David Harrell v. Brookshire Grocery Company

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-108

DAVID HARRELL

VERSUS

BROOKSHIRE GROCERY COMPANY

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 2
PARISH OF RAPIDES, NO. 08-20268
JAMES L. BRADDOCK, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, Billy Howard Ezell, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Keaty, J., dissents in part and assigns written reasons.

Dale G. Cox, Jr.
Attorney at Law
501 Caddo Courthouse, 5th Floor
Shreveport, Louisiana 71101-5400
(318) 226-6832
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant:
Brookshire Grocery Company

Dorwan G. Vizzier
Broussard, Halcomb & Vizzier
Post Office Box 1311
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309-1311
(318) 487-4589
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee:
David Harrell

PICKETT, Judge.

The defendant, Brookshire Grocery Company (Brookshire), appeals a judgment

rendered by the workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) in favor of the claimant, David

Harrell, finding that he was injured in a work-related accident and awarding him

workers’ compensation benefits, medical expenses, and a power wheelchair.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Harrell, an overnight stocker at a Brookshire-owned Super 1 grocery store in

Alexandria, Louisiana, testified that on the evening of April 23, 2005, he was

stocking groceries in the glass aisle of the store when his supervisor, James Newman,

called out for help. Harrell ran to the end of the aisle and saw Newman backing a

forklift off the foot of Jonathan Ridder, another Brookshire employee. Harrell put

Ridder into a wheelchair and rolled him to the front of the store where another stocker

was waiting with a car to take Ridder to the hospital. Harrell lifted Ridder to put him

into the back of the car, but because Ridder did not put a foot down, he was “dead

weight,” and Harrell almost dropped him. Harrell stated that he asked Newman for

help, explaining that he had a “catch” in his back, and together they got Ridder into

the car.

According to Harrell, something popped in his back when he was picking

Ridder up, and then his back began burning and tingling. He testified that as they

were walking back into the store, he told Newman that he thought he had hurt his

back because it felt funny and was burning. Harrell then resumed his stocking duties,

working an additional four hours or so before leaving his shift. He did not seek

medical attention at the time, thinking that his back was just tired and that the pain

would go away.

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Harrell testified that, during the next shift that he worked, he told his head

supervisor, Alphonsa Lenyard, that he had been injured during his previous shift.

When Newman asked Lenyard for an accident report form for Harrell, Lenyard

replied that they had used the last form for Ridder’s accident. A day or two later,

Harrell reported his injury to Scott Lachney, the assistant store director, who gave

him a form to fill out regarding the accident. He completed the form in front of

Lachney, returned it to him, and never saw it again. Harrell reported his injury to the

store director, Randy Randall, around the same time, and Randall filled out a

Partner’s First Report of Injury form.

Harrell continued working for several days after the accident, but one evening

he was not able to unload a truck because of his back pain. Either Lachney or

Randall told him to go home and not come back until he had seen a doctor. He

sought treatment at the St. Frances Cabrini Hospital Emergency Room (ER) on

April 29, 2005. The initial triage information noted that Harrell’s complaints were

of back, right groin, and right neck pain since helping an injured co-worker six days

prior. Harrell was discharged that same date with diagnoses of sprain/strain of the

lumbar and cervical regions. He was given a note to return to work on May 2, 2005,

and was told to follow up with his physician. Harrell returned to Brookshire after his

ER visit, and Randall referred him to Dr. Gregory Bevels, a family practitioner.

Harrell has not worked since that time.

Dr. Bevels referred Harrell to Dr. Rayland Beurlot, a physical medicine and

rehabilitation specialist, in August of 2005. Harrell then began treatment with

Dr. Gerald Leglue, another physical medicine and rehabilitation specialist, in

September of 2005. In May of 2006, Dr. Leglue referred Harrell to Dr. Michael Dole,

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a pain management physician. Dr. Dole sent Harrell to Dr. James Quillin, a

psychologist, for treatment for depression. Around that time, Harrell was also seen

by Dr. Anil Nanda, a neurosurgeon. At the time of trial in May and June of 2010,

Harrell was treating regularly with Drs. Dole and Quillin.

