State of Louisiana v. James Deron Williams
State of Louisiana v. James Deron Williams, No. KW-0009-0993 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. May 26, 2010).
The holding in the court’s own words
1 We therefore hold that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to quash.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- State v. Legendre 362 So. 2d 570
- State v. Gutweiler 979 So. 2d 469
- HAMP'S CONST. v. City of New Orleans 924 So. 2d 104
- New Orleans Rosenbush Claims Service, Inc. v. City of New Orleans 653 So. 2d 538
- State v. Marshall 424 So. 2d 423
Opinion text
STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
KW 09-993
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JAMES DERON WILLIAMS
**********
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW FROM THE
ELEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF SABINE, NO. 63,601
HONORABLE STEPHEN B. BEASLEY, PRESIDING
**********
SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE
**********
Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Billy H. Ezell, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.
Ezell, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Don Burkett, District Attorney
P.O. Box 1557
Many, LA 71449
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana
Carol D. Powell Lexing
141 DeSiard Street, Suite 806
Monroe, LA 71201
(318) 324-0700
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:
James Deron Williams
COOKS, Judge.
Defendant, Deron James Williams, asserts on May 16, 2007, he was involved
in an altercation. During the altercation, a Wildlife and Fisheries agent came upon
the scene, and, according to Defendant, pulled a gun out and pointed it at Defendant.
Defendant initially made a statement over the phone against the agent, but was
advised to submit the complaint in writing. He eventually submitted a complaint in
writing along with that of a corroborating witness. The complaint was investigated,
and the result was that Defendant was arrested and charged by bill of information
with false swearing for purposes of violating public health or safety, a violation of
La.R.S. 14:126.1.
Defendant filed a Motion to Quash, which matter was submitted to the district
court on briefs and denied. Defendant is now before this Court on an application for
writ of supervisory review, seeking review of the district court’s denial of his Motion
to Quash. For the following reasons, we find the conduct charged in this case does
not fall within the ambit of La.R.S. 14:126.1, and therefore remand to the trial court
with instructions to grant the motion to quash the indictment.
ANALYSIS
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 532(1) provides a motion to quash
can be used to quash a bill of information that “fails to charge an offense which is
punishable under a valid statute.” Our Supreme Court in State v. Legendre, 362
So.2d 570, 571, stated “[t]he question then is whether the indictment charges a valid
offense. If it does not, it is a defective indictment and its invalidity may be declared
by a ruling on a motion to quash, . . .” In this case Defendant was arrested and
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charged with violating La.R.S. 14:126.1 for filing an unsworn complaint. La.R.S.
14:126.1 provides as follows:
§ 126.1. False swearing for purpose of violating public health or
safety
No person shall make a false statement, report or allegation
concerning the commission of a crime for the purpose of violating,
disrupting, interfering with or endangering the public health or safety,
or to deprive any person or persons of any right, privilege or immunity
secured by the United States Constitution and laws or by the Louisiana
Constitution and laws, or cause such false statement or report to be made
to any official or agency of the state or any parish, city or political
subdivision thereof, or to any judicial, executive or legislative body or
subdivision thereof within this state, knowing or having reason to
believe the same or any material part thereof to be false and with the
intent to cause an investigation of or any other action to be taken as a
result thereof.
La.R.S. 14:126.1 follows La.R.S. 14:126, which reads as follows:
§ 126. Inconsistent statements; false swearing
It shall constitute false swearing whenever any person having
made a under sanction of an oath, or an equivalent affirmation, required
by law, shall thereafter swear or affirm in a manner materially
contradictory of or inconsistent with his former sworn or affirmed
statement. It shall not be necessary for the prosecution, in such case, to
show which of the contradictory or inconsistent statements was false;
but it shall be an affirmative defense that at the time he made them, the
accused honestly believed both statements to be true.
The above statutes are found in a group of statutory provisions, La.R.S. 14:123
through 14:128, which deal with sworn speech. La.R.S. 14:123 and 14:124 deal with
perjury, which is a false statement in a judicial proceeding made under oath or an
equivalent affirmation. La.R.S. 14:125 deals with false swearing, which is defined
in that article as “the intentional making of a written or oral statement, known to be
false, under sanction of oath or an equivalent affirmation, where such oath or
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affirmation is required by law.” La.R.S. 14:125.1 applies to “False swearing in
paternity cases” and defines that crime as the “intentional making of a written or oral
statement [in a paternity case], known to be false, under sanction of oath or equivalent
statement. . .” La.R.S. 14:127 lists the limitation of defenses for a “prosecution for
perjury or false swearing.” It does not reference unsworn statements in any way.
Defendant argues La.R.S. 14:126.1 cannot be read in a vacuum and must be
interpreted with the statutes that both precede and follow it. Statutory construction
laws require that all laws pertaining to the same subject matter must be interpreted in
pari materia, or in reference to each other. La.Civ.Code art. 13; State v. Gutweiler,
06-2596 (La. 4/8/08), 979 So.2d 469.
We further note La.R.S. 14:126 does not have a penalty provision in it, but
La.R.S. 14:126.1 does, leading to the obvious conclusion that La.R.S. 14:126 and
14:126.1 operate in tandem, and consequently, must be read in para materia. They
cannot operate together effectively unless La.R.S. 14:126.1 is read to require a sworn
statement as La.R.S. 14:126 requires. “The Legislature is presumed to have enacted
a statute in light of the preceding statutes involving the same subject matter . . .”
State v. Gutweiler, 943 So.2d at 484, citing Hamp’s Constr., L.L.C. v. City of New
Orleans, 05-489, p. 9 (La. 2/22/06), 924 So.2d 104, 110; New Orleans Rosenbush
Claims Serv., Inc. V. City of New Orleans, 94-2223, p. 11 (La. 5/10/95), 653 So.2d
538, 544. We find it clear that La.R.S. 14:126.1 was intended to require a sworn
statement based on the requirement found in La.R.S. 14:126 as well as the other
statutes in La.R.S. 14:123-128, both preceding and following it.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that La. R.S. 14:126.1 was not intended
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to apply when there is not a statement made under oath. Thus, in the present case, the
State failed to charge a crime in the manner required by law because Defendant’s
statement was not made under oath.1 We therefore hold that the trial court abused its
discretion by denying Defendant’s motion to quash. Accordingly, the ruling of the
trial court is reversed. We remand to the trial court with instructions to grant the
motion to quash the indictment.
REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
1
We note there is at least one other statute that appears to criminalize the
alleged conduct of Defendant. La.R.S. 14:59(A)(5) sets forth:
A. Criminal mischief is the intentional performance of any of the
following acts:
...
(5) Giving of any false report or compliant to a sheriff, or his
deputies, or to any officer of the law relative to the commission of, or
an attempt to commit, a crime.
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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT
09-993
STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS
JAMES DERON WILLIAMS
EZELL, J., dissents
I must respectfully dissent from the majority. The majority in this matter fail
to recognize that Article 126 applies to an incident where one has made a previous
statement under oath and then makes an inconsistent statement, again under oath at
the time the second statement is made.
Article 126.1 does not require that one be under oath. This article stands alone
and it is not necessary for one to look at Article 126 for support, due to the fact that
Article 126 is dealing with statements under oath.
I would follow the ruling by the Second Circuit in State v. Marshall, 424 So.2d
423, (La.App. 2Cir. 1982) that was authored by the Honorable Pike Hall.