KA-0024-0492 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

State of Louisiana v. Stefan Jermaine Briggs A/K/A Stefan Briggs

Louisiana Court of Appeal, First Circuit · Filed July 22, 2026

Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., April 2, 2025

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-490 consolidated with 24-492

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

DONALD BRIGGS, III
A/K/A DONALD BRIGGS

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILLION, NO. 69263
HONORABLE THOMAS J. FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********
ON REMAND FROM
THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
NO. 2025-K-00529
**********

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Gary J. Ortego, and Clayton Davis,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

p. 2

Aaron M. Meche
Assistant District Attorney
15th Judicial District, Vermilion Parish
100 N. State Street, Ste. 215
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-4320
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Mary Constance Hanes
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 4015
New Orleans, LA 70178-4015
(504) 866-6652
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Donald Briggs, III

p. 3

WILSON, Judge.

This matter comes before the court on remand from the Louisiana Supreme

Court to consider the pretermitted assignments of error after the supreme court

reversed this court’s decision and reinstated the conviction and life sentence of

Defendant, Donald Briggs, III, for second-degree murder. State v. Briggs, 25-529

(La. 5/1/26), 432 So.3d 167. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction

and sentence.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the prosecutor denied due process with
false testimony; and

(2) whether Defendant was denied a fair trial when the
court allowed a relative of the victim to sit on the
jury.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 14, 2022, Jazaylon Levy was shot while walking outside of an

apartment in the Stone Bridge Apartment complex in Abbeville, Louisiana. He later

died from his injuries. On October 31, 2022, Donald Briggs and his brother, Stefan

Briggs, were each charged by a single grand jury indictment with one count of

second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. A two-day jury trial

commenced on August 29, 2023, after which both Donald and Stefan were found

guilty as charged.

On September 26, 2023, Donald, through counsel, filed a motion for post-

verdict judgment of acquittal and a separate motion for new trial. After hearing

p. 4

testimony and evidence, the motions were denied by the trial court on March 28,

2024. After waiving sentencing delays, both Donald and Stefan were sentenced to

life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of

sentence. On April 8, 2024, Donald, through counsel, filed a notice of appeal. His

trial counsel filed a separate motion to withdraw and appoint the Louisiana Appellate

Project (“LAP”). On April 11, 2024, the trial court granted an appeal, and on April

29, 2024, the trial court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw and appoint LAP.

This court reversed the convictions and sentences of both Defendants based

on insufficient circumstantial evidence. State v. Briggs, 24-490 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/2/25), 409 So.3d 399. The State appealed to the supreme court, which reversed

this court’s decision and reinstated the conviction and sentence for each Defendant.

The supreme court found this court erred in substituting its verdict for that of the

jury and remanded for this court to consider the pretermitted assignments of error.

Briggs, 432 So.3d 167.

III. LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there

is one error patent.

There is a conflict between the sentencing minutes, Uniform Sentencing

Commitment Order, and the transcript of sentencing. Both the minutes of sentencing

and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order state the trial court ordered

Donald’s sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence he was presently

serving. No such statement, however, is reflected in the transcript. This conflict is

to be resolved in favor of the transcript. See State v. Wommack, 00-137 (La.App. 3

p. 5

Cir. 6/7/00), 770 So.2d 365, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Thus,

the sentencing minutes and commitment order should be amended to delete the

statement that the trial court ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with any

other sentence Donald was presently serving.

FALSE TESTIMONY

Donald Briggs asserts that the prosecutor presented false testimony.

According to Mr. Briggs, the prosecutor testified that Roland Bernard, III, shot

Stefan in the face and then testified that Donald and Stefan gunned down Mr.

Bernard’s father. Mr. Briggs contends the prosecutor knew these two instances

involved open cases being investigated by Detective Trent Guidry of the Abbeville

Police Department. Mr. Briggs further accuses the prosecutor of “craftily engaging

a detective, who is actively conducting an investigation, prejudicing the jury by

spe[a]king of a crime the defendant is possibly a person of interest [in] as if he has

been duly convicted.” Finally, Mr. Briggs asserts that this testimony was “basically

being passed off as other crimes evidence in order to taint the minds of the jury[.]”