Brookshire instituted indemnity benefits and began paying Harrell’s medical

expenses shortly after his injury. Brookshire began surveillance of Harrell in April

2006, which continued until September 2010. Brookshire sent Harrell to Dr. Rennie

Culver, a psychiatrist, on March 20, 2007, and to Dr. Karl Bilderback, an orthopedic

surgeon, on July 9, 2008, to have them render second medical opinions regarding

Harrell’s mental and physical condition. Shortly after receiving Dr. Bilderback’s

report in late July of 2008, Brookshire terminated Harrell’s indemnity benefits and

restricted payment of his medical benefits to treatment with Dr. Dole to wean him off

of narcotics.

Harrell filed a 1008 Disputed Claim for Compensation (1008) against

Brookshire on August 7, 2008, seeking reinstatement of indemnity benefits, payment

for a power wheelchair, payment of behavioral pain management expenses, and

penalties and attorney fees pursuant to the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act,

La.R.S. 23:1021-1415. According to the 1008, Harrell claimed to be totally, or

temporarily totally, disabled, “or alternatively disabled to return to his former

employment under supplemental earnings benefits.”

Brookshire answered Harrell’s claim, denying that he suffered any injury or

disability, and asserting that because Harrell had made willful misrepresentations and

engaged in fraudulent conduct in order to obtain compensation benefits, he forfeited

his right to continue receiving workers’ compensation benefits.

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Thereafter, Harrell filed a supplemental 1008 to allege that Brookshire had

failed to authorize prescribed medication and that Brookshire had willfully made false

statements and representations for the purpose of defeating his workers’

compensation claim.

The matter was tried over the course of three days in May and June of 2010.

Oral reasons for judgment were read into the record on September 29, 2010. A

written judgment was signed on October 27, 2010, decreeing the following:

1. Ordering Brookshire to pay Harrell temporary total disability
(TTD) benefits at the rate of $273.33 per week for each weekly
period from July 28, 2008, together with legal interest on each
payment from its due date until paid;

2. Ordering that Harrell was and is entitled to continued medical
care through Michael Dole, M.D. and continued care with the
psychologist, James W. Quillin, Ph.D., including behavioral pain
management prescribed by Dr. Quillin;

3. Ordering Brookshire to pay for Harrell’s past medical expenses
incurred in connection with the diagnosis and treatment of the on-
the-job injuries in the amount of $12,295.68, together with legal
interest from the date of judicial demand until paid in full;

4. Denying Harrell’s claims that Brookshire committed fraud under
La.R.S. 23:1208;

5. Denying Brookshire’s claims that Harrell committed fraud under
La.R.S. 23:1208;

6. Denying Harrell’s claims against Brookshire for statutory
penalties and attorney fees for the termination of weekly benefits,
for failure to pay medical expenses, and for failure or refusal to
authorize medical treatment;

7. Setting the amounts due for the bills for certified medical records
and the fees of experts testifying on Harrell’s behalf, and the costs
of court reporters for trial deposition, and taxing those amounts
as costs, which Brookshire was ordered to pay.

Brookshire now appeals.

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ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Brookshire asserts four assignments of error:

1. The trial court erred in finding that claimant sustained an accident that
produced a disability in the course and scope of his employment.

2. The trial court erred in finding that claimant had proved by clear and
convincing evidence his entitlement to temporary, total disability
benefits.

3. The trial court erred in finding that defendant had failed to prove its
defense of intentional misrepresentation.

4. The trial court erred in finding that claimant was entitled to medical
treatment with Dr. Michael Dole and Dr. James Quillin and payments
for the motorized wheelchair.

DISCUSSION

Workplace Accident

A worker bringing a compensation action against his employer bears the

burden of proving, as a threshold requirement, that he suffered “personal injury by

accident arising out of and in the course of his employment.” La.R.S. 23:1031(A);

Bruno v. Harbert Int’l Inc., 593 So.2d 357 (La.1992). The word “accident” as used

in La.R.S. 23:1031 is defined as “an unexpected or unforeseen actual, identifiable,

precipitous event happening suddenly or violently, with or without human fault, and

directly producing at the time objective findings of an injury which is more than

simply a gradual deterioration or progressive degeneration.” La.R.S. 23:1021(1).

