State of Louisiana v. Jerome Lee Manuel

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

24-593

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JEROME LEE MANUEL

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APPEAL FROM THE
TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF NATCHITOCHES, NO. T 526846
HONORABLE DESIREE DYESS, DISTRICT JUDGE

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WILBUR L. STILES
JUDGE

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Court composed of Charles G. Fitzgerald, Ledricka J. Thierry, and Wilbur L. Stiles,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 82389
Lafayette, LA 70598-2389
(337) 991-9757
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Jerome Lee Manuel

Billy Joe Harrington
District Attorney
Clifford R. Strider, III
Assistant District Attorney
R. Bray Williams
Assistant District Attorney
200 Church Street
Natchitoches, LA 71457
(318) 357-2214
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

STILES, Judge.

Defendant Jerome Lee Manuel appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion

to Quash the use of a predicate offense in his conviction of operating a vehicle while

intoxicated third offense. For the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Following an August 10, 2023 traffic stop in Natchitoches Parish, the State

charged Defendant by bill of information with operating a vehicle while intoxicated,

third offense, a violation of La.R.S. 14:98; no lights on license plate, a violation of

La.R.S. 32:304; and operating a vehicle while under suspension, a violation of

La.R.S. 32:415. Following arraignment, Defendant entered a plea of not guilty to

those charges.

On October 2, 2023, Defendant filed a pro se Motion to Quash, attacking the

use of his prior OWI convictions and, thereafter, filed two additional motions in

support of his position. The trial court heard and denied the Motions to Quash on

May 13, 2024.

After a recess in the hearing, the State amended the bill of information to

delete the misdemeanor offenses and to provide pertinent details regarding the

predicate OWI convictions, which occurred in Red River and Caddo Parishes.

Counsel initially waived formal arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty on

behalf of Defendant. Before the matter proceeded to trial, however, the State and

Defendant entered into a plea agreement whereby Defendant entered a plea of guilty

under State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976), reserving his right to seek review

of the trial court’s ruling on his Motion to Quash.

When the matter proceeded to a sentencing hearing on June 1, 2024, the trial

court first denied Defendant’s request to withdraw his plea1 and thereafter sentenced

Defendant to serve five years at hard labor without benefit of probation, parole, or

suspension of sentence. The trial court ordered the sentence to run consecutively to

any other sentence Defendant was serving. The trial court also imposed a fine of

$2,000. Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence on June 20, 2024, which

the trial court denied the following day.

The trial court granted Defendant’s request for an out of time appeal on July

26, 2024. In his sole assignment of error, Defendant maintains that:

I. The trial court’s failure to comply with Boykin [v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709 (1969)], in the alleged predicate offense
in Caddo Parish Docket Number 336822, for second offense
OWI, precludes the use of that offense as a predicate for a
conviction of a third offense operating a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol.

DISCUSSION

Errors Patent

Following review of the record in accordance with La.Code Crim.P. art. 920,

we identify no errors patent.

Motion to Quash – Caddo Parish Offense

Defendant maintains that the trial court failed to comply with Boykin in the

predicate offense in Caddo Parish Docket Number 336822 and, therefore, the State

is precluded from using that offense for purposes of the third offense OWI

conviction. In sum, Defendant points out that the Caddo Parish matter involved his

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In denying the request, the trial court stated that: “Sir, your request to withdraw your
guilty plea is denied. You were properly boykinized. And the Court accepted your plea. I found
that you had knowingly, intelligently, and consciously waived your rights, and your plea of guilty
was accepted on May 13th when you decided to plead guilty.”

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plea to not only the predicate offense of OWI second offense but also to a count of

vehicular negligent injuring. Defendant maintains that due to the presence of two

charges, he was exposed to a twelve-month sentence and was entitled to a jury trial.

He contends that, despite that alleged exposure, the trial court did not “properly

inform[] him of his right to a jury trial in that situation.”

In considering this assignment, we note that, in State v. Carlos, 98-1366 (La.

7/7/99), 738 So.2d 556, the supreme court established the burden of proof for a

defendant’s challenge to the state’s use of a prior offense. The court explained:

[W]hen a defendant denies the allegations contained in the bill of
information in an habitual offender proceeding, the burden is on the
State to prove the existence of the prior guilty pleas and that the
defendant was represented by counsel when they were taken. Id. If the
State meets this initial burden, the defendant must produce affirmative
evidence showing an infringement of his rights or a procedural
irregularity in the taking of the plea. Id. If the defendant carries this
burden, then the burden reverts to the State to prove the
constitutionality of the plea. Id. The State will meet this burden by
producing a “perfect” transcript of the guilty plea colloquy. Anything
less than a “perfect” transcript, such as a guilty plea form or minute
entry, will require the trial judge to weigh the evidence submitted by
both sides and determine whether the defendant’s Boykin rights were
prejudiced.

Id. at 559 (footnote omitted) (citing State v. Shelton, 621 So.2d 769 (La.1993)). See

also State v. Johnson, 08-494 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/5/08), 996 So.2d 1235, writ denied,

08-2844 (La. 9/25/09), 18 So.3d 84.

