KA-0024-0490 Nonprecedential Set aside Processed

State of Louisiana v. Donald Briggs, III A/K/A Donald Briggs

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed April 2, 2025

Authorities cited

Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.

State Ex Rel. Graffagnino v. King 436 So. 2d 559
State v. Duncan 420 So. 2d 1105
State v. Moody 393 So. 2d 1212
State v. Richardson 425 So. 2d 1228
State v. Kennerson 695 So. 2d 1367
State v. Camp 446 So. 2d 1207
State v. Burns 441 So. 2d 843
State v. Williams 124 So. 3d 1236
State v. Irving 139 So. 3d 1024
State v. Baumberger 200 So. 3d 817
State v. Baumberger 221 So. 3d 859
State v. Brady 414 So. 2d 364
State v. Long 408 So. 2d 1221
State v. Bright 776 So. 2d 1134
362 So. 3d 356 not in our corpus
State v. Page 28 So. 3d 442
State of Louisiana v. Kelton Greenard. 38 So. 3d 299
362 So. 3d 599 not in our corpus
State v. Petty 103 So. 3d 616
State v. Bridgewater 823 So. 2d 877
State v. Pierre 631 So. 2d 427
State v. Holmes 388 So. 2d 722
State v. Anthony 776 So. 2d 376

Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-490 consolidated with 24-492

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DONALD BRIGGS, III
A/K/A DONALD BRIGGS

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 69263
HONORABLE THOMAS J. FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Gary J. Ortego, and Clayton Davis,
Judges.

CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND SENTENCE VACATED.

p. 2

Aaron M. Meche
Assistant District Attorney
15th Judicial District, Vermilion Parish
100 N. State Street, Ste. 215
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-4320
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Mary Constance Hanes
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 4015
New Orleans, LA 70178-4015
(504) 866-6652
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Donald Briggs, III

p. 3

WILSON, Judge.

A jury found Defendant, Donald Briggs, III, guilty of second degree murder,

in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. The trial court sentenced Mr. Briggs to life

imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence. Mr. Briggs now appeals his conviction. For the following reasons, we

reverse the conviction and vacate the sentence.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether there is insufficient evidence to support
Donald Briggs’ conviction for second degree
murder and the State failed to negate every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence;

(2) whether the prosecutor denied due process by
allowing false testimony; and

(3) whether Defendant was denied a fair trial when the
court allowed a relative of the victim to sit on the
jury.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 14, 2022, Jazaylon Levy was shot while walking outside of an

apartment in the Stone Bridge Apartment complex in Abbeville, Louisiana. He later

died from his injuries. On October 31, 2022, Donald Briggs and his brother, Stefan

Briggs, were each charged by a single grand jury indictment with one count of

second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. A two-day jury trial

commenced on August 29, 2023, after which both Donald and Stefan were found

guilty as charged.

On September 26, 2023, Donald Briggs, through counsel, filed a motion for

post-verdict judgment of acquittal and a separate motion for new trial. After hearing

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testimony and evidence, the motions were denied by the trial court on March 28,

2024. After waiving sentencing delays, both Donald and Stefan were sentenced to

life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of

sentence. On April 8, 2024, Donald Briggs, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal.

His trial counsel filed a separate motion to withdraw and appoint the Louisiana

Appellate Project (“LAP”). On April 11, 2024, the trial court granted an appeal, and

on April 29, 2024, the trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and appoint

LAP.

III. LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there

is one error patent.

There is a conflict between the sentencing minutes, Uniform Sentencing

Commitment Order, and the transcript of sentencing. Both the minutes of sentencing

and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order state the trial court ordered

Donald’s sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence he was presently

serving. No such statement is reflected in the transcript. Given our decision to

reverse the conviction and vacate the sentence, however, this error patent is moot.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, Mr. Briggs contends that the evidence was

insufficient to convict him of second degree murder as the State failed to negate

every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.

The analysis for sufficiency of the evidence is well settled:

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p. 5

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d
559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v.
Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the
appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations
of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the
Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d
559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order
for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect
that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

When the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, La.R.S.
15:438 provides that the state “must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence” in order to convict. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d
1207, 1209 (La.1984). “Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which elemental factors may be
inferred according to reason, experience and common sense.” State v.
Burns, 441 So.2d 843, 845 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983). However, La.R.S.
15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than
the rational juror’s reasonable doubt standard. The statute serves as a
guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence. On
appeal, the issue is whether a rational trier of fact, when viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded. State v. Williams,
13–497 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d 1236, writ denied, 13–2774
(La.5/16/14), 139 So.3d 1024.

State v. Baumberger, 15-1056, pp. 10–11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 200 So.3d 817,

826–27, writ denied, 16-1251 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 859.

Donald Briggs was charged with second degree murder, a felony in violation

of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Specifically, Donald was tried under La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1),

which is defined as the killing of human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific

intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” Specific intent is defined as “that

state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively

desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

3

p. 6

La.R.S. 14:10(1). In addition to proving the statutory elements of the charged

offense at trial, the State is required to prove the defendant’s identity as the

perpetrator.

When a key issue at trial is whether the defendant was the perpetrator
of the crime, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability
of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 430 So.2d at 45; see also State v.
Brady, 414 So.2d 364, 365 (La.1982); State v. Long, 408 So.2d 1221,
1227 (La.1982). The fact-finder weighs the respective credibilities of
the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those
determinations. State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559
(La.1983). However, we are mindful that the touchstone of Jackson v.
Virginia is rationality and that “irrational decisions to convict will be
overturned, rational decisions to convict will be upheld, and the actual
fact finder’s discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of
law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d at 1310.

State v. Bright, 98-0398, pp. 22–23 (La. 4/11/00), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147.

The State contends that the Briggs brothers committed the murder of Jazaylon Levy

by shooting from a moving vehicle, and that their intended target was actually an

individual by the name of Gavin Garnica, who was standing outside of the apartment

complex with Mr. Levy. Specifically, the State contends that as the driver, Donald

gave his brother, Stefan, the opportunity to kill the victim; thus, Donald aided and

abetted in the commission of the victim’s murder. The State further contends that

the brothers’ motives and specific intent to kill were demonstrated by testimony

regarding animosity between the brothers and affiliates of Gavin Garnica.

