Braddy v. Triangle Timber, Inc.
Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 1st Cir., November 17, 1970 241 So. 2d 557
Braddy v. Triangle Timber, Inc., 345 So. 2d 1252 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
The holding in the court’s own words
We therefore conclude that there is no merit to plaintiff-appellee's argument that this is not an appealable judgment.
Quoted verbatim from the opinion — no paraphrase, nothing generated. Not yet human-reviewed. How we find the holding.
Cited by
- Hazelton v. Soileau 532 So. 2d 393 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
- Flot v. Transportation Insurance Co. 533 So. 2d 1235 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
- Notoriano v. Anthony 527 So. 2d 1120 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
- Poullard v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. 504 So. 2d 1182 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
- Dimarco v. Ace Transportation Inc. 496 So. 2d 1201 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
- Pearson v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. 460 So. 2d 11 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984
- Smith v. Cajun Insulation, Inc. 392 So. 2d 398 La. 1980
- Vizina v. Industrial Indem. Co. 374 So. 2d 753 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979
- Sciortino v. Levitz Furniture Co. 375 So. 2d 1197 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1979
- Fetty v. Colonial Bank 365 So. 2d 44 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1978
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Vidrine v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance 166 So. 2d 287
- Naquin v. Coal Operators Casualty Co. 157 So. 2d 276
- Griffith v. Wyatt Lumber Co. 193 So. 257
Opinion text
345 So.2d 1252 (1977) Judy BRADDY v. TRIANGLE TIMBER, INC. No. 11519. Court of Appeal of Louisiana, First Circuit. May 9, 1977. Henry A. Mentz, Jr., Hammond, for appellant. Charles B. W. Palmer, Amite, for appellee. Before SARTAIN, COVINGTON and LOTTINGER, JJ. LOTTINGER, Judge. ON MOTION TO DISMISS This is a workmen's compensation suit. On March 4, 1977, the Trial Court rendered both a preliminary judgment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1316 as well as a judgment on the merits after a trial. On March 9, 1977, defendant was granted a suspensive appeal and filed the requisite bond. Plaintiff has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal only insofar as it relates to the preliminary judgment contending that it is an interlocutory decree which is not appealable citing Vidrine v. Argonaut-Southwest Insurance Company, 166 So.2d 287 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1964); Naquin v. Coal Operators Casualty Co., 157 So.2d 276 (La.App.3rd Cir. 1963); and Griffith v. Wyatt Lumber Co., 193 So. 257 (La.App.2nd Cir. 1939). In Vidrine , after a preliminary judgment had been rendered, the suit was dismissed as being premature, and thus with the dismissal fell the preliminary judgment. The Court in passing merely noted "that a preliminary judgment rendered in a workmen's compensation suit under the provisions of LSA-R.S. 23:1316 is not a final judgment but is interlocutory in nature." In Naquin , the Court held that an order setting aside two previously granted preliminary judgments was interlocutory and nonappealable. Similarly in Griffith the Court held that an order denying a preliminary judgment was interlocutory and nonappealable. Generally appeals can only be taken from final judgments or "from an interlocutory *1253 judgment which may cause irreparable injury." LSA-C.C.P. art. 2083. Therefore, conceding arguendo that a preliminary judgment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1316 is interlocutory rather than a final judgment, it could only be appealed if it may cause irreparable injury. However, we note that LSA-R.S. 23:1351 in part provides: "Either party may appeal to the proper appellate court from any judgment rendered as provided in R.S. 23:1035 and in Part IV of this Chapter. * * *." (emphasis supplied) The chapter that is referred to is Chapter 10 of Title 23, Labor and Workmen's Compensation. Part IV of Chapter 10 includes LSA-R.S. 23:1316, preliminary judgments. Therefore, the conclusion must be reached that even though generally interlocutory decrees are not appealable, a preliminary judgment pursuant to LSA-R.S. 23:1316, whether interlocutory or not, is appealable. As between a general and a special law, the special law controls. We therefore conclude that there is no merit to plaintiff-appellee's argument that this is not an appealable judgment. Therefore, for the above and foregoing reasons the motion to dismiss is denied. All costs of this proceeding before this Court are taxed to plaintiff-appellee. MOTION DENIED.