We recently discussed the standard of review to be employed in workers’

compensation cases, noting:

Factual findings in workers’ compensation cases are
subject to the manifest error or clearly wrong standard of
appellate review. Smith v. Louisiana Dep’t of Corrections,
93-1305 (La. 2/28/94); 633 So.2d 129. In applying the
manifest error standard, the appellate court must determine
not whether the trier of fact was right or wrong, but

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whether the factfinder’s conclusion was a reasonable one.
Stobart v. State, 617 So.2d 880 (La.1993). Where there are
two permissible views of the evidence, a factfinder’s
choice between them can never be manifestly erroneous or
clearly wrong. Id. Thus, “if the [factfinder’s] findings are
reasonable in light of the record reviewed in its entirety,
the court of appeal may not reverse, even though convinced
that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have
weighed the evidence differently.” Sistler v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 558 So.2d 1106, 1112 (La.1990).

“The determination of coverage is a subjective one in that each
case must be decided from all of its particular facts.” Jackson v. Am.
Ins. Co., 404 So.2d 218, 220 (La.1981). This court has held that, in light
of that standard of review, “great deference is accorded to the [workers’
compensation judge’s] factual findings and reasonable evaluations of
credibility.” Cent. Lumber Co. v. Duhon, 03-620, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir.
11/12/03), 860 So.2d 591, 593, writ denied, 04-315 (La. 4/2/04), 869
So.2d 880 (quoting Garner v. Sheats & Frazier, 95-39, p. 7 (La.App. 3
Cir. 7/5/95), 663 So.2d 57, 61).

Green v. Nat’l Oilwell Varco, 10-1041, p. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/27/11),63 So.3d 354,

357-58 (quoting Foster v. Rabalais Masonry, Inc., 01-1394, pp. 2-3 (La.App. 3 Cir.

3/6/02), 811 So.2d 1160, 1162, writ denied, 02-1164 (La. 6/14/02), 818 So.2d 784)

(alterations in original).

Harrell suspected that something was wrong with his back immediately after

he lifted Ridder into the car on April 23, 2005, and he informed his various

supervisors of his back pain either during that shift or within a few days of the

accident. He also sought medical treatment once he realized that the pain was not just

routine soreness that would resolve on its own. Although Harrell’s supervisors were

unsure about the exact date of when they learned of his accident, none disputed

having learned of it before the accident report was filled out on May 2, 2005.

The WCJ’s factual finding that Harrell suffered injuries as a result of a

workplace accident is reasonable in light of the record evidence. Brookshire’s first

assignment of error is without merit.

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Entitlement to Temporary Total Disability Benefits

Brookshire argues that surveillance videos and the reports of Dr. Bilderback

show that Harrell is lying about the extent of his injury and that he is capable of

returning to work. It also alleges that there are no objective findings of injury to

support a claim of (TTD) benefits.

A workers’ compensation claimant seeking temporary or permanent total

disability benefits bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, his

inability to engage in any type of employment because of his physical condition.

Greis v. Lake Charles Mem’l Hosp., 97-1258 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/98), 709 So.2d 986,

writs denied, 98-937, 98-939 (La. 5/15/98), 719 So.2d 467.

In this case, the WCJ weighed testimony from Dr. Leglue and Dr. Dole,

Harrell’s treating physicians, who discussed the injuries, symptoms, and results of

diagnostic tests they performed on Harrell over several years. The WCJ chose to

accept that evidence as credible. In doing so, the WCJ discounted the surveillance

video of Harrell engaged in different activities and the opinion of Dr. Bilderback,

who saw Harrell only once for an evaluation. Our supreme court has made clear that

an appellate court should not substitute its opinion for the credibility determinations

made by the finder of fact. Leal v. Dubois, 00-1285 (La. 10/13/00), 769 So.2d 1182.

