State of Louisiana v. Jermaine D. Guidry A/K/A Jermaine Guidry

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

19-200

STATE OF LOUISIANA
VERSUS

JERMAINE D. GUIDRY

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ON APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY WRITS FROM THE
FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF VERMILION, NO. 63032
HONORABLE EDWARD B. BROUSSARD, DISTRICT JUDGE

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VAN H. KYZAR

JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, John E. Conery, and Van H. Kyzar, Judges.

WRIT DENIED.

JoVonna R. Charles-Young

204 Charity Street

Abbeville, LA 70510

337-898-2090

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT/DEFENDANT:
Jermaine D. Guidry

Keith Stutes

District Attorney

Craig Bordolon, II

Assistant District Attorney

Fifteenth Judicial District

P.O. Box 175

Abbeville, LA 70510

337-232-5170

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:
State of Louisiana

Kyzar, Judge.

The defendant, Jermaine D. Guidry, has filed the instant application for
supervisory writs from the trial court’s January 30, 2019 ruling denying his motion
to suppress evidence. For the following reasons, we deny the writ.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant was charged by bill of information that on April 9, 2018, he
committed four felony counts in violation of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous
Substance Law, as follows: possession with intent to distribute Methamphetamine,
a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967;
possession of Oxycodone, a Schedule II controlled dangerous substance, in violation
of La.R.S. 40:967; possession of Hydrocodone, a Schedule II controlled dangerous
substance, in violation of La.R.S. 40:967, and that he willfully, knowingly,
unlawfully and intentionally received or acquired proceeds derived from a violation
of the Controlled Dangerous Substance Law, in violation of La.R.S. 40:1041(D).
Defendant was also charged with one misdemeanor count of possession of
marijuana, a Schedule I controlled dangerous substance, in violation of La.R.S.
40:966. He was arraigned and pled not guilty on May 31, 2018.

On July 25, 2018, Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence of the drugs
seized from his vehicle without a warrant on April 9, 2018, asserting that the search
of the vehicle was unconstitutional. The State opposed the motion, specifically
alleging that the inventory search, search incident to arrest, and inevitable discovery
exceptions, as well as abandonment, were applicable. Following a hearing on
January 30, 2019, the trial court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress.

According to the State, Defendant was wanted via a fugitive warrant posted
on the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) when he was spotted in Vermilion

Parish and pursued by law enforcement officers. A high-speed vehicle chase ensued,

resulting in the deployment of spike strips. After losing control of his vehicle,
Defendant drove into a sugarcane field and then fled on foot. He was apprehended
and then placed under arrest.

Sergeant James Martin, of the Vermilion Parish Sheriff's Department,
testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that Defendant lost control of his
vehicle after driving nearly half a mile in a sugarcane field while fleeing from
officers, who were pursuing him in multiple police units. He stated that the front
end of Defendant’s vehicle hit a cane row after traveling over a headland in the field
and that Defendant then “got out of the vehicle and took off running.” When asked
if there were any passengers in the vehicle, Sergeant Martin stated, “No, the vehicle
was abandoned.” During direct examination of Sergeant Martin, the following
colloquy occurred as to the events:

Q. So at that point, you have this abandoned vehicle. What do you
do?

A. Well, the vehicle was stuck in the field. There was no way for
us to get it out. So a tow truck had to be called. And then
including the fact that he led us on a pursuit and he had active
felony warrants and then decided to get out the car and run and
abandon vehicle, we towed it. We were going to tow it so it was
searched. A vehicle inventory was completed and turned in.

Q. Okay. And among the things that were inventoried, were there
any things that led to additional charges being filed?

A. _ The only things that are placed on inventory are things that are
being left with the vehicle when the tow company takes them.
But while we were searching the car, we did locate
methamphetamine, hydrocodone, marijuana and | think that’s it.
Sergeant Martin then stated specifically that “a vehicle inventory was
completed and turned in” before the vehicle was towed. While it was unclear as to

when the call for the tow truck was made, there was no choice but to call the tow

truck as the vehicle was stuck in the sugarcane field some half mile from the road.

The vehicle was searched without a warrant where it came to a stop, and drugs were
found inside the vehicle in a duffle bag.

Defendant seeks review of the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress
the drug evidence. He asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to
suppress when it ruled that the police conducted a valid inventory search of his
vehicle. We find no error in the trial court’s decision for multiple reasons.

