Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Meshell v. Bauer, 41 So. 2d 237.
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Candace Johnson v. Angelica Solorazano Sotomayor, Alberto Jose Sotomayor, Jr., the Alberto Jose Sotomayor, III Trust, State of …
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2022
Appellant’s argument fails because a legally valid tax sale, “is beyond attack and becomes indefensible after the period of redemption … has expired.” 41 So.
- Pardon v. Moore 908 So. 2d 1253 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2005
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Dockery v. DuPont
635 So. 2d 679
La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1994
See, Securities Mortgage Company, , (1949).
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Harris v. Estate of Fuller
532 So. 2d 1367
La. 1988
(1949) (interruption by possession only applies to actions to annul).
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Lasseigne v. Clement
311 So. 2d 600
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1975
and Walker v. Douglas, La.App., .
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Jackson v. Hanna
206 So. 2d 779
La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1968
Accordingly, Nelson Burk was not the record tax debtor and the court refused to sustain the plea that Nelson Burk had physical possession of the property until 1946, the court reasoning that Nelson Burk was not possessing as the record owner, and that this infirmity in Abbitt's title was cured by the peremption of five years, the court citing these cases: , (1949); Succession of Terrell v. Buckner, La.App., 176 So.
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A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc. v. Law
106 So. 2d 802
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1958
This exact point was considered and decided by the opinion of Mr. Justice Fournet (now Chief Justice) , , which opinion adopted, in toto, the opinion of this court ( ) which was under review by the Supreme Court.
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Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Company v. Butler
99 So. 2d 129
La. 1958
The trial judge found that the evidence did not establish a continuous adverse possession sufficient to support the plea of acquisitive prescription The judge may have been correct in this holding, but we do not find it necessary lo consider defendant’s plea of 30 years’ , , decided in 1949.
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Staring v. Grace
97 So. 2d 669
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1957
merely civil or constructive, such as by payment of taxes or that following an initial corporeal possession; for the only type of possession permitted by its nature of continuous protest to serve to prevent the perfection of the peremptive bar to annulment of the tax sale is an actual, physical, active, open, and continuing exercise of the right of possession by the tax debtor, , ; Stone v. Kimball's Heirs, 199 La.
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Stevens v. Johnson
87 So. 2d 743
La. 1956
Succession of Terrell v. Buckner, La.App., 176 So.
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Stevens v. Johnson
81 So. 2d 464
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1955
The position of Burk was similar to that of Meshell in Meshell v. Bauer, 1949, , , where, the court having observed' that Meshell was not the tax debtor and record owner of the property, his physical' detention of the property for a period of' over thirty years could not avail him.
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Bauswell v. Favret
78 So. 2d 213
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1955
5 Cir., 141 F.2d 478 ; , ; Kathman-Landry, Inc., v. Morrison, La.App., ; Code of Practice of Louisiana, Article 15.” Counsel for the three original owners think that they have found the reason for the difference in the results which were reached by the Supreme Court in the two cases, Doll v. Meyer, on the one hand
- Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Marks 74 So. 2d 36 La. 1954
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Thurmon v. Hogg
72 So. 2d 500
La. 1954
sale, as shown above, fall before the peremption of three years, under section 11 of article 10 of the Constitution of 1921’.” “The distinguishing feature between Close v. Rowan and the case at bar is the fact that in the Close v. Rowan case, “ ‘Plaintiffs or, so far as appears, those through whom they hold, have not had actual possession of the property since the tax sale.’ ” “ , [239], is cited by counsel for plaintiff as holding that, “ ‘ownership under a plea of thirty years prescription cou
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Housing Authority v. Banks
69 So. 2d 5
La. 1953
187 ; 5 Cir., 141 F.2d 478 ; , ; Kathman-Landry, Inc. v. Morrison, La.App., ; Code of Practice of Louisiana, Article 15.
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Kathman-Landry, Inc. v. Morrison
64 So. 2d 40
La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1953
an adjudication or a tax sale “may not be set aside for any cause, except on proof of payment of the taxes for which the property was sold prior to date of the sale.” As was pointed out by the Court in that case the peremption provided by the constitutional article is suspended “so long as the ta