To support its case, the State presented several witnesses. Detective Lon

Hargrave was the first to testify at trial. Detective Hargrave testified that he resided

in and was a courtesy security officer for Stone Bridge Apartments on the night of

the murder. While taking out his trash, a little after 9:00 p.m., Detective Hargrave

heard ten gunshots. Detective Hargrave dropped his bags of trash, retrieved his duty

weapon, and began walking toward the area of the gunshots. Detective Hargrave

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p. 7

found the victim lying on the ground in the parking lot. According to Detective

Hargrave, the victim was awake but not alert.

Detective Hargrave concluded that the shooting was a drive-by shooting and

explained why the vehicle must have been moving at the time:

A Yes, sir. It would have had to have been going north to south
based on the - - later on, once Jazaylon had passed, I was called back.
They said, “Hey, can you help us get in an apartment? We want to look
at the rendering of an apartment marked 313 just immediately above
where Jazaylon was.” That was the apartment he was standing in front
of. That apartment - - I don’t remember the lease holder’s name. She
wasn’t home at the time. That apartment immediately took gunfire
obviously, multiple rounds in the residence.

I was able to - - if you understand trajectory - - the line where
the bullet goes - - I was able to determine some rounds came from north
to south; some came straight on. Some came south to north.

Q That would indicate a moving vehicle?

A It would. It also, to me, indicated, based on my training and
experience, that the rounds that came south to north were higher, which
if you know a rifle, the rifle is going to climb as you shoot. So that tells
me that the shots that were south to north came after the ones that came
- - I’m sorry. The shots that came north to south came after the ones
that came south to north.

Q Assume that the entry wound in Jazaylon’s body was on his right
upper buttocks. That would indicate to you this was one of the earlier
shots?

A I actually think, because of the position of the vehicle, it was
going to be a shot more in the middle of the thihgh [sic]. I believe the
first thing that got shot was either the building or the red vehicle.

After describing the various bullet holes found near the scene, Detective

Hargrave further testified:

A Yes, Sir. Based on everything that I saw, my training, my
experience, the shootings I’ve worked with APD, the sheriff’s office,
everything pointed to a vehicle moving at a moderate pace, decent pace,
nothing crazy, south in that lane of Stone Bridge - - that final driveway.
The rounds started southern, continued and finalized north before the
vehicle was out of that area. Everything points to - - it all coming out
of one vehicle moving at a constant speed. The rounds that I remember
hearing were back to back. There was no gap. There was no alternating

5

p. 8

pitch where it could have been more than one weapon. One weapon.
One vehicle. One path.

Q So if Jazaylon was facing the driveway when the shooting
started, the vehicle would have been coming from his left?

A Yes, sir, which I would assume a normal reaction would be the
second that first shot rang, he probably turned around which would
have caused that - - you had said the higher up shot. I’m assuming he
turned to run from the gunshots and that’s when he was hit.

When asked if he saw evidence of gunshot damage in the apartment, Detective

Hargrave responded, “Absolutely.”

Detective Hargrave’s investigation revealed that an individual by the name of

Gavin Garnica was with the victim at the time of the shooting. According to the

detective, “[t]here was rumor and conjecture” that Mr. Garnica was staying in Unit

322. During an interview after the murder, Mr. Garnica thanked Detective Hargrave

for the care he gave the victim after the shooting. Mr. Garnica then stated that he

was present during the shooting and received a “grazing gunshot to the leg.”

According to Detective Hargrave, Mr. Garnica was not cooperative, “[o]utside of

saying that he was out there when ‘them boys started shooting.’”

The next witness was Detective Trent Guidry, who was employed with the

Abbeville Police Department at the time of the shooting. Detective Guidry testified

that he knew both Defendants and identified them in court. In connection with his

investigation, Detective Guidry viewed video from the following locations: the

Abbeville Walmart, Stone Bridge Apartments and the adjacent The Havens

apartment complex, the Red Barn building on Rodeo Road, the Abbeville Motel 6,

and the Texaco station in Delcambre. According to Detective Guidry, Walmart was

approximately half a mile from Stone Bridge Apartments, and it would have taken

someone about one minute to travel from Walmart to Stone Bridge.

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p. 9

The video footage was compiled into a single DVD which was introduced as

State’s Exhibit 7. While the video was played for the jury, Detective Guidry and the

State had the following colloquy:

Q Detective Guidry, we’re going to show this video to the jury. But
I’m going to ask you at certain points in the video what you see in the
video, all right?

A Okay.

Q Let’s begin. Can you tell me what this location is?

A That is the Wal Mart parking lot.

Q And you observe a vehicle pulling in?

A I do.

Q Can you describe it?

A It is a light colored sedan, silver sedan - - I’m sorry - - light
colored sedan.

Q Can you describe what you see?

A Two individuals that exited the light colored sedan, one wearing
a white shirt and one wearing a black shirt walking into Wal Mart.

Q Can you describe what you see in the video?

A Yes, the same two individuals that exited the sedan, the white
shirt and the black shirt.

Q Can you identify these individuals?

A Yes, the white shirt - - is Donald Briggs, III and the one wearing
the black shirt is Stefan Briggs.

Q Are these the same two individuals?

A Yes.

Q What time are we looking at here?

A That is 9:15 P.M.

Q Did you determine whether the Wal Mart time stamp clock was
accurate?

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p. 10

A Yes, sir.

Q Describe what you see here.

A That is the same two individuals walking back to their vehicle.

Q Can you describe who gets in the driver’s seat?

A Yes, sir. Donald Briggs, III.

Q And the passenger seat?

A Stefan Briggs.

Q What do you see here?

A The same - - the vehicle they just entered in now leaving.

Q And headed towards what street?

A Broadmoor.

Q Does Broadmoor connect to Rodeo?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where does the vehicle turn?

A Towards Rodeo Road.

Q When you see the next event, describe it. What’s that location?

A That’s the entrance to Stone Bridge Apartments.

Q You see a vehicle entering Stone Bridge?

A Yes, a light colored sedan entering the Stone Bridge.

Q Did you determine whether the Stone Bridge time stamp clock
was accurate?

A It was not.

Q Describe what you see.

A That is an exit driveway for Stone Bridge.

Q Continue. Stop. What did we just hear?

A Gunshots.

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p. 11

Q Approximately how many?

A Ten.

Based on the running time on the Stone Bridge time stamp clock, Detective Guidry

determined that nine to eleven minutes elapsed between the time the light colored

sedan entered Stone Bridge and the time the gunshots were heard.

