Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Gleissner v. Hughes, 95 So. 529.

23 citing documents.

Taylor Seidenbach, Inc. v. Healy 90 So. 2d 158 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1956
Cain v. Central Plumbing and Heating Company 85 So. 2d 376 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1956
715 , and (under earlier Act) , 95 So.
Highland Lumber Supply Co. v. Young 38 So. 2d 638 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1948
Pertinent to this discussion, see Gleissner et al. v. Hughes, Sheriff et al., , 95 So.
Idom v. Moss 32 So. 2d 411 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1947
In support of the doctrine that such a lien affects property even in the hands of third persons who acquire the same prior to the actual recordation of the lien the following cases were cited: , 95 So.
General Lumber & Supply Co. v. McLellan 200 So. 501 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1941
Carr v. Eby 177 So. 455 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1937
Union Homestead Ass'n v. Finck 156 So. 458 La. 1934
National Homestead Ass'n v. Graham 147 So. 348 La. 1933
State Ex Rel. Wheless Inv. Co. v. City of Shreveport 142 So. 641 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1932
Cox v. Rockhold 128 So. 702 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1930
Lawrence v. Wright 124 So. 697 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1929
Counsel for defendant has also cited the following authorities: Gleissner vs. Hughes, , 95 So.
Hortman-Salmen Company v. White 123 So. 715 La. 1929
Houston v. Lewin 120 So. 894 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1929
any privilege provided for by this act may be enforced by a civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction in the parish in which the land is situated and such right of action shall prescribe within one year from the date of recordation of the privilege in the office of the recorder of mortgages, unless renewed in accordance with law.” Defendant argues that the case of Gleissner vs. Hughes, , 95 So.
Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Spurlock 120 So. 126 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1928
' The Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Company, Inc., cites the case of Gleissner vs. Hughes, , as sustaining its contention that the sixty-day delay for filing the claims of privilege began to run as it claims and not as contended for by the intervenors.
Dixie Bldg. Material Co. v. Chartier 8 La. App. 469 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1928
In the case of Gleisner vs. Hughes, , 95 So.
Central Lumber Co. v. Schroeder 114 So. 644 La. 1927
Constitution, art. 19, § 19; , 95 So.
Capital Building & Loan Ass'n v. Carter 113 So. 886 La. 1927
J. J. Clarke Co. v. Petivan 109 So. 913 La. 1926
Clarke Co. v. Petivan 5 La. App. 97 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1926
In the case of Gleissner vs. Hughes, , finally decided on rehearing in January, 1923, the court, in interpreting Act 229 of 1916, made a distinction between “the acceptance of the labor, material, machinery, etc., of each individual claimant, as distinguished from the completed job”.
Cook v. Carter 106 So. 704 La. 1925
H. W. Johns-Manville Co. v. Eunice Electric Theatre Co. 1 La. App. 228 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1924
In passing on the question as to what time the delay for recordation began to run, the Court in the case cited by counsel referred to the clause of the Act hereinabove reproduced, but in connection therewith cites the case of Gleissmer vs. Hughes, , 95 South.
Robinson-Slagle Lumber Co. v. Rudy 100 So. 296 La. 1924
Rose v. Eunice Electric Theatre Co. 97 So. 322 La. 1923