No. 26721. Precedential Processed

Stout v. Henderson

Louisiana Supreme Court · Filed November 3, 1924 · 102 So. 193

Cited by

Gorman v. Miller 136 So. 3d 834 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2013
VILLE PLATTE CONCRETE SERV., INC. v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co. 377 So. 2d 532 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1979
Soileau v. Fusilier 237 So. 2d 92 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970
Gulling v. EI Du Pont De Nemours and Company 228 So. 2d 750 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1969
Modern Appliance & Supply, Inc. v. Sapp 200 So. 2d 363 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
Raia v. WWL-TV 176 So. 2d 390 La. 1965
Raia v. WWL-TV 176 So. 2d 390 La. 1965
Clark v. Richardson 157 So. 2d 325 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1963
Succession of Seals 150 So. 2d 13 La. 1963
Scruggs v. Butler Furniture Co. 104 So. 2d 178 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
De Frances v. Gauthier 55 So. 2d 896 La. 1951
De Frances v. Gauthier 55 So. 2d 896 La. 1951

Opinion text

O’NIELL, C. J. (dissenting). It- was never intended that the authority of this court to review the judgments of the courts of appeal — which is a part of our supervisory jurisdiction — should ever be used to prevent the other court’s exercising its discretion. In this ease, to avoid injustice, and as a matter of equity, the Court of Appeal, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside a judgment taken by default, and remanded the case to allow the defendant a hearing on the merits of the case. No injustice could possibly have resulted from such a decree. If the plaintiff was entitled to a judgment, he would have obtained it after a trial of the case on its merits; if not, the decree of the court of appeal would have avoided an injustice. The decree of the' Court of Appeal did not end the suit; and it is not such a judgment or decree as was intended to be reviewed by this court. If the Court of Appeal had refused the defendant a hearing, we might be justified in reversing the decree. But we are not warranted, in the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction, in substituting, for a decree which only tends to do justice, and which cannot possibly do injustice, and which does not violate any law, a decree which merely denies to a party his day in court, and which may therefore be a hardship. The majority opinion and decree in this case is a bad precedent. I respectfully dissent from it.