Goldie M. Jack v. Prairie Cajun Seafood Wholesale

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-0102

GOLDIE JACK

VERSUS

PRAIRIE CAJUN SEAFOOD WHOLESALE

************

APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 4
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 04-4435
HONORABLE SHARON M. MORROW,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

************

JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

************

Court composed of Jimmie C. Peters, Glenn B. Gremillion, and J. David Painter,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Goldie Jack
In Proper Person
1900 Prejean F-91
Lake Charles, LA 70607
(337) 562-8106

Mark Ackal
Post Office Box 52045
Lafayette, LA 70505-2045
(337) 237-5500
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Prairie Cajun Seafood Wholesale

PETERS, J.

In this workers’ compensation action, the plaintiff, Goldie Jack, appeals the

grant of a directed verdict dismissing her claim for benefits against her former

employer, Prairie Cajun Seafood Wholesale (Prairie Cajun). For the following

reasons, we affirm the judgment in all respects.

In her Disputed Claim For Compensation filed on June 24, 2004, Ms. Jack

asserted that she sustained an injury while working at Prairie Cajun’s crawfish

peeling plant in Evangeline Parish, Louisiana. Specifically, she asserted in her

pleadings that she “jerked [her] body” when she slipped on water on the floor of the

work area.

At the October 24, 2006 trial, Ms. Jack testified, called two witnesses, and

introduced five exhibits to support her claim. After Ms. Jack completed the

presentation of her evidence, the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) granted Prairie

Cajun’s motion for directed verdict and dismissed Ms. Jack’s claim. In doing so, the

WCJ noted that the accident was unwitnessed and that the medical evidence presented

by Ms. Jack did not support her position. Thereafter, Ms. Jack perfected this appeal.

OPINION

Although she had legal counsel when she filed her claim, Ms. Jack represented

herself at trial and continues to do so on appeal. Her lack of legal training is evident

in her expression of complaints on appeal, and this court has attempted to formulate

those complaints into what we understand her arguments to be. We will address all

of her arguments as we understand them, but not necessarily in the order raised in her

appellate brief.

Ms. Jack began working for Prairie Cajun as a crawfish peeler on March 4,

2004, and was paid at the rate of $1.50 per pound of crawfish peeled. Each crawfish

peeling station had a bowl of water/iodine mixture available for the peeler to rinse his

or her hands while working. The bowl had to be refilled from time-to-time from a

larger container located at the end of the crawfish peeling table. The accident at issue

is alleged to have occurred while Ms. Jack was refilling her bowl.

According to Ms. Jack, on April 27, 2004 (not April 22, 2004 as asserted in her

pleadings), she slipped twice while returning to her work station with a refilled bowl.

She testified that she sustained no injury the first time, but in the second incident she

felt a pulling in the back of her leg, in her left knee, in the lower part of her back, and

in her neck. She testified that the two incidents occurred approximately one-half hour

apart, and that she did not fall to the floor in either incident. Ms. Jack claims to have

sought medical attention on April 27, 2004. She further testified that April 28, 2004,

was her last day of employment. She claims that she has been unable to work since

that day due to her injuries.

When questioned by Prairie Cajun’s counsel concerning the dynamics of the

second incident, Ms. Jack could not remember whether she dropped the bowl of water

when she slipped, whether it remained in her hands, or whether the water spilled out

of the bowl. Additionally, she claimed that a co-worker named Betty observed the

incident and commented to her that “[g]irl, I know you hurt yourself.” However, Ms.

Jack testified that she did not call Betty to testify because she and Betty had a

subsequent disagreement.

Concerning the date of the accident, Ms. Jack testified on cross-examination

that it occurred on April 22, 2004, not April 27 as she had previously testified. She

continued to assert that she first sought medical care on April 27, 2004, when she

presented herself to the Ville Platte Medical Center Emergency Room. She testified

2

that she has seen numerous doctors since the accident, and she introduced various

medical records in support of this assertion.

Prairie Cajun introduced medical records which reflected that Ms. Jack did go

to the Ville Platte Medical Center Emergency Room on April 27, 2004, but not before

seeing her family physician, Dr. Charles Fontenot, a Ville Platte general practitioner.

According to Dr. Fontenot’s records, her complaints were not of having sustained an

accident, but of headaches, vomiting, sinus difficulties, left leg pain, sore throat, and

sneezing. The other medical records introduced by Prairie Cajun established that Ms.

Jack has had a history of neck problems beginning in December of 1994. Ms. Jack

asserted that the medical records were not accurate, but did acknowledge on cross-

examination that she began receiving monthly disability benefits from Social Security

in 1993 while working cash jobs peeling crawfish and farming sweet potatoes. She

also acknowledged that she had been involved in automobile accidents in the late

1990's and in 2002, that she had asserted an earlier workers’ compensation claim for

a wrist and neck injury, and that she had been involved in multiple lawsuits.

The testimony of Ms. Jack’s two other witnesses did not address the specifics

of the accident or her current medical condition. Leola Rideau testified that Ms. Jack

worked for her during 2002 and 2003, and during that time did not appear to have any

injuries to her neck or back. Additionally, John Rideau testified that he helped move

Ms. Jack and her mother from Lake Charles, Louisiana, to Ville Platte sometime in

December of 2003. This testimony related to the accuracy of a medical record which

will be discussed later in this opinion.

