Donelon v. Donelon
Donelon v. Donelon, 659 So. 2d 512 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995).
Cited by
- Koussanta v. Dozier 142 So. 3d 202 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2014
- Rome v. Bruce 27 So. 3d 885 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009
Authorities cited
Identified automatically; this list may not be exhaustive.
- Howes v. Howes 388 So. 2d 1182
- Cooper v. Anderson 393 So. 2d 738
- Monteleone v. Monteleone 591 So. 2d 1228
- Sparks v. Sparks 649 So. 2d 1223
- Dundas v. Real Superstore 653 So. 2d 590
- Haik v. Haik 648 So. 2d 1015
- Haik v. Haik 651 So. 2d 271
- Connelly v. Connelly 644 So. 2d 789
- Barnes v. Cason 637 So. 2d 607
- Barnes v. Cason 643 So. 2d 149
Opinion text
liBARRY, Judge, concurring in the result. A consent judgment relating to child custody is not a considered decree. A considered decree is one rendered after a trial on the issue and a court’s decision applying the pertinent law. Howes v. Howes, 388 So.2d 1182 (La.App. 4th Cir.1980), writ refused, 393 So.2d 738 (La.1980). The heavier Bergeron burden for modification of child custody should apply where the custody has previously been determined in a considered decree, not here where custody was decided by means of a 1987 consent judgment. See Monteleone v. Monteleone, 591 So.2d 1228, 1236 (La.App. 4th Cir.1991) (Barry, J., dissenting). The Fourth Circuit is the only circuit which holds that a parent must meet the Bergeron standard to change custody when a consent judgment was the basis for the prior child custody award. See Sparks v. Sparks, 94-1315 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/1/95) ; 649 So.2d 1223 , writ denied, 95-0561 (La. 4/28/95); 653 So.2d 590 ; Haik v. Haik, 9A- 563 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/14/94); 648 So.2d 1015 , writ denied, 95-0146 (La. 3/17/95); 651 So.2d 271 ; Connelly v. Connelly, 94 0527 (La.App. 1 Cir. 10/7/94) ; 644 So.2d 789 ; Barnes v. Cason, 25,808 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/4/94); 637 So.2d 607 , writ denied, 94-1325 (La. 9/2/94); 643 So.2d 149 . The trial court erred by deciding the no cause of action exception on the basis of whether Ms. Hamilton alleged in her rule to change custody that continuation of the present custody was so deleterious to the children as to justify modification of the custody decree under Bergeron. Mr. Donelon’s sole custody was based on a 1987 consent judgment signed by Ms. Hamilton, at the |2time a woman addicted to drugs, in need of hospitalization and unable to support her two children. I agree in the result that the judgment maintaining Mr. Donelon’s no cause of action be reversed and the matter remanded for a hearing on the rule to change custody.