For the reasons discussed below, we find that this assignment has not been preserved

for review.

Although Mr. Briggs does not refer to any record pages, it appears that he is

referring to the colloquy between the State and Detective Guidry regarding gun

violence and animosity between two groups in Abbeville. When the State told the

detective that “Group A” was affiliated with Roland Bernard, III, the State asked if

the detective was familiar with that group. When the State referred the detective to

“Group B,” a defense attorney objected “as to relevance” and requested a sidebar.

The transcript indicated that a bench conference was held without the court reported

being present. The trial court then stated:

p. 6

BY THE COURT: I need to rule on the objection for the record.
I think the objection was relevance and that’s overruled. I think the rest
of it we’ve already decided. I mean, y’all are going to object if
something else comes up.

BY MR. VIDAL: Correct.

The following colloquy ensued:

Q Is there a Group B?

A Yes.

Q And to your knowledge, based on your investigation - - I’m, not
talking about criminal activity. I’m just talking about association or
affiliation - - is there a group which you know the Briggs brothers are
associated with?

A Yes.

Q We’ll call it Group B?

A Sure.

Q Is there animosity between Group A and Group B?

A Yes.

Q Is there gun violence between the groups?

A Yes.

Q I want to refer you to September of 2020. Did the Abbeville
Police Department receive a report of a shooting where Stefan Briggs
was wounded?

A Yes.

Q Do you know the details?

A Vaguely, yes.

Q Tell us.

A Stefan and his brother, Donald, were traveling in a vehicle in the
area of Martin Luther King and South Lamar Street. While they were
traveling in the vehicle, a shooting took place. Stefan was shot in his
hand and Donald drove him to the emergency room, dropped him off
and went after the shooter.

Q Did the Abbeville Police attempt to investigate that?

p. 7

A Yes.

Q Was the victim cooperative?

A No, sir.

Q Were you able to determine who fired the shot?

A No, sir. There was a suspect mentioned as Roland Bernard, III.

Q Let’s move to November of 2020. Roland Bernard, III’s father
was Roland Bernard, Jr.; is that correct?

A Correct.

Q And what happened to him in November of 2020?

A He was executed in his driveway.

Q Do you know any details about that?

A He was shot numerous times in his driveway by - - it was by two
different caliber - - two caliber casings were picked up indicating two
shooters.

Q Let’s move to the next month, December of 2020. Did you
receive a report of another shooting involving Stefan Briggs?

A Yes.

Q What do you know about that?

A During this incident, Donald and his brother, Stefan, were
traveling in a vehicle in the area of Seventh Street - - Seventh or Eighth
Street, South Louisiana area. While they were traveling in the vehicle,
shots were fired at the vehicle and Stefan was struck in his face with a
7.62 caliber rifle.

Detective Guidry testified that although an attempt to investigate was made by the

Abbeville Police Department, Stefan was not cooperative.

First, Mr. Briggs’s assertion that the prosecutor “testified” is incorrect.

Although the prosecutor asked Detective Guidry leading questions, Detective

Guidry was the one testifying. Secondly, Mr. Briggs mischaracterizes Detective

Guidry’s testimony. According to Mr. Briggs, there was testimony that Roland

Bernard, III, shot Stefan in the face and that Donald and Stefan gunned down Mr.

p. 8

Bernard’s father, Roland Bernard, Jr. In actuality, Detective Guidry testified that

Stefan was shot in the hand in one instance and shot in the face in another. Although

Detective Guidry testified that Roland Bernard, III, was a suspect in the investigation

of the gunshot to Stefan’s hand, Detective Guidry by no means testified that Roland

Bernard was the actual shooter and did not mention Roland Bernard with respect to

the incident wherein Stefan was shot in the face. When Detective Guidry testified

as to Roland Bernard, III’s father being executed in his driveway, he mentioned that

there appeared to be two shooters but stated nothing about Donald and Stefan being

the shooters.

Although Mr. Briggs’s argument that the testimony was “basically being

passed off as other crimes evidence in order to taint the minds of the jury” could be

a legitimate argument, it was not preserved for review. Defense counsel objected as

to “relevance” with no mention of “other crimes evidence.” After an unrecorded

bench conference, the trial court announced that it overruled the objection. Defense

counsel then agreed that he would object if something else came up. We have found

no other objection based on other crimes evidence in the record.

