State of Louisiana v. Calvin Evans Anderson
State of Louisiana v. Calvin Evans Anderson, No. KA-0024-0677 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. Apr. 9, 2025).
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Etienne 746 So. 2d 124
- State ex rel. Marshall v. State 765 So. 2d 1067
- State v. Jones 398 So. 2d 1049
- State v. Tedder 471 So. 2d 1176
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
24-677
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
CALVIN EVANS ANDERSON
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 8143-16
HONORABLE DAVID ALEXANDER RITCHIE, DISTRICT JUDGE
**********
CHARLES G. FITZGERALD
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Jonathan W. Perry, Sharon Darville Wilson, and Charles G.
Fitzgerald, Judges.
AFFIRMED.
Paula C. Marx
Louisiana Appellate Project
Post Office Box 82389
Lafayette, Louisiana 70598-2389
(337) 991-9757
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Calvin Evans Anderson
Stephen C. Dwight
District Attorney
John Eric Turner
Assistant District Attorney
Fourteenth Judicial District
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 437-3400
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana
FITZGERALD, Judge.
Defendant, Calvin Evans Anderson, appeals his sentence for possession of
alprazolam, a Schedule IV drug.
PROCEDURAL HISTROY
In March 2016, Defendant was charged by Bill of Information with possession
of a controlled dangerous substance, alprazolam, in violation of La.R.S. 40:969(C).
The bill also charged Defendant with possession and intent to distribute a controlled
dangerous substance, marijuana, under La.R.S. 40:966(A)(1) and with illegal
possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled dangerous substance
under La.R.S. 14:95(E).
In 2017, Defendant was arraigned on those charges and entered a not guilty
plea. Five years later, on October 24, 2022, Defendant withdrew his guilty plea and
pled guilty to the charge of possession of alprazolam. In exchange for the plea, the
remaining two charges were dismissed.1
Defendant was sentenced that same day. The State and defense counsel
jointly recommended a sentence of two years at hard labor, suspended, with three
years of supervised probation. The trial court disagreed and imposed a maximum
five-year sentence, suspended, with three years of supervised probation. And as a
condition of probation, the trial court ordered Defendant to serve 100 days in the
parish jail. On appeal, a different panel of this court vacated Defendant’s sentence
as illegally excessive and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing. See
State v. Anderson, 23-507 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/24) (unpublished opinion).
1
Defendant had also amassed other charges in different docket numbers, including two
counts of operating a vehicle while intoxicated and six unrelated misdemeanor charges. As part
of the plea deal, Defendant admitted guilt to the OWI charges; the misdemeanor charges were
dismissed.
The resentencing hearing was held on July 19, 2024. At that hearing, the trial
court again imposed the five-year suspended sentence, but this time with a two-year
supervised probation period and without the 100-day probation condition. In
response, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which was denied by the
trial court. Defendant then filed the appeal now before us.
On appeal, Defendant asserts the following assignment of error: “THE
COURT IMPOSED A MAXIMUM SENTENCE OF FIVE YEARS IN THIS
CASE. WHILE THE SENTENCE WAS SUSPENDED, A MAXIMUM
SENTENCE IS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE FOR POSSESSION
OF SEVEN ALPRAZOLAM TABLETS BY [DEFENDANT], A YOUNG FIRST-
FELONY OFFENDER.” (Emphasis in original).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
At the outset, all criminal appeals are initially reviewed for errors patent on
the face of the record under La.Code Crim.P. art. 920. Here, we find no patent errors.
Turning now to Defendant’s assignment of error. In short, Defendant
challenges his sentence as “unconstitutionally excessive.” The appropriate standard
of review for an excessive-sentence challenge is abuse of discretion. State v. Etienne,
99-192 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99), 746 So.2d 124, writ denied, 00-165 (La. 6/30/00),
Defendant advances two arguments in support of his assignment. First,
Defendant argues that even though his sentence is fully suspended, it is still a
maximum sentence for the offense and maximum sentences should be reserved for
the worst offenders. And second, he argues that the trial court failed to properly
consider the mitigating factors under La.Code Crim.P. art. 894.1.
2
Importantly, Defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence included the specific
ground upon which the motion was based. In relevant part, the motion alleged that
Defendant “believes that the sentence imposed was excessive and he wishes to
preserve his right to appellate review of the sentence subject hereof for
excessiveness. . . . [Defendant] is a first felony offender, and the incarceration
sentence given was the maximum sentence allowed by statute, albeit suspended.”
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 881.1 provides the mechanism
for preserving the review of a sentence on appeal:
A. (1) In felony cases, within thirty days following the imposition
of sentence or within such longer period as the trial court may set at
sentence, the state or the defendant may make or file a motion to
reconsider sentence.
....
E. Failure to make or file a motion to reconsider sentence or to
include a specific ground upon which a motion to reconsider sentence
may be based, including a claim of excessiveness, shall preclude the
state or the defendant from raising an objection to the sentence or from
urging any ground not raised in the motion on appeal or review.
Although Defendant’s argument regarding the excessive nature of the
sentence was raised in his motion to reconsider sentence, the argument that the trial
court failed to consider the mitigating factors was not. Thus, the failure-to-consider-
the-mitigation-factors argument has been waived under La.Code Crim.P. art.
881.1(E).
As stated above, Defendant was convicted of possession of a controlled
dangerous substance, alprazolam. The sentencing statute, La.R.S. 40:969(C),
provides that a defendant “shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not
less than one year nor more than five years[.]” And again, the trial court sentenced
3
Defendant to a five-year suspended sentence and a two-year supervised probation
period.
In short, Defendant’s argument of excessiveness is that he is a first felony
offender who pled guilty to possessing seven tablets of alprazolam, that he cannot
be the worst kind of offender, that his possession of seven tablets is not one of the
most serious violations of the described offense, and that the trial court thus abused
its discretion is imposing the maximum sentence. In support, Defendant cites State
v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049 (La.1981). In that case, the supreme court explained that
“[m]aximum sentences are appropriately imposed in cases involving the most
serious violations of the described offense, and for the worst kind of offender.” Id.
at 1053.
By contrast, the State points out that Louisiana courts have affirmed
maximum sentences when a plea deal results in reduced penalty exposure. See, e.g.,
State v. Tedder, 471 So.2d 1176, 1177–78 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1985) (citations omitted)
(“It was proper for the court to consider the benefits of a reduced penalty exposure
that defendant got from the plea bargain. It was also proper for the court to consider
criminal activity not limited to convictions.”).
Here, the trial court emphasized at the sentencing hearing that it strongly
considered the State’s dismissal of two felony charges. Indeed, a conviction for
illegal possession of a firearm while in possession of a controlled dangerous
substance under La.R.S. 14:95(E) carries a hard-labor sentence of “not less than five
nor more than ten years without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of
sentence.” Additionally, the penalty range for the other dismissed felony—
possession with intent to distribute marijuana, a Schedule I drug—is “not less than
4
five nor more than thirty years” imprisonment at hard labor under La.R.S.
40:966(B)(3).
In the end, Defendant was facing a possible sentence of five to thirty years on
one dismissed charge and five to ten years on the other. Yet Defendant received a
fully suspended five-year sentence and was able to avoid any time in prison. In our
view, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in crafting a fully suspended, albeit
maximum, sentence.
DISPOSITION
For the above reasons, Calvin Evans Anderson’s sentence is affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
5