Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Moffet v. Koch, 106 La. 371.

23 citing documents.

Kempff v. B. E. King & Sons, Inc. 222 So. 2d 921 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
Evans v. Allstate Insurance Company 194 So. 2d 762 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
Gantt v. Brown 191 So. 2d 793 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
denied; American Employers’ Insurance Company v. International Harvester Company, La.App., (4th Cir. 1963); Mahony v. Griffith Rental Tools, Inc., La.App., (3rd Cir. 1964) ; Carter v. Travelers Insurance Company, La.App., (4th Cir. 1965); , 31 So.
Swilley v. American Fire & Casualty Co. 148 So. 2d 157 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
The rule which we consider applicable to the case at bar is well stated in the following language appearing in Spears v. American *161 Fidelity & Casualty Company, La.App., : “ , 31 So.
O'BRIEN v. Traders and General Insurance Company 136 So. 2d 852 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
"In contrast to these decisions we have the opinions in certain damage suits, , 31 So.
Spears v. American Fidelity & Casualty Company 123 So. 2d 513 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
Fradger v. Shaffer-Stein Corp. 73 So. 2d 612 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1954
In rejecting plaintiff’s demands, it was stated: “ ‘ , 31 So.
Regenbogen v. Southern Shipwrecking Corporation 41 So. 2d 110 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1949
Munson v. Mistretta 29 So. 2d 402 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1947
Miller v. Wyatt Lumber Mfg. Co. 3 So. 2d 565 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1941
Hardware Mut. Casualty Co. v. Standard Coffee Co. 2 So. 2d 89 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1941
"In contrast to these decisions we have the opinions in certain damage suits, , 375, 31 So.
Gallaher v. Ricketts 191 So. 713 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1939
“In contrast to these decisions we have the opinions in certain damage suits, , 31 So.
Marquez v. Le Blanc 143 So. 108 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1932
■In contrast to these decisions we have the opinions in certain damage suits, , 31 So.
James v. Hillyer-Deutsch-Edwards, Inc. 130 So. 257 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1930
lumber to be hauled, but only such as was pointed out and when pointed out by the employer.” Then returning to Johnson’s undertaking the court used this language: *75 “In the instant case there was a specific pile, stack, or quantity of steel to be carried, there was a particular job to be executed, and obviously a piece of work to be performed.” , 31 So.
Goetschel v. Glassell-Wilson Co. 127 So. 81 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1930
1547; Dick vs. Gravel Logging Co., supra; Moffet vs. Koch, , 31 So.
Helton v. Tall Timber Lumber Co. 86 So. 729 La. 1920
1913B, 574; 14 R. C. L. 67; 65 L. R. A. 447; , 31 South.
Clark v. Tall Timber Lumber Co. 73 So. 239 La. 1916
278 , 61 S. E. 811 , 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 370; , 31 South.
Franek v. Brewster 71 So. 213 La. 1916
[1] The facts are that the surety on the bond, the Texas Fidelity & Bonding Company, had duly qualified under the provisions of Act No. 41, p. 45, of 1894 ( , 31 South.
Henderson v. American Lumber Co. 70 So. 620 La. 1916
608 , the court said: “Where the danger is manifest, and incident to the work, and the employé is of sufficient age and intelligence to appreciate the risk, the employer is not required to give any special warning, as, for instance, that the hands or the clothing of the employs may get caught in the moving machinery at which he is employed.” , 31 South.
Zavaglia v. Notarbartolo 69 So. 152 La. 1915
Savant v. Mercadal 66 So. 961 La. 1914
The validity of Act 41 of 1894 has been affirmed in several cases, , 31 South.
Ramsey v. Tremont Lumber Co. 46 So. 608 La. 1908
Robideaux v. Hebert 43 So. 887 La. 1907