When it played the video from The Havens apartments, the State noted an exit

driveway from Stone Bridge and asked Detective Guidry what he saw:

A So that is a light colored sedan passing around a white Ford F-
150 as it enters the exit gates towards Rodeo Road.

Q So this light colored sedan actually passed another vehicle to try
to get to the gate?

A Yes.

Q Describe what this is.

A So the light colored sedan that passed up the white truck also
passed the first vehicle you saw as it was passing towards the exit. The
first vehicle that passed in front of the white truck, it also overtook that
vehicle as it exited.

Q Now, the light colored vehicle, when it got to Rodeo, turned
which way?

A That would be northeast.

Q Left or right?

A Left.

Q Describe this.

A The first vehicle was traveling from Highway 14. The second
vehicle is the light sedan that exited Stone Bridge as it continues down
Rodeo.

Q Is that light colored vehicle going back in the same direction it
came from?

A Yes.

Q Going back east?

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p. 12

A Correct.

Q What is this location?

A That is Motel 6 located near the airport.

Q And describe what you see.

A Light colored sedan traveling eastbound on Highway 14.

Q Was that clip almost immediately after the vehicle exited Stone
Bridge, that light colored vehicle?

A Yes, sir, very soon afterward.

Q What is this location?

A That is the Texaco station in Delcambre located at Highway 89
and Highway 14.

Q What is this vehicle?

A That’s a Toyota Camry.

Q What is the second vehicle, the light colored vehicle, that just
came in?

A You’re asking me to describe the model?

Q Yes, sir.

A That is a Mercedes Benz.

Q Do you recognize the individuals exiting the Mercedes?

A Yes.

Q Who is the driver?

A Donald Briggs, III.

Q Who is that getting in the driver’s seat of the Mercedes?

A Stefan Briggs.

Q Which way is the Mercedes going?

A Towards the East.

Q And the Toyota?

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p. 13

A The Toyota leaves traveling north on 89. The Mercedes leaves
traveling East on 14.

Through his investigation, Detective Guidry learned that the driver of the

Toyota Camry was Nyesha Mouton, who was in a relationship with Donald Briggs.

Detective Guidry identified State’s Exhibit 8 as a picture of the Mercedes driven by

Donald Briggs.

Detective Guidry further testified that there were well-defined groups of

people between which there was gun violence in Abbeville. “Group A” was

associated with an individual named Roland Bernard, III, while “Group B” was

associated with the Briggs brothers. Detective Guidry testified that there was

animosity between the two groups, resulting in gun violence between them. The

State referred Detective Guidry to an incident in September of 2020 wherein Stefan

Briggs was wounded. He described the incident as follows:

A Stefan and his brother, Donald, were traveling in a vehicle in the
area of Martin Luther King and South Lamar Street. While they were
traveling in the vehicle, a shooting took place. Stefan was shot in his
hand and Donald drove him to the emergency room, dropped him off
and went after the shooter.

According to Detective Guidry, Stefan did not cooperate in the investigation

of the shooting. Based on his experience and expertise, he opined that a shooting

victim’s lack of cooperation usually indicated “[p]otential retaliation.” When asked

if he was able to determine who fired the shot, Detective Guidry answered, “No, sir.

There was a suspect mentioned as Roland Bernard, III.” Detective Guidry testified

that Roland Bernard’s father was executed in his driveway in November of 2020.

Numerous shots were fired, and two different caliber casings indicated two shooters.

In December of 2020, Detective Guidry received a report of another shooting

involving Stefan Briggs:

A During this incident, Donald and his brother, Stefan, were
traveling in a vehicle in the area of Seventh Street - - Seventh or Eighth

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p. 14

Street, South Louisiana area. While they were traveling in the vehicle,
shots were fired at the vehicle and Stefan was struck in his face with a
7.62 caliber rifle.

Once again, Detective Guidry testified that Stefan did not cooperate in the

investigation. Additionally, Detective Guidry testified that Gavin Garnica was

affiliated with Roland Bernard, III. Finally, Detective Guidry testified that Stefan

Briggs had recently been involved in an altercation at the jail with another person

affiliated with Roland Bernard, III.

On cross-examination, Detective Guidry agreed that the police did not

determine Roland Bernard to be the one who shot Stefan. Additionally, Detective

Guidry agreed that the video showing the Texaco station did not have a time or date

stamp.

The following colloquy then took place on redirect:

Q When you originally viewed the Texaco video, was that at the
Texaco station?

A Yes, sir.

Q And did it have a time stamp on it?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you use that along with the other video to establish a time
line?

A Yes, sir.

Q And were you able to determine approximately how long
between the shooting - - the actual shooting - - the sounds of the
shooting and the exiting of the vehicle from the light colored sedan
from Stone Bridge to the time it arrived at Texaco?

A Yes, sir.

Q How long was that?

A Approximately ten to eleven minutes.

Q Did you attempt to recreate the route?

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p. 15

A Yes, sir.

Q At the time, was Texaco your destination?

A The Delcambre Bridge was my destination.

Q You just timed it?

A I did.

Q And the Texaco station from the bridge is what?

A Maybe - - I don’t know.

Q Half a mile?

A Three-quarters - - I mean, a quarter of a mile to a half a mile.

Q And driving normal highway speeds from the Stone Bridge
Apartments to Highway 14 and then to the Delcambre bridge took you
how long?

A Approximately nine minutes and twenty seconds, nine minutes,
thirty seconds. That’s considering there’s four traffic lights and traffic.

Q Roughly the same amount of time you calculated the vehicle - -
the shooting - - the time the vehicle - - the light colored vehicle left
Stone Bridge and the time the Mercedes arrived at Texaco?

A Yes, sir.

Q And the light colored vehicle was headed in the direction of the
Texaco station?

A Yes, sir.

The next witness, Nyesha Mouton, testified that she saw Donald Briggs the

night of July 14, 2022. According to Ms. Mouton, Donald originally asked her to

meet him at a bargain furniture place but then changed the meeting place to “[t]he

Texaco” in Delcambre. Ms. Mouton testified that she drove a brown Toyota Camry

to the Texaco station, where Donald arrived in a silver Mercedes. Donald’s brother,

Stefan, was also in the car. According to Ms. Mouton, Donald got into her car and

drove to IHOP in Lafayette. When asked to describe Donald’s mood, Ms. Mouton

replied, “He was upset, talking to himself.” Ms. Mouton dropped Donald off at

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p. 16

Willowind Apartments, where Donald’s cousin lived. Ms. Mouton stated that

Donald did not talk in the car.