OPINION

Article 1, Section 5 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974 and the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution protect individuals from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Although a search warrant is required as a general rule in
order for a search to be constitutionally permissible, several exceptions to the
warrant requirement have developed over time. State v. LaRue, 368 So.2d 1048
(La.1979). A defendant adversely affected may move to suppress any evidence from
use at the trial on a merits on the ground that it was unconstitutionally obtained, and
the state has the burden of proving the admissibility of any evidence seized without
a warrant. La.Code Crim.P. art. 703(A) and (D). In State v. Wells, 08-2262, pp. 4-
5 (La. 7/6/10), 45 So.3d 577, 580-81 (alteration in original), the supreme court
reiterated the appellate standard of review applicable to rulings on motions to
suppress:

This court has recently restated the general rule that appellate
courts review trial court rulings under a deferential standard with regard

to factual and other trial determinations, while legal findings are subject

to a de novo standard of review. State v. Hunt, 09-1589, p. 6

(La.12/1/09), 25 So.3d 746, 751, citing State v. Hampton, 98-0331, p.

18 (La.4/23/99), 750 So.2d 867, 884. When a trial court makes findings

of fact based on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the

witnesses, a reviewing court owes those findings great deference, and

may not overturn those findings unless there is no evidence to support

those findings. /d. A “trial judge’s ruling [on a fact question], based

on conclusions of credibility and weight of the testimony, is entitled to
great deference and will not be disturbed on appeal unless there is no

evidence to support the ruling.” State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 222
(La.1993).

Abandonment Theory

While the trial court did not specifically rely on abandonment as grounds for
denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, the State urged such in its opposition to the
motion and in oral argument after the close of testimony at the hearing. Additionally,
the evidence produced by the State at the hearing supports its assertion that no
warrant was necessary to search the vehicle as Defendant had, indeed, abandoned
his vehicle in the sugarcane field after he fled on foot. An abandoned automobile
may be legally searched without a warrant. State v. Kelly, 576 So.2d 111 (La.App.
2 Cir.), writ denied, 580 So.2d 666 (La.1991); see also State v. Parker, 421 So.2d
834 (La.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1044, 103 $.Ct. 1443 (1983).

In Kelly, the second circuit upheld the denial of a defendant’s motion to
suppress where his vehicle was searched after it was abandoned in a ditch following
a high-speed chase. The court found that in addition to the automobile exception to
the warrant requirement, the abandonment of the vehicle also provided justification
for the search.

Furthermore, the police were entitled to search the Lincoln as an
abandoned vehicle. When property has been abandoned, a person’s
property interest in it lapses, and there is no further reasonable
expectation of privacy. As a consequence, the property may be
searched and seized without the normally required warrant. State v.
Kyles, 513 So.2d 265 (La.1987), cert. denied, 118 486 U.S. 1027, 108
S.Ct. 2005, 100 L.Ed.2d 236, rehearing denied, 487 U.S. 1246, 109 S.Ct.

4, 101 L.Ed.2d 955 (1988).

If, prior to the abandonment of the evidence, there is an unlawful
intrusion into the defendant’s constitutional right to be left alone, then
the evidence is unlawfully seized. An unlawful intrusion occurs when
there is an actual stop without reasonable cause or when a stop without
reasonable cause is imminent. State v. Littleberry, 511 So.2d 1229
(La.App. 2d Cir.1987). However, when a stop is reasonable, the

officers may search and seize property that is abandoned in response to
the stop. State v. Washington, 513 So.2d 358 (La.App. 4th Cir.1987).

Id. at 117-18.

In State v. Nieves, 525 So.2d 1203 (La.App. 5 Cir. 1988), the court reviewed
an appeal of the defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of stolen jewelry found in
a warrantless search of the vehicle he had been operating. The facts established that
on May 24, 1987, two officers were responding to a police dispatch when they
observed defendant stop his vehicle at the exit of a parking lot and start running
away. Believing his actions to be suspicious, one of the officers gave chase on foot,
and when he finally caught up with defendant, the defendant hit him. After the
defendant was arrested, an investigation determined that the vehicle that he was
driving was stolen. The police searched the vehicle, without first obtaining a warrant,
and discovered stolen jewelry within. The defendant was charged with battery of a
police officer, burglary, and possession of stolen goods. In affirming the trial court’s
denial of the motion to suppress, the court stated as follows:

Defendant properly cites the cases of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925)[,] and Chambers vy.
Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970)[,] for
explanation of the automobile exception to warrantless searches.
However, the present situation presents a different rationale to support
the search. The defendant exited his vehicle and fled. The vehicle was
left running parked in the exitway of a parking lot. Thus, the search
was conducted upon abandoned property.

Courts have frequently admitted into evidence objects
found by the police during the examination of an
abandoned vehicle. Sometimes this is done on the ground
that the defendant, by abandoning the vehicle, had no
standing to object, and sometimes on the more general
ground that such an examination is not a search under the
justified expectation of privacy test of Katz v. United
States, [389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576
(1967) ].

LaFavre, Search and Seizure)2d ed, Section 2.5a (West Publishing Co.
1987). “The courts have found cars to be abandoned when it appears
the operator of the vehicle left the car behind in an effort to avoid
apprehension by the police.” [I]d.

