Ruby L. Hawkins v. Pilgrim's Pride Corporation

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-402

RUBY L. HAWKINS

VERSUS

PILGRIM'S PRIDE CORPORATION

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 2
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 09-04181
JAMES L. BRADDOCK, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, J. David Painter, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

REVERSED.

Dona Kay Renegar
Huval, Veazey, Felder, Aertker & Renegar, LLC
P. O. Box 80948
Lafayette, LA 70508
(337) 234-5350
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation

Richard Bray Williams
Williams Family Law Firm, L.L.C
P. O. Box 15
Natchitoches, LA 71458-0015
(318) 352-6695
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Ruby L. Hawkins

GREMILLION, Judge.

Ms. Ruby L. Hawkins appeals the judgment of the Workers’ Compensation

Judge (WCJ) maintaining the exception of prescription in favor of her former

employer, Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation. For the reasons that follow, we reverse.

FACTS

Hawkins was employed at the chicken processing plant in Natchitoches,

Louisiana, from 1979 until July 24, 2008, when Pilgrim’s Pride terminated her

employment. Before her termination, Hawkins had been diagnosed with carpal tunnel

syndrome and fibromyalgia. Hawkins had a long history of carpal tunnel issues, for

which she underwent surgical procedures in December 2003 and January 2004.

Following those procedures, Hawkins returned to modified duty at the plant.

Unfortunately, in February 2008, Hawkins developed a worsening of her condition

to the point that her treating physician, Dr. Robert E. Goodman, a Shreveport,

Louisiana, rheumatologist, directed that she not work from February 11, 2008 through

May 8, 2008, and that, when she did return to work, Hawkins not work in a cold

environment. During this absence from work, Hawkins received benefits from a

short-term disability insurer.

Hawkins attempted to return to work on May 8, 2008, but was not allowed to

resume her duties. The company indicated that its policies prohibited an employee

from working under restrictions that were not the result of a work-related illness.

Pilgrim’s Pride’s Human Resources Supervisor, Pearlie Hamilton, notified

Hawkins that before she could return to work, Hawkins would have to supply a

release to assume the essential duties of her job from her doctor. This notification

was sent to Hawkins on May 14, 2008, and required Hawkins to supply the requested

documentation no later than May 21, 2008. Hawkins furnished no such release.

Pilgrim’s Pride notified Hawkins of her termination by letter dated July 24, 2008.

Hawkins filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation with the Office of Workers’

Compensation on May 19, 2009, seeking supplemental earnings benefits, statutory

penalties, attorney fees, and legal interest. Pilgrim’s Pride interposed an exception

of prescription, arguing that Hawkins’ claim was untimely as it was brought more

than a year after she became disabled from work and more than three years after the

last payment of compensation to Hawkins. The hearing on this exception was held

on November 9, 2009. The WCJ ruled from the bench maintaining Pilgrim’s Pride’s

exception. Judgment was signed on November 30. Hawkins then perfected this

appeal.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Hawkins assigns as error the WCJ ruling that the date she was disabled as a

result of an occupational disease was February 11, 2008.

ANALYSIS

The compensation for disability resulting from occupational diseases is

governed by La.R.S. 23:1031.1. The statute specifies that work-related carpal tunnel

syndrome is an occupational disease. La.R.S. 23:1031.1(B).

Revised Statute 23:1031.1(E) governs prescription in occupational disease

claims and provides:

All claims for disability arising from an occupational disease are barred
unless the employee files a claim as provided in this Chapter within one
year of the date that:

(1) The disease manifested itself.

(2) The employee is disabled from working as a result of the disease.

(3) The employee knows or has reasonable grounds to believe that the
disease is occupationally related.

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Subsection (E) uses no conjunction between the three paragraphs. The courts,

however, have ruled that prescription on the claim does not begin to toll until all three

conditions have been met. Bynum v. Capital City Press, 95-1395 (La. 7/2/96), 676

So.2d 582.

