Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite John M. Parker & Co. v. Guillot, 42 So. 782.

14 citing documents.

  • Mesa v. Wares 815 So. 2d 1091 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2002
    John M. Parker & , 42 So.
  • Mesa v. Spurlock 761 So. 2d 652 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000
    John M. Parker & , 42 So.
  • Barnes v. Park Place Homes, Inc. 289 So. 2d 859 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1974
    467 (1872); and John M. Parker & , 42 So.
  • Boyce Machinery Corp. v. Carpet Inn, Inc. 277 So. 2d 496 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
    John M. Parker & , 42 So.
  • Fireman's Fund Insurance v. Richard 209 So. 2d 95 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1968
    tion is defined in the O’Banion case, as follows: “The agreement between the maker and the holder of the note in this case was not the mere gratuitous indulgence or forbearance on the part of the holder not to force collection without fixing a definite period and without the giving of any consideration, as we find was the case in some decisions, notably John M. Parker & , 42 So.
  • Leadman v. Querbes 163 So. 745 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1935
    214 ; John M. Parker & , 42 So.
  • Masters v. Cleveland 162 So. 51 La. 1935
    thout consideration, a mere indulgence, and was subject to her withdrawal at any time, and when she sold the property to plaintiff that act alone, as a matter of course, did terminate the indulgence and did also operate as a nullification of her contract with defendant, as therein provided, in case of his default in meeting his payments for as much as six months.” See Parker & , 42 So.
  • Masters v. Cleveland 158 So. 382 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1935
  • McLachlan v. Cuny 156 So. 76 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1934
    226 , , but we do not think that that decision is apposite here.
  • Commercial Bank Trust Co. of Alexandria v. Turregano 134 So. 383 La. 1931
    Ann. 630, 631 ; , 42 So.
  • O'Banion v. Willis 129 So. 440 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1930
    95, and the latter case, Parker & , 42 So.
  • Alexander v. Majors 4 La. App. 486 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1926
    Here the division is claimed and under the imperative requirement of the law must be allowed.” See also Parker & Co. vs. Guillot, , 42 South.
  • Gunter v. Phillips 2 La. App. 219 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1925
    John M. Parker & Co. vs. Guillot, , 42 South.
  • Bonart v. Rabito 14 Teiss. 1 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1916
    And more recently, , the principle that the endorser is released by an extention to the maker granted after the note had been dishonored or protested, was again recognized, though it'is true .that the principle was not therein applied because the grant of time was held to constitute a*mere indulgence not binding on the holder.