Dr. Christopher Tape, accepted as an expert in the field of forensic pathology,

performed an autopsy on the victim. Looking at a diagram, Dr. Tape identified a

single gunshot entry wound to the right buttocks. Dr. Tape further testified about

the trajectory of the gunshot:

A It goes through the pelvis; you can see that. It exits here, left
anterior thigh, just across the pelvis. Slightly irregular 0.8 centimeters,
about eight centimeters left of midline. And this is at the same inferior
superior level as the entry. Its [sic] going basically straight across.
Trajectory back right to left, upward and downward.

But now keep in mind, that this trajectory - - this is not so much
moving, but its [sic] essentially going straight across there. Just keep
in mind that I’m making my measurements in an anatomic position. So
you can see its [sic] roughly halfway up the body - - probably more than
halfway up the body, going straight across the hips there.

There’s an abrasion here on the right ankle and there’s also an
abrasion here above the entry wound. There’s nothing else, no other
injuries. This is not to scale, representative only.

Dr. Tape agreed that his report indicated the victim was seventy-one inches,

or “[f]ive, eleven.” Based on the victim’s height, Dr. Tape opined that the victim

was standing upright when the bullet entered his body. According to Dr. Tape, the

bullet entry wound was “[s]omewhere around three of four feet at least” or “[a]bout

half [the victim’s] length” from the ground. Dr. Tape concluded that the victim’s

cause of death was “blood loss from damage to the artery.”

The State then recalled Detective Hargrave, who agreed that the video he

watched showed a small light colored sedan first exit the Stone Bridge Apartment

complex the night of the shooting, followed by a full-sized pickup truck. When

asked if he saw any other vehicles exit the parking lot “besides the one that was

already in the driveway when the shots were fired,” Detective Hargrave answered,

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p. 17

“Only those.” Detective Hargrave was then asked if he measured the window sill

height of a Ford F-150, and the detective answered:

A I was able to get multiple makes and models. The average that I
saw from that top of that door frame was about four foot, four inches or
four foot, seven inches of various makes, models and years. It all
averaged about that.

Q So anywhere from fifty-two to fifty-seven inches?

A Around.

The following colloquy then took place:

Q And you heard Dr. Tape - - maybe you didn’t hear him - - but Dr.
Tape testified that the trajectory of the bullet that killed Mr. Levy was
straight on with no up or down angle. You’ve seen that before?

A The autopsy, yeah.

Q So if a bullet was fired from the lowest point in the F-150 - - let’s
say fifty-two inches - - at a man who’s five feet, eleven, approximately
where would it strike him?

A Middle torso.

Q Not below the waist?

A I’m six, two. So at four a [sic] half feet of my body, I mean,
that’s middle torso all day.

Q Now, did you also compare the heights on a vehicle similar to
the one that was seen at the Texaco station driven by the defendant?

A Yes, sir.

Q And that is a Mercedes-Benz C300?

A C class, yes.

Q And did you find one?

A Yes, sir.

Q The Briggs vehicle is 2009 model. Did you locate a 2009 model?

A I did, sir.

Q Where did you find it?

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p. 18

A At Mercedes-Benz of Lafayette on Johnston Street.

Detective Hargrave confirmed that the vehicle he examined was a white 2009

Mercedes-Benz C Class. Detective Hargrave also identified a photograph showing

the front passenger door of the Mercedes-Benz with a tape measure going from the

ground to the window sill. Detective Hargrave noted that the tape measured “right

around thirty-seven inches, give or take a few millimeters.” Detective Hargrave’s

testimony continued:

Q And you’re six, two?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you measure on your own body about where that reflected?

A It was - -

Q You can stand up.

A For me, standing up next to the vehicle, it would have put
approximately in this area.

Q Where your left hand is?

A Yeah. In between - - depending on shoes and everything, it would
have been in that general belt line area.

On re-cross examination, Detective Hargrave testified that when he watched

the video, he saw three people leaving Stone Bridge. Detective Hargrave agreed that

there were plenty of other vehicles in the complex prior to and after the shooting.

When asked if he measured the window distance of any other vehicles, Detective

Hargrave replied:

A I calculated - - no. But to elaborate, I calculated the distance of

the vehicles that were moving at the time of the incident, the F-150 and

the Mercedes-Benz.

Q Three vehicles you saw leaving?

A Correct.

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p. 19

Q Not all the vehicles inside the complex?

A Correct.

After confirming that the detective was six feet two inches, defense counsel

asked him to show the jury again where the bullet would have hit him. The detective

pointed to an area, but the record does not reflect the area to which he was pointing.

The following colloquy ensued:

Q So it’s safe to say that at five foot, eleven, three inches shorter, it
would probably would have come up towards - - you know, lower back
to mid-back, wouldn’t you agree?

A I could only say where I think it would hit me based on the
window sill where it would be.

Q And you have six foot, two frame?

A Yeah.

Continuing on cross-examination with the other defense counsel, the

following colloquy ensued:

Q You stated that you only measured vehicles that matched more
or less the description of the vehicles that you saw in the clip that you
received from the state, correct?

A Uh-huh (affirmative response).

Q But you were on the scene. And when you came shortly after the
shooting, you didn’t see any other vehicles leaving, right?

A Correct.

Q But you did see other vehicles in the parking lot, correct?

A Correct, yeah.

Q And you’re not saying that these measurements excludes the
possibility of gunshots coming from any other kind of similar vehicle
as to what you saw, correct?

A Unless it came from a parked vehicle that was still on the scene
--

Q Yes.

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p. 20

A - - When I came out, then there would be no other ones. But the
only vehicle that departed between the shooting and me coming on
scene I would have seen them leave was those three.

As for the possibility that the shots could have been fired from a vehicle other

than the three shown in the video, the testimony continued as follows:

Q So what I’m asking is, you’re only measuring the vehicles that
you saw leaving?

A Correct.

Q But you’re not excluding the possibility that the vehicle which
fired the shot could have still be [sic] on scene?

A It’s possible, but again, we’re also talking about my two vehicles,
my personal vehicle and my department vehicle, my neighbors who
came outside when the shooting happened. They weren’t in their
vehicles. There are other vehicles in that generic area, but to say - -
plus the vehicle that got shot would have been Mr. Gernekus Peeple
from 322.

