Cited by

Opinions in Louisiana that cite Cartwright v. Chrysler Corp., 232 So. 2d 285.

162 citing documents.

Richardson v. Moffett 608 So. 2d 275 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1992
(1970), has been limited and redefined in later cases, `constructive' knowledge, as opposed to `actual' knowledge, is still recognized as the starting point of the prescriptive period.
Mistich v. Cordis Mfg. Co. 607 So. 2d 955 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1992
Tilley v. Kennedy 605 So. 2d 226 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992
Sharkey v. Sterling Drug, Inc. 600 So. 2d 701 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1992
The test for what constitutes notice sufficient to mark the commencement of prescription, , (1970) [10] , has been substantially modified by recent jurisprudence, (La.
Lima v. Schmidt 595 So. 2d 624 La. 1992
1992); Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Development Co., Inc., , (1970).
Curtis v. Greenberg 592 So. 2d 501 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1991
in order that prescription should run, it is not required that the loss should have been already suffered, but only that the fact that it is going to be suffered, or is sure to result, should be sufficiently certain to serve as a basis for a claim of damages in tort.” To the same effect is the Supreme Court’s which adopted a rationale of constructive notice as opposed to actual notice of knowledge of one’s claim: “Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and c
Augustine v. Derronne 590 So. 2d 703 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1991
(1970), the Supreme Court stated: ‘Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of every thing to which inquiry may lead and such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the owner on inquiry is su
Gore v. Snider 590 So. 2d 677 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1991
(1970) has been limited and redefined in later cases, `constructive' knowledge, as opposed to `actual' knowledge, is still recognized as the starting point of the prescriptive period.
Goodman v. Roberts 587 So. 2d 807 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1991
Recently, this court explicitly noted that this language in Cartwright v. Chrysler Corporation [ , (1970) ], supra had been `refined' to focus on the reasonableness of a tort victim's action or inaction.
Beth Israel v. Bartley, Inc. 579 So. 2d 1066 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1991
Roberts v. Murphy Oil Corp. 577 So. 2d 308 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1991
Camaille v. Martzell 579 So. 2d 1023 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1991
and Gravois v. New England Ins.
In Re Medical Review Panel of Howard 573 So. 2d 472 La. 1991
[5] , (1970), that "whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of every thing to which inquiry may lead, and such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the owner on inquiry is sufficient to start th
Rhoden v. Wegmann 569 So. 2d 35 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990
Nicosia v. Doe 563 So. 2d 1359 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990
This prescription commences to run from the day of injury or damages sustained.” , (1970) provides the test for the commencement of the.prescription period: The rule that prescription does not run against one who is ignorant of the exis-tance of facts that would entitle him to bring suit, applies only when such ignorance is not wilful and does not result from negligence ...
Succession of Smith v. Kavanaugh, Pierson and Talley 565 So. 2d 990 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990
Harlan v. Roberts 565 So. 2d 482 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1990
and call for inquiry" , (1970) has been limited and redefined in later cases, "constructive" knowledge, as opposed to "actual" knowledge, is still recognized as the starting point of the prescriptive period.
Gioustover v. Progressive American Ins. Co. 561 So. 2d 961 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1990
Intracoastal Seafood Co., Inc. v. Scott 556 So. 2d 974 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990
(1970), the Supreme Court stated: "Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of every thing to which inquiry may lead and such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the owner on inquiry is su
Maung v. May 556 So. 2d 221 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1990
and call for inquiry" , (1970), has been limited and redefined in later cases, "constructive" knowledge, as opposed to "actual" knowledge, is still recognized as the starting point of the prescriptive period.
Rajnowski v. ST. PARTICK'S HOSPITAL OF LAKE CHARLES 551 So. 2d 806 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990
Gravois v. New England Ins. Co. 553 So. 2d 1034 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989
Goodman v. Dixie MacH. Welding & Metal Works, Inc. 552 So. 2d 440 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989
Leyva v. Laga 549 So. 2d 914 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1989
Strata v. Patin 545 So. 2d 1180 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1989
Co., rehearing den.; Griffin v. Kinberger, 507 So.2d at 823 [as long as such ignorance is not willful, negligent or unreasonable]
Chandarlis v. Shah 535 So. 2d 895 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1988
Clofer v. Celotex Corp. 528 So. 2d 1074 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988
598 , (1970) provides the test for when prescription begins to run: [I]t is not necessary that the party have actual knowledge of the conditions as long as there is "constructive notice."