Since there was no objection to other crimes evidence, the issue has not been

preserved for review. La.Code Crim.P. art. 841. Even if “other crimes” was

discussed in the bench conference, the transcript states the court reporter was not

present. Since the court reporter was not present, the bench conference was

presumably not recorded. Recently, this court stated the following regarding an

unrecorded bench conference:

The State argues that because Defendant’s contention is solely
based on an unrecorded bench conference, the assignment of error is
founded entirely on speculation. Also, the State points out that
Defendant neither requested that the bench conference be recorded nor
objected on the record that it was not recorded. The State then further
asserts that Defendant never sought to introduce evidence of the

p. 9

victim’s history. Finally, the State argues that even if Defendant had
tried to introduce such evidence, it would have been inadmissible.

Law and Analysis

In State v. Pinion, 06-2346, p. 7 (La. 10/26/07), 968 So.2d 131,
134, the supreme court stated:

This Court has never articulated a per se rule either
requiring the recording of bench conferences or exempting
them from the scope of La.C.Cr.P. art. 843, which requires
in felony cases the recording not only of the evidentiary
portions of trial but also of “the examination of
prospective jurors . . . and objections, questions,
statements, and arguments of counsel.” State v. Hoffman,
98-3118, p. 50 (La. 4/11/00), 768 So.2d 542, 586.

Continuing in Pinion, 968 So.2d at 134, the opinion stated, “The Court
has instead, conducted a case-specific inquiry to determine whether the
failure to record the conferences results in actual prejudice to the
defendant’s appeal.”

It is equally well-accepted that in a criminal case an appellate
court has no authority to receive or review evidence not contained in
the trial court record. State v. Oubichon, 422 So.2d 1140 (La.1982);
State v. Turner, 626 So.2d 890 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 93-
3182 (La. 4/4/94), 635 So.2d 1122. After reviewing the briefs and the
record in the present case, we contacted the district court asking it to
supplement the record with a transcription of the bench conference. In
response, the district court clerk’s office advised us that the conference
cannot be transcribed, as the record states, it was “AN OFF THE
RECORD DISCUSSION.”

In view of the response we received from the district court, it is
evident that the contentions made by the State and Defendant are based
solely upon speculation. As the record provides no facts on which to
base any analysis, we have nothing to review.

State v. Miller, 23-554, pp. 13–15 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/3/24), 387 So.3d 713, 722

(footnote omitted), writ denied, 24-560 (La. 10/15/24), 394 So.3d 816.

Likewise, the notation that the court reporter was not present during the bench

conference held in this case indicates the bench conference was not recorded.

Additionally, as in Miller, defense counsel did not request the bench conference be

recorded and did not object when it was not recorded. Thus, this court has nothing

p. 10

to review regarding the allegation of other crimes evidence, and this assignment of

error has not been preserved for review.

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL:

Mr. Briggs contends the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial,

which alleged that Juror Laura Mouton failed to disclose that she was related to the

victim. For the reasons discussed below, we find this assignment lacks merit.

On March 14, 2024, Mr. Briggs filed a “Motion for New Trial for Newly

Discovered Evidence.” He alleged that he recently learned that Juror Mouton failed

to reveal on voir dire that she was related to the victim and had a close personal

relationship with the victim’s family. Had she disclosed this information, Mr. Briggs

claimed Juror Mouton would have been challenged for cause. After hearing

evidence at a hearing held March 28, 2024, the trial court denied the motion.

At the hearing, Keresha Levy, the victim’s mother, testified that she had never

met Juror Mouton and did not know of any relationship between Juror Mouton and

the victim’s dad, Whitney Allen, Jr. According to Ms. Levy, the victim’s dad died

in 2012 or 2013. On cross-examination, Ms. Levy testified that when she was five

months pregnant with the victim, the victim’s dad went to prison until the victim

was six or seven years old. Ms. Levy agreed that the victim was eight or nine when

his dad died in 2013, but the victim did visit his dad and paternal grandmother quite

often. When asked who Onique Umini1 was, Ms. Levy stated she was the victim’s

paternal aunt. According to Ms. Levy, Ms. Umini and the victim’s dad had the same

father but different mothers. When asked if she had ever met the victim’s family in

Kaplan, Ms. Levy replied, “No.”

