Gerald Taylor v. Hathorn Transfer & Storage

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

07-993

GERALD TAYLOR

VERUS

HATHORN TRANSFER & STORAGE

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION
PARISH OF RAPIDES, DOCKET NO. 06-04044
HONORABLE JAMES H. BRADDOCK,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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SYLVIA R. COOKS
JUDGE
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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks, and
Jimmie C. Peters, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Clifton J. Spears, Jr.
Attorney at Law
5003 Masonic Drive, Suites 119-122
Alexandria, LA 71301-3373
(318) 442-6240
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:
Gerald Taylor

Thomas D. Travis
Johnson, Stilner & Rahman
2237 S. Acadian Thruway
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
(225) 231-0521
COUNSEL FOR APPELLEES:
Hathorn Transfer & Storage and
Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Corporation

COOKS, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a workers’ compensation case. The issue presented is whether an

employee’s claim against his employer for payment of a medical bill and mileage is

extinguished by virtue of a compromise and settlement entered into by the parties and

approved by order of the workers’ compensation judge. The workers’ compensation

judge found that the claim was barred. For the reasons assigned below, we affirm the

decision of the workers’ compensation judge.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts are as follows. Gerald Taylor was injured while on the job for his

employer, Hathorn Transfer & Storage. Mr. Taylor was initially represented by

attorney Thomas Davenport. He later retained Clifton J. Spears, Jr. The employer

was represented by Frank E. Brown, III. Mr. Taylor was sent to Dr. Alan Appley, a

neurosurgeon, for evaluation. Dr. Appley ordered an MRI of the cervical and

thoracic spine. The MRI was approved by the employer. In his deposition, Dr.

Appley admitted at the time he ordered the test, he believed Mr. Taylor needed both

a cervical and thoracic MRI. After the tests were performed, Dr. Appley decided the

work-related problem Mr. Taylor was experiencing was unrelated to his cervical

spine. The employer bifurcated the bill and paid only for the thoracic MRI. Mr.

Taylor began receiving bills from Open Air MRI prior to the settlement. A

compromise was eventually agreed to between the parties. Mr. Spears drafted two

letters to Mr. Brown dated February 8, 2006 and February 9, 2006. The February 8

letter confirmed “I am in receipt of the settlement package and my client has agreed

to settle this matter for FIFTY THOUSAND and no/100 ($50,000.00) DOLLARS.”

The letter addressed the issue of the mileage and the outstanding MRI bill, as follows:

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There is the matter of unpaid mileage and an unpaid bill to Open Air
MRI of Louisiana, which I have attached to this letter. If possible, could
we have the mileage check made separate from the settlement check and
made payable to Gerald Taylor only?

The letter of February 9 from Mr. Spears to Mr. Brown states the settlement

documents have been “duly executed” but the “Receipt and Release has not been

executed and will not be executed until I have check in hand.” The letter also

provides:

There is the matter of unpaid mileage and an unpaid bill to Open Air
MRI of Louisiana. Please have the mileage check made separate from
the settlement check, and made payable to Gerald Taylor only.

Counsel for Mr. Taylor asserts that he and Mr. Brown agreed the mileage and

MRI charges would be paid separate and above the settlement. The settlement

documents were signed but they do not mention the agreement between the two

attorneys or the disputed charges. The settlement was approved by the workers’

compensation judge. The check for the disputed charges was not forthcoming.

Counsel for Mr. Taylor called Mr. Brown in reference to the unpaid mileage and MRI

bill and learned that Mr. Brown was fired from his employment with the firm.

Mr. Taylor filed a disputed claim for payment based on representations made

by counsel for the employer that the expenses were to be paid over and above the

settlement. The employer filed an exception of res judicata. The workers’

compensation judge found although the letters indicate a concern regarding the

unpaid charges, there was nothing to suggest that the employer agreed to pay the

disputed charges in addition to the settlement amount. Further, the workers’

compensation judge found the Plaintiff signed the settlement knowing there was an

outstanding MRI bill and unpaid mileage benefits. The workers’ compensation judge

maintained the exception of res judicata, finding the settlement extinguished any

obligation on the part of the employer for the disputed charges. The employee

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appeals.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1272 provides, in relevant part:

A. A lump sum or compromise settlement entered into by the parties
under R.S. 23:1271 shall be presented to the workers’ compensation
judge for approval through a petition signed by all parties and verified
by the employee or his dependent, or by recitation of the terms of the
settlement and acknowledgement by the parties in open court which is
capable of being transcribed from the record of the proceedings.

B. When the employee or his dependent is represented by counsel, and
if attached to the petition presented to the workers’ compensation judge
are affidavits of the employee or his dependent and of his counsel
certifying each one of the following items: (1) the attorney has explained
the rights of the employee or dependent and the consequences of the
settlement to him; and, (2) that such employee or dependent understands
his rights and the consequences of entering into the settlement, then the
workers’ compensation judge shall approve the settlement by order, and
the order shall not thereafter be set aside or modified except for fraud
or misrepresentation made by any party. (Emphasis added).

The purpose of this statute is to “provide numerous safeguards to prevent an

employee from being coerced, to prevent a hasty and possibly ill-advised resolution

of the employee’s claim, and to protect the parties from unwise actions which may

cause them serious detriment.” Sedgwick Claims Management Serv. Inc. v. Cormier,

02-0216 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/26/03), 841 So.2d 1032, writ denied, 03-1185 (La.

6/20/03), 847 So.2d 1234. A judgment obtained in compliance with the statutory

requirements may only be set aside for fraud or misrepresentations. Id.

At the hearing, Mr. Spears argued Plaintiff was induced into settling his claim

by the false assurances made by Mr. Brown that the MRI charges and attendant

mileage expenses would be paid over and above the settlement. He asserts the

Plaintiff began receiving a bill for the cervical MRI prior to the settlement. This bill

was discussed with Mr. Brown and the parties agreed that the full amount of the

charges and related mileage expenses would be paid in addition to the settlement

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amount. In support of Plaintiff’s claim, Mr. Spears introduced the letters sent to Mr.

Brown. No testimony was offered other than Mr. Spears’s argument at the hearing

regarding the verbal agreement between he and Mr. Brown.

A “compromise instrument is the law between the parties and must be

interpreted according to the parties’ true intent.” Brown v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019, p.

7 (La. 1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741, 748. “Thus, the intent which the words of the

compromise instrument express in light of the surrounding circumstances at the time

of execution of the agreement is controlling.” Brown, 630 So.2d at 748. The record

indicates the settlement package includes a Joint Petition for Approval of

Compromise Settlement, signed by Plaintiff, which states: “Employee understands

that this settlement will release the Employer and Insurer from any obligation to pay

past or future weekly benefits and past or future medical benefits whether or not those

medical bills have been submitted to the Employer/Insurer.” The settlement package

also contains a Verification signed by Mr. Taylor, an Attorney Statement, and a

Motion and Order to Dismiss the Claim signed by Mr. Taylor and Mr. Spears. The

Order was signed by the workers’ compensation judge on March 2, 2006. There is

nothing in the record to suggest Plaintiff was mislead or defrauded by the employer

into signing the settlement documents. Plaintiff was represented by competent

counsel and was fully aware that there was an outstanding medical bill and that he

had incurred travel expenses for which he had not been reimbursed. We agree with

the workers’ compensation judge and find any further claim for expenses is barred by

the settlement with the employer. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the

workers’ compensation judge. All costs of this appeal are assessed to Gerald Taylor.

AFFIRMED.

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