Donna Tyson v. Thompson Home Health

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

08-193

DONNA DANETE TYSON

VERSUS

THOMPSON HOME HEALTH
**********
APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION, DIST. 02
PARISH OF ACADIA, NO. 07-00314
HONORABLE JAMES L. BRADDOCK,
ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING OFFICER

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, J. David Painter, and Chris J. Roy. pro tem,
Judges.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

GEORGE A. FLOUNOY
P.O. Box 1270
Alexandria, LA 71309
Counsel for Plaintiff-Appellant:
Donna Danete Tyson

Ward F. Lafleur
Lisa M. Milazzo
K. Eric Lafleur
P.O. Box 3089
Lafayette, LA 70502
Counsel for Defendant-Appellee:
Thompson Home Health

PAINTER, Judge.

Plaintiff, Donna Danete Tyson, appeals the judgment of the trial court

dismissing her action for payment of medical expenses under the workers’

compensation statute pursuant to a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant,

Thompson Home Health (Thompson). Finding that a question of material fact

remains, we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTS

Tyson was injured in an automobile accident on January 23, 2003, while in the

course and scope of her employment as a licensed physical therapist for Thompson.

She made a claim against Thompson for workers’ compensation benefits and payment

of medical expenses. She received benefits for a time, but, on March 17, 2004, she

filed a disputed claim for compensation asking for medical benefits, penalties, and

attorney*s fees. She agreed to a settlement with Thompson, and, on September 2,

2005, the settlement was approved by the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ). The

settlement agreement included the following language:

APPEARER declares that for and in consideration of the aforesaid
payment, she does hereby release and forever discharge THOMPSON
HOME HEALTH and LOUISIANA HEALTH CARE SELF
INSURANCE FUND . . . from any and all past, present and future
claims, demands, compensation, medical expenses (in addition to any
and all outstanding medical bills and/or charges for medical treatment
which employer has already authorized and agreed to pay as a result of
Employee*s work related accident and injury), costs, expenses, penalties,
attorney*s fees . . . .

However, on January 16, 2007, Tyson again filed a disputed claim for

compensation alleging failure to pay medical bills under the settlement agreement and

asking for payment of the bills as well as penalties and attorney*s fees. Thompson

filed a motion for summary judgment asserting that no issue of fact remained but that

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all Tyson*s claims arising out of the January 23, 2003 accident were terminated by

the settlement agreement. The trial court dismissed the claim finding no remaining

issue of material fact. Tyson appeals.

DISCUSSION

Summary Judgment

Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the
same criteria that govern the trial court*s determination of whether
summary judgment is appropriate. Henderson v. Kingpin Development
Co., 01-2115, p. 4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 8/6/03), 859 So.2d 122, 126. A
motion for summary judgment is a procedural device used to avoid a
full-scale trial when there is no genuine issue of fact. Jarrell v. Carter,
632 So.2d 321, 323 (La.App. 1 Cir.1993). Summary judgment is only
appropriate if the admissible pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits
show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La.Code Civ. P. art. 966(B).

Lacrouts v. Succession of Longo, 04-1938, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 1 Cir. 9/23/05), 923

So.2d 717, 719.

Interpreting La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(C)(2), a panel of this court stated:

Under the amended statute, the initial burden of proof remains
with the mover to show that no genuine issue of material fact exists.
However, under Art. 966(C), once the mover had made a prima facie
showing that the motion should be granted, the burden shifts to the
non-moving party to present evidence demonstrating that material
factual issues remain. Once the motion for summary judgment has been
properly supported by the moving party, the failure of the non-moving
party to produce evidence of a material factual dispute mandates the
granting of the motion.

Hayes v. Autin, 96-287, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/96); 685 So.2d
691, 694, writ denied, 97-0281 (La.3/14/97); 690 So.2d 41. Thus, we
must determine: (1) whether the defendant has met its initial burden by
showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the
defendant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law; and, if so, (2)
whether the claimant failed to produce evidence of a material factual
dispute.

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Johnson v. Sunbelt Builders, Inc., 02-0959, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/03), 838 So.2d

907, 910.

Settlement

A transaction or compromise is an agreement between two or
more persons, who, for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit, adjust
their differences by mutual consent, in the manner which they agree on,
and which every one of them prefers to the hope of gaining, balanced by
the danger of losing. La. C.C. art. 3071; Dumas v. Angus Chemical
Co., 31,969, p. 5 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/20/99), 742 So.2d 655, 660. A
release executed in exchange for consideration is a compromise. Brown
v. Drillers, Inc., 93-1019 (La.1/14/94), 630 So.2d 741. A compromise
regulates only the differences that appear clearly to be comprehended
therein by the intention of the parties, “whether it be explained in a
general or particular manner,” and does not extend to differences that
the parties never intended to include. La. C.C. art. 3073; Ortego v.
State, Dept. of Transp. and Development, 96-1322 (La.2/25/97), 689
So.2d 1358. Further, a general release will not necessarily bar recovery
for those aspects of the claim not intended to be covered by the release.
Dimitri v. Dimitri, 2000-2641, p. 5 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/30/02), 809 So.2d
481, 485, citing Moak v. American Automobile Insurance Company, 242
La. 160, 134 So.2d 911 (1961).

The parties* intent in executing a compromise is normally
discerned from the four corners of the document; extrinsic evidence is
normally inadmissible to explain, expand or contradict the terms of the
instrument. Brown, supra. Nevertheless, when the parties to a
compromise dispute its scope, they are permitted to raise factual issues
regarding whether the unequivocal language of the instrument was
intended to be truly unequivocal. Id. However, such latitude is granted
only in the presence of some “substantiating evidence” of mistaken
intent. Dimitri, supra. In Brown, the Supreme Court held that
“substantiating evidence” must establish either: 1) that the releasor was
mistaken as to what he or she was signing, even though fraud was not
present; or 2) that the releasor did not fully understand the nature of the
rights being released or that the releasor did not intend to release certain
aspects of his or her claim.

In the absence of such evidence, the compromise is subject to the
normal rules of contract analysis and enforced precisely as written.
Brown, supra.

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Carrie v. La. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 04-1001, pp 3-4 (La.App. 4 Cir. 2/16/05),

900 So.2d 841, 844, writ denied, 05-711 (La.5/6/05), 901 So.2d 1099.

Plaintiff asserts that she did not intend to release certain rights, specifically the

payment of certain medical bills incurred in the treatment of her work related injury.

Plaintiff points to correspondence with Defendant which supports her argument that

Defendant was to “remain responsible for any and all work related medical expenses

incurred, but still unpaid, if any through the date of [the] settlement.”1 Since the

parties dispute the scope of the settlement document, this evidence may be accepted

as substantiating evidence. Given this evidence, we find that Plaintiff has shown that

a question of material fact remains unresolved. Accordingly, summary judgment was

not appropriate given the record in this case.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the judgment rendered by the trial court is reversed. This

matter is remanded for further proceedings. Costs of this appeal are assessed to

Defendant.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

1
Defendant cites Nelams v. Allen*s TV Cable, 95-444 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/2/95);
664 So.2d 563 as support for its argument that the settlement document should not
be set aside or modified except in the case of fraud or misrepresentation. We note that
the language of the settlement document in Nelams was significantly different from
the one currently before the court and distinguish the case on that basis.

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