1
Onique Umini is also referred to as Umini Caldwell. This court will refer to her as Ms.
Umini.
8

p. 11

Juror Mouton testified that Ms. Umini was her cousin and that they grew up

together in Kaplan. According to Juror Mouton, she and Ms. Umini saw each other

at family reunions. Juror Mouton identified a picture from a March 26, 2018

Facebook post that stated, “Laura Mouton is feeling loved with Onique Umini and

Shawn Mouton.” Juror Mouton also wrote, “[m]y cousins” below the picture. When

asked when she learned that the victim (Ms. Umini’s nephew) passed away, Juror

Mouton responded:

A I don’t remember, but I saw - - I mean, whenever I came to court,
that’s whenever I found out that that was her nephew - - after court was
done, I found out that was her nephew on her daddy’s side.

Q So despite growing up with her, knowing her family history, you
had no idea? Is that what you’re testifying today, that you had no idea
that she had a nephew named Jazaylon?

A No, I didn’t know - - I don’t know who that - - I didn’t know that
that was her nephew, no.

Q As she - - was Ms. Umini present at all during the trial to your
knowledge?

A Not when I was here.

Looking at Ms. Umini’s Facebook page, Juror Mouton identified a picture of

Ms. Umini and a person she believed to be the victim. The following colloquy

ensued:

Q So it’s your testimony today - - I just want to make sure I
understand - - that at no time did you, through Facebook or any other
means realize that Umini had lost a nephew?

A I didn’t know that was her nephew.

Q That wasn’t my question. At any time, did you realize that Umini
had lost a nephew?

A Yeah.

Juror Mouton also testified that the victim’s father was also father to her

godchild. Even so, Juror Mouton maintained that at the beginning of the case, she

p. 12

had no knowledge of anyone involved in the case. When asked when she became

aware that she might know someone in the trial, Juror Mouton responded:

A After everything was over with.

Q When?

A What you mean?

Q Well, when? I mean, the day after it ended, the day - - a week
later?

A Oh, yeah, it was - - it might have been the day after I found out.

Q So almost immediately. How did you find out?

A Because I was talking to people about it.

Q And you never talked to people about it before the trial?

A Uh-uh (negative response).

Q When it happened, you never talked to anybody?

A No, whenever I was asked did I know anybody from either side
- - they asked the little boy - - I don’t know him or his mama. I don’t
know that family. And then they asked if I knew these two right here.
I don’t know them either.

When questioned by the State regarding her relationship with Ms. Umini,

Juror Mouton testified that their grandmothers were third or fourth cousins, making

her and Ms. Umini fifth or sixth cousins. Juror Mouton testified that she had no

family relationship with the victim’s father. At trial, Juror Mouton did not hear Ms.

Umini’s name mentioned nor did she hear the name of the victim’s father.

According to Juror Mouton, her first time seeing the victim’s face was when

the State displayed his picture at trial. At that time, Juror Mouton had no idea who

the victim was, who his mother was, or who his grandmother was. The following

colloquy ensued:

Q If you had known somebody involved in the case, you would
have told the judge, wouldn’t you?

p. 13

A Right.

Q And learning about these facts afterwards had nothing to do with
your decision in the case?

A No.

Q When you swore under oath that you didn’t know anybody
involved in the case, you were telling the truth?

A Yes.

Q And just because you’re on Facebook with people - - a lot of
people probably - - and you’re on Facebook with Umini doesn’t mean
you knew anything about her nephew being killed in 2020, did you?

A No.

Q She never talked to you about it?

A Uh-uh (negative response).

Q Was there any reason why you would have been biased in this
case?

A No.

Defense clarified with Juror Mouton that before trial, she did know that Ms.

Umini had lost a nephew to murder but had not put “two and two together . . . as

[she] sat on the jury.”

