Rebecca Reed v. Lcs Corrections Services, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

10-866

REBECCA REED

VERSUS

LCS CORRECTIONS
SERVICES, LLC

**********
APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 4,
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 09-01849
HONORABLE SHARON M. MORROW,
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

**********

J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Oswald A. Decuir, Marc T. Amy, and J. David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

H. Douglas Hunter, Attorney at Law
P.O. Drawer 1329
Opelousas, LA 70571
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Rebecca Reed

Jeffrey Warrens, Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 98001
Baton Rouge, LA 70898
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
LCS Corrections Services, LLC

PAINTER, Judge.

The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) found that the decedent, Solomon

Reed, did not fall within the manual labor exception to the independent contractor

rule found in La.R.S. 23:1201(7). Thus, Plaintiff, Rebecca Reed, appeals the

judgment of the WCJ granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant,

LCS Corrections Services, LLC (LCS), on this issue and denying her cross motion

on the same issue. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Solomon Reed was an airplane pilot. LCS provides consulting services to

privately run correctional facilities in Louisiana and other states. LCS leases a

corporate plane to transport its executives. Mr. Reed was often the pilot of the plane

leased by LCS. Mr. Reed billed LCS a flat hourly rate for his services as a pilot. He

was paid by LCS and issued a 1099 at the end of the year. Mr. Reed had other clients

to whom he provided his services a pilot. Mr. Reed was also employed by Our Lady

of Lourdes as a respiratory therapist.

Mr. Reed perished in a plane crash occurring on March 10, 2008, while piloting

the plane that was transporting Pat LeBlanc, then the president of LCS, and Michael

LeBlanc, the CEO and Director of Marketing of LCS, for business purposes. Michael

LeBlanc was not involved in the plane crash, as he was taken to Baton Rouge,

Louisiana, from Jackson, Mississippi, and the crash occurred on the trip from Baton

Rouge to Lafayette. The plane was owned by Mark Hampton.

Mr. Reed’s widow filed a workers’ compensation death benefit claim against

LCS. All parties agree that Mr. Reed was an independent contractor. Mrs. Reed

submitted a statement of uncontested facts wherein she stated that Mr. Reed was an

independent contractor working as a commercial pilot. Thus, LCS asserts that Mrs.

Reed is prevented from seeking benefits under the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation

Act. Mrs. Reed, on the other hand, contends that the manual labor exception to the

independent contractor rule applies. Both parties filed motions for summary

judgment on the issue of whether the manual labor exception applied. The WCJ

1

found that Mr. Reed’s work tasks did not constitute manual labor, granted LCS’

motion for summary judgment, denied Mrs. Reed’s motion for summary judgment,

and dismissed her claim with prejudice. Mrs. Reed now appeals.

DISCUSSION

We review this matter de novo. Supreme Serv. and Specialty Co., Inc. v. Sonny

Greer, Inc., 06-1827 (La.5/22/07), 958 So.2d 634.

The term “independent contractor” is defined by La.R.S. 23:1021(7) (emphasis

added) as:

[A]ny person who renders service, other than manual labor, for a
specified recompense for a specified result either as a unit or as a whole,
under the control of his principal as to results of his work only, and not
as to the means by which such result is accomplished, and are expressly
excluded from the provisions of this Chapter unless a substantial part of
the work time of an independent contractor is spent in manual labor by
him in carrying out the terms of the contract, in which case the
independent contractor is expressly covered by the provisions of this
Chapter. The operation of a truck tractor or truck tractor trailer,
including fueling, driving, connecting and disconnecting electrical
lines and air hoses, hooking and unhooking trailers, and vehicle
inspections are not manual labor within the meaning of this
Chapter.

Mrs. Reed herself presents the only issue for review as “[w]hether a substantial

part of Mr. Reed’s work time as a pilot for LCS was spent in manual labor carrying

out the terms of his contract with LCS such that he was covered by the Act.” She

would have us analogize her husband’s situation to that of the driver of a vehicle who

is “physically required to regulate the direction, speed and control of the car by

physical means.” See Timberlake v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc., 361 So.2d 934, 935

(La.App. 4 Cir. 1978). In Timberlake, the Fourth Circuit found that driving an

automobile was manual labor such that the injured party, a person who contracted

with Avis to drive a car from one location to another, was covered by the Act. Mrs.