There are multiple vehicles there, but I do not see the ability for
any other vehicle that was currently parked there to have been involved
in the shooting.

Q But you weren’t there; you didn’t see it?

A Correct. At the time of the shooting, no, correct.

The final witness to testify was Kashawna Preston, a person who knew the

victim and was at Stone Bridge Apartments the night of the shooting. Ms. Preston

was with several people, including the victim and Gavin Garnica. Right before the

shooting, Ms. Preston and her sister were walked to their cars by the victim, Mr.

Garnica, and a teenager by the name of Javian. Ms. Preston and her sister were in

separate cars and left at about the same time. Ms. Preston testified that she pulled

out first, and her sister pulled out right behind her. Regarding other cars in the

parking lot, Ms. Preston testified as follows:

Q When you walked out to get in your car in the parking lot, could
you look down there and see if any other cars were parked?

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p. 21

A Yeah, you walk out and to the left, you see all the cars that was
parked. That’s how I noticed the vehicle.

Q All right. Let’s talk about the vehicle. Did you see a car - - did
you see a silver Mercedes-Benz?

A Yeah, backed in.

Q Backed into a parking place?

A Uh-huh (affirmative response).

Q And show us about where it was.

A Kind of down here.

Q I know you did this for me the other day in my office, but if you
would, please, put an “X” where you saw the silver Benz.

A (Witness complied with request.)

Q You could clearly see it?

A Yeah.

Q Had you seen it before?

A I seen a car before, but didn’t pay no mind. I thought it was a
regular car that was backed in like the rest of them.

Q You’re sure it was a silver Mercedes-Benz?

A Positive.

Q And when you left - - when you and your sister left, was that car
still there?

A Yeah, that’s when we seen it. When we was leaving out, that’s
when we seen the car.

Q So it was still there?

A Uh-huh (affirmative response). It was still there.

Q Did you leave Stone Bridge Apartments?

A Yes, I left. I was going home and I made it to like U-Pack It, the
gas station up the road. And then I got a phone call saying there was a
shooting back there and it was by my friend’s house.

Q So did you go back?

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p. 22

A Yeah, I turned right around. And I called my sister while I was
turning around. So we pulled up back at like the same time.

Ms. Preston testified that she saw the victim on the ground with people around

him. The victim was still alive when she arrived, and she tried to keep him calm.

On cross examination, Ms. Preston clarified that she saw the Mercedes when

she left her friend’s apartment and walked to her car. Ms. Preston did not see anyone

inside the vehicle and testified that the vehicle was turned off. Before the State

rested, the parties stipulated that according to the emergency room records, the

victim died at 10:39 p.m.

A review of the record in this case reveals that there was no direct evidence

connecting the Briggs brothers to the victim’s murder. The brothers concede that on

the night of the shooting, they were at the Walmart in Abbeville and later at a Texaco

station in Delcambre. There was only circumstantial evidence, however, as to where

the brothers were between these two destinations and whether they shot the victim.

Therefore, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution to determine whether every reasonable hypothesis of innocence was

excluded.

The video footage placing Donald and Stefan Briggs at the scene of the crime

was not very clear. Although Detective Guidry identifies the brothers in the Walmart

video footage getting into a light colored sedan, they are not clearly identified again

until the video from the Texaco station, where they are seen getting out of the light

colored sedan. The light colored sedan at Texaco is identified as a Mercedes Benz.

When narrating the video footage between Walmart and Texaco, the State’s

witnesses refer to the vehicle as a “light colored sedan” without stating definitively

that it is the same sedan throughout. However, considering the video footage and

Detective Guidry’s narration in the light most favorable to the prosecution, there was

20

p. 23

evidence that Donald and Stefan Briggs were near the scene of the murder at the

time the murder was committed and left shortly thereafter. There was also evidence

that the victim was shot from a moving vehicle and evidence to discount the victim

being shot from the F-150 truck also leaving the scene. There was no evidence,

however, that the brothers were connected to the victim.

In order to convict Donald Briggs for the second degree murder of Jazaylon

Levy, the State had to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

In State v. Alexander, 22-1205 (La. 5/5/23), 362 So.3d 356, the supreme court

determined that there was insufficient circumstantial evidence and affirmed the

reversal of the defendant’s conviction. In March 2002, Scott Paul Latiolais was

killed by a shotgun wound to the back. Id. at 357. The State’s theory was that

Alexander and his cousin, Timothy Roberts, intended to rob Latiolais but shot him

in the back when he tried to flee. Id. The following facts were discussed:

Defendant, Roberts, the victim, and several witnesses all lived in
the same area of Henderson in St. Martin Parish. Defendant [sic] was
with Roberts on the night the crime occurred. That night, the victim
approached Tony Mouton, who lived across the street from defendant
and Roberts, wanting to buy $50 worth of crack cocaine. He had none,
so Mouton asked Roberts if he had any to sell. Roberts did not. Roberts,
who had been wearing a white t-shirt, went into this home and came
out wearing a dark jacket. He and defendant, who was already wearing
a long-sleeved jacket, pulled up their hoods and walked to a gravel path
that cut through a nearby grassy field. About ten minutes later, the
victim left Mouton’s front yard and walked down the same gravel path.
There he encountered defendant, Roberts, and Julius Charles, a mutual
cousin of defendant and Roberts.

According to Charles, the victim and Roberts stood apart from
him and defendant talking. Suddenly, the victim ran, Roberts pursued
him briefly, and then shot him in the back. Defendant, Roberts, and
Charles all ran toward their respective homes. Roberts called Charles
and told him not to say anything about the crime. Ignatius Patt, a cousin
of Charles, testified that the next day he asked Charles if Roberts shot
the victim and Charles said no. He then asked who did it, and Charles
told Patt he did not know.

Id. at 358.

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p. 24

Initially, the State indicted Roberts for first degree murder, but the charge was

dismissed when Alexander did not show up as a witness at trial. Id. The State

obtained a second indictment against Roberts in 2008, but no trial occurred. Id.

Reopening the investigation in 2012, the State searched for the murder weapon but

found nothing, tested Roberts’ and Alexander’s clothing for gunshot residue, and

interviewed Alexander two more times. Id. at 358–59. In 2014, the State indicted

Alexander for second degree murder, arguing that he could be convicted either as

the shooter or under a felony-murder theory. Id. at 359.