The Louisiana Supreme Court has held that police may lawfully
seize abandoned property when there has been no prior unlawful
intrusion into a citizen’s right to be left alone. State v. Spears, 395
So.2d 762 (La.1981). “An unprovoked abandonment presents
independent legal basis for seizure of evidence, without the question of
probable cause. Stated another way, when property is truly abandoned,
its seizure is beyond the protection of the Fourth Amendment because
the individuals right of privacy in the thing has come to an end.” State
v. Gains, 423 So.2d 111, 112 (La.App.4th Cir.1982).

The defendant was unprovoked when he exited his vehicle and
began to run away. The vehicle was clearly abandoned and thus the
seizure of evidence from within was outside the boundaries of
constitutional protections.

Id, at 1205.

The defendant here abandoned the vehicle in a sugarcane field when he exited
the vehicle and fled on foot. In addition to the crimes committed by virtue of his
vehicular high-speed flight from the officers, the defendant was wanted via a fugitive
warrant.

In the instant case circumstances surrounding the entire incident
suggest an exigency to search without a warrant. The car was left with
at least one door open; the keys were in the ignition; two former
occupants of the car were still at large and a crowd had begun to
congregate at the scene. Furthermore, the occupants having run from
the car in the ditch with the door open, coupled with the officer’s having
probable cause to believe those running had recently robbed a bank,
would strongly suggest to the officers that the automobile’s former
occupants had no expectation of privacy in the vehicle but rather that
they had abandoned the vehicle and disassociated themselves from it.
The officers were justified in conducting an on-the-scene search of the
vehicle and seizing the evidence taken from the robberies. See State v.

Edsall, 385 So.2d 207 (La.1980).
Parker, 421 So.2d at 842.

In State v. Freeman, 50,282 (La.App. 2 Cir. 4/13/16), 194 So.3d 1, writ denied,
16-927 (La. 5/1/17), 220 So.3d 743, the defendant, who had been under investigation

for narcotics trafficking, was pursued by officers during a high-speed vehicle chase.

The defendant ultimately crashed the vehicle into a tree and fled on foot. The court

on appeal upheld the warrantless search of the vehicle on multiple grounds,
including the abandonment of the vehicle, as follows:

Under the automobile emergency exception to the search warrant
requirement, a constitutional search of a vehicle may be made without
a warrant (1) if there is probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contains contraband or evidence of a crime, and (2) exigent
circumstances require an immediate search. An abandoned automobile
may be legally searched without a warrant. State v. Kelly, 576 So.2d
111 (La.App. 2d Cir.1991), writ denied, 580 So.2d 666 (La.1991).
When property has been abandoned, a person’s property interest in it
lapses, and there is no further reasonable expectation of privacy. Asa
consequence, the property may be searched and seized without the
normally required warrant. State v. Kelly, supra.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s
motion to suppress. The evidence and testimony presented at the
suppression hearing and at trial establish that the initial stop, arrest,
search and seizure were all proper. Regarding the initial stop, Trp.
Lowery testified that he observed Defendant traveling 60 mph in a 55
mph zone. This observation provided him with the necessary
reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation had been
committed, and he was justified in attempting to stop the vehicle for a
traffic violation, even if the purpose of the stop was to investigate for
CDS violations. However, rather than cooperating with Trp. Lowery’s
signals to stop, Defendant refused to stop, leading Trp. Lowery on a
chase and ultimately crashing into a tree. This provided Trp. Lowery
with probable cause to arrest Defendant for flight from an officer. See
La. R.S. 14:108.1.

Id. at 22.

In the instant case, the stop of Defendant was patently reasonable as he was
wanted on a felony warrant. Thereafter, he committed additional crimes by fleeing
from the officers in his vehicle and then on foot. Having abandoned his vehicle, he
had no expectation of privacy. The “Fourth Amendment protects people, not places”
and “[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.” Karz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511 (1967). By abandoning his vehicle in a sugarcane

field at the conclusion of the high-speed chase and then fleeing from the officers on

foot, Defendant exposed his vehicle to the public; thus, the vehicle was not subject
to protection under either the Fourth Amendment or the Louisiana Constitution.
Inevitable Discovery

The inevitable discovery rule applies as well. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,
104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984); State v. Lee, 05-2098 (La. 1/16/08), 976 So.2d 109, cert.
denied, 555 U.S. 824, 129 §.Ct. 143 (2008). Whether the inventory search was
conducted in the sugarcane field or at the police station is of no consequence here
given the circumstances. The vehicle was, of necessity, going to be searched either
prior to or immediately after being towed because the only option was to have it
towed since it was stuck and abandoned in a privately owned sugarcane field
approximately one-half mile from the road.

DISPOSITION

Accordingly, we find no error in the trial court’s denial of the motion to

suppress. Thus, Defendant’s writ application is denied.

WRIT DENIED.