We find that the record before us supports the finding made by the WCJ that

Harrell is entitled to TTD benefits, and to have his medical treatment with Dr. Dole

and Dr. Quillin paid for by Brookshire. We find no merit in the second and fourth

assignments of error.

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Intentional Misrepresentation

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1208(A) provides that it shall be unlawful for

any claimant or employer “to willfully make a false statement or representation” “for

the purpose of obtaining or defeating” any workers’ compensation benefit or

payment. The statute further provides that if the WCJ determines that a claimant has

violated the statute, he or she will forfeit their right to workers’ compensation

benefits.

“The requirements for forfeiture of benefits under Section 1208 governing

misrepresentations concerning workers’ compensation benefits are that: (1) there is

a false statement or representation; (2) it is willfully made; and (3) it is made for the

purpose of obtaining or defeating any benefit or payment.” R & R Steel Erectors v.

Watson, 01-1322, pp. 3-4 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/6/02), 809 So.2d 1228, 1231. An

appellate court reviews a WCJ’s factual findings with regard to a claim of forfeiture

of benefits under the manifest error/clearly wrong standard. Doyal v. Vernon Parish

Sch. Bd., 06-1088 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 950 So.2d 902, writ denied, 07-832 (La.

6/15/07), 958 So.2d 1190.

Brookshire contends that Harrell intentionally misrepresented the extent of his

injuries in order to receive benefits. To support its claim, Brookshire introduced

video surveillance to show that Harrell was able to perform more strenuous activities

than he claimed to his doctors. In rejecting Brookshire’s defense of intentional

misrepresentation, the WCJ determined that although Harrell had exaggerated his

symptoms and his abilities, and although the video surveillance showed him doing

activities that he claimed to be unable to do, “the evidence did not present significant

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credibility issues” and Harrell’s actions did not amount to a sufficient showing of

fraud so as to trigger forfeiture of benefits under La.R.S. 23:1208.

The WCJ’s finding is supported by the deposition testimony of Dr. Dole, who

stated:

Q. Okay. Doctor, if in fact over the course here, let’s say from
2006, 2007, 2008, 9 or even 10, that on occasions David
Harrell had, let’s say he’d used a push mower in his front
yard for ten or fifteen minutes or twenty minutes to mow
part of his yard, that he’d used a riding mower, whether he
had ridden on a motorcycle or a dune buggy or that he
lifted a piece of veneer plywood or that he went fishing on
occasions or that he’d lifted a tire, an aluminum wheel into
his van or that he picked up paper or cleaned up his place,
his yard kind of policing action or that kind of stuff, would
any of those individually change any opinions that you’ve
issued here today?

A. I don’t think so. Mr. Harrell has told me he has done those
things. I think he has a horse he rides on occasion that he
really – you know, that’s the most enjoyment he gets out of
life is getting on his horse. When he does that, he states
that it really flares up his back pain, but he really enjoys
doing it but it generally kind of lays him out for a day or
two after that, and he takes care of his yard and, you know,
there’s things that he has to do around the house, but he’s
able to do those at his own pace, you know, when he’s
feeling better and then, you know, if he needs to take a
break or if he needs to lay down for a day or two after that,
then he can do that.

Q. That would be expected given his circumstances?

A. That’s very typical of patients that I treat.

We find that the WCJ weighed the medical evidence and the surveillance

videos, and its finding that Harrell did not intentionally misrepresent his condition in

order to receive benefits is not manifestly erroneous. Brookshire’s third assignment

of error lacks merit.

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CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed in all respects. Costs of this appeal

are assessed to the employer, Brookshire Grocery Company.

AFFIRMED.

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STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-108

DAVID HARRELL

VERSUS

BROOKSHIRE GROCERY COMPANY

KEATY, J., dissenting in part.

Although I agree that Harrell was injured as a result of the April 23, 2005

workplace accident, I respectfully dissent from the remainder of the majority opinion.