Herron v. Pendleton Memorial Methodist Hospital 527 So. 2d 344 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
(1970), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that an injured party does not need actual knowledge of the conditions to start the running of prescription as long as there is “constructive notice,” i.e., “whatever is notice enough to excite attention ...
Newsom v. Boothe 524 So. 2d 923 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1988
Manion v. Pollingue 524 So. 2d 25 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1988
1986); , (1970); Walter v. Caffall, 192 La.
Rozas v. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN RES. 522 So. 2d 1195 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1988
White v. Ford Motor Co. 525 So. 2d 96 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
(1970), the Supreme Court, speaking of constructive knowledge in contra non valentem cases, said: “Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which inquiry may lead and such information or
Wilco Marsh Buggies & Draglines, Inc. v. XYZ Ins. Co. 520 So. 2d 1292 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1988
Blanchard v. Reeves, supra
Moran v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 519 So. 2d 871 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988
Richards v. LaCour 515 So. 2d 813 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1987
Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp. 509 So. 2d 420 La. 1987
In the Lee case the court of appeal held such notice sufficient to start the prescription period running, and quoted dicta [1] *423 , (1970).
Shortess v. Touro Infirmary 508 So. 2d 938 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987
App., 4th Cir., 1986) , (1970).
Griffin v. Kinberger 507 So. 2d 821 La. 1987
[2] , spoke of constructive knowledge in contra non valentem cases as follows: "Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which inquiry may lead and such information or knowledge as ought t
Beauclair v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. 504 So. 2d 657 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987
Marcel v. Hospital Corp., Srs.
Plaquemines Par. Com'n Council v. Delta Dev. Co. 502 So. 2d 1034 La. 1987
598 , (1970), and finding that in 1941 the levee boards' causes of action were known, or reasonably knowable, the courts refused to apply the exception of contra non valentem non currit praescriptio.
Monceaux v. Bernauer 498 So. 2d 1173 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
(1970).” The mere apprehension by plaintiff that something is wrong is not sufficient to start prescription unless plaintiff knew or should have known by exercising reasonable diligence that his injury may have been caused by acts of malpractice.
Jordan v. Employee Transfer Corp. 499 So. 2d 454 La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1986
(1970), the court stated that whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and *457 call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which inquiry may lead and such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the owner on inquiry, is suffici
Layton v. Watts Corp. 498 So. 2d 23 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
[597] 598, at page 287: "* * * Also, it is not necessary that the party have actual knowledge of the conditions as long as there is `constructive notice.'
McDermott, Inc. v. M-Elec. & Const. Co., Inc. 496 So. 2d 1105 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
at 287 (1970), the Louisiana Supreme Court discussed the type of notice which would begin the running of time for purposes of prescription: Also, it is not necessary that the party have actual knowledge of the conditions as long as there is "constructive notice."
Gleason v. Milford 487 So. 2d 787 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1986
This is equivalent to actual knowledge or notice which should put a reasonable person in a position to inquire as to any civil wrong, , (1970).
Plaquemines Parish Comm'n Council v. Delta Development Co., Inc. 486 So. 2d 129 La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986
Both sides seem to agree with the following quotation from Cartwright v. Chrysler Corporation, 255 La.597, (1970): The rule that prescription does not run against one who is ignorant of the existence of facts that would entitle him to bring suit, applies only when such ignorance is not wilful and does not result from negligence, and the doctrine has been limited to cases where the debtor has concealed the fact of the oblig
Jungeblut v. PARISH OF JEFFERSON, CITY OF KENNER 485 So. 2d 974 La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1986
: "Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the owner on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which inquiry may lead and such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably put the owner on inquiry is sufficient to start the running
Varnado v. Insurance Corp. of America 484 So. 2d 813 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1986
598 , (1970) held: Whatever is notice enough to excite attention and put the [plaintiff] on his guard and call for inquiry is tantamount to knowledge or notice of everything to which inquiry may lead and such information or knowledge as ought to reasonably *816 put the [plaintiff] on inquiry is sufficient to start the runni
Rayne State Bank & Trust Co. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. 483 So. 2d 987 La. 1986
Since no damage was conclusively sustained at that time, , (1970) is erroneous.
McNary v. Sidak 478 So. 2d 712 La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1985
(1970), stated: "[I]t is not necessary that the party have actual knowledge of the conditions as long as there is `constructive notice'.