In its ruling, the trial court found the biological relationship between Juror

Mouton and Ms. Umini was tenuous at best and found no evidence of a relationship

between Juror Mouton and the victim’s father or mother. Additionally, the trial court

found Juror Mouton did not know the victim “and only found out after the trial that

the victim was the nephew of somebody that she knew and somebody that she is

very, very distantly related to.” Finally, the trial court stated the following:

But all that being said, the Court finds that the defendants did not
present anything to the Court to show that there was a relationship, that
Ms. Mouton concealed any type of relationship, that there was any
actual or implied bias on the part of the juror. And all that being said,
the Court is going to deny the motion for new trial.

p. 14

Mr. Briggs asserts that Juror Mouton not only knew the victim through “some

loose association,” but she was biologically related to the victim’s aunt. He argues:

Mouton knew the victim, knew the defendant, suspending any
hypothesis of innocence, and had an already predisposed conviction of
guilt. She sat [sic] out to sit on this jury and convict. Becoming the
jury foreperson, there is no way of knowing how much influence she
had on other jurors and their vote.

Juror Mouton’s relationship, Mr. Briggs contends, was “more than enough to imply

biasness to Laura Mouton, therefore rendering the [trial] unfair and partial, violating

the defendant[’]s right to a fair trial, and leaving no confidence in the fair outcome

of the trial.” According to Mr. Briggs, being a relative of the victim requires an

automatic disqualification under La.Code Crim.P. art. 797.

In State v. Cooley, 11-959 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/4/12), 87 So.3d 285, writ denied,

12-1008 (La. 10/26/12), 99 So.3d 640, this court reviewed the denial of a motion for

new trial, which alleged that a juror made a false statement during voir dire. The

juror in Cooley, Francis Powell, answered “no” to a question on the voir dire

questionnaire asking whether the juror, the juror’s family member, or the juror’s

close acquaintance had been a victim of sexual abuse. Id. at 289. Cooley’s attorney

alleged that after the verdict, he learned that Juror Powell’s brother had been

investigated for sexually assaulting his niece and his biological daughter. Id. At a

hearing on Cooley’s motion for new trial, there was testimony that the niece who

accused Juror Powell’s brother was not related to Juror Powell as she was the niece

of the brother’s wife by blood relation. Id. at 290. There was also testimony that

the daughter of Juror Powell’s brother made the allegations to an unknown source,

and no investigation or arrest had been made in Beauregard Parish. Id.

This court addressed Cooley’s motion for new trial as follows:

p. 15

La.Code Crim.P. art. 775. In a post-trial context, the matter can be
raised in a motion for new trial.

The motion for a new trial is based on the
supposition that injustice has been done the defendant,
and, unless such is shown to have been the case the motion
shall be denied, no matter upon what allegations it is
grounded.

The court, on motion of the defendant, shall grant a
new trial whenever:

(1) The verdict is contrary to the law and the
evidence;

(2) The court’s ruling on a written motion, or an
objection made during the proceedings, shows prejudicial
error;

(3) New and material evidence that,
notwithstanding the exercise of reasonable diligence by
the defendant, was not discovered before or during the
trial, is available, and if the evidence had been introduced
at the trial it would probably have changed the verdict or
judgment of guilty;

(4) The defendant has discovered, since the verdict
or judgment of guilty, a prejudicial error or defect in the
proceedings that, notwithstanding the exercise of
reasonable diligence by the defendant, was not discovered
before the verdict or judgment; or

(5) The court is of the opinion that the ends of
justice would be served by the granting of a new trial,
although the defendant may not be entitled to a new trial
as a matter of strict legal right.

La.Code Crim.P. art. 851.

“The motion for new trial is based upon the supposition, and
requires a showing, that injustice has been done the defendant.
La.C.Cr.P. art. 851. Regarding the misstatements of jurors, the
defendant must show that he was prejudiced by the misstatement for a
new trial to be warranted.” State v. Johnson, 32,910, p. 5 (La.App. 2
Cir. 1/26/00), 750 So.2d 398, 403–04, writ denied, 00–911
(La.11/3/00), 773 So.2d 140.

First, as argued by the State, Cooley was not prevented from
having a full and adequate voir dire as he has failed to show that either
the State or the trial court placed unreasonable limitations on the voir
dire examination by the defense:

p. 16

As a general matter, an accused in a criminal case is
constitutionally entitled to a full and complete voir dire
examination. La. Const. Art. I, § 17. The purpose of voir
dire is to determine the qualifications of prospective jurors
by testing their competency and impartiality and to assist
counsel in articulating intelligent reasons for exercise of
cause and peremptory challenges. The scope of voir dire
is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and his
rulings will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear
showing of an abuse of discretion.