The WCJ reasoned that Hawkins first manifested carpal tunnel syndrome in

2003. There was little doubt that she knew the carpal tunnel syndrome was work-

related. The issue on which the exception turned was the date Hawkins was disabled

from work as a result of the condition. For the WCJ, that date was February 11, 2008,

when Dr. Goodman excused her from work.

This represents a finding of fact on the WCJ’s part, and is thus subject to

review under the manifest error standard. Id. This standard of review requires the

appellate court review the entire record, not to determine whether the WCJ was right

or wrong, but whether his conclusion is reasonably supported by the record. See

Cosse v. Allen-Bradley Co., 601 So.2d 1349 (La.1992); Housley v. Cerise, 579 So.2d

973 (La.1991); Sistler v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106 (La.1990). We are

constrained both by the WCJ’s capacity to evaluate the witnesses and by the proper

allocation of constitutional authority between the administrative officer and the

appellate court. Where two permissible views are reflected in the record, the WCJ’s

finding of fact can never be wrong. Stobart v. State through Dept. of Transp. and

Dev., 617 So.2d 880 (La. 1993).

The February 11 letter from Dr. Goodman relates at least a degree of Hawkins’

disability to carpal tunnel syndrome. It informs its reader, however, that on May 8,

2008, Hawkins could return to work in conditions that do not expose her to cold.

This was not a new restriction on Hawkins’ employment. She had been restricted

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from a cold environment by Dr. Gordon Mead, who performed the two carpal tunnel

release procedures.

The WCJ viewed this case as one involving disability for a period of limited

duration. It is not disputed that the prescriptive period in this case commenced when

Hawkins was “disabled” from work. The dispute is as to when this date arrived.

Hawkins contends that the case of LaCour v. Hilti Corp., 98-2691 (La.

5/18/99), 733 So.2d 1193, disposes of this issue. A discussion of LaCour is

warranted. The claimant in LaCour was a jackhammer salesman engaged in outside

sales. He developed difficulties with carpal tunnel syndrome and elbow tendinitis

that was related to his sales activities. Between April 1992 and August 1995, LaCour

underwent three surgical procedures related to those conditions. After each surgery,

Mr. LaCour received short-term disability, and he was told repeatedly by his doctors

that he needed to modify his job or expect more problems.

The LaCour Court had to answer the same question that challenges this court.

Namely, on what date was the third and final Bynum condition met? Stated more

directly, on what date was Mr. LaCour “disabled”? There were three dates in

contention.

The earliest date, November 14, 1995, was the date that his employer sent him

a letter advising that if he was “physically unable to return to work” by January 11,

1996, he would no longer be an “employee.” The next date chronologically was a

non-specific date in December 1995 when, according to Mr. LaCour’s testimony, he

“finally realized that he was unable to return” to work. Obviously, the last date was

the termination date of January 11, 1996 provided by the employer in its November

14, 1995 letter.

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The WCJ ruled that the last date, January 11, 1996, was the date LaCour had

become disabled, because that was the date he was forced to terminate his

employment. The supreme court agreed and stated expressly that, “January 11, 1996

was the date when Mr. LaCour’s disability began because that was the date when he

was forced to terminate his employment and all three factors set forth in Bynum were

met.” LaCour, 733 So.2d at 1195-96.

In LaCour, the Supreme Court found that the termination date was the

disability date. Hawkins contends that LaCour stands for the proposition that, as a

matter of law, prescription on occupational disease claims does not commence until

the employee is terminated. We agree. The supreme court clearly stated that it was

not until LaCour’s condition forced his termination that his disability commenced.

The present matter is almost directly on point, and we find LaCour binding.

CONCLUSION

The workers’ compensation judge found that Hawkins was disabled as of

February 11, 2008, when she was excused from work by Dr. Goodman. We find that

the LaCour case, however, stands for the proposition that under these circumstances,

the date of termination marks the commencement of the prescriptive period under

La.R.S. 23:1031.1. Hawkins was terminated by letter dated July 24, 2008. Because

Hawkins initiated her claim for compensation within a year of her termination, it was

timely filed.

The judgment of the Workers’ Compensation Judge is reversed. Costs of this

appeal are taxed to defendant/appellee, Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation.

REVERSED.

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