State of Louisiana v. Lawrence J. Joseph

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

KA 07-748 consolidated with KH 07-571

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

LAWRENCE JAMES JOSEPH
A/K/A JOSEPH JAMES LAWRENCE

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APPEAL FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 110850
HONORABLE MARILYN CARR CASTLE, DISTRICT JUDGE

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OSWALD A. DECUIR
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Oswald A. Decuir, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

William T. Babin
Assistant District Attorney
Fifteenth Judicial District
P.O. Box 3306
Lafayette, LA 70502
(337) 232-5170
Counsel for Appellee:
State of Louisiana

Edward K. Bauman
Louisiana Appellate Project
P. O. Box 1641
Lake Charles, LA 70602-1641
(337) 491-0570
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Lawrence James Joseph

Lawrence J. Joseph
In Proper Person
R.B.D.C. II
9450 Hwy 65 South
Lake Providence, LA 71254

DECUIR, Judge.

On May 4, 2006, the Defendant, Lawrence J. Joseph, a/k/a Joseph James

Lawrence, was charged by bill of information with the following: 1) purse snatching,

a violation of La.R.S. 14:65.1; 2) possession of cocaine, a violation of La.R.S.

40:967; 3) possession of marijuana, a violation of La.R.S. 40:966; and 4) flight from

an officer, a violation of La.R.S. 14:108.1. The Defendant was tried by a jury on

counts one and two and was found guilty as charged on September 20, 2006.1 The

Defendant was sentenced to serve consecutive terms of ten years at hard labor for

purse snatching and three and one-half years at hard labor for possession of cocaine.

The Defendant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence which was denied

without a hearing on January 4, 2007. He is now before this court on writs and

appeal, the two being consolidated because they both seek review of the trial court’s

ruling on his Motion to Reconsider Sentence. The Defendant asserts that his

sentences are cruel, unusual, and excessive.

FACTS

On February 28, 2006, the victim was shopping at the Family Dollar Store

when she was struck in the face and her purse was stolen. The victim saw the

perpetrator leave the store in a blue car, and another witness obtained the license plate

number of the car. The victim later identified the Defendant’s automobile in a

photograph. On March 6, 2006, the Defendant was observed driving the identified

vehicle and was pursued by Deputy Clay Steven Carter. After a car chase and a foot

chase, the Defendant was ultimately apprehended by Deputy Carter. A small, clear

plastic bag containing what was later determined to be cocaine was seized from the

car. Following his arrest, the victim identified the Defendant in a photo lineup.

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On January 22, 2007, the State moved to dismiss the charges in counts three
and four.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

In his sole assignment of error, the Defendant argues that the sentences

imposed by the trial court were cruel, unusual, and excessive. In his motion to

reconsider sentence, the Defendant did not assert with any specificity the grounds

upon which he alleged his sentences to be excessive. The motion merely asserted that

“. . . the sentence was excessively harsh.” When a defendant fails to assert specific

grounds for excessiveness, he is then limited on appeal to review of a bare claim of

excessiveness. State v. Mims, 619 So.2d 1059 (La.1993), appeal after remand, 626

So.2d 856 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 93-2933 (La. 2/11/94), 634 So.2d 373.

This court has set forth the following standard to be used in reviewing

excessive sentence claims:

La.Const. art. I, § 20 guarantees that, “[n]o law shall subject any
person to cruel or unusual punishment.” To constitute an excessive
sentence, the reviewing court must find the penalty so grossly
disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of
justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to
acceptable penal goals and is, therefore, nothing more than a needless
imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205
(La.1981). The trial court has wide discretion in the imposition of
sentence within the statutory limits and such sentence shall not be set
aside as excessive absent a manifest abuse of discretion. State v.
Etienne, 99-192 [p.5] (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/13/99); 746 So.2d 124, writ
denied, 00-0165 (La.6/30/00); 765 So.2d 1067. The relevant question
is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not
whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v.
Cook, 95-2784 [p. 3] (La.5/31/96); 674 So.2d 957, cert. denied, 519
U.S. 1043, 117 S.Ct. 615, 136 L.Ed.2d 539 (1996).

State v. Barling, 00-1241, p. 12 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/31/01), 779 So.2d 1035, 1042-43,

writ denied, 01-838 (La. 2/1/02), 808 So.2d 331.

To decide whether a sentence shocks the court’s sense of justice or makes no

meaningful contribution to acceptable penal goals, this court has held:

[An] appellate court may consider several factors including the nature
of the offense, the circumstances of the offender, the legislative purpose
behind the punishment and a comparison of the sentences imposed for

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similar crimes. State v. Smith, 99-0606 (La.7/6/00), 766 So.2d 501.
While a comparison of sentences imposed for similar crimes may
provide some insight, “it is well settled that sentences must be
individualized to the particular offender and to the particular offense
committed.” State v. Batiste, 594 So.2d 1 (La.App. 1 Cir.1991).
Additionally, it is within the purview of the trial court to particularize
the sentence because the trial judge “remains in the best position to
assess the aggravating and mitigating circumstances presented by each
case.” State v. Cook, 95-2784 (La.5/31/96), 674 So.2d 957, 958.

State v. Smith, 02-719, p. 4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/12/03), 846 So.2d 786, 789, writ denied,

03-562 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1061.

The Defendant was found guilty of purse snatching, a violation of La.R.S.

14:65.1, which reads, in pertinent part, “Whoever commits the crime of purse

snatching shall be imprisoned, with or without hard labor, for not less than two years

and for not more than twenty years.” Thus, the Defendant received one-half of the

possible maximum sentence he could have received.

The Defendant was also found guilty of possession of cocaine, a violation of

La.R.S. 40:967, which reads, in pertinent part, “(C)(2) Any person who violates this

Subsection as to any other controlled dangerous substance shall be imprisoned with

or without hard labor for not more than five years and, in addition, may be sentenced

to pay a fine of not more than five thousand dollars.” Thus, the Defendant received

about two-thirds of the maximum possible sentence and a fine was not imposed.

When sentencing the Defendant, the trial court stated:

Mr. Joseph, the Court has studied the presentence report that I’ve
received in this case, and I have considered this report in light of the
nature of the offense and in light of Article 894.1, and I do make the
following findings regarding your sentence:

Although you do not have any prior felony convictions, your
record does indicate that you have engaged in past incidents of
assaultive behavior. You were placed on supervised probation in
conjunction with your aggravated assault conviction, but you did not
comply with probation.

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I find that you are in need of correctional treatment that can best
be provided by commitment to an institution, and I also find that you
used actual violence in committing the purse snatching.

Considering the facts of the instant case and the aggravating factors as

identified by the trial court in its reasons for sentencing, we find the sentences

imposed are not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crimes, nor do they

shock one’s sense of justice. Additionally, the offenses for which the Defendant was

convicted did not occur on the same day and were not related in any way. Thus,

consecutive sentences were appropriate in this matter. Accordingly, we affirm the

sentences imposed.

DECREE

Finding no errors patent on the face of the record, and finding no merit to the

sole assignment of error asserted by the Defendant, we affirm.

AFFIRMED.

This opinion is NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION. Rule 2-16.3, Uniform Rules,
Courts of Appeal.

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