State of Louisiana v. Matthew Tyler Hayes

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

20-73

STATE OF LOUISIANA

VERSUS

MATTHEW TYLER HAYES

**********
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI FROM THE
FOURTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 20547-16,
HONORABLE DAVID A. RITCHIE, DISTRICT JUDGE

**********
JONATHAN W. PERRY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and Jonathan W. Perry,
Judges.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

Annette Roach
Attorney at Law
724 Moss Street
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 436-3384
P. O. Box 1123
COUNSEL FOR RELATOR:
MATTHEW TYLER HAYES

Stephen C. Dwight
District Attorney
Calcasieu Parish
Ross Murray
Elizabeth B. Hollins
Assistant District Attorneys
901 Lakeshore Drive, Suite 800
Lake Charles, Louisiana 70601
(337) 437-3400
COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT:
STATE OF LOUISIANA

PERRY, Judge.

In this criminal case, we are asked to address a res nova question of whether

an application for post-conviction relief timely filed while a defendant is in custody

can be denied on procedural grounds because the defendant is no longer in custody

at the time his application is heard. The trial court, relying upon this procedural

ground, denied the application of Matthew Tyler Hayes (“Relator”). For reasons

that follow, we grant Relator’s writ and make it peremptory.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 29, 2016, the State charged Relator by bill of information with

false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon, a violation of La.R.S. 14:46.1, and

aggravated assault with a firearm, a violation of La.R.S. 14:37.4.

On January 20, 2017, Relator pled no contest1 to the charge of false

imprisonment with a dangerous weapon. In exchange for Relator’s plea, the State

dismissed the charge of aggravated assault with a firearm. On the same day, the trial

court deferred the imposition of sentence and placed Relator on supervised probation

for a period of three years, subject to general and special conditions, including

serving three months in the parish jail with credit for time served.

On May 8, 2018, counsel for Relator filed a “Motion to Set Aside Guilty

Plea.” In this motion, Relator sought to withdraw his guilty plea for several reasons.

First, Relator alleged the original counsel was ineffective for failing to properly

evaluate the strength of the State’s case; second, Relator was led to believe his only

option was to plead no contest to false imprisonment with a dangerous weapon or

1
As provided in La.Code Crim.P. art. 552(4),

A sentence imposed upon a plea of nolo contendere is a conviction and may
be considered as a prior conviction and provide a basis for prosecution or
sentencing under laws pertaining to multiple offenses[] and shall be a conviction
for purposes of laws providing for the granting, suspension or revocation of licenses
to operate motor vehicles.

face a minimum of twenty years in prison; third, the district attorney’s office failed

to perform minimal investigation to uncover exculpatory evidence; and fourth, the

victim confessed that she had been untruthful about the alleged incident.

On February 4, 2019, the trial court heard Relator’s motion to withdraw his

guilty plea. During the hearing, the trial court explained that the proper procedural

device was an application for post-conviction relief. At the end of the hearing, the

trial court allowed counsel to file and resubmit an application for post-conviction

relief. The trial court then reset the matter for a later hearing on Relator’s application

for post-conviction relief. In his application, Relator asserted that the victim lied

about the incident and had recanted her story. Thus, he contended his conviction

and sentence were unconstitutional.

On February 6, 2019, the trial court held a status hearing on Relator’s

probation. At the hearing, the probation officer told the court that Relator still owed

$484.50. Relator then said he was ready to pay the amount in full. The trial court

took a brief recess to allow Relator to pay his costs. Once Relator paid the fees and

provided proof of employment, the trial court terminated Relator’s probation early

and satisfactorily.

On August 19, 2019, the trial court heard Relator’s application for post-

conviction relief. At this hearing, counsel for Relator asserted the application was

proper and that Relator had suffered violations to his second and sixth amendment

rights, as well as noting concerns about Relator’s mental competency at the time of

the plea. However, the State objected to the proceeding because Relator’s probation

had terminated, and he was no longer in custody. The trial court then reset the matter

for another hearing and ordered the parties to submit briefs on whether the dismissal

of probation barred consideration of Relator’s application for post-conviction relief.
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On October 25, 2019, the trial court held another hearing on the question of

whether a party could file an application for post-conviction relief while he was

under probation and have a hearing after the applicant had completed serving his

sentence. Counsel for Relator asserted that Relator was still on probation at the time

he filed his application for post-conviction relief and was therefore still in custody

under La.Code Crim.P. art. 924. The State’s position was that because Relator was

no longer in custody, the post-conviction relief articles no longer applied, so he was

not entitled to post-conviction relief. After considering the arguments of counsel,

the trial court denied Relator’s “Uniform Application for Post-Conviction Relief”

and gave oral reasons for judgment:

But, in any event, I - - it seems [to] me that it - - you know, the -
- the application for post-conviction relief contemplates the defendant
being [in] some kind of - - some form of custody, whether it be actual
custody or some kind of - - on some kind of supervision, which he is -
- he is not.

