No. 36835. Precedential Processed

Standard Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Futral

Louisiana Supreme Court · Filed May 17, 1943 · 15 So. 2d 65

Cited by

Distinguished in 1

Succession of Crute v. Crute 226 So. 3d 1161 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017
Lewis v. Townsend 108 So. 3d 184 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012
Cohort Ener. v. Caddo-Bossier Parishes Port 852 So. 2d 1174 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2003
Lejano v. Bandak 705 So. 2d 158 La. 1998
Horton v. Mobley 578 So. 2d 977 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991
Lulich v. Robin 466 So. 2d 780 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
Humble Oil & Refining Company v. Chappuis 239 So. 2d 400 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1970
Prentice v. Amax Petroleum Corporation 220 So. 2d 783 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1969
Campo v. LaNasa 173 So. 2d 365 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1965
Walker v. Jim Austin Motor Company 162 So. 2d 135 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
Evangeline Refining Co. v. Nunez 153 So. 2d 886 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1963
Price v. Taylor 139 So. 2d 230 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1962

Opinion text

On Application for Rehearing. PER CURIAM. In their application for a rehearing, counsel for Sam W. Futral contend that the clause in the Van Geffen deed declaring “that it is understood and agreed that the purchaser is to receive as a royalty * * * one-eight (Vs) of all royalties received by vendor * * * ” places the interest transferred “in the legal category of a ‘royalty deed’ ” and is not a transfer of a mineral right or servitude as held by us. If that clause were considered alone, there might be merit to their contention, but when it is considered together with all other clauses in the deed and effect is given to each, the construction which we gave the deed, in our opinion, reflects the intention of the parties, i.e. that Futral intended to sell and Van Geffen to acquire a mineral interest Or servitude on Futral’s land which was not prescribed for the same reasons assigned in our opinion that Futral’s deed to LeBourgeois and Barnett had not prescribed. We have carefully considered each of the other points raised by counsel in their application for a rehearing and, in our opinion, they are equally without merit. Counsels motion for a rehearing therefore is denied.