Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Harrill v. Pitts, 193 So. 562.

30 citing documents.

Nugent v. Franks 471 So. 2d 816 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1985
Weaver v. Hailey 416 So. 2d 311 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1982
Stutts v. Humphries 408 So. 2d 940 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1981
Bd. of Com'rs. Etc. v. Hunter Foundation 354 So. 2d 156 La. 1977
Tullis v. Aertker 352 So. 2d 415 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1977
Tinney v. Lauve 280 So. 2d 588 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1973
JH Jenkins Contractors, Inc. v. Farriel 246 So. 2d 340 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1971
White v. Phillips Petroleum Company 232 So. 2d 83 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1970
Dupuis v. Broadhurst 213 So. 2d 528 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1968
Bailey v. American Marine & General Insurance 185 So. 2d 214 La. 1966
Basco v. Moorhead 164 So. 2d 599 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1964
*601 It is the contention of counsel for plaintiffs that the exception in the deed from ■Gerhart to Kerry is vague and uncertain, and that the reservation should be construed in favor of the vendee and against the -vendor, , 193 So.
Savoia v. Capello 119 So. 2d 113 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
Hadwin v. Sledge 116 So. 2d 114 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1959
Blevins v. Manufacturers Record Publishing Co. 105 So. 2d 392 La. 1958
Canterberry v. Slade Brothers 96 So. 2d 4 La. 1957
La Fleur v. Fontenot 93 So. 2d 285 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
234, 239 , it is said: `"Notice of facts which ought to excite inquiry, and which, if purchased, would lead to knowledge of other facts operates as notice thereof."' " , 193 So.
Bruce v. Cheramie 93 So. 2d 202 La. 1956
Martin v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co. 81 So. 2d 852 La. 1955
Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Marks 74 So. 2d 36 La. 1954
Juneau v. Laborde 54 So. 2d 325 La. 1951
Arnold v. Sun Oil Co. 48 So. 2d 369 La. 1949
Emerson v. Cotton 26 So. 2d 16 La. 1946
Aertker v. John W. Ball 17 So. 2d 309 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1944
Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Guillory 17 So. 2d 13 La. 1943
Rock Island, A. & L. R. Co. v. Guillory 17 So. 2d 17 La. 1943
ion, where, as here, a construction is contended, for which would produce the unreasonable result of splitting into two pieces a tract of land, which existed as one tract, subject only to an easement, and which, in reason, must be considered to have been conveyed as such, and not to have been split into separate parts, with a thin wedge of land between.” See, also, , 193 So.
Pierce v. Hunter 13 So. 2d 259 La. 1943
Dinwiddie v. Cox 9 So. 2d 68 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1942
234 , 239, it is said: "`Notice of facts which ought to excite inquiry, and which, if pursued, would lead to knowledge of other facts operates as notice thereof.'" , 142, 193 So.
Wolfson v. Succession of Lisso 6 So. 2d 231 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1942
The prevailing rule, frequently approved for the construction of deeds, , 193 So.
Snelling v. Adair 199 So. 782 La. 1940
Brown v. Sugar Creek Syndicate 197 So. 583 La. 1940