Jerome C. Ardoin, Jr. v. Cleco Power, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-1085

JEROME C. ARDOIN, JR.

VERSUS

CLECO POWER, LLC

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 02
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 08-22694
HONORABLE JASON OURSO
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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JIMMIE C. PETERS
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Jimmie C. Peters, and Billy H. Ezell, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Cooks, J. dissents and assigns reasons.

Bret C. Beyer, Sr.
Hill & Beyer
Post Office Box 53006
Lafayette, LA 70505-3006
(337) 232-9733
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Jerome C. Ardoin, Jr.

Kathryn Fowler Van Hoof
Van Hoof Law Firm
Post Office Box 339
LeCompte, LA 71346
(318) 776-4836
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:

CLECO Power, LLC

1 PETERS, J.

2 The plaintiff, Jerome C. Ardoin, Jr., was terminated from his employment with

3 the defendant, Cleco Power, LLC (Cleco). While clearing out his office, he slipped,

4 fell, and suffered injuries to his neck and back. Mr. Ardoin filed suit against Cleco

5 seeking workers’ compensation benefits. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ)

6 rendered summary judgment in favor of Cleco, finding that Mr. Ardoin was not

7 entitled to benefits as he was not injured while in the course and scope of his

8 employment. Mr. Ardoin appeals this judgment. For the following reasons, we

9 affirm the judgment of the WCJ in all respects.

10 DISCUSSION OF THE RECORD

11 The facts are not in dispute. Mr. Ardoin’s employment with Cleco was

12 terminated on Friday morning, October 24, 2008. Mr. Ardoin’s office with Cleco was

13 located in Eunice, Louisiana, but he was informed of his employment termination at

14 Cleco’s Work Center in Opelousas, Louisiana. His employer gave him permission

15 to return to his office on Monday morning, October 27, 2008, to collect his personal

16 effects and return any Cleco property still in his possession. While clearing out his

17 office on Monday morning, Mr. Ardoin sustained serious physical injuries in a slip

18 and fall accident. His treating physician recommended that he undergo surgery to

19 both his neck and lower back as treatment for the injuries he sustained.

20 Mr. Ardoin filed a disputed claim for compensation against Cleco seeking

21 wage benefits, medical treatment, and penalties and attorney fees. Cleco answered

22 denying liability. The matter is now before us because both litigants filed motions

23 for partial summary judgment addressing Mr. Ardoin’s employment status at the time

24 of the accident. The WCJ granted Cleco’s motion, denied Mr. Ardoin’s motion, and

25 dismissed Mr. Ardoin’s claims against Cleco.

1 Mr. Ardoin sought a supervisory writ from this court which, in an unpublished

2 opinion, was denied because this court found that he had an adequate remedy through

3 ordinary appeal. Ardoin v. Cleco Power, L.L.C., 09-683 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/26/09).

4 Mr. Ardoin then appealed, raising one assignment of error:

5 Judge Ourso erred as a matter of law by determining that the
6 plaintiff, an employee under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act,
7 terminated on a Friday evening, was not covered by the Act when
8 injured the following Monday morning on the employer’s premises,
9 while wrapping up the affairs of his employment pursuant to an
10 agreement with the employer.

11 OPINION

12 Appellate courts review summary judgments de novo, using the same analysis

13 as the trial court in deciding whether summary judgment is appropriate. Smith v. Our

14 Lady of the Lake Hosp., Inc., 93-2512 (La. 7/5/94), 639 So.2d 730. A motion for

15 summary judgment must be granted if the pleadings, depositions, answers to

16 interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

17 there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment

18 as a matter of law. La.Code Civ.P. art. 966(B). Because the facts are not in dispute,

19 the only issue before us is the legal question concerning Mr. Ardoin’s employment

20 status at the time of the accident.

21 An employee, who suffers an injury while in the course and scope of his

22 employment, is limited to recovery pursuant to the Workers’ Compensation Act.

23 La.R.S. 23:1032. The few cases dealing with the scenario where the employee

24 seeking workers’ compensation benefits is injured on the employer’s premises

25 subsequent to being terminated, have been addressed by extrapolating from situations

26 dealing with employees injured on the employer’s premises before or after work. The

27 end result of these cases is to conclude that employees are allowed a reasonable

2

1 period of time to gather up their belongs before quitting their employer’s premises.

2 If an injury occurs during that reasonable period of time, the employee is considered

3 to be within the course and scope of his/her employment. See Livings v. Reliance Ins.

4 Co., 525 So.2d 620 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988); Matthews v. Milwhite Mud Sales Co., 225

5 So.2d 391 (La.App. 3 Cir.), writ denied, 254 La. 772, 226 So.2d 526 (1969), writ

6 denied, 255 La. 149, 229 So.2d 732 (1970); see also LaFleur v. Swallow’s Rice Mills,

7 532 So.2d 255 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988); Carter v. Lanzetta, 249 La. 1098, 193 So.2d

8 259 (1966).

9 Many of these opinions support their decision with language found in WEX S.

10 MALONE & H. ALSTON JOHNSON, III, 13 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE, WORKERS’

11 COMPENSATION, § 167, p. 332-33 (4th ed. 2002) (footnotes omitted), pertaining to

12 “Accidents on Employer’s Premises Before or After Working Hours”:

13 The observation has been made in previous sections that an
14 employee is acting in the course of his employment while he is actually
15 engaged in his employer’s work even before or after working hours.
16 Furthermore, even if he has finished the day’s work and is preparing to
17 leave, or is in the act of leaving, he is entitled to a reasonable period
18 while still on the premises which is regarded as within the course of the
19 employment. The working day embraces these intervals just as it
20 includes reasonable periods for rest, relaxation or the attendance of
21 personal needs. This applies also to periods prior to the actual
22 beginning of work under similar circumstances.

23 We decline to conclude that given the facts of this case, the delay between the

24 Friday evening termination and the Monday morning injury was a reasonable period

25 of time. That being the case, we find no merit in Mr. Ardoin’s assignment of error.

26 DISPOSITION

27 We affirm the judgment of the workers’ compensation judge in all respects.

28 We assess all costs of this appeal to Jerome C. Ardoin, Jr.

29 AFFIRMED.

3

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

09-1085

JEROME ARDOIN

VS.

CLECO POWER

COOKS, J. DISSENTS.

Mr. Ardoin returned to pick up his personal effects on the date, Monday,
October 27, 2008, his employer granted him permission to do so. Any “delay” in
retrieving the effects resulted from the employers insistence that he wait until
Monday. The employer granted the claimant a “reasonable time” on a fixed
date to retrieve his belongings and the accident occurred during this period.