Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Succession of Lambert, 28 So. 2d 1.

29 citing documents.

Succession of Marian Ethel Plant Petry La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2024
1992), So.2d 1, 8 (1946).
Succession of John Patrick Theriot, Jr. La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2017
“It is a cardinal rule of testamentary construction that each and every part of the will shall be given effect; no word, phrase or clause shall be declared surplusage if it can be afforded a reasonable and legal interpretation.” (1946).
Succession of Theriot 221 So. 3d 862 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2017
“It is a cardinal rule of testamentary construction that each and every part of the will shall be given effect; no word, phrase or clause shall be declared surplusage if it can be afforded a reasonable and legal interpreta *870 tion.” , (1946).
In re the Successions of Lain 189 So. 3d 1125 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2016
(1946); see also Succession of McCarron, 247 La.
In re the Successions of Lain 147 So. 3d 1204 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2014
686 , (1946); see also Succession of McCarron, 247 La.
Succession of DiLeo 90 So. 3d 488 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2012
In Succession of Lambert the Supreme Court addressed whether persons “who have taken title to succession property” relying on jurisprudential interpretations which were being overruled and answered that “[t]hey are protected under the law in effect at the time of the vesting of their interests.” , (1946).
Marionneaux v. Hines 902 So. 2d 373 La. 2005
State, Department of Transportation & Development v. Berry 609 So. 2d 1100 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1992
Succession of Russell 590 So. 2d 606 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1991
As Justice Hamiter stated in , (1946): "It is a cardinal rule of testamentary construction that each and every part of the will shall be given effect; no word, phrase or clause shall be declared surplusage if it can be afforded a reasonable and legal interpretation.
Succession of Baldwin 485 So. 2d 97 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
Ayo v. Control Insulation Corp. 477 So. 2d 1258 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1985
665 , (1972); , (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Powell v. Ferguson 429 So. 2d 488 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
665 , (1972); , (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Hopson v. Ratliff 426 So. 2d 1377 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1983
(1946), dealing with language `share and share alike' overruled Wilcox and Maus, saying that the phrase `share and share alike' is distributive, not conjoint, pretty much as a matter of law.
Dominguez v. Travelers & Allstate Insurance 415 So. 2d 434 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1982
665 , (1972); , (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Mason v. Mason 399 So. 2d 1272 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1981
665 , (1972); , 28 * (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Tilley v. Government Employees Ins. Co. 396 So. 2d 525 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1981
665 , (1972); , (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Johnson v. Fournet 387 So. 2d 1336 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1980
665 , (1972); , (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Stipe v. Joseph A. Neyrey General Contractors, Inc. 385 So. 2d 568 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1980
665 , (1972); , (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Lott v. Haley 370 So. 2d 521 La. 1979
665 , (1972); , (1946); Shreveport Long Leaf Lumber Co. v. Wilson, 195 La.
Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v. Martin 358 So. 2d 295 La. 1978
105 , (1971); , (1946); Comment, Retrospective Effect of an Overruling Decision, 7 La.L.Rev.
Succession of Higgins 275 So. 2d 447 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1973
419 , (1965), and , (1946).
Succession of McCarron 172 So. 2d 63 La. 1965
They cite and rely on Articles 1706, 1707 and 1709 of the Revised Civil Code, and the cases of , , Succession of Rougon, 223 La.
Succession of McCarron 172 So. 2d 63 La. 1965
They cite and rely on Articles 1706, 1707 and 1709 of the Revised Civil Code, and the cases of , , Succession of Rougon, *424 223 La.
Succession of Mulqueeny 172 So. 2d 326 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
Our jurisprudence includes in its expressions on the subject that no word or clause should be declared surplusage if it can be given effect, , (1946); every part of the will should be given effect, consistent with the general purpose as gathered from the entire testament, Gueydan v. Montagne, 199 La.
Giroir v. Dumesnil 172 So. 2d 89 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1965
61 ; , ; Succession of Kamlade, 232 La.
Succession of McCarron 166 So. 2d 47 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
Succession of Rougon, 223 La.
Succession of Williams 124 So. 2d 924 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1960
ed the Louisiana jurisprudence on the subject and said: “ * * * Where the whole thing bequeathed is given to two persons, if one of them fails to receive the benefit of the disposition, either because he dies before the testator, or is incapable to take it, or refuses to take it, or because as to him it is revoked, the whole goes to the other legatee by accretion ; * * * In , , the Supreme Court stated that Albert Lambert, one of the legatees, had “predeceased the testator.” In Succession of Dup
In Re Succession of Milne 89 So. 2d 281 La. 1956
revoked, because of the averred violation of the condition imposed by the testator; that The Female Orphan Society (formerly The Poydras Female Asylum) is a universal residuary legatee under a conjoint legacy, and as such is entitled to all or at least one-fourth of the funds now available for distribution; that the legacy is different from those considered in the cases of , , and Succession of Rougon, 223 La.
Gregory v. Hardwick 49 So. 2d 423 La. 1950
Defense counsel, in support of their conclusion that plaintiffs are legatees under a universal title and are without seizin, cite only , ; but that decision is not authority for the position taken.