Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Reed v. Warren, 136 So. 59.
- First Federal Savings Bank of New Orleans v. Gab Business Services, Inc. 524 So. 2d 111 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
- Guidry v. Theriot 377 So. 2d 319 La. 1979
- Honeycutt v. Town of Boyce 341 So. 2d 327 La. 1976
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Callais v. Allstate Insurance Co.
334 So. 2d 692
La. 1976
In support of this position, , 136 So.
- Whittington v. Hopfensitz 321 So. 2d 836 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975
- Carney v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 250 So. 2d 776 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
- Marcotte v. Travelers Insurance Co. 236 So. 2d 587 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970
- Thomas v. Matthews Lumber Co. of Mansfield 201 So. 2d 357 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1967
- Howard v. Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York 179 So. 2d 522 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1965
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Whatley v. Dupuy
178 So. 2d 438
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
“This history of the Article is told by Chief Justice O’Neill in the case of Reed vs. Warren, , 136 So.
- Dumas v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company 134 So. 2d 45 La. 1961
- Caldwell v. US Casualty Company of New York 129 So. 2d 813 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1961
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Palmer v. American General Insurance Company
126 So. 2d 777
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
arl Palmer, contending that a stepfather cannot recover for the injuries or death of his stepchild; and both defendants filed exceptions of nonjoinder of a proper and indispensable party, contending that the Palmers' petition affirmatively showed that the father of Carol White, Arthur E. White, survived his daughter, and was a necessary party to the suit under the holding of Reed v. Warren, 1931, , 136 So.
- Emmco Insurance Company v. Nola Cabs, Inc. 125 So. 2d 207 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1960
- Board of Com'rs v. CITY OF NEW ORLEANS EX REL. PUBLIC BELT R. COMMISSION 65 So. 2d 313 La. 1953
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Gabriel v. United Theatres, Inc.
50 So. 2d 514
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1951
10S2, , to mean that “if there be a minor child or children and a surviving spouse, the survivors shall have the right of action jointly, and if there be a surviving spouse and no minor child, or only one minor child and no surviving spouse, the one survivor shall ■have the right of action.” It will be observed that in
- Harris v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. 48 So. 2d 728 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1950
- Walker v. Joseph P. Geddes Funeral Service 33 So. 2d 570 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1948
- Artigue v. Artigue 26 So. 2d 699 La. 1946
- Thompson v. Kivett Reel 25 So. 2d 124 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1946
- Wolfson v. Succession of Lisso 13 So. 2d 521 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1943
- Ott v. Grace 13 So. 2d 138 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1943
- Burthlong v. Huber 4 So. 2d 480 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1941
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Baird v. Thibodo
199 So. 585
La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1941
Reynaud v. Champagne, 14 Orleans App. 179; , 136 So.
- De Hart v. Continental Land & Fur Co. 200 So. 9 La. 1940
- Thornton v. Peak 191 So. 182 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1939
- Riggin v. Watson-Aven Ice Cream Co. 188 So. 144 La. 1939
- Pierce v. Robertson 182 So. 544 La. 1938
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Thompson v. Travelers Ins. Co.
182 So. 356
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1938
The Supreme Court, , 136 So.
- Fried v. New York Life Ins. Co. 148 So. 5 La. 1933
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Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., Inc.
147 So. 385
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1933
ed to amend their petition so as to include therein their respective direct claims, were justified in their refusal by reason of the fact that the jurisprudence of the state, as it existed at that time, gave them the right to believe that the various claims resulting from death by wrongful act might be asserted separately, , 136 So.
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Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., Inc.
146 So. 758
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1933
Since the Supreme Court of Louisiana, , 136 So.
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Norton v. Crescent City Ice Mfg. Co., Inc.
146 So. 753
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1933
n to his survivors, we shall, for convenience, hereinafter refer to as the “transmitted claim,” and the latter, or direct claim, which accrued to each survivor for the loss of companionship, affection, support, etc., we shall designate as the “direct claim.” The difference between the two claims is well set forth by the Supreme Court in many decisions, , 136 So.