Reed also argues that Spells v. Extreme Nissan, 03-2179 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/1/04), 884

So.2d 609, writs denied, 04-2660 and 04-2718 (La. 1/7/05), 891 So.2d 682, 683,

which deals with a person who died while driving a vehicle for an auto dealership,

stands for the proposition that driving a vehicle constitutes manual labor. Mrs. Reed

argues that all of the physically engaging aspects of driving a vehicle are present

2

when piloting a plane, that planes have many more physically engaging aspects, and

that pilots are also physically engaged before the engine is ever turned on in that they

must perform a pre-flight inspection of the plane.

LCS, on the other hand, argues that the manual labor exception does not apply

because Mr. Reed did not spend a substantial part of his work time performing

manual labor. LCS alleges that Mr. Reed had no responsibility for the unloading or

loading of any passengers or luggage and that he did not fuel or maintain the plane

in any manner. According to LCS, Mr. Reed’s only obligation was the operation of

the plane. Most importantly, LCS points out that the Timberlake and Spells decisions

have been legislatively overruled by the 2004 amendment (which became effective

June 10, 2004) to La.R.S. 12:1021(7) which added the language stating that the

operation of a truck tractor or truck tractor trailer is not manual labor.

We agree that the cases cited by Mrs. Reed have been abrogated by statute.

Furthermore, this court has not recognized that the physical act of driving in and of

itself constitutes manual labor. For example, in Whitlow v. The Shreveport Times,

02-1215, pp. 6-7 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/23/03), 843 So.2d 665, 670, writ denied, 03-1406

(La. 9/19/03), 853 So.2d 647, this court stated:

Manual labor in this context “denote[s] work in which the physical
element predominates over the mental,” a definition articulated in Welch
v. Newport Industries, 86 So.2d 704, 707 (La.App. 1 Cir.1956), and
adopted by Riles v. Truitt Jones Construction, 94-1224 (La.1/17/95),
648 So.2d 1296. As the WCJ pointed out in reasons for judgment, Ms.
Whitlow admitted that she did a significant amount of driving to deliver
the newspapers to her customers. However, we must rely on our finding
in Guillory v. Overland Express Co., 01-419, p. 6 (La.App. 3 Cir.
10/3/01); 796 So.2d 887, 891, wherein we found the following:

To fall within the manual labor exception, however, as
provided for in La.R.S. 23:1021(6), the plaintiff must show
not only that he engaged in manual labor, but that a
“substantial part” of his work time was spent in manual
labor. We do not find the physical act of actually driving
the truck in itself is “manual labor” as defined by law. We
must, therefore, look to the other tasks the plaintiff
performed in accomplishing his job.

We, like Mrs. Reed, have found no cases involving a pilot. While we might

agree with Mrs. Reed that a pilot’s services are analogous to that of a truck driver or

3

the driver of a motor vehicle, we are statutorily precluded from reaching the

conclusion that driving a vehicle constitutes manual labor as asserted by Mrs. Reed.

As the WCJ noted, “under the facts as presented by the exhibits, there was a very

minimal physical component to the job.” There is no evidence that other than

conducting a pre-flight inspection, which by analogy to the truck driving situation,

is statutorily excluded from the manual labor exception, Mr. Reed was required to do

any manual labor in the provision of his services as a pilot. Therefore, we find that

the WCJ’s grant of LCS’ motion for summary judgment and denial of Mrs. Reed’s

cross motion for summary judgment were well founded. Based on the undisputed

evidence and our interpretation of the statute, we find that the trial court did not err

in granting the motion for summary judgment and in dismissing Mrs. Reed’s disputed

claim for benefits. Accordingly, Mrs. Reed is not entitled to collect worker’s

compensation benefits from LCS.

DECREE

For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm both the grant of summary judgment

in favor of LCS and the denial of Mrs. Reed’s motion for summary judgment. Costs

of this appeal are assessed to Plaintiff/Appellant, Rebecca Reed.

AFFIRMED.

4