State of Louisiana v. Antonio Jackson

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-592

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

ANTONIO JACKSON

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APPEAL FROM THE
THIRTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 116560-F
HONORABLE CHUCK R. WEST, DISTRICT JUDGE

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WILBUR L. STILES
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Wilbur L. Stiles, and Clayton Davis, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Trent Brignanc
Evangeline Parish District Attorney
13th Judicial District
Chauncey J. Hesnor
P. O. Drawer 780
Ville Platte, LA 70586
(337) 363-3438
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Chad M. Ikerd
Louisiana Appellate Project
600 Jefferson St., Ste. 903
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 366-8994
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Antonio Jackson

STILES, Judge.

Defendant, Antonio Jackson, pled guilty to the amended charge of

manslaughter. He appeals his sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Because Defendant pled guilty, the factual basis in the record is limited. The

basic facts of the incident leading to the shooting of the victim, Julius Goudy, were

established during a Continued Juvenile Custody Hearing and Probable Cause

Hearing held on October 3, 2019. Defendant was sixteen years old at the time of the

incident.

On October 2, 2019, Aliejah Fontenot was taking out the trash. Ms. Fontenot

was Defendant’s girlfriend and the mother of his child. Mr. Goudy approached Ms.

Fontenot and started flirting with her, but she did not respond in kind. He said some

vulgar things to Ms. Fontenot and the two began arguing, catching the attention of

Keabreonna Doucet. Ms. Doucet walked over to Mr. Goudy and Ms. Fontenot. Mr.

Goudy then said vulgar things to Ms. Doucet as well. Soon thereafter, Defendant’s

grandmother, Debra Jackson, approached and yelled at Mr. Goudy that he should

not be talking to these young women this way. A fight ensued in front of Ms.

Jackson’s apartment, as shown in recovered surveillance footage taken from the

apartment complex and described by Detective Steven Deville at the October 3, 2019

hearing:

At this at this point [sic] Ms. uh Debra Jackson told me she approached
Mr. Julius and told him that he shouldn’t be talking to these young
women this way. And then uh that turned to an argument between Mr.
Julius and Ms. Debra.

....

[A]nd right here uh a physical altercation takes place and then as you
can see Ms. Aleijah pushed him and Ms. Debra goes after him and then
this altercation moves in front of her apartment. She grabs a bucket of
beer cans and throws it at him. And he’s on her sidewalk in front of her
front door. And she now has a broom that she’s swinging at him.

....

[A]nd the fight continues. Then Ms. Debra and Julius is [sic] on the
ground and there are some unknown individuals right here who
participated in the fight. You see he’s drug [sic] right there, he’s uh he’s
getting beat pretty bad. He’s on his hands and knees and then you see
Antonio walk up right here and shoot him right in the back.

Prior to the shooting, after learning that Mr. Goudy had hit Ms. Fontenot and

his grandmother, Defendant joined the fight against Mr. Goudy. He then ran back

into the apartment, came back with a gun, and shot Mr. Goudy point blank in the

back. A powder burn was left on Mr. Goudy’s back, caused by the gun barrel being

placed directly against the skin of his back. The bullet entered Mr. Goudy’s upper

right shoulder blade and burrowed into his jaw area, just beneath the tongue. After

shooting Mr. Goudy, Defendant tucked the gun into his waistband and walked away.

On October 14, 2019, the State filed a bill of information charging Defendant

with second degree murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1, illegal use of weapons

or dangerous instrumentalities, in violation of La.R.S. 14:94, and illegal possession

of a handgun by a juvenile, in violation of La.R.S. 14:95.8. On October 23, 2019, an

Evangeline Parish Grand Jury indicted Defendant on the charge of second degree

murder, in violation of La.R.S. 14:30.1. On December 14, 2023, Defendant pled

guilty to the amended charge of manslaughter, in violation of La.R.S. 14:31. In

exchange for his plea, the State dismissed the charges of illegal use of weapons or

dangerous instrumentalities and illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile. On

May 23, 2024, the trial court sentenced Defendant to serve twenty-five years at hard

labor, with credit for time served.

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Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, arguing that his sentence is

constitutionally excessive. The trial court denied the motion.

Defendant has now appealed, asserting that his twenty-five-year sentence is

constitutionally excessive for a sixteen-year-old child who was defending his

grandmother after she was physically attacked by a younger male.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

After reviewing the record in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920, we

find no errors patent.

Assignment of Error

In his sole assignment of error, Defendant contends that his twenty-five-year

sentence is constitutionally excessive since he was sixteen years old at the time he

shot the victim. Defendant submits that he was acting in a stressful situation in which

the victim had instigated a verbal and physical argument with Defendant’s

grandmother and two other young women. He asserts that he was young and

inexperienced, and his ability to cope was underdeveloped.

