State of Louisiana v. Allen Hayes

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 24-436

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ALLEN HAYES

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APPEAL FROM THE
NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 351,851
HONORABLE WILLIAM GREGORY BEARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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LEDRICKA J. THIERRY
JUDGE

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Court composed of D. Kent Savoie, Gary J. Ortego, and Ledricka J. Thierry, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

J. Phillip Terrell, Jr., District Attorney
Kenneth A. Doggett, Jr., Assistant District Attorney
Rapides Parish
P.O. Box 7358
Alexandria, LA 71306-7358
(318) 473-6650
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P.O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602
(337) 491-0570
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Allen Hayes

THIERRY, Judge.

Defendant, Allen Hayes, appeals as excessive his sentence of twenty-five

years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence

for his conviction on one count of third-degree rape. For the following reasons, we

affirm Defendant’s sentence.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 16, 2021, Defendant, Allen Hayes, was charged with two counts of

third-degree rape, in violation of La.R.S. 14:43. The victim in count one was

identified as D.E., whose date of birth was November 18, 1997; the victim in count

two was K.B., whose date of birth was June 14, 1986.1 Defendant entered a plea of

not guilty to both charges. A “Motion for Severance of Offenses” was filed, which

after a contradictory hearing was denied. On September 18, 2023, the State filed a

“Notice of Intent Pursuant to La.C.E. Art. 412.2” in which it set forth its intent to

introduce evidence of two prior rapes committed by Defendant.

On January 23, 2024, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to count one, the

third-degree rape of D.E. The State agreed to dismiss the second charge of the bill,

the third-degree rape of K.B., and to leave sentencing entirely up to the discretion of

the trial court. A pre-sentencing hearing was held on February 14, 2024. At that

time, the State provided a written impact statement from D.E., as well as victim

impact testimony from B.B., the victim of one of the prior rapes the State had

planned to introduce at trial. Defense counsel submitted a statement from Pastor

Eugene Stevenson on Defendant’s behalf.

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In accordance with La.R.S. 46:1844(W), the victims of sex offenses are referred to by
their initials.

The Court laid out the following prior to sentencing:

As a summary of these acts, the rape of D.E. forms the one count
of the defendant’s guilty plea. Paraphrasing from the affidavit of
probable cause, D.E. stated at the hospital on August [18, 2020,] she
was sitting behind the Seagull [sic] Select Hotel when a black male, the
defendant, Allen Hayes, of whom she did not know approached her and
asked if she wanted to smoke a blunt. D.E. was twenty-two years of
age at this time. D.E. got into the vehicle and smoked a blunt. Hayes
offered to buy her cigarettes and she agreed to go to the Circle K Store.
Hayes and D.E. were the only ones in the vehicle. After leaving the
store, they rode around for a short time and Hayes brought her to an
area of Alexandria Iron, which is many miles away from the hotel.
There, the defendant climbed on top of her, took her clothes off and
vaginally raped her. When asked if she fought him, D.E. stated no
because she was afraid of what he may do. D.E. told the defendant to
stop multiple times and cried during the event. After finishing, the
defendant took her back to the hotel. The defendant was identified
based off the video at the Circl3e [sic] K Store and his employer, Chili’s
work shirt. After being arrested and read his Miranda Rights, the
defendant stated that the sex was consensual.

On March 6, 2024, the trial court sentenced Defendant to the statutory

maximum for third-degree rape, twenty-five years at hard labor without benefit of

probation, parole, or suspension of sentence. The trial court also noted Defendant’s

crime was a crime of violence, and he was entitled to credit for time served.

Defendant now appeals his sentence, contending that it was excessive to give

him a maximum sentence.

ANALYSIS

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends that his twenty-five-year

sentence, the statutory maximum for third-degree rape, was excessive. We note

Defendant did not object to his sentence nor did he file a motion to reconsider

sentence. Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides the

mechanism for preserving the review of a sentence on appeal:

A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition
of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at

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sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to
reconsider sentence.

