So.2d 424, 427 (finding a
rational trier of fact can conclude defendant committed a lewd and
lascivious act by reaching under the victim’s t-shirt to touch her breasts
and reaching into her underpants to touch the area below her naval near
her vagina); State v. Sturdivant, 27,680, pp. 1-2 (La. App. 2 Cir.
2/28/96), 669 So.2d 654, 656 (a parent, while receiving a school tour,
made sexual comments to a 13-year-old and then groped her); State v.
Kohl, 524 So.2d 781, 784 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1988) (defendant’s rubbing
of his beard on crotch of sleeping victims sufficient to prove violation
of R.S. 14:81).

Here, defendant hugged the victim and kissed her on the cheek,
but did not touch her genitals. Although courts have found that mere
kissing or hugging alone does not rise to the level of lewd or lascivious,
see, e.g., State v. Louviere, 602 So.2d 1042 (La. App. 4 Cir.1992), writ
denied, 610 So.2d 796 (La.1993), defendant engaged in a subtle but
panoply of acts from which a jury, when viewing his conduct as a
whole, could rationally find his behavior was lewd or lascivious.
Notably, defendant also rubbed [the victim’s] thigh, slapped her on her
rear end, professed his love for her, and invited her to spend the night
with him. While defendant argues that the State failed to rule out the
reasonable hypothesis of innocence that by touching the girl he was
merely trying to comfort an upset runaway, his verbal expression of his
romantic feelings and his invitation to spend the night with him are at
odds with that hypothesis. A reasonable alternative hypothesis is not
one that merely “could explain the events in an exculpatory fashion,”
but one that, after viewing all of the evidence in a light most favorable
to the prosecution, “is sufficiently reasonable that a rational juror could
not ‘have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.
Captville, 448 So.2d 676, 680 (La. 1984) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia).
Finding that the court of appeal erred in substituting its appreciation for
the totality of defendant’s actions and statements in their context for
that of the jury, we reinstate the conviction for indecent behavior with
a juvenile. See generally State v. Bugbee, 34,524, pp. 7-8 (La. App. 2
Cir. 2/28/01), 781 So.2d 748, 755 (“Finding that an act is lewd or
lascivious depends upon the time, the place and all of the circumstances
surrounding its commission, including the actual or implied intention
of the actor.”) (further citation omitted).

State v. Shaikh, 16-750, pp. 2–4 (La. 10/18/17), 236 So.3d 1206, 1208–09.

The ages of Defendant and K.S. are not disputed. Whether, viewing the

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, the State proved that Defendant

35

committed lewd or lascivious acts with the intent of gratifying himself or K.S. is the

issue.

The testimony of K.S. establishes at least three incidents describing overtly

sexual contact between herself and Defendant. Defendant characterizes K.S.’s

testimony as inconsistent and contrary to the evidence as a whole and points out that

the State’s case rests wholly on K.S.’s testimony. The State counters that evidence

in the form of tire tracks and beer bottle at the gully corroborate K.S.’s testimony.

We disagree with the State’s assertion that this evidence corroborates K.S. Beer

bottles and tire tracks do not prove any liaison between Defendant and K.S. They

only prove that Defendant rode his four-wheeler to the scene and drank beer.

Defendant freely admitted this.

Defendant asserts that the violation of standard forensic interview protocols,

the confusing and leading questions posed to K.S. during a string of interviews, and

K.S.’s statement to the intake nurse at a wellness examination the day after she was

interviewed by Deputy Jorden in which she denied previous sexual activity

demonstrates her unreliability as a witness. However, the jury viewed all of K.S.’s

interviews. Ms. Batts explained that the examination of K.S. was not for the purpose

of determining whether K.S. had engaged in sexual activity. And the jury heard

K.S.’s direct testimony from the witness stand about all she claimed had taken place

and was able to observe her in order to get a better understanding of whether it felt

she was lying or insincere.

It is the jury’s prerogative to assess the credibility of the witnesses. F.B.A.,

983 So.2d 1006. Even Ms. Chapoton was clear that initial disclosure by a juvenile

victim of every detail of such encounters is uncommon. Knowing the flaws in the

State’s investigation, having viewed all of the interviews, having heard K.S.’s live

36

testimony, and having listened to Defendant tell his version of what happened, the

jury found K.S. to be credible enough that Defendant was convicted of three counts

of indecent behavior with a juvenile. This court is not well positioned to second-

guess the jury’s credibility assessments. Viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the prosecution, we conclude that it is sufficient to support Defendant’s

convictions.