The trial court noted during sentencing that if Defendant had not pled guilty

to manslaughter, he would have faced a far greater sentence for second degree

murder than the forty-year maximum sentence for manslaughter. A conviction of

second degree murder alone could have brought Defendant life imprisonment, not

to mention the additional sentences from the other two charges ultimately dismissed

by the State. Thus, Defendant received a considerable benefit for entering a plea of

guilty.

Defendant nonetheless contends that this benefit was minimal “because an

average jury would not have agreed with the State’s charge of second-degree murder

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had this case gone to trial.” Defendant believes that manslaughter would have most

likely been the outcome of a trial, and thus, when deciding on a sentence, the trial

court should have considered that Defendant pled guilty to the crime he was factually

guilty of, thereby sparing the State and Mr. Goudy’s family a trial.

Defendant further argues that there were clear mitigating facts in this case,

reasserting the arguments made in his motion to reconsider sentence: his age and

lack of maturity; he acted under strong provocation; the victim facilitated the

commission of the offense by attacking members of Defendant’s family; and he has

attempted to better himself while incarcerated. Defendant maintains that it was “[a]n

impulsive decision by a 16-year-old child who saw a young man physically and

verbally fighting with his grandmother on her front porch[,]” and that he never

intended to kill Mr. Goudy.

Louisiana courts have laid out the following guidelines regarding the review

of a sentence on a claim of constitutional excessiveness:

Sentences within the statutory sentencing range can be reviewed
for constitutional excessiveness. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762
(La.1979). In State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01),
779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43, writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d
331, a panel of this court discussed the review of excessive sentence
claims, stating:

La. Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law
shall subject any person to cruel or unusual punishment.”
To constitute an excessive sentence, the reviewing court
must find the penalty so grossly disproportionate to the
severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that
the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than
a needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v.
Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981). The trial court has
wide discretion in the imposition of sentence within the
statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set aside as
excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124,
writ denied, 00-0165 (La. 6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The

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relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad
sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might
have been more appropriate. State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.
5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1043, 117
S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

Further, in reviewing the defendant’s sentences, the appellate
court should consider the nature of the crime, the nature and
background of the offender, and the sentences imposed for similar
crimes. State v. Lisotto, 98-648 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/16/98), 726 So.2d
57 (citing State v. Telsee, 425 So.2d 1251 (La.1983)), writ denied, 99-
433 (La. 6/25/99), 745 So.2d 1183. In State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4
(La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied, 03-562 (La.
5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061, a panel of this court observed that:

While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar
crimes may provide some insight, “it is well settled that
sentences must be individualized to the particular offender
and to the particular offense committed.” State v. Batiste,
594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1991). Additionally, it is
within the purview of the trial court to particularize the
sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best
position to assess the aggravating and mitigating
circumstances presented by each case.” State v. Cook, 95-
2784 (La. 5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Soileau, 13-770, pp. 4-5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/14), 153 So.3d 1002, 1005-06

(alteration in original), writ denied, 14-452 (La. 9/26/14), 149 So.3d 261.

The possible maximum sentence for a conviction of manslaughter is forty

years at hard labor. La.R.S. 14:31(B). Defendant received twenty-five years at hard

labor, within the mid-range of the possible sentence. When imposing his sentence,

the trial court stated the following:

The Court has carefully studied the pre-sentence report, the
record if [sic] prior offenses, factors in mitigation as well as aggravation
present by both the defendant and the State of Louisiana. The Court has
considered these matter [sic] was well [sic] as the nature of the present
offense in light of the provisions of Article - - Code of Criminal
Procedure Article 894.1 and the Court makes the following findings
regarding sentencings. There is no issue Mr. Jackson was born on
January 5, 2003. The crime was committed on October 2, 2019. Mr.
Jackson was therefore sixteen years old at the time of the offense. The
record indicates that the victim was involved in an altercation with three
women including the defendant’s grandmother at which time several

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community members had intervened to restrain the victim. While the
victim was on the ground, the defendant came out the house and struck
the victim with a gun and according to the defendant the gun went off
killing the victim. Imprisonment must be imposed if there is, A, an
undue risk of commission of another crime. Correction treatment would
be most effective in an institution. Or C, a lesser sentence will deprecate
the seriousness of the crime. Mr. Jackson has plead [sic] guilty to a
serious crime. Total suspension of sentence would deprecate the
seriousness of that crime. Manslaughter particularly puts other persons
at risk and has resulted in the death of a human being therefore I [sic]
cannot be taken lightly. For that reason, imprisonment for a period of
time is warranted. In mitigation the Court finds that Mr. Jackson was
sixteen years old at the time of the offense and that the situation you
were confronted with was volatile. In aggravation the Court finds that
the victim was retrained [sic] at the time and therefore posed no danger
to anyone.

The trial court then reviewed several cases in which the defendants were convicted

of and sentenced for manslaughter before concluding:

In this particular case Mr. Jackson was originally charged with second
degree murder, illegal use of a weapon or dangerous instrumentality,
and illegal possession of a handgun by a juvenile. On December 14,
2023, uh the State moved to amend the bill of information, they
amended the charge from second degree murder to manslaughter at
which time Mr. Jackson plead [sic] to that charge. The State then moved
to nolle pros the remaining charges which motion was granted.
Therefore, similar to the prior jurisprudence, Mr. Jackson has received
the benefit of a reduced plea.