In Magee v. Abek, Inc., 04-2554, p. 5 (La.App. 1 Cir. 4/28/06), 934 So.2d 800,

807, writ denied, 06-1876 (La. 10/27/06), 939 So.2d 1287, the first circuit noted that

“[a] claimant’s lack of credibility on factual issues can serve to diminish the veracity

of his complaints to a physician,” and that “in many cases, the credibility of the

history given by the claimant to his physicians becomes as important as the medical

opinions based in part on that history.”

In support of its claim that Harrell forfeited his right to continue receiving

workers’ compensation benefits, Brookshire offered video surveillance showing

Harrell participating in a multitude of strenuous activities with apparent ease. The

surveillance also showed that while Harrell routinely used a cane at his doctor

appointments and therapy visits, he quickly discarded his cane after those visits, and

he did not use a cane around his yard.

The surveillance taken before and after Harrell’s July 9, 2008 IME visit with

Dr. Karl Bilderback shows him ambling about his yard without using a cane,

squatting down while washing his truck tires, and lifting a tire into the back of his

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truck with no apparent difficulty. In contrast, Harrell reported to Dr. Bilderback that

his pain was eight out of ten, that he had difficulty in forward bending, and that he

needed to use his cane during the examination because he “was about to fall.” During

testing and despite his statements to the contrary, Harrell’s reflexes and motor

strength were normal and he reported more back pain than leg pain. Before Harrell’s

scheduled appointment, Dr. Bilderback read Harrell’s records from Drs. Michael

Dole, Gerald Leglue, Rayland Beurlot, Anil Nanda, and James Quillin, along with

some of Harrell’s physical therapy notes, Harrell’s two EMG/nerve conduction

studies, and the films from his October 18, 2005 and September 5, 2006 lumbar

MRIs. Based on his physical examination of Harrell, together with the information

gleaned from Harrell’s medical records, Dr. Bilderback found no evidence to show

that Harrell suffered from lumbar radiculopathy or that he was a surgical candidate.

Given the fact that the records indicated that Harrell had tried various forms of

conservative treatment such as physical therapy and epidural injections, none of

which had provided him with lasting relief, Dr. Bilderback opined that Harrell had

reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) with regard to his back. He also

believed that Harrell could return to work in at least a medium capacity.

After Dr. LeGlue released Harrell to return to work, Brookshire offered Harrell

a position as an attendant at the fuel center of its Pineville store, a job which met the

light/sedentary duty restriction set by Dr. LeGlue. Harrell rejected the job.

Our supreme court noted, in regard to La.R.S. 23:1208, the workers’

compensation anti-fraud statute:

The legislature has determined workers’ compensation fraud is a severe
and growing problem and has continually amended Section 1208 to
make it easier to enforce and to make the penalties stiffer. It is clear
from the history of the statute that the legislature intended that any false

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statements or representations willfully made for the purpose of obtaining
benefits would result in forfeiture of those benefits, and this legislative
intent cannot be ignored.

Resweber v. Haroil Constr. Co., 94-2708, p. 8 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 7, 12-13.

A workers’ compensation judge’s factual findings with regard to a claim of

forfeiture of benefits are reviewed under the manifest error/clearly wrong standard.

Doyal v. Vernon Parish Sch. Bd., 06-1088 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/7/07), 950 So.2d 902,

writ denied, 07-832 (La. 6/15/07), 958 So.2d 1190. After carefully reviewing the

record, exhibits, and surveillance, the only conclusion that I can reach is that the

information Harrell gave to his doctors regarding his pain and his abilities amounted

to far more than mere exaggerations; it was gross misrepresentations of the truth

made with the intent of obtaining and/or prolonging his entitlement to workers’

compensation benefits. Thus, I am convinced that the workers’ compensation judge

committed manifest error in concluding that Harrell’s misrepresentations did not

amount to fraud sufficient to forfeit his right to continue receiving workers’

compensation benefits.

Finally, I find it especially troubling that Harrell often included one or more

members of his family, including his children, in his perpetration of fraud, vacillating

between ambulating with great ease one moment and pretending to struggle with

significant and debilitating pain the next.

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