State v. Ball, 00–2277, p. 23 (La.1/25/02), 824 So.2d 1089, 1110, cert.
denied, 537 U.S. 864, 123 S.Ct. 260, 154 L.Ed.2d 107 (2002) (citation
omitted).

Second, Cooley failed to establish that Juror Powell actually lied
in response to the inquiry on the jury questionnaire. The testimony of
Robert McCullough was the only evidence either proffered or offered
to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The niece whose complaints
were investigated during the first case, the charges of which Rexford
Powell was acquitted, was not the niece of Juror Powell because the
niece was only related to Rexford Powell through his wife.

Further, Mr. McCullough was not involved in the second
investigation; he learned only that Rexford Powell’s daughter had
alleged to an unknown source that her father had molested her. Thus, it
appears as if Mr. McCullough had only heard rumors that such sexual
misconduct had occurred. As Rexford Powell was never investigated
for, arrested for, charged with, or prosecuted for sexual misconduct
with his daughter, the rumors were never proven or substantiated. Thus,
Cooley failed to establish that Juror Powell intentionally misled the
court when he answered “no” to the question asking if he, any family
member, or close acquaintance had been the victim of a sex crime.

Finally, assuming, arguendo, that Juror Powell was aware of the
rumor concerning his brother and his brother’s daughter, Cooley failed
to show that he was prejudiced by or suffered injustice as a result of the
misinformation. Cooley did not show whether Juror Powell believed
his brother guilty of the misconduct, whether Juror Powell’s
impartiality was affected by sympathy for his niece, or whether Juror
Powell influenced his fellow jury members to find Cooley guilty.

Accordingly, this assertion is without merit.

Id. at 290–91.

As in Cooley, Mr. Briggs makes no allegation that either the State or the trial

court placed unreasonable limitations on his voir dire examination. Additionally,

Mr. Briggs fails to establish that Juror Mouton lied during the voir dire. Although

p. 17

he claims Juror Mouton purposely concealed her relationship to the victim in order

to assure his conviction, Juror Mouton was adamant in her testimony at the motion

for new trial hearing that she did not learn of her connection to the victim until after

trial. Finally, Mr. Briggs fails to show he was prejudiced by Juror Mouton’s failure

to disclose her connection to the victim. As the trial court found in its ruling, the

biological relationship between Juror Mouton and the victim’s aunt was tenuous at

best. Thus, even assuming for the sake of argument that Juror Mouton realized her

connection, Mr. Briggs fails to show Juror Mouton’s impartiality was affected by

the connection or that she influenced the other jurors. Accordingly, this assignment

of error lacks merit.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the conviction and sentence of Defendant Donald

Briggs are affirmed. We order that the sentencing minutes and Uniform Sentencing

Commitment Order be amended to delete the statement that the trial court ordered

the sentence to be served concurrently with any other sentence Defendant was

presently serving.

AFFIRMED.

p. 18

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-492 consolidated with 24-490

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

STEFAN JERMAINE BRIGGS
A/K/A STEFAN BRIGGS

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILLION, NO. 69263
HONORABLE THOMAS J. FREDERICK, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********
ON REMAND FROM
THE LOUISIANA SUPREME COURT
NO. 2025-K-00529

**********

SHARON DARVILLE WILSON
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sharon Darville Wilson, Gary J. Ortego, and Clayton Davis,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

p. 19

Aaron M. Meche
Assistant District Attorney
15th Judicial District, Vermilion Parish
100 N. State Street, Ste. 215
Abbeville, LA 70510
(337) 898-4320
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Holli Herrle-Castillo
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 2333
Marrero, LA 70073
(504) 345-2801
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Stefan Jermaine Briggs

p. 20

WILSON, Judge.

This matter comes before the court on remand from the Louisiana Supreme

Court to consider the pretermitted assignments of error after the supreme court

reversed this court’s decision and reinstated the conviction and life sentence of

Defendant, Stefan Briggs, for second-degree murder. State v. Briggs, 25-529 (La.

