State of Louisiana v. Joshua Lewis

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

18-600

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

JOSHUA LEWIS

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ON SUPERVISORY WRIT FROM THE
SIXTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 16-1174
HONORABLE ANTHONY THIBODEAUX, DISTRICT JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy H. Ezell, and Candyce G. Perret,
Judges.

Perret, J., dissents and assigns written reasons.

WRIT DENIED.

Alexander Hurd
Public Defender’s Office – 16th JDC
215 W. Saint Peter Street
New Iberia, LA 70560
(337) 365-4006
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPLICANT:
Joshua Lewis

M. Bofill Duhe
District Attorney
W. Claire Howington
Assitant District Attorney
300 Iberia St., Suite 200
New Iberia, Lousiana 70560
(337) 369-4420
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT:
State of Louisiana

PICKETT, Judge.

Relator, Joshua Lewis, seeks supervisory writs from a May 2, 2018 district

court judgment that denied his motion to terminate revocation proceedings due to

both the summons and the probation revocation hearing being untimely. For the

following reasons, we deny the writ application.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On September 29, 2016, the state filed a bill of information charging Mr.

Lewis with one count of possessing marijuana with intent to distribute, in violation

of La.R.S. 40:966; with one count of performing transactions with drug proceeds, in

violation of La.R.S. 40:1041; and with one count of possessing drug paraphernalia,

in violation of La.R.S. 40:1023 and 40:1025. On March 6, 2017, Mr. Lewis entered

into a plea agreement with the state. In accordance with the bargain, the state

dismissed the drug proceeds charge, and Mr. Lewis pled guilty to the lesser-included

offense of simple possession of marijuana and guilty as charged to possession of

drug paraphernalia. The sentencing court then imposed penalties in accordance with

the plea agreement, six months of jail time for each conviction; the district court

further ordered the sentences to run consecutively, suspended the penalties, and

placed Mr. Lewis on one year of probation, which was to end on March 6, 2018. Mr.

Lewis did not appeal.

On March 6, 2018, Mr. Lewis’s probation officer filed a motion and order to

revoke Mr. Lewis’s probation with the district court. The allegations in the motion

were presented via affidavit; they were sworn by Probation Officer Charles Wilson

before a notary public. On the same date, the district court signed the attached rule

to show cause setting the matter for hearing and ordering a copy of the pleading be

served upon all relevant parties. Two days later, on March 8, 2018, the Sixteenth

Judicial District Court clerk’s office sent notices to the parties.

The district court conducted the probation revocation hearing on May 2, 2018.

At the hearing, defense counsel moved to quash the probation revocation

proceedings because neither an arrest warrant nor a summons was issued during Mr.

Lewis’s probationary period. The district court denied the motion and held the

relevant date was the date it signed the order attached to the motion and order to

revoke probation. The district court then continued the revocation hearing until

September 5, 2018. Mr. Lewis now seeks supervisory review of the May 2, 2018

ruling that denied his oral motion to quash the probation revocation proceedings

based upon expiration of the probationary term prior to issuance of the summons.

DISCUSSION

In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Lewis contests the district court’s finding

of what constitutes the relevant date for determining whether probation revocation

proceedings were instituted in a timely matter:

The trial court erred in not [grant]ing Appellant’s
objection and motion to quash the revocation hearing as
untimely due to a probationer’s term only being suspended
upon the issuance of either a summons to appear or a
warrant of an arrest; here, a summons to appear was issued
two days after Mr. Lewis had already completed his
probation term on March 6, 2018.

The issue before this court is whether the detainer or summons to appear

“issued” when the judge signed the order or when it was sent out from the clerk’s

office. According to La.Code Crim.P. art. 899(A) and (D), a probationer’s

probationary period is suspended upon issuance of an arrest warrant or detainer, and

states:

A. At any time during probation and suspension of
sentence the court may issue a warrant for the arrest of a
defendant for violation of any of the conditions of
probation, or may issue a summons to appear to answer to
a charge of violation or threatened violation.

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The warrant of arrest may be executed by any peace
officer and shall direct that the defendant be returned to
the custody of the court or to a designated detention
facility. The summons shall be personally served upon the
defendant.

....

D. When a warrant for a defendant’s arrest or a
summons for defendant’s appearance is issued under
Paragraph A or a detainer is issued under Paragraph B of
this Article, the running of the period of probation shall
cease as of the time the warrant, summons, or detainer is
issued.

Further, La.Code Crim.P. art. 898 provides that “[u]pon completion of the period of

suspension of sentence or probation, . . . the defendant shall have satisfied the

sentence imposed.”

We find that when the trial court signed the rule to show cause why

Mr.Lewis’s probation should not be revoked on March 6, 2018, that act constituted

the issuance of a summons to appear pursuant to La.Code Crim.P. art. 899(A). State

v. Broussard, 408 So.2d 909 (La.1981). This issuance of a summons, by the terms

of Article 899(D), ceased the running of the period of probation.

Mr. Lewis argues that the issuance of the summons did not occur until the

notice to appear was served on him on March 8, 2018. But this reading of the statute

conflates the issuance of the summons in the first paragraph of section (A) with the

service of the summons to appear in the second paragraph of section (A). “Courts

should give effect to all parts of a statute and should not give a statute an

interpretation that makes any part superfluous or meaningless, if that result can be

avoided.” McLane Southern, Inc. v. Bridges, 11-1141, pp. 6-7 (La. 1/24/12), 84

So.3d 479, 483.

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DECREE

We find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to end revocation

proceedings. The application for supervisory writs is denied.

WRIT DENIED.

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