The only direct evidence of Alexander as the shooter occurred during a police

interview wherein Alexander stated that he shot Latiolais. Alexander immediately

clarified, however, that he meant to say that he saw Roberts shoot Latiolais. Id. The

supreme court stated that “[t]his was the lone instance in the course of multiple

interviews over an eleven-year period that [Alexander] implicated himself as the

shooter.” Id.

Since such a brief misstatement by defendant was unlikely to win
a conviction, the State based its case against defendant almost entirely
on the presence of gunshot residue (GSR) on a blue Nike jacket
collected from his house. The State sought to use this circumstantial
evidence to establish that defendant shot or handled the gun used to kill
Latiolais. Of course, if defendant was not wearing that jacket that night,
the GSR is not relevant to defendant’s involvement in this crime. For
that reason, a rational juror must first determine from the evidence
presented that defendant was wearing that particular jacket on the night
of the crime, independent of the fact that it contained particles of GSR.
However, as explained below, without firm evidence, the jury was left
to choose between two equally likely possibilities. As a result, a
conclusion that defendant wore that jacket must have rested on
conjecture alone.

The day after the crime, the police collected a variety of clothes
from the homes of Roberts and defendant that fit the general description
Mouton provided of what he saw them wearing the night before.
Neither Mouton nor Charles identified the Nike jacket as what they saw
defendant wearing. In statements to police shortly after the crime, both
witnesses described defendant wearing a dark colored, hooded jacket.
The blue Nike jacket does not have a hood. In 2012, ten years after the
crime, defendant told the State Police detective he did not remember

22

p. 25

what he and Roberts were wearing that night. Nine months later, in
2013, defendant was interviewed again. During that interview, the
detective, without objective evidence of this, insisted that defendant
was wearing the blue Nike jacket on the night of the crime. Defendant
nodded, but demonstrated no independent recollection of what he was
wearing that night. In the end, based on all of the evidence, the jury
could only speculate as to whether defendant was wearing that jacket
when the crime occurred.

Even if a rational juror could infer from this evidence that he
wore the jacket on the night of the crime, the GSR nevertheless has
limited evidentiary value in this case. The testing provided no
information as to when or how the GSR got onto the jacket, nor from
what firearm it originated. Furthermore, the Nike jacket is not the only
piece of clothing collected from defendant’s house that fit the
description provided by the witnesses. The police also collected a dark
hooded sweatshirt which later tested negative for GSR. Moreover, the
Nike jacket is not the only dark, hooded jacket collected that contained
gunshot evidence—GSR and a partially burned gunpowder particle
were found on a sweatshirt collected from Roberts’s house. Again, the
evidence, such as it was, required the jurors to guess as to whether the
GSR found on the Nike jacket came from the gun used to kill the victim.

The alternative theory proposed by the State was that defendant
carried the gun to the field where he and Roberts laid in wait to rob the
victim. To support the felony-murder theory, the State argued that the
two men had just learned that the victim had $50, they were wearing
dark clothes, and that the GSR on the jacket showed defendant hid the
gun in his sleeve before passing it to Roberts who then shot the victim.
As described above, jurors could only speculate as to whether the GSR
on the Nike jacket connected defendant to the gun used in this crime.
Furthermore, there was no evidence of any plan between defendant and
Roberts to rob the victim. Defendant and Roberts walked down the
gravel path through the field before the victim left Mouton's yard ten
minutes later. The State presented nothing suggesting either man could
have predicted that the victim would have followed them. Defendant
told the State Police detective that he did not know where the victim
lived.

Furthermore, Mouton told police that only Roberts went inside
his home and came out dressed in long sleeves. If this is when the gun
was acquired, then Roberts must have passed the gun to defendant first
and then defendant must have passed it back to Roberts in the field. Yet
neither Mouton nor Charles saw a gun in defendant’s possession or
passed between the two men. Finally, the motive of the crime was
ostensibly to rob the victim, however, his wallet and over $200 in cash
was on his person when he was found the next morning.

Considering all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, no rational juror could find the State proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant either shot the victim or participated in

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p. 26

a plan to rob the victim. The State’s circumstantial case against
defendant failed to exclude every hypothesis of innocence. “A trial
jury’s inference that an accused aided and abetted in a crime cannot be
‘mere speculation based upon guilt by association.’ ” [State v.]
Schwander, 345 So.2d [1173] at 1175 [(La.1977)]. Based on this
record, however, speculation based upon guilt by association is all the
jury’s inference can be. In light of the absence of evidence that
defendant knew in advance of any plan to rob the victim, the only
explanation for the jury finding defendant guilty in this case was based
upon his association with Roberts. Accordingly, we affirm the decision
of the appellate court, which reversed defendant’s conviction.

Id. at 359–60 (footnote omitted).

In brief, the State asserts that as the driver of the Mercedes, Donald gave

Stefan the opportunity to kill the victim; thus, Donald aided and abetted in the

commission of the victim’s murder. Although, no instruction on principals was

given at trial, La.R.S. 14:24 provides that “[a]ll persons concerned in the commission

of a crime, whether present or absent, and whether they directly commit the act

constituting the offense, aid and abet in its commission, or directly or indirectly

counsel or procure another to commit the crime, are principals.” Regarding the

matter of principal liability:

Only those persons who knowingly participate in the planning or
execution of a crime are principals to that crime. An individual may
only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for which he
personally has the requisite mental state, and the mental state of one
defendant may not be imputed to another defendant. Thus, mere
presence at the scene of a crime does not make one a principal to the
crime. However, it is sufficient encouragement that the accomplice is
standing by at the scene of the crime ready to give some aid if needed,
although in such a case it is necessary that the principal actually be
aware of the accomplice’s intention. State v. Page, 08-531 (La.App. 5
Cir. 11/10/09), 28 So.3d 442, 449, writ denied, 09-2684 (La. 6/4/10),
38 So.3d 299.

State v. Alexander, 21-641, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/25/22), 362 So.3d 599, 604,

(quoting State v. Petty, 12-278, p. 11 (La.App. 5 Cir. 10/30/12), 103 So.3d 616, 623).

In this case, there was no evidence of any plan between Donald and Stefan to

commit the drive-by shooting nor was there any evidence that Donald even knew

24

p. 27

Stefan had a gun. Other than Detective Hargrave’s testimony that Gavin Garnica

was rumored to live in Unit 322, there was no evidence that Donald knew Gavin

would be at Stone Bridge Apartments or knew that Gavin would be walking outside

when they drove through.