And there may be some other way to attack the conviction in - -
within - - to legally attack the conviction. I don’t know that this
application for post-conviction relief, it doesn’t seem to necessarily be
the - - the mechanism to do it. There may be some other way to do it,
but I don’t - - I don’t see that that’s the mechanism to do it. So, because
of that, I’m going to deny the - - the defendant’s application for post-
conviction relief.

On January 27, 2020, Relator filed a writ application2 with this court seeking

review of the trial court’s ruling of October 25, 2019, denying Relator’s application

for post-conviction relief. In Relator’s writ application to this court, he asserts two

alternative assignments of error. First, the trial court erred in denying the application

2
Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 930.6(A) provides:

The petitioner may invoke the supervisory jurisdiction of the court of appeal
if the trial court dismisses the application or otherwise denies relief on an
application for post-conviction relief. No appeal lies from a judgment dismissing
an application or otherwise denying relief.
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for post-conviction relief on procedural grounds without consideration of the merits

of the application. Second, if the trial court correctly found that the termination of

probation procedurally barred consideration of the application for post-conviction

relief which was pending when his probation was terminated, Relator’s counsel’s

representation fell below that guaranteed by the sixth amendment.

DISCUSSION

The threshold matter the trial court faced which is now squarely before us is

whether Relator’s timely-invoked application for post-conviction relief was

procedurally barred because he was no longer in custody at the time of his hearing

and thus no longer entitled to post-conviction relief.

“The interpretation and application of the statutes are matters of law subject

to a de novo standard of review.” State v. Lexington Nat. Ins. Corp., 13–1134, p. 2

(La.App. 3 Cir. 3/5/14), 134 So.3d 230, 232. In State v. Griffin, 14-1214, 14-1238,

pp. 4-5 (La. 10/14/15), 180 So.3d 1262, 1267 (footnote omitted), our supreme court,

relying in part on basic Civil Code concepts regarding the interpretation of statutes,

see State v. Bennett, 610 So.2d 120 (La.1992), stated:

Legislation is the solemn expression of legislative will; thus, the
interpretation of legislation is primarily the search for the legislative
intent. Cat’s Meow, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 98–0601, p. 15
(La.10/20/98), 720 So.2d 1186, 1198; La. Safety Ass’n of Timbermen
Self–Insurers Fund v. La. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2009–0023, p. 8
(La.6/26/09), 17 So.3d 350, 355–56. When a law is clear and
unambiguous, and its application does not lead to absurd consequences,
it shall be applied as written, with no further interpretation made in
search of the legislative intent. See La. C.C. art. 9. The starting point
for interpretation of any statute is the language of the statute itself. See,
e.g., Cat’s Meow, 98–0601, p. 15, 720 So.2d at 1198; Timbermen,
2009–0023, p. 8, 17 So.3d at 356.

An application for post-conviction relief is defined in La.Code Crim.P. art.

924(1) as “a petition filed by a person in custody after sentence following conviction

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for the commission of an offense seeking to have the conviction and sentence set

aside.” See also State in the Interest of A.N., 18-1571 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So.3d 969

(contrasting La.Ch.Code art. 909 and La.Code Crim.P. art. 924). “‘Custody’ means

detention or confinement, or probation or parole supervision, after sentence

following conviction for the commission of an offense.” La.Code Crim.P. art.

924(2). Applying La.Code Crim.P. art. 924(1) and (2) as written, it is clear that

Relator was still subject to probation when he filed his petition for post-conviction

relief and thus met the requirements set forth therein. It is equally clear that Relator’s

hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief was held after he satisfactorily

completed probation. What effect Relator’s subsequent release from probation prior

to having a hearing on his timely filed petition for post-conviction relief has on his

application for post-conviction relief presents a res nova issue under the facts of this

case.

In its brief in opposition to Relator’s writ application to this court, the State

submits that although Relator was in custody when he converted the motion to

withdraw his guilty plea into an application for post-conviction relief, at the time of

the post-conviction hearing, he had been released from his supervised probation and

was no longer in custody. Thus, it argues that the trial court properly dismissed

Relator’s application for post-conviction relief. For reasons that follow, we find no

merit to the State’s argument.