5/1/26), 432 So.3d 167. For the following reasons, we affirm the conviction and

sentence.

ISSUES

We must decide:

(1) whether the trial court erred in denying the motion
for new trial; and

(2) whether the trial court erred in overruling the
defense’s objection to the evidence of uncharged
other crimes.

II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On July 14, 2022, Jazaylon Levy was shot while walking outside of an

apartment in the Stone Bridge Apartment complex in Abbeville, Louisiana. He later

died from his injuries. On October 31, 2022, Stefan Briggs and his brother, Donald

Briggs, were each charged by a single grand jury indictment with one count of

second degree murder, a violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. A two-day jury trial

commenced on August 29, 2023, after which both Stefan and Donald were found

guilty as charged.

On March 28, 2024, the trial court denied Stefan’s post verdict judgment of

acquittal and motion for new trial. After waiving sentencing delays, both Stefan and

Donald were sentenced to life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole,

p. 21

probation or suspension of sentence. On April 8, 2024, Stefan Briggs, through

counsel, filed a notice of appeal which was granted the same day.

This court reversed the convictions and sentences of both Defendants based

on insufficient circumstantial evidence. State v. Briggs, 24-490 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/2/25), 409 So.3d 399. The State proceeded to the supreme court, which reversed

this court’s decision and reinstated the conviction and sentence for each Defendant.

The supreme court found this court erred in substituting its verdict for that of the

jury and remanded for this court to consider the pretermitted assignments of error.

Briggs, 432 So.3d 167.

III. LAW AND DISCUSSION

ERRORS PATENT

In accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, all appeals are reviewed for

errors patent on the face of the record. After reviewing the record, we find that there

is one error patent.

There is a conflict between the sentencing minutes, Uniform Sentencing

Commitment Order, and the transcript of sentencing. Both the minutes of sentencing

and the Uniform Sentencing Commitment Order state the trial court ordered Stefan’s

sentence to run concurrently with any other sentence he was presently serving. No

such statement, however, is reflected in the transcript. This conflict is to be resolved

in favor of the transcript. See State v. Wommack, 00-137 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/7/00),

770 So.2d 365, writ denied, 00-2051 (La. 9/21/01), 797 So.2d 62. Thus, the

sentencing minutes and commitment order should be amended to delete the

statement that the trial court ordered the sentence to be served concurrently with any

other sentence Stefan was presently serving.

p. 22

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL

Stefan Briggs contends the trial court should have granted his motion for new

trial based upon newly discovered evidence. On March 14, 2024, Mr. Briggs filed

a “Motion for New Trial for Newly Discovered Evidence.” He alleged that he

recently learned that Juror Laura Mouton failed to reveal in voir dire that she was

related to the victim and had a close personal relationship with the victim’s family.

Had she disclosed this information, Mr. Briggs claimed Juror Mouton would have

been challenged for cause. After hearing evidence at a hearing held March 28, 2024,

the trial court denied the motion.

Mr. Briggs asserts that during voir dire, Juror Mouton denied knowing or

being related to any parties involved in the case. After trial, Mr. Briggs contends, it

became apparent that Juror Mouton was actually related to the victim. According to

Mr. Briggs, Juror Mouton’s testimony at the motion for new trial hearing was

“suspect and inconsistent, casting doubt on the veracity not only of her testimony at

the hearing, but of all of her voir dire responses.” Had Juror Mouton disclosed her

relationship, Mr. Briggs contends that she would have been challenged for cause, or

at the least stricken by a peremptory challenge.

The State contends that it was “quite obvious” that Juror Mouton did not know

the victim and was not aware before trial of the victim’s relation to her distant cousin,

Umini Caldwell. 1 The State also argues that Mr. Briggs’s counsel failed to prove

he exercised due diligence to discover Juror Mouton’s relationship:

Appellant’s counsel, during voir dire, had the opportunity to question
each potential juror to ascertain any vital information that may exclude
them from sitting on the jury. Counsel did not ask any questions of that
effect to juror Mouton, then went on to accept her as a juror.