Assignment of error 1:

Defendant complains that the prosecutor improperly vouched for the State’s

witnesses during rebuttal argument when he stated, “I won’t put a witness on a stand

that I think is lying.” Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 774 provides,

in pertinent part, “The argument shall be confined to evidence admitted, to the lack

of evidence, to conclusions of fact that the state or defendant may draw therefrom,

and to the law applicable to the case. The argument shall not appeal to prejudice.”

The prosecutor’s statement came in rebuttal after Defendant argued that K.S.

was “scripted to tell vomit, if you will, what she needed to say to you to try to get a

conviction.”

In State v. Willis, 05-218 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/05), 915 So.2d 365, writ denied,

06-186 (La. 6/23/06), 930 So.2d 973, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1052, 127 S.Ct. 668

(2006), the defendant was initially charged with multiple counts of aggravated rape,

among other violent sex offenses, committed against his stepdaughter, C.M., when

she was between the ages of ten and fifteen. During trial, the State dismissed one of

the aggravated rape charges, and during closing argument, defense counsel claimed

that the dismissal of the charge was evidence that the State overcharged Defendant.

Additionally, the victim’s mother was originally charged with numerous sex

offenses against C.M., too, but was allowed to plead guilty to a single charge while

37

the rest were dismissed. In closing, defense counsel contended the mother was lying

and would say anything to get out of jail. He also accused the victim of lying about

everything to benefit her uncle, one of the defendant’s business competitors.

In rebuttal, the prosecutor told the jury he dismissed the charge because he

“would not call upon you as a juror to consider a charge of this magnitude if I wasn’t

fully convinced of it and if I couldn’t prove it beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at

394. Furthermore, regarding the claim that the victim’s mother would say anything

to stay out of jail, the prosecutor commented, “I don’t know if you resent that or not

but as a person, I do. Because it means that I would have to promote this, condone

this.” Id.

This court found that the comments were not improper because they “came

after a discussion of the testimony at trial and the prosecutor did not imply that he

had personal knowledge of facts not presented to the jury which indicated the

Defendant’s guilt.” Id. at 397. Additionally, we held that the comments about the

dismissal of the charge “were made in order to rebut the statements made by defense

counsel and appear to explain the prosecutorial process and the burden of proof.”

Id. at 398. We went on:

“[A]n argument with regard to the credibility of a witness is
proper where the credibility of the witness is in question and the facts
bearing on the witness’ credibility appear in the record. State v. Sayles,
395 So.2d 695 (La.1981); State v. Procell, 365 So.2d 484 (La.1978),
cert. denied, 441 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2164, 60 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1979);
State v. May, 339 So.2d 764 (La.1976); State v. West, 319 So.2d 901
(La.1975).” State v. Brewer, 38,515, pp. 9–10 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/04),
880 So.2d 1005, 1011, writ denied, 04–2509 (La.2/18/05), 896 So.2d
27. The credibility of J.W. and C.M. was clearly at issue in this case.
The defense attorney pointed this out in his closing argument when he
informed the jury that the case hinged on the credibility of C.M. and
J.W. Accordingly, a comment by the prosecutor in reference to their
credibility was not improper.

Id. (alteration in original).

38

Defendant cites State v. Kaufman, 304 So.2d 300 (La.1974), in which the

defendant was charged with the murder of a gas station attendant in the course of a

robbery. The defendant asserted that the robbery and murder were committed by

another. During his closing argument, the prosecutor said:

“I don’t believe that Willie Holmes, a friend of Kaufman, confessed to
robbery and murder, unless it was true” (objection made by defendant),
then immediately a reference to Delores Williams as yet a third
participant in the killing (objection), then, “Gentlemen, my argument,
when I speak in a personal way, my argument is based on the evidence,
and believe me, that’s right, I personally feel from the evidence that I
have a case; otherwise, I wouldn’t be here, because it’s within my power
to be here or not be here” (objection).