....

E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from
urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.

In previous instances, this court has reviewed claims of excessiveness where

no objection was made and no motion to reconsider sentence was filed. See State v.

Johnlouis, 09-235 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/4/09), 22 So.3d 1150, writ denied, 10-97 (La.

6/25/10), 38 So.3d 336, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1150, 131 S.Ct. 932 (2011); State v.

Thomas, 08-1358 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/09), 18 So.3d 127; State v. Perry, 08-1304

(La.App. 3 Cir. 5/6/09), 9 So.3d 342, writ denied, 09-1955 (La. 6/25/10), 38 So.3d

352; State v. H.J.L., 08-823 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/10/08), 999 So.2d 338, writ denied

sub nom. State ex rel. Lantz v. State, 09-606 (La. 12/18/09), 23 So.3d 936; State v.

Quinn, 09-1382 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/12/10), 38 So.3d 1102, writ denied, 10-1355 (La.

1/7/11), 52 So.3d 885. Thus, we will review Defendant’s claim as a bare claim of

excessiveness.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding excessive

sentence review:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed
for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762
(La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, 00-1591, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir.
1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02),
808 So.2d 331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive
sentence claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that

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the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than
a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124,
writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The
relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotta, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.
5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste,
594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991). Additionally, it is
within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, 13-771, pp. 4–5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002,

1005–06 (alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

Regarding the nature of the crime, Defendant was convicted of third-degree

rape, which is defined by La.R.S. 14:43(A)(4) as “a rape committed when the anal,

oral, or vaginal sexual intercourse is deemed to be without the lawful consent of a

victim because it is committed when the offender acts without the consent of the

victim.” In the instant case, D.E. told Defendant to stop multiple times and cried

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throughout the ordeal. Third-degree rape is both a sex offense and a violent crime

which represents one of the worst possible violations of an individual’s bodily

autonomy. It carries a sentencing range of “not more than twenty-five years,” and

the sentence is necessarily served at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole,

or suspension of sentence.

As to the second factor, the nature and background of the offender, the trial

court noted Defendant was sixty-two years old at sentencing with a tenth-grade

education and a prior work history. The district court also went through Defendant’s

criminal history, which began with an arrest for possession of stolen goods in 1988

and ended when Defendant was arrested on March 16, 2021, for the third-degree

rape of K.B., the charge which was dismissed when Defendant pled guilty. During

that time, Defendant was arrested twenty-five times and had six convictions which

included three failed stints on probation. Four of his arrests were for rape, including

the two arrests involved in the instant case.

The third factor is a comparison of Defendant’s sentence with the sentences

imposed in similar cases. In State v. Despanie, 06-1269 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 949

So.2d 1260, this court affirmed a maximum, twenty-five-year sentence for a first

offender convicted of simple rape where the nineteen-year-old defendant pled no

contest to raping an incapacitated, ninety-two-year-old patient at the long-term care

facility where the defendant worked.2 The court noted the defendant benefited by

pleading to a reduced charge when his original charge could have carried a life

sentence.

2
Per La.R.S. 14:43(C), “simple rape” and “third degree rape” are the same offense.

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Likewise, this court in State v. Green, 16-938 (La.App. 3 Cir. 7/19/17), 248

So.3d 360, writ denied, 17-1348 (La. 4/27/18), 239 So.3d 836, upheld a maximum

sentence for simple rape for a forty-seven-year-old defendant with a prior sex

offense conviction who raped a seventeen-year-old coworker. The trial court relied

on Despanie in reaching its sentence.

In light of both Despanie and Green, we cannot say the trial court abused its

discretion in imposing a maximum sentence. Additionally, we note that by pleading

guilty, Defendant lowered his sentencing exposure from fifty years to twenty-five

years given that the State dismissed the second third-degree rape charge, which

occurred following Defendant’s arrest for the rape to which he pled guilty.

Therefore, we affirm Defendant’s sentence.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION.
Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-16

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