In State v. Bridgewater, 00-1529 (La. 1/15/02), 823 So.2d 877, cert. denied,

537 U.S. 1227, 123S.Ct. 1266 (2003), the defendant was convicted of first degree

murder by a jury. In reversing the conviction, the supreme court reasoned:

At trial, the state advanced two possible scenarios for finding
defendant guilty of first degree murder: (1) defendant and Jacobs both
were shooters; or (2) Jacobs was the sole shooter, and defendant was a
principal. Under the first scenario, the state was required to identify
defendant as a shooter. Yet, as defendant stresses, the state’s opening
statement at trial was that we “may never know who fired these shots.”

Due to the lack of any eyewitnesses coupled with the equivocal
physical evidence, suggesting only a possibility of multiple shooters,
the state apparently realized that any attempt to identify the actual
shooter would result in a “finger pointing” game between defendant and
Jacobs. The state’s case thus focused on the second scenario—that even
if defendant was not the shooter, he acted in concert with Jacobs, and
thus is guilty as a principal under La. R.S. 14:24. To prevail on its
principal theory, the state had the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that defendant harbored specific intent to kill the
victims, not merely that defendant knew of Jacobs’ intent to do so. The
shooter’s specific intent cannot be transferred to the principal; “[a]n
individual may only be convicted as a principal for those crimes for
which he personally has the requisite mental state.” State v. Pierre, 93–
0893 at p. 4 (La.2/3/94), 631 So.2d 427, 428; State v. Holmes, 388
So.2d 722, 726–27 (La.1980)(reasoning that “[p]roof of one person’s
intent is not proof of another’s” and thus that to find non-shooter liable
state was require to establish “the circumstances indicated that [non-
shooter] also actively desired the death of or great bodily harm to the
victim”).

In support of its principal theory, the state relies upon our recent
holding in State v. Anthony, 98–0406 at p. 14 (La.4/11/00), 776 So.2d
376, 386, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 934, 121 S.Ct. 320, 148 L.Ed.2d 258
(2000), for the proposition that the state is not required to prove
defendant actually pulled the trigger. In Anthony, supra, however, the
evidence reflected the defendant’s “participation was major;” the
defendant “had, minimally, a neutral element of reckless indifference;”
the defendant “intended from the outset to kill these victims;” and the
defendant was armed. Id. The same cannot be said of the evidence in
this case.

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p. 28

The circumstantial evidence the state relied on in this case to
establish defendant’s liability as a principal was as follows: (1) that
defendant was in the Beaugh’s neighborhood on the morning of the
double homicide (as established by his own admission and by Ms.
Menard’s identification); (2) that defendant entered the Beaugh’s
residence and was armed, albeit with a broken BB gun (as established
again by his own admissions); and (3) that defendant failed to prevent
(or, as the state argues, attempt to prevent) Jacobs from committing the
double homicide. Citing La. R.S. 14:10(1)’s reference to specific intent
in terms of an offender’s “failure to act,” the state argues that the latter
apparent failure to act sufficed to establish defendant’s specific intent.
We disagree.

As a general rule, “liability [as a principal] will not flow merely
from a failure to intervene;” however, “silence in the face of a friend’s
crime will sometimes suffice when the immediate proximity of the
bystander is such that he could be expected to voice some opposition or
surprise if he were not a party to the crime.” 2 Wayne R. LaFave and
Austin W. Scott, Jr., Substantive Criminal Law §
6.7(a)(1986)(Emphasis supplied). Defendant’s statement that he was in
the Beaugh’s garage when the fatal shots were fired places him outside
the “immediate proximity” of the double homicide and inside the
general rule precluding a finding of liability as a principal based solely
on a passive failure to intervene in a friend’s criminal acts.

Our finding that the evidence is insufficient to establish
defendant’s liability as a principal is buttressed by the state’s failure to
present any evidence establishing defendant’s specific intent to kill. No
one testified that defendant had anything more than a broken BB gun;
indeed, as noted, it was defendant who conceded that much. Ms.
Menard, the neighbor, observed no weapons on either of the suspicious
pair. This lack of evidence that defendant even was armed with a
functional weapon reduces the state’s circumstantial case to a request
that the jury engage in speculation based merely upon “guilt by
association.” Pierre, 93–0893 at p. 6, 631 So.2d at 429.

Accordingly, we reject the state’s contention that the jury
reasonably could have found defendant liable as a principal based
merely on his failure to prevent Jacobs from committing the double
homicide. We hold that the state failed to exclude a reasonable
hypothesis of innocence—that defendant was merely present—and, for
that reason, we reverse defendant’s conviction of first degree murder
and death sentence.

Id. at 889–91.

While Donald was allegedly the driver in the present case, there was no

evidence of a plan between him and Stefan to commit murder nor any evidence that

Donald knew Stefan had a gun. Other than Gavin Garnica’s statement that “them

26

p. 29

boys” started shooting, there was also no eye-witness testimony as to the shooting

itself. Thus, there was no evidence as to anything Donald might have done or said

before, during, or after the shooting. Ms. Mouton testified that Donald was upset

when he entered her car at the Texaco station, but she did not testify as to anything

specific he said.

We find that the evidence was insufficient to convict Donald Briggs of second

degree murder. Even if the jury reasonably inferred from the video evidence that

the brothers were in the vicinity of the shooting at the time of the shooting and left

shortly afterwards, the jury was required to speculate as to whether the shots were

fired from the brothers’ car. Given the lack of physical evidence connecting the

brothers to the shooting, the absence of any weapon, the absence of any evidence

connecting the brothers to the victim, and the ambiguous evidence connecting the

brothers to Gavin Garnica, the jury’s determination that the shots were fired from

the brothers’ vehicle was based on speculation rather than reasonable inferences.

Furthermore, the evidence was not sufficient to prove Donald possessed the specific

intent to kill. For these reasons, we reverse the conviction of Donald Briggs for

second degree murder and vacate the corresponding sentence.

DUE PROCESS/ FAIR TRIAL

In his second assignment of error and third assignments of error, Donald

asserts that the prosecutor denied due process by allowing false testimony and that

he was denied a fair trial when the court allowed a relative of the victim to sit on the

jury. Because we have determined that Donald’s conviction should be reversed,

these assignments of error are moot.