Id. at 307. The objections were raised as to the prosecutor expressing his opinion as

to the defendant’s guilt. Relying upon La.Code Crim.P. art 774, the supreme court

held this argument improper, holding:

Partly based upon this statutory prohibition (but also for reasons
of fairness which extend beyond it), a prosecutor in Louisiana (as well
as in almost all other American jurisdictions) is prohibited from
expressing his personal opinion of the defendant’s guilt in his argument
to the jury. State v. Curry, 262 La. 280, 263 So.2d 36 (1972); State v.
Landry, 262 La. 32, 262 So.2d 360 (1972); State v. Sercovich, 246 La.
503, 165 So.2d 301 (1964); 2 Marr’s Criminal Jurisprudence of
Louisiana, Section 664 (1923); 5 Wharton’s Criminal Law and
Procedure, Section 2083 (Anderson ed., 1967); Annotation, 50
A.L.R.2d 766 (1968). Nevertheless, as these sources indicate, the
expression of such an opinion by the prosecutor is often held to be
nonreversible, if it is apparent to the jury that it is expressly or
impliedly only based on the evidence presented to the jury rather
than on personal knowledge of facts outside the record.

Wharton’s cited above at p. 245, explains the underlying reason
for this rule of most American jurisdictions: “It has sometimes been
stated, in support of the foregoing rules or holdings, that the assertion
of the prosecutor’s belief, opinion, or knowledge constitutes an
invasion of the province of the jury and a usurpation of its function to
declare the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is, however, a
merely technical or theoretical argument. The more practical and
substantial reasons or grounds of objection usually assigned are
that the statement complained of injects into the case irrelevant and
inadmissible matter or a fact not legally produced in evidence, and
adds to the probative force of the testimony adduced upon the trial the

39

weight of the prosecutor’s personal influence, knowledge,
professional opinion, or the influence of his official position.” (Italics
ours.)

Id. at 307–08 (emphasis added in bold). The court further noted that the offensive

remark in the prosecutor’s argument was the statement that he would not have

prosecuted the defendant if he felt he had no case. “This type of argument is an

attack on the presumption of innocence afforded all accused before our courts. It

emphasizes the function of the prosecutor as an officer of government and tends to

exploit it. Such an argument by the prosecutor is almost universally held to be

objectionable.” Id. at 308.

We find no incongruity between Kaufman and Willis. The distinction between

the two cases is that in Kaufman, the prosecutor invaded the jury’s province of

determining ultimate guilt or innocence as opposed to the Willis prosecutor, who

argued in favor of the witness’s credibility, which had been questioned by the

defense. This assignment lacks merit.

Assignment of error 2:

The second assignment of error addresses the trial court’s refusal to dismiss

Mrs. Ardoin as a juror for cause based upon her personal relationship with K.S.’s

family and rumors she had heard in the community.

Challenges of jurors for cause is governed by La.Code Crim.P. art 797, which

states:

The state or the defendant may challenge a juror for cause on the
ground that:

(1) The juror lacks a qualification required by law;

(2) The juror is not impartial, whatever the cause of his partiality.
An opinion or impression as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant
shall not of itself be sufficient ground of challenge to a juror, if he

40

declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial
verdict according to the law and the evidence;

(3) The relationship, whether by blood, marriage, employment,
friendship, or enmity between the juror and the defendant, the person
injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel, is such
that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in
arriving at a verdict;

(4) The juror will not accept the law as given to him by the court;
or

(5) The juror served on the grand jury that found the indictment,
or on a petit jury that once tried the defendant for the same or any other
offense.

Louisiana Constitution Article 1, § 17 guarantees an accused’s “right to full

voir dire examination of prospective jurors and to challenge jurors peremptorily.”

When a defendant uses all twelve of his peremptory challenges, an
erroneous ruling of a trial court on a challenge for cause that results in
depriving him of one of his peremptory challenges constitutes a
substantial violation of his constitutional and statutory rights, requiring
reversal of the conviction and sentence. See State v. Cross, 93–1189, p.
6 (La.6/30/95), 658 So.2d 683, 686; State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198,
225 (La.1993), overruled on other grounds by State v. Comeaux, 93–
2729 (La.7/1/97), 699 So.2d 16. Prejudice is presumed when a
challenge for cause is erroneously denied by a trial court and a
defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. State v. Robertson,
92–2660, p. 3 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 1278, 1280; State v. Ross, 623
So.2d 643, 644 (La.1993). Therefore, to establish reversible error
warranting reversal of a conviction and sentence, defendant need only
demonstrate (1) the erroneous denial of a challenge for cause; and (2)
the use of all his peremptory challenges. Cross, 93–1189 at 6, 658
So.2d at 686; Bourque, 622 So.2d at 225.

State v. Juniors, 03-2425, pp. 7–8 (La. 6/29/05), 915 So. 2d 291, 304–05.

Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 797(3) (emphasis added)

provides that a juror may be challenged for cause when “The relationship, whether

by blood, marriage, employment, friendship, or enmity between the juror and the

defendant, the person injured by the offense, the district attorney, or defense counsel,

is such that it is reasonable to conclude that it would influence the juror in arriving

41

at a verdict[.]” Relationships—even by blood—will not suffice to disqualify a juror

unless from the nature of the relationship one can reasonably conclude that it would

influence the juror. Juniors, 915 So.2d 291. On the other hand, “a prospective

juror’s statement that he or she will be fair and impartial is not binding on the trial

court. If the revealed details of the relationship are such that bias, prejudice or

impartiality may be reasonably inferred, a juror may be properly refused for cause.”

Id. at 306–07. Indeed, “A challenge for cause should be granted, even when a

prospective juror declares his ability to remain impartial, if the juror’s responses as

a whole reveal facts from which bias, prejudice or inability to render judgment

according to law may be reasonably implied.” State v. Jones, 474 So.2d 919, 926

(La.1985) (emphasis added), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2906 (1986).

In Juniors, 915 So.2d 291, a juror was challenged because the prosecuting

attorney was his landlord. The supreme court analyzed La.Code Crim.P. art. 797.

Because the landlord/ tenant relationship is not one specifically mentioned in article

797(3), “the relationship does not appear to be inherently suspect.” Id. at 308. A

trial court’s decision to not excuse a juror for cause is reviewed by an examination

of the responses of the juror as a whole and determining whether it reveals an abuse

of the trial court’s discretion. Id.

In State v. Brown, 496 So.2d 261 (La.1986), the supreme court found (in dicta)

that the trial court erred in denying a challenge for cause of a juror who knew the

victim’s parents and whose son dated the victim in high school. The juror said she

would have difficulty facing the victim’s family if she voted not guilty and was sure

the relationship would influence her. The juror also stated it would be hard to be

impartial and that her verdict would probably be affected. The supreme court held

that even though the juror said she could give the defendant a fair trial, “it was

42

unrealistic to conclude that her relationship. . . would not affect her deliberations in

reaching a verdict.” Id. at 264. Likewise, the supreme court found the trial court

erred in denying Brown’s challenge of another juror when the juror’s son played on

the same baseball team as the victim’s son. The juror stated that being on the jury

would probably cause him problems the next summer at the ballpark.

In State v. Guidry, 18-867 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/8/19), 271 So.3d 275, writ denied,

19-1363 (La. 7/24/20), 299 So.3d 66, the prospective juror’s wife was the stepsister

of the victim’s father and had known the victim’s father for over 30 years. The juror

said the relationship would not influence him as he had never met the victim and did

not know the victim’s family well. This court distinguished Brown because the juror

in Guidry unequivocally stated that his relationship with the victim’s family was not

close and that he could be impartial.

In State v. Hamilton, 12-204 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/20/13), 127 So.3d 76, writ

denied, 13-2925 (La. 5/30/14), 140 So.3d 1173, this court again distinguished Brown

because the juror in Hamilton never declared that she could not be fair and impartial.

The juror in Hamilton went to school with the deceased victim and saw him socially.

The juror’s father and the victim’s father were good friends. The juror said, however,

that she had not been in close contact with the victim’s family for a while.

In State v. Letulier, 97-1360 (La. 7/8/98), 750 So.2d 784, the supreme court

found the trial court properly excused a juror when the juror was close friends with

the victim’s daughter, and the juror’s wife was a cousin of the victim’s wife’s son.

The juror stated that he did not think he could be fair and impartial.

As discussed, this issue came before the court previously on writs. State v.

Myers, 23-502 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/10/23) (unpublished writ). This court ruled:

43

WRIT DENIED; STAY DENIED: Defendant seeks review of the
trial court’s August 7, 2023 denial of his challenge for cause of Juror
Rachel Ardoin. “A trial judge is vested with broad discretion in ruling
on challenges for cause, and such a ruling is subject to reversal only
when a review of the entire voir dire reveals the judge abused his
discretion.” State v. Dotson, 16-473, P. 5 (La. 10/18/17), 234 So.3d 34,
39. “The trial judge’s refusal to excuse a prospective juror on the
ground he is not impartial is not an abuse of discretion where, after
further inquiry or instruction (frequently called ‘rehabilitation’), the
prospective juror has demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide
the case impartially according to the law and the evidence.” Id. We
find Juror Ardoin demonstrated a willingness and ability to decide the
case impartially according to the law and evidence. Accordingly, we
find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s
challenge of Juror Ardoin. The writ application is denied, and the
request for a stay is denied.

