Texas Pacific-Missouri Pac. Terminal R. R. v. Dittmar
Texas Pacific-Missouri Pac. Terminal R. R. v. Dittmar, 108 So. 877 (La. 1926).
Cited by
- State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Bourgeois 146 So. 2d 642 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
- Trunkline Gas Co. v. Cassidy 138 So. 2d 424 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962
- State Ex Rel. Department of Highways v. Central Realty Investment Co. 117 So. 2d 261 La. 1960
- State ex rel. Department of Highways v. Hub Realty Co. 118 So. 2d 364 La. 1960
- Mississippi River Bridge Authority v. Simon 95 So. 2d 144 La. 1957
- Rapides Parish School Board v. Nassif 94 So. 2d 40 La. 1957
- Housing Authority v. Polmer 91 So. 2d 600 La. 1956
- Caddo Parish School Board v. Willer 78 So. 2d 833 La. 1955
- City of New Orleans v. Noto 47 So. 2d 36 La. 1950
- Louisiana Highway Commission v. Davis 16 So. 2d 129 La. 1943
- Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal R. v. Rouprich 117 So. 273 La. 1928
- Texas Pac.-Missouri Pac. Terminal R. v. Walter 117 So. 272 La. 1928
Opinion text
*445 BRUNOT, J., This, is a suit by the Texas Pacific-Missonri Pacific Terminal Railroad of New Orleans to expropriate two lots of ground located in that part of the city of Gretna known as the town of McDonoughville. A supplemental petition was filed correcting the description of certain property sought to be expropriated. The right of expropriation is not contested, and the only question presented to this court is one of value of the two lots of ground plaintiff seeks to expropriate. The jury fixed the value of the lots at $4,000, placing a value of $1,500 upon the key lot and $2,500 upon the corner'lot. From this finding of the jury and the judgment of the court based thereon the plaintiff appealed. Plaintiff has offered in evidence a number of sales of property in the vicinity of the lots sought to be expropriated; it has proven that it tendered the defendant for his two lots $3,000,: and it contends that the true criterion of the value of these two lots is the price for which property in that vicinity has been recently purchased. Most of these sales were purchases by the plaintiff, and some of the properties acquired by it are quite a dis-. tance from the property of the defendant. Plaintiff, however, purchased from O. P. H. Gugel certain property adjoining the property of defendant, for which it paid 19.08 cents per square foot. The record shows that defendant’s property consists of 17,792 square feet, with some improvements on it. The price paid for the Gugel property is perhaps the best criterion of the value of defendant’s property. This price, when the improvements are taken into consideration, brings the value of the defendant’s two lots to approximately the sum fixed by the jury as the value thereof. It must be remembered that in expropriation proceedings the jury is composed of property holders of the vicinage, and the law and jurisprudence of the state attaches some importance to their knowledge of property values in their immediate neighborhood, and with reference to such values they are considered in the nature of experts. Of coursé, where they manifestly inflate the value, this court will correct the error; but in this cáse we think the facts do not -warrant us in disturbing the finding of the jury, and that the verdict and judgment are correct. For these reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed at appellant’s cost. ST. PAUL. J., recused.