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p. 30

IV. CONCLUSION

We find that assignment of error number one has merit and that the evidence

presented by the State was insufficient to support the conviction of Donald Briggs,

III for second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Therefore, the

conviction is reversed, and the corresponding sentence of life imprisonment at hard

labor without benefits is vacated and set aside.

CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND SENTENCE VACATED.

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p. 31

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-492 consolidated with 24-490

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STEFAN JERMAINE BRIGGS
A/K/A STEFAN BRIGGS

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 69263
HONORABLE THOMAS J. FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Gary J. Ortego, and Clayton Davis,
Judges.

CONVICTIONS REVERSED AND SENTENCE VACATED.

p. 32

Aaron M. Meche
Assistant District Attorney
15th Judicial District, Vermilion Parish
100 N. State Street, Ste. 215
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-4320
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Holli Herrle-Castillo
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 2333
Marrero, LA 70073
(504) 345-2801
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Stefan Jermaine Briggs

p. 33

WILSON, Judge.

A jury found Defendant, Stefan Jermaine Briggs, guilty of second degree

murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. The trial court sentenced Mr. Briggs to life

imprisonment at hard labor without the benefit of parole, probation, or suspension

of sentence. Mr. Briggs now appeals his conviction. For the following reasons, we

reverse the conviction and vacate the sentence.

I.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the evidence was insufficient to uphold the
conviction for second-degree murder;

(2) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion
for new trial; and

(3) whether the trial court erred in overruling the
defense’s objection to the evidence of uncharged
other crimes.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 14, 2022, Jazaylon Levy was shot while walking outside of an

apartment in the Stone Bridge apartment complex in Abbeville, Louisiana. He later

died from his injuries. On October 31, 2022, Stefan Briggs and his brother, Donald

Briggs, were each charged by a single grand jury indictment with one count of

second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. A two-day jury trial

commenced on August 29, 2023, after which both Stefan and Donald were found

guilty as charged.

On March 28, 2024, the trial court denied Stefan’s post verdict judgment of

acquittal and motion for new trial. After waiving sentencing delays, both Stefan and

p. 34

Donald were sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,

probation or suspension of sentence. On April 8, 2024, Stefan Briggs, through

counsel, filed a notice of appeal which was granted the same day.

III. LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there

is one error patent.

There is a conflict between the sentencing minutes, Uniform Sentencing

Commitment Order, and the transcript of sentencing. Both the minutes of sentencing

and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order state the trial court ordered Stefan’s

sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence he was presently serving. No

such statement is reflected in the transcript. Given our decision to reverse the

conviction and vacate the sentence, however, this error patent is moot.

INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE

In his first assignment of error, Stefan contends that the evidence was

insufficient to prove his identity as the offender and to prove that he had the specific

intent to kill or commit great bodily harm.

The analysis for sufficiency of the evidence is well settled:

When the issue of sufficiency of evidence is raised on appeal, the
critical inquiry of the reviewing court is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier
of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct.
2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, rehearing denied, 444 U.S. 890, 100 S.Ct. 195,
62 L.Ed.2d 126 (1979), State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d
559 (La.1983); State v. Duncan, 420 So.2d 1105 (La.1982); State v.
Moody, 393 So.2d 1212 (La.1981). It is the role of the fact finder to
weigh the respective credibility of the witnesses, and therefore, the

2

p. 35

appellate court should not second guess the credibility determinations
of the triers of fact beyond the sufficiency evaluations under the
Jackson standard of review. See State ex rel. Graffagnino, 436 So.2d
559 (citing State v. Richardson, 425 So.2d 1228 (La.1983)). In order
for this Court to affirm a conviction, however, the record must reflect
that the state has satisfied its burden of proving the elements of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Kennerson, 96-1518, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/7/97), 695 So.2d 1367, 1371.

When the conviction is based upon circumstantial evidence, La.R.S.
15:438 provides that the state “must exclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence” in order to convict. State v. Camp, 446 So.2d
1207, 1209 (La.1984). “Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which elemental factors may be
inferred according to reason, experience and common sense.” State v.
Burns, 441 So.2d 843, 845 (La.App. 3 Cir.1983). However, La.R.S.
15:438 does not establish a stricter standard of review on appeal than
the rational juror’s reasonable doubt standard. The statute serves as a
guide for the jury when considering circumstantial evidence. On
appeal, the issue is whether a rational trier of fact, when viewing the
evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could find that all
reasonable hypotheses of innocence were excluded. State v. Williams,
13–497 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/6/13), 124 So.3d 1236, writ denied, 13–2774
(La.5/16/14), 139 So.3d 1024.

State v. Baumberger, 15-1056, pp. 10–11 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 200 So.3d 817,

826–27, writ denied, 16-1251 (La. 5/26/17), 221 So.3d 859.

Stefan Briggs was charged with second-degree murder, a felony in violation

of La.R.S. 14:30.1. Specifically, Stefan was tried under La.R.S. 14:30.1(A)(1),

which is defined as the killing of human being “[w]hen the offender has a specific

intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm[.]” Specific intent is defined as “that

state of mind which exists when the circumstances indicate that the offender actively

desired the prescribed criminal consequences to follow his act or failure to act.”

La.R.S. 14:10(1). In addition to proving the statutory elements of the charged

offense at trial, the State is required to prove the defendant’s identity as the

perpetrator.

When a key issue at trial is whether the defendant was the perpetrator
of the crime, the State is required to negate any reasonable probability
of misidentification in order to carry its burden of proof beyond a

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p. 36

reasonable doubt. State v. Smith, 430 So.2d at 45; see also State v.
Brady, 414 So.2d 364, 365 (La.1982); State v. Long, 408 So.2d 1221,
1227 (La.1982). The fact-finder weighs the respective credibilities of
the witnesses, and this court will generally not second-guess those
determinations. State ex rel. Graffagnino v. King, 436 So.2d 559
(La.1983). However, we are mindful that the touchstone of Jackson v.
Virginia is rationality and that “irrational decisions to convict will be
overturned, rational decisions to convict will be upheld, and the actual
fact finder’s discretion will be impinged upon only to the extent
necessary to guarantee the fundamental protection of due process of
law.” State v. Mussall, 523 So.2d at 1310.

State v. Bright, 98-0398, pp. 22–23 (La. 4/11/00,), 776 So.2d 1134, 1147.