We find no demonstrable palpable error or manifest injustice in the writ

panel’s ruling. Mrs. Ardoin indicated that she could put aside her relationships,

which she described as somewhat tenuous except for her treatment of K.S.’s

grandfather. Further, the six-person jury, of which Mrs. Ardoin was a member,

refused to convict Defendant of sexual battery. Accordingly, we find no merit in

this assignment of error.

Assignment of error 4:

Defendant contends that “[a] mistrial is proper when the State provides

exculpatory discovery several days into trial.” Mr. S. disclosed midway through trial

that K.S. had seen a second counselor, previously unknown to any of the attorneys.

Following a hearing, the trial court found that there was no evidence that the

counseling with the second counselor, Ms. Martel, was related to sexual abuse.

Accordingly, the trial court held there was no Brady violation and no reason for

mistrial. As previously noted, Defendant then took an emergency writ, contending

he was entitled to a mistrial because the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.

83, 83 S.Ct. 1194 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763

44

(1972), when it failed to disclose the fact that K.S. had been seeing Ms. Martel. This

court denied Defendant’s writ of review, noting that there was no evidence of a

Brady violation. See Myers, 23-525.

Defendant continues to refer to the State’s “concealment of evidence, in

violation of Brady.” The problem with that sentiment is that it directly contradicts

what actually happened at trial. There is no evidence to support the notion that the

State withheld evidence. The State disclosed the existence of the second counselor

the same day it found out about her, the day before the hearing. Brady, 373 U.S. at

87, held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused

upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to

punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” The

evidence in this case clearly established that the State did not suppress anything,

instead turning over the news of a second counselor immediately after discovery.

There was no suppression; therefore, there was no Brady violation and no

justification for granting a mistrial or going back now and granting Defendant a new

trial. After reviewing the arguments by Defendant, we find no manifest injustice

will occur by relying on the ruling in Defendant’s writ. Thus, we decline to revisit

the trial court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for mistrial.

Assignment of error 5:

Defendant contends he should be entitled to a new trial because “[a] member

of the Sheriff’s Posse should be stricken from the jury for cause.” Following

sentencing, Defendant learned that one of the jurors, Mr. Joseph Fontenot, “was a

member of the Sheriff’s Posse, carried a Sheriff’s commission card and badge, and

appeared in numerous photographs with the Sheriff.” Defendant contends he is

entitled to a new trial “[s]ince Fontenot failed to disclose these relationships with the

45

arresting entity and witness(es), Myers was never able to raise a cause objection or

even use a peremptory challenge. The juror’s concealment warrants reversal.”

Defendant raised this issue for the first time in a “Motion for New Trial” filed

on January 8, 2024, more than a month after he had been sentenced. Defendant’s

motion for new trial specifically invokes the language of La.Code Crim.P. art.

851(B)(4), which states that a new trial shall be granted when “[t]he defendant has

discovered, since the verdict or judgment of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in

the proceedings that, notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by the

defendant, was not discovered before the verdict or judgment.” Under La.Code

Crim.P. art. 853(A), “a motion for a new trial must be filed and disposed of before

sentence.” Although the article contains two exceptions that allow either a one-year

or three-year extension of time, neither applies to claims raised under La.Code

Crim.P. art. 851(B)(4). Accordingly, Defendant’s “Motion for New Trial” was

untimely filed. This court will not review the trial court’s ruling.

Error patent:

We are required to review all cases for errors that are patent on the face of the

record. La.Code Crim.P. art 920. We find one such error.

The sentencing transcript reflects that Defendant received a five-year sentence

on each of his three counts of indecent behavior with juveniles, to run consecutively.

The court minutes do not reflect that a five-year sentence was imposed on each

count, as stated in the sentencing transcript; rather, the court minutes state, “the

Court sentenced the defendant to five (5) years hard labor with the Department of

Corrections to run consecutive to each other.”

“[W]hen the minutes and the transcript conflict, the transcript prevails.” State

v. Wommack, 00-137, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, 369, writ denied,

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00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Accordingly, because the court minutes do

not properly reflect the sentences as stated in the sentencing transcript, the trial court

is instructed to amend the court minutes to reflect a five-year hard labor sentence

was imposed on each count of indecent behavior with juveniles.

DECREE

Defendant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed. The district court is

instructed to amend the court minutes to reflect a five-year hard labor sentence was

imposed on each count of indecent behavior with juveniles.

CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.

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