Cited by

1st Cir. 1966), Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., (La.App.

the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed defendant's exception of prescription and said in part as follows: "Since then [Carpenter v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., La.App., ] our jurisprudence on prescription has generally been to the effect that if an injured employee continues to work for the same employer, whether he does light duty or other wise, if his pay is commensurate with his services the payment of wages does not interrupt the running of prescription.

[2] Mella v. Continental Emsco, La.App., ; Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., La.App., ; Arnold v. Solvay Process Company, La.App., .

iling to overrule defendant's pleas of prescription because (1) defendant lulled plaintiff into a sense of false security by rehiring appellant thereby inducing him to forego timely filing of a claim and having thus misled plaintiff was barred from pleading prescription on authority of Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., La.App., and Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., La.App., ; (2) defendant paid unearned wages in lieu of compensation following plaintiff's return to work thus interruptin

446 , ; and Carpenter v. E. I. duPont de Nemours Co., La.App., .

He cites several cases on this question of law including Stiles v. International Paper Company, La.App., ; Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours and Co., La.App., ; Scalise v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, La.App., ; Rimbolt v. City of New Orleans, La.App., .

228 ; Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., La.App., ; Scalise v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, La.App., 84 So.

1 Cir., , that payment of full wages for the performance of lighter duties were to be considered payment in lieu of compensation which would suspend the accrual of prescription.

til the expiration of the year has' elapsed, so that the employer might then plead prescription in bar of a ■suit for compensation, the payments made after the injury might well have the effect of preventing the running ■of prescription; otherwise an injustice would be sanctioned, — as explained by the court of appeal in the Carpenter case [Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., La.App., ].” “ ‘If the wages paid to an injured employee after the accident are in the nature of or are in li

Based upon the above recited facts, counsel for plaintiff contends that where there has been a detrimental reliance because of the representations, whether deliberate or unintentional, of defendants’ agents, the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies, and that this Court, in effect, applied such a doctrine in the case of Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont deNemours & Co., La.App., .

In Carpenter v. E. I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., La.App.1940, , this court said: “ * * * it is our confirmed opinion that when, with knowledge of the *604 employee’s disabling injury, the employer continues to pay him his usual wages, which is 35% more than the amount of compensation he would have to pay, for performing lighter services than he was doing before, there resul

of security until the expiration of the year has elapsed, so that the employer might then plead prescription in bar of a suit for compensation, the payments made after the injury might well have the effect of preventing the running of prescription; otherwise an injustice would be sanctioned,—as explained by the court of appeal in the Carpenter case [Carpenter v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., ].'

Finally it is urged that when plaintiff was transferred to lighter work and continued in the employ of defendant with the payment of regular wages, his position has been brought within the application of the principle set forth in Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., La.App., , and other cases to the effect that prescription does not run so long as such payments are continued.

App., , and he says that in many other cases the doctrine which he relies upon as having been established in the Carpenter case has been considered, and that in none of them has it been disapproved.

App., , considered that the payment of full wages to an employee, previously injured, is justly to be considered as paid in lieu of compensation.

App., ; Arnold v. Solvay Process Co., 207 La.

App., , and Heard v. Receivers of Parker Gravel Company, La.

App., ; Esthey v. Avondale Marine Ways, Inc., La.

In Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., decided by the Court of Appeal for the First Circuit in March, 1940, , it was expressly held, and I think correctly, that where an employer, with knowledge of his employee’s disabling injury, continues to pay the employee his usual wages, which are in excess of the amount of compensation the employer *279 would have to pay for performing lighter services than the employee was performin

Principally relied on among these is Carpenter v. E. I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., La.App., .

Du Pont De Nemours Co., La.App., , in which the word "payments" as used in section 31 of the compensation statute, as amended by Act 29 of 1934, was interpreted and held not to be restricted to actual compensation due under the statute, but to include wages received by the injured employee for performing lighter services than he was rendering before

Dupont De Nemours Co., , where we held that, if an employer continues to pay his employee his usual wages, with full knowledge of a disabling injury, for lighter work than the employee was doing before the injury, such payment of wages would interrupt the running of prescription against the claim for compensation.

it is held that the payment of wages under such circumstances is sufficiently akin to the payment of compensation to interrupt the running of the peremptive period.

Dupont De Nemours Co., La.App., .