Due diligence in this particular situation would have been to
further delve into each potential juror’s background to ascertain these

1
Umini Caldwell is also referred to as Onique Umini. We will refer to her as Ms. Umini.
3

p. 23

vital bits of information. No effort was made by Appellant’s counsel
to further question juror Mouton during voir dire. No attestation of
reasonable diligence was made.

Keresha Levy, the victim’s mother, testified that she had never met Juror

Mouton and did not know of any relationship between Juror Mouton and the victim’s

dad, Whitney Allen, Jr. According to Ms. Levy, the victim’s dad died in 2012 or

2013. On cross-examination, Ms. Levy testified that when she was five months

pregnant with the victim, when the victim’s dad went to prison until the victim was

six or seven years old. Ms. Levy agreed that the victim was eight when his dad died

in 2013, but the victim did visit his dad and paternal grandmother quite often. When

asked who Ms. Umini was, Ms. Levy stated she was the victim’s paternal aunt.

According to Ms. Levy, Ms. Umini and the victim’s dad had the same father but

different mothers. When asked if she had ever met the victim’s family in Kaplan,

Ms. Levy replied, “No.”

Juror Mouton testified that Ms. Umini was her cousin and that they grew up

together in Kaplan. According to Juror Mouton, she and Ms. Umini saw each other

at family reunions. Juror Mouton identified a picture from a March 26, 2018

Facebook post that stated, “Laura Mouton is feeling loved with Onique Umini and

Shawn Mouton.” Juror Mouton also wrote, “[m]y cousins” below the picture. When

asked when she learned that the victim (Ms. Umini’s nephew) passed away, Juror

Mouton responded:

Q So despite growing up with her, knowing her family history, you
had no idea? Is that what you’re testifying today, that you had no idea
that she had a nephew named Jazaylon?

A No, I didn’t know - - I don’t know who that - - I didn’t know that
that was her nephew, no.

p. 24

Q As she - - was Ms. Umini present at all during the trial to your
knowledge?

A Not when I was here.

Looking at Ms. Umini’s Facebook page, Juror Mouton identified a picture of

Ms. Umini and a person she believed to be the victim. The following colloquy

ensued:

Q So it’s your testimony today - - I just want to make sure I
understand - - that at no time did you, through Facebook or any other
means realize that Umini had lost a nephew?

A I didn’t know that was her nephew.

Q That wasn’t my question. At any time, did you realize that Umini
had lost a nephew?

A Yeah.

Juror Mouton also testified that the victim’s father was also father to her

godchild. Even so, Juror Mouton maintained that at the beginning of the case, she

had no knowledge of anyone involved in the case. When asked when she became

aware that she might know someone in the trial, Juror Mouton responded:

A After everything was over with.

Q When?

A What you mean?

Q Well, when? I mean, the day after it ended, the day - - a week
later?

A Oh, yeah, it was - - it might have been the day after I found out.

Q So almost immediately. How did you find out?

A Because I was talking to people about it.

Q And you never talked to people about it before the trial?

A Uh-uh (negative response).

Q When it happened, you never talked to anybody?

p. 25

When questioned by the State regarding her relationship with Ms. Umini,

Juror Mouton testified that their grandmothers were third or fourth cousins, making

her and Ms. Umini fifth or sixth cousins. Juror Mouton testified that she had no

family relationship with the victim’s father. At trial, Juror Mouton did not hear Ms.

Umini’s name mentioned nor did she hear the name of the victim’s father.

According to Juror Mouton, her first time to see the victim’s face was when

the State displayed his picture at trial. At that time, Juror Mouton had no idea who

the victim was, who his mother was, or who his grandmother was. The following

colloquy ensued:

Q If you had known somebody involved in the case, you would
have told the judge, wouldn’t you?

A Right.

Q And learning about these facts afterwards had nothing to do with
your decision in the case?

A No.

Q When you swore under oath that you didn’t know anybody
involved in the case, you were telling the truth?

A Yes.

A No.

Q She never talked to you about it?

A Uh-uh (negative response).

Q Was there any reason why you would have been biased in this
case?

p. 26

A No.

Defense counsel clarified with Juror Mouton that before trial, she did know

that Ms. Umini had lost a nephew to murder but had not put “two and two together

. . . as [she] sat on the jury.”