In State v. Matthew, 07-1326 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/28/08), 983 So.2d 994, writ

denied sub. nom State ex rel. Matthew v. State, 08-1664 (La. 4/24/09), 7 So.3d 1193,

the defendant was initially charged with second degree murder and unauthorized use

of a motor vehicle. He pled guilty to the amended charges of manslaughter and

aggravated battery, receiving thirty-five years for manslaughter and seven years for

aggravated battery. This court upheld his sentences, stating:

We note that the defendant was initially charged with second degree
murder which carried a sentence of “life imprisonment at hard labor
without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.” By
pleading guilty to manslaughter, the defendant greatly reduced his
sentencing exposure. Furthermore, he did not receive the maximum
sentence for manslaughter.

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Id. at 997.

Additionally, in State v. Banks, 16-34 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/16), 194 So.3d 1224,

this court upheld a twenty-five-year sentence for manslaughter imposed on a

defendant who was seventeen years old when he and his friend committed a drug

robbery which resulted in the friend stabbing the victim multiple times, fatally

wounding him. Though the defendant was originally charged with first degree

murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery or in the alternative simple robbery,

and armed robbery, he pled guilty to the reduced charge of manslaughter and

conspiracy to commit simple robbery. The State dismissed the armed robbery charge.

When affirming the sentence, this court noted:

In the current case, Defendant received a significant benefit from
pleading guilty to manslaughter. The evidence in the record of this case
was such that it was highly probable that Defendant was facing life
imprisonment for his participation as a principal in this offense.

Id. at 1231.

Turning to the facts of the case before us, we find that though Defendant was

only sixteen, and though the situation he was in was certainly stressful since it was

his loved ones who were being attacked, Defendant did not demonstrate the

impulsiveness of an inexperienced sixteen-year-old. The record shows that

Defendant stopped fighting the victim, went inside his grandmother’s apartment,

grabbed a gun, and returned to shoot the victim point blank in the back. Defendant

then put the gun in his waistband and walked away. The record does not support

Defendant’s claim that a jury would have likely found him not guilty of second

degree murder.

We look to this court’s decision in State v. Guillory, 16-237 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/2/16), 206 So.3d 1153, writ denied, 16-2186 (La. 9/22/17), 227 So.3d 823,

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wherein the defendant was convicted by a jury of second degree murder. He

appealed, arguing, in part, that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he had

the specific intent to kill the victim and only supported a conviction for manslaughter.

This court affirmed the defendant’s conviction of second degree murder, stating the

following:

Mr. Guillory argues that he acted on impulse and that the
circumstances surrounding the death of Mr. Boutte indicate that the
offense was committed in sudden passion or the heat of blood
immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive a man of his
self-control and cool reflection. Mr. Guillory and Mr. Boutte had been
arguing throughout the day through text messages until Mr. Boutte
arrived at Mr. Guillory’s trailer wherein a physical confrontation
ensued. While the testimony establishes that there was a fist fight, the
circumstances were not nearly volatile enough to warrant a reduction
of the charge of second degree murder to manslaughter. The fist fight
had already terminated before the shooting occurred. Additionally, an
argument alone is not “sufficient provocation in order to reduce a
murder charge to manslaughter.” State v. Miller, 98-642, p. 10 (La.App.
3 Cir. 10/28/98), 720 So.2d 829, 834, writ denied, 98-3119 (La.
5/14/99), 741 So.2d 659. Family members were attempting to calm and
separate the two men. Furthermore, Mr. Guillory walked away from Mr.
Boutte and retrieved a gun from his bedroom or a box in the hallway,
and then walked back into the living room. Following the shooting, Mr.
Guillory appeared calm and stood talking to people until police arrived.
He did not exhibit the behavior of someone who had just shot his
girlfriend’s stepfather in a sudden passion or heat of blood.

Guillory, 206 at 1156-57. The circumstances surrounding the shooting in Guillory

are similar to the circumstances which led to Defendant shooting Mr. Goudy. Thus,

we find that a jury could have very well found Defendant guilty of second degree

murder, resulting in a life sentence.

As this court noted in both Matthew, 983 So.2d 994, and Banks, 194 So.3d

1224, Defendant received a significant benefit by pleading guilty to manslaughter,

thereby removing the possibility of life in prison. Furthermore, the record shows that

the trial court considered this benefit as well as other mitigating evidence when

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sentencing Defendant to twenty-five years, fifteen years less than the maximum

sentence of forty years.

Consequently, we find that the trial court did not abuse its vast discretion in

sentencing Defendant to twenty-five years at hard labor, nor is the sentence so

excessive as to qualify as cruel and unusual punishment.

DECREE

We affirm Defendant’s sentence of twenty-five years at hard labor.

AFFIRMED.

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