Exchange Oil & Gas Co. v. Foster
Also decided on this docket: La. Ct. App. 1st Cir., November 3, 1953 68 So. 2d 219; La., January 15, 1883 35 La. Ann. 41; La. Ct. App. 3d Cir., February 4, 1981 394 So. 2d 722; La. Ct. App. 4th Cir., May 17, 1977 346 So. 2d 882
Exchange Oil & Gas Co. v. Foster, 237 So. 2d 904 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1970).
Cited by
- Reef Exploration, Inc. v. Bobbie Jean Busby Patin La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2025
- Ultramar Oil & Gas Ltd. v. Fournet 598 So. 2d 645 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1992
- Adobe Oil & Gas Corp. v. MacDonell 480 So. 2d 961 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1985
- Shell Oil Co. v. Pitman 476 So. 2d 1031 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985
- Allied Chemical Corp. v. Despot 414 So. 2d 1346 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1982
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Trunkline Gas Company v. Steen 249 La. 520
- Childs v. Washington 229 La. 869
- Jumonville Pipe & MacHinery Co. v. Federal Land Bank 230 La. 41
- Crown Central Petroleum Corporation v. Barousse 238 La. 1013
Opinion text
SARTAIN, Judge (concurring). I concur in the result reached by the majority because I consider the rationale of Trunkline Gas Co. v. Steen, 249 La. 520 , 187 So.2d 720 as controlling. Factually, Trunkline is similar to this case except that in Trunkline a mineral servitude was involved while in this case royalty interests are at issue. The Supreme Court in Trunkline correctly held that an order of the Commissioner of Conservation could not alter previously existing property rights without a clear conservation purpose. The court’s opinion reflected the final step in the movement away from the "division theories” of Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869 , 87 So.2d 111 and Jumonville Pipe and Machinery Co., Inc. v. Federal Land Bank of N. O., et al., 230 La. 41 , 87 So.2d 721 . I agree that the fact that royalty interests are involved in the case at bar is no basis for distinguishing it from Trunkline. Had the Commissioner’s order not issued in this case, there would be no question but that production from the unit would have interrupted prescription. I disagree, however, with the majority’s analysis of the Crown Central 1 and Trunkline cases. Crown involved a voluntary unit, royalty owners, and off-tract *916 production. Trunkline involved a compulsory unit, mineral servitude owners, and on-tract production. In Trunkline, the basis for the decision was that the Conservation Commissioner could not alter the rules of use applying to servitudes unless a conservation purpose was served. The decision in Crown was apparently based on the grant of royalties in which the grantor reserved exclusive development rights. The royalty owner’s participation in the confection of the unitization agreement, as the Supreme Court pointed out, was unnecessary. The landowner granted a lease which inured to the benefit of the royalty owners, as would unitization. Thus, I can see no basis for saying that Trunkline has reversed Crown insofar as Crown extends the rights of royalty owners outside a unit, where no conservation purpose is served. I respectfully suggest that the decision in Trunkline bears no relationship to voluntary unitization. . Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013 , 117 So.2d 575 .