From the outset, we recognize State ex rel. Becnel v. Blackburn, 410 So.2d

1015 (La.1982), and State v. Smith, 96-798 (La. 10/21/97), 700 So.2d 493, two cases

that address the effect of custody on a petition for post-conviction relief, are not

dispositive of the question now before us. The following language from Smith, 700

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So.2d at 495, best highlights how it and Becnel are distinguishable from the present

matter:

The defendant in Becnel, at the time of filing his post-
conviction application, was actually incarcerated, but not
for the conviction under attack. He had served his
sentence for the challenged conviction, and he had been
convicted of a subsequent offense and sentenced as a
habitual offender based on the underlying prior
conviction. In that narrow context, we held that the fact
the defendant had served his sentence for the prior
conviction did not render moot his post-conviction
application challenging that prior conviction. In so
holding, however, we expressly noted that the defendant
“now suffers substantial detriment from the judgment of
conviction, which survived the satisfaction of the sentence
imposed on him.” 410 So.2d at 1017 (emphasis added).

The present case [Smith] is factually distinguishable from
Becnel. Defendant here, at the time of filing his
application for post-conviction relief, was not incarcerated
and was not then actually facing any collateral
consequence from his prior conviction, such as
enhancement of the sentence for another pending charge
or use of the conviction as an element of another crime for
which he had been charged. His only basis for bringing
the post-conviction proceeding was the speculative
possibility of future use of the challenged conviction to
enhance a sentence or to serve as an element of another
crime.

The present case is a combination of Becnel and Smith, as the defendant was

in the custody of the State when he filed for his post-conviction relief and was

released from custody at the time of the post-conviction relief hearing.

Louisiana law distinguishes post-conviction relief from a writ of habeas

corpus which is applicable to pre-conviction complaints regarding custody. La.Code

Crim.P. art. 351, Official Revision Comment (c). Notwithstanding that distinction,

the definition of custody found in La.Code Crim.P. art. 924 “merely codifies the

jurisprudence, which has included such supervised release situations within the

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ambit of habeas corpus relief.” Cheney C. Joseph, Jr., Post-conviction Procedure,

41 La.L.Rev. 625, 631 (1981).

Against that backdrop, in Smith, 700 So.2d at 495, the supreme court stated:

Custody historically was an obvious requirement in a true habeas
corpus proceeding. While the definition of custody has undergone
considerable changes over the years in federal habeas corpus
proceedings, the custody requirement was apparently incorporated in
Louisiana post-conviction proceedings to continue the notion of
restraint as a justification for seeking such relief. In order to have
standing to seek post-conviction relief, the petitioner must demonstrate
some significant restraint upon his or her individual liberty.

We purposefully refer to the writ of habeas corpus because the issue of custody and

its relationship to the res nova question now before us, one that is common to both

habeas corpus and post-conviction relief, has been addressed in the context of federal

habeas corpus. For that reason, we will draw from jurisprudence on federal habeas

corpus to resolve the question now before us.

To be eligible for federal habeas corpus relief, a petitioner must be in custody.

Dickerson v. Louisiana, 816 F.2d 220 (5th Cir. 1987). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

2241(c), in pertinent part:

The writ of habeas corpus shall not extend to a prisoner unless—

(1) He is in custody under or by color of the authority of the
United States or is committed for trial before some court thereof; or

(2) He is in custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of an
Act of Congress, or an order, process, judgment or decree of a court or
judge of the United States; or

(3) He is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States; or

(4) He, being a citizen of a foreign state and domiciled therein is
in custody for an act done or omitted under any alleged right, title,
authority, privilege, protection, or exemption claimed under the
commission, order or sanction of any foreign state, or under color
thereof, the validity and effect of which depend upon the law of
nations[.]
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Whether a federal habeas corpus petitioner is “in custody” is determined as of the

date on which the habeas petition is filed. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 118 S.Ct.

978 (1998); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 1556 (1968); Port v. Heard,

764 F.2d 423 (5th Cir. 1985). If a petitioner for habeas corpus meets the custody

requirement, the court’s jurisdiction attaches at that time. Should the petitioner later

be released from custody, it is well settled that the jurisdictional prerequisite of

custody is not defeated. Carafas, 391 U.S. 234; Port, 764 F.2d 423.

Based upon the clear language of La.Code Crim.P. art. 924 and illuminated

by jurisprudence which examined a like question in the context of federal habeas

corpus, we find that the requisite “custody” requirement provided in La.Code

Crim.P. art. 924 is determined as of the date the application for post-conviction relief

was filed. Under our de novo standard of review, we adopt the rule that a change in

custody status has no effect on a pending application for post-conviction relief,

provided the applicant properly and timely filed his application while in custody. In

the present case, when Relator filed his application for post-conviction relief, he was

in custody, clearly satisfying La.Code Crim.P. art. 924. Thus, we find it was error

for the trial court to dismiss his application on these procedural grounds.

Accordingly, Relator’s writ application is granted and made peremptory. We

remand this matter, and the trial court is ordered to consider and rule on the merits

of Relator’s application for post-conviction relief.

WRIT GRANTED AND MADE PEREMPTORY.

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