Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Succession of Reilly, 67 So. 27.

29 citing documents.

Succession of Merritt 581 So. 2d 728 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991
Succession of Stewart, 301 So.2d at 881 , quoting from , 67 So.
Succession of Kolbe 499 So. 2d 1154 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
A substitution is an attempt on the part of the donor or testator to make a testament for his do-nee or legatee along with his own will, and to substitute his own will for the legal order of succession from his donee or legatee.”
Succession of Jenkins 481 So. 2d 607 La. 1986
In re the Succession of Baker 432 So. 2d 817 La. 1983
Succession of Gwathmey 364 So. 2d 226 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979
In an oft-quoted opinion, , 67 So.
Taylor v. Baten 364 So. 2d 226 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1978
In an oft-quoted opinion, , 67 So.
Succession of Burgess 359 So. 2d 1006 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1978
Succession of Stewart 301 So. 2d 872 La. 1974
tions, fidei commissas or trust estates; that the legislature may authorize the creation of trust estates for a period not exceeding ten years from the settlor's death as to a beneficiary which is not a natural person; ten years from the settlor's death as to a beneficiary who is a natural person or until the death of the beneficiary whichever is the longer period; * * *" In , 67 So.
Succession of Dinwiddie 263 So. 2d 739 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1972
Succession of Walters 259 So. 2d 12 La. 1972
Crichton v. Succession of Gredler 235 So. 2d 411 La. 1970
Most often quoted to illustrate this development is the case of , 67 So.
Crichton v. Succession of Gredler 220 So. 2d 714 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
These principles were emphasized by the late Chief Justice O’Neill in , 67 So.
Succession of Thomas 202 So. 2d 410 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
To dispose of appellees’ final argument, that the disposition of what remains, “if anything remain”, is indicative that a fidei commissum rather than a substitution was created, we look to the latest pronouncement by the Supreme Court on the distinctions between the two concepts, found in the Simms case: “In , 67 So.
Succession of Simms 195 So. 2d 114 La. 1966
In Re Succession of Abraham. 136 So. 2d 471 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1962
Succession of Johnson 67 So. 2d 591 La. 1953
Succession of Rougon 65 So. 2d 104 La. 1953
On the question of whether the qualifying clauses attending the bequests to Mrs. Decuir and Mrs. Lorio are mere precatory suggestions or are prohibited substitutions, the following observations contained in , 67 So.
Heikamp v. Succession of Solari 54 So. 2d 347 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1951
“The essential elements of the prohibited substitution are that the immadiate donee is obliged to keep the title of the legacy inalienable during his lifetime, to be transmitted at his death to a third person designated- by the original donor or testator.” , 67 So.
Girven v. Miller 52 So. 2d 843 La. 1951
Breaux v. Breaux 51 So. 2d 73 La. 1951
Maddox v. Butchee 14 So. 2d 4 La. 1943
Succession of Lissa 196 So. 924 La. 1940
Succession of Purkert 167 So. 444 La. 1936
This she could not validly do.” That decision and others to the same effect were cited with approval in the , 67 So.
Succession of Feitel 146 So. 145 La. 1933
which is found under the general heading “Of Dispositions” and the subheading “Of Dispositions Reprobated by Law in Donations Inter Yivos and Mortis Causa,” provides that: “Every disposition by which the donee, the heir or legatee is charged to preserve for or to return a thing to a third person is null, even with regard to the donee, the instituted heir or the legatee.” In , page 363, 67 So.
Succession of Marion 112 So. 667 La. 1927
Succession of Heft 112 So. 301 La. 1927
Sisters of Charity of Incarnate Word v. Emery 81 So. 99 La. 1919
Succession of Hall 75 So. 802 La. 1917
(Many decisions on that subject, showing that the doctrine has been adhered to quite consistently in our jurisprudence, were reviewed in a recent decision, in the , 67 South.
Succession of Deubler 71 So. 846 La. 1916