3

Argument Concerning Particulars of the Accident

In one of her arguments, Ms. Jack complains about Prairie Cajun’s legal

counsel asking her why she did not call other employees who may have seen the

accident to testify on her behalf. Without acknowledging her testimony concerning

Betty’s observance of the accident, she states in brief that she could not think of a

witness who observed her “limping” on that day. Her argument is apparently that it

was unfair for opposing counsel to question the lack of support for her accident, and

that the WCJ erroneously relied on that lack of corroboration. We conclude that Ms.

Jack is arguing error on the part of the WCJ in rejecting her claim based on lack of

evidence. We disagree with this assertion.

Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1021(1) defines an accident as “an unexpected

or unforeseen actual, identifiable, precipitous event happening suddenly or violently,

with or without human fault, and directly producing at the time objective findings of

an injury which is more than simply a gradual deterioration or progressive

degeneration.” An employee in a workers’ compensation action must prove a work-

related accident by a preponderance of the evidence. Bruno v. Harbert Int’l Inc., 593

So.2d 357 (La.1992). The employee’s testimony alone may be sufficient to discharge

this burden, provided that (1) no other evidence discredits or casts serious doubt upon

the employee’s version of the incident and (2) the employee’s testimony is

corroborated by the circumstances following the alleged incident. Id. In determining

whether the employee has discharged his burden of proof, the workers’ compensation

judge should accept as true a witness’s uncontradicted testimony, even though the

witness is a party, absent circumstances that cast suspicion on the reliability of that

testimony. Id. Further, the workers’ compensation judge’s determinations on

4

whether the employee’s testimony was credible and on whether the employee met his

burden of proof are factual findings not to be disturbed on appeal absent manifest

error. Id. Disability can be proven by both medical and lay testimony, and the

workers’ compensation judge must weigh all of the evidence in order to determine

whether the employee has met his burden of proof of this element. Bailey v. Smelser

Oil & Gas, Inc., 620 So.2d 277 (La.1993). This also is a factual determination which

is subject to a manifest error analysis. Id.

In this matter, Ms. Jack’s testimony concerning the specifics of the accident

was not contradicted by any eyewitness testimony. However, other evidence cast

serious doubts on Ms. Jack’s credibility, and the circumstances following the alleged

accident did not corroborate her assertions of fact with regard to the accident or her

medical treatment.

In granting the directed verdict, the WCJ acknowledged the status of the law

as cited above, but concluded that Ms. Jack had not carried her burden of proof . We

find no manifest error in the WCJ’s factual findings. Thus, we find no merit in this

particular argument.

Argument Concerning Effect of Prior Payments by Prairie Cajun

Prairie Cajun paid Ms. Jack weekly compensation benefits from April 22, 2004,

through October 15, 2004. Ms. Jack points out that in its pretrial statement, Prairie

Cajun asserted that she did not receive an injury on April 24, 2004. Her argument in

this regard seems to be that Prairie Cajun cannot decide which day the accident

occurred and, therefore, should not be allowed to argue that she was not injured on

April 22, 2004.

5

We find no merit in this argument. As previously discussed, Ms. Jack had

difficulties with the dates in her testimony at trial, and it is clear from the record that

the argument is over one accident only. That is to say, the date of the alleged

accident was not a disputed issue in this case.

Argument Concerning Accuracy of Certain Medical Records

Medical records were introduced establishing that Ms. Jack was admitted to the

Eunice Community Medical Center Emergency Room on May 21, 2005, complaining

of injuries sustained in a fall the year before. The specific notation found in the

record quoted Ms. Jack as saying, “I FELL IN CAJUN COUNTRY FLEA MARKET AND

GROCERY STORE 1YR AGO, AND I BEEN HURT’N EVER SINCE.” When questioned at trial

concerning whether she made this statement, Ms. Jack testified, “I might have. I done

forgot what I told them people. I forgot.” However, on appeal, she asserts that she

never fell in that particular grocery store, “or any other store in my life.” In other

words, she asserts that the medical records are inaccurate.

The trial record also contains the December 8, 2003 medical records from the

Ville Platte Medical Center, wherein Ms. Jack expressed complaints of pain in the

neck associated with a history of problems with the discs in her neck. Ms. Jack

questioned the accuracy of this record as well. According to Ms. Jack, she was not

in Ville Platte on December 8. Instead, she asserted that she was in Lake Charles, in

the process of moving her mother from the Chateau du Lac Apartments in Lake

Charles to Ville Platte. In support of her assertion, Ms. Jack introduced a tenant

ledger card, showing that her mother’s move-out date from the Chateau du Lac

Apartments was December 8, 2003. Ms. Jack stated that she was living with her

mother in Lake Charles at that time. John Rideau testified that he helped her and her

6

mother move from Lake Charles to Ville Platte, and that they left Lake Charles at

7:00 or 8:00 p.m., but that he did not remember the date that they moved.

With regard to her belief in the medical records, the WCJ stated

[F]or me to completely believe you I would have to believe that each
and every one of these medical records are wrong except the ones that
you’ve presented. And while I am completely willing to accept that
doctors and hospitals make mistakes, I am not willing to accept that they
did so this many times.

We find no manifest error in the WCJ’s factual conclusions with regard to the

credibility of the medical records versus that of Ms. Jack. Therefore, we find no merit

in this argument.

DISPOSITION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the workers’

compensation judge dismissing Goldie Jack’s claim for workers’ compensation

benefits against her former employer, Prairie Cajun Seafood Wholesale. We assess

all costs of this appeal to Goldie Jack.1

AFFIRMED.

1
When judgment is rendered against a party who has been allowed to litigate without the
payment of costs, the party “shall be condemned to pay the costs incurred by him . . . and those
recoverable by the adverse party.” La.Code. Civ.P. art. 5188.

7