Pursuant to Carlos, the State had the initial burden of proving the existence of

the Defendant’s prior guilty pleas in Caddo and Red River Parishes and that

Defendant was represented by counsel when the pleas were entered. The State met

its burden by submitting the transcripts of both of Defendant’s pleas. The burden

thus shifted to the Defendant to prove there was an infringement of his rights or a

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procedural irregularity in the taking of his prior pleas. Our review supports the trial

court’s determination that Defendant failed to meet that burden.

In his October 2, 2023 Motion to Quash Bill of Information, Defendant

asserted that he had “never been convicted on no invalid predicate offense(s)[.]”

Defendant stated it was “too impossible for the Prosecutor to provide a copy of the

certified conviction packet” that verified he was properly Boykinized.

Next, in an October 27, 2023 Supplemental Motion to Quash Bill of

Information, he argued that the OWI conviction in Caddo Parish should be quashed

because the State could not provide a “validly written Bill of Information clearly and

lawfully evidencing that any District Attorney of Caddo Parish lawfully charged

[him] to be a Second DWI Offender by a completely valid certified Bill of

Information.” Defendant further argued that his Caddo and Red River convictions

could not be used because the State could not produce a valid certified conviction

packet.

Finally, in his December 6, 2023 Evidence in Support of Supplemental

Motion to Quash Bill of Information, Defendant suggested that the “certified guilty

plea/sentencing minutes” attached to his motion supported his claim that his prior

pleas were not knowingly and intelligently made. In particular, he maintained that

they did not show he willingly waived his privilege against self-incrimination, to

trial by judge and by jury where applicable, and to confront his accusers. Defendant

also alleged that the record did not show that the State offered three different blood

alcohol tests to support the bill of information. He further maintained that the trial

court presiding over each of the predicate offenses failed to comply with La.Code

Crim.P. art. 556.1 in that they failed to ascertain whether he understood the nature

and consequences of his pleas.

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At the hearing on the motions, defense counsel argued that the previous

transcripts did not adequately and sufficiently reflect a factual basis for the pleas and

that Defendant was not “freely aware of the consequences of his plea and therefore

each plea in Red River and Caddo Parish should be quashed.” Neither Defendant

nor his counsel specifically argued, as Defendant does on appeal, that the Caddo

Parish court should have informed Defendant that he had the right to trial by jury

because he was exposed to an aggregate sentence of twelve months. Thus, the trial

court was never presented with the particular objection Defendant advances for the

first time on appeal. While an appellate court will not typically consider a new basis

for an objection for the first time on appeal, we are mindful that Defendant advanced

the more general and encompassing complaint that he was not “freely aware” of the

consequences of his plea. We address Defendant’s argument within that context.

The State presented the transcript of the February 8, 2016 plea hearing in the

Caddo Parish predicate offense. The transcript reflects that the trial court advised

Defendant that:

First, sir, if you had a trial - - because these are misdemeanor
charges, the state is dismissing the felony charges - - you would have
the right to trial before the court on each of those charges. I will note,
as you indicated, that if they sought to run the sentences concurrent,
you may have the right to a trial by jury, even though the charges are
misdemeanor charges.

Albeit with imprecise language, the trial court informed Defendant of two distinct

circumstances. First, the trial court explained to Defendant that he had a right to a

“trial before the court on each of those charges.” Further, the trial court specifically

advised Defendant that in the event the State sought to “run the sentences concurrent

[sic], you may have the right to a trial by jury, even though the charges are

misdemeanor charges.” Notwithstanding the trial court’s reference to “concurrent”

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sentences rather than “consecutive” sentences, the trial court apprized Defendant of

the right to trial by jury under certain circumstances. When the trial court asked

whether Defendant understood that he would be “giving up those rights in this case,

and there will not be trials on these charges[,]” Defendant responded, “Yes, sir. Your

Honor.”

Moreover, while the Caddo Parish materials indicate that Defendant pled

guilty to OWI, second offense on the same day he pled guilty to vehicle negligent

injury, and it appears that the acts occurred on the same date, Defendant was charged

by two separate docket numbers. Neither the transcript of the proceedings nor

Defendant’s pleadings filed in the trial court indicate in any way that the docket

numbers were consolidated. We thus conclude that Defendant has not affirmatively

shown that he was entitled to a trial by jury and that the Caddo Parish judge was

required to further, or more particularly, inform him of his right to a jury trial. See

State v. Stewart, 02-196 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/2/02), 827 So.2d 1277 (wherein a panel

of this court determined that, although two misdemeanors occurred on the same date,

Defendant did not affirmatively show that he was entitled to a jury trial as he did not

claim that the misdemeanor charges were to be consolidated for purposes of trial.).

See also State v. Boudreaux, 13-394 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/12/13), 131 So.3d 342, writ

denied, 14-115 (La. 6/20/14), 141 So.3d 807; State v. Vu, 02-1243 (La.App. 5 Cir.

4/8/03), 846 So.2d 67. Rather, the record demonstrates that the trial court advised

Defendant of the required Boykin rights, that Defendant acknowledged those rights,

and thereafter effectively waived them. See Carlos, 738 So.2d 556.

Defendant’s assignment of error lacks merit.

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DECREE

Defendant’s conviction and sentence are affirmed.

AFFIRMED.

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