WCA-0011-1131 Nonprecedential Affirmed Processed

Stacey Schoeffler v. Ecolab, Inc.

Louisiana Court of Appeal, Third Circuit · Filed February 1, 2012

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Opinion text

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

11-1131

STACEY SCHOEFFLER

VERSUS

ECOLAB, INC.

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 3
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 09-07043
HONORABLE SAM LOWERY,
WORKERS’ COMPENSTATION JUDGE

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J. DAVID PAINTER
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, John D.
Saunders, and J. David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Kevin L. Camel
Jason R. Bell
723 Broad Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Stacey Schoeffler

Elizabeth Heinen
700 St. John Street, Suite 401
Lafayette, LA 70501
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Ecolab, Inc.

PAINTER, Judge

Claimant, Stacey Schoeffler, appeals the judgment of the Workers’

Compensation judge (WCJ) that he is not entitled to benefits arising out of

an alleged accident or accidents which occurred while he was employed by

Ecolab, Inc.

FACTS

Claimant was employed by Ecolab. from February 1990 through May

2009. He worked first as a service technician doing pest control for

commercial establishments. After a time, he was promoted to service

supervisor and later to district manager. As such, he supervised about ten

technicians and filled vacant routes himself. He alleges that in March 2008,

while filling a vacant route, he injured his lower back while doing a pest

control treatment at Delta Downs Casino in Vinton, Louisiana. He reported

the accident to the human resources office at Ecolab and continued to work

both as district manager and as a fill-in technician. In November 2008, again

at Delta Downs Casino, Claimant again injured his back and again reported

the incident to human resources. He never missed any work as a result of

either accident but continued to work until he was terminated in May 2009.

At the hearing, Claimant testified that his supervisor told him he was

being terminated due to failure to timely file his monthly reports. However,

he felt that he was terminated due to his health problems and his refusal to

accept a demotion to service technician. After being terminated, he began his

own pest control business. He worked many fewer accounts, due, at least

partially, to his physical limitations.

In August 2009, Claimant filed a disputed claim for compensation

seeking supplemental earnings benefits and medical benefits. A hearing was
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held on February 14, 2011. The WCJ, in oral reasons for judgment, found

that Claimant had not proven that either the March or the November 2008

accident caused his current condition, either by medical evidence or by his

own uncontradicted testimony. Claimant appeals.

DISCUSSION

The WCJ, in his oral reasons for judgment explained his decision as

follows:

Both of these alleged accidents were unwitnessed. And,
of course, in such cases, the Court can accept as true the
testimony of the claimant, absent any circumstances casting
suspicion on the reliability of that testimony.

The scenario Mr. Schoeffler presents to the court does, in
and of itself, evoke, if not suspicion, then at least enough
skepticism to warrant careful examination of the facts here. To
readily accept that one person might have two disabling
accidents, both of which were private affairs, requires a
challenge to belief, but the situation is not so far-fetched to be
dismissed out of hand. But Mr. Schoeffler does seem to add a
new depth and dimension to the term “coincidence”.

He asks the Court to believe that an employee working in
dozens and dozens of buildings in a territory stretching from
New Orleans to the Texas border had two separate accidents
affecting the same part of his body and both occurring in the
same city and in the same casino just months apart.

Now, it’s fair to say that this sequence of events lies a
good ways outside of the accepted boundaries of what is
generally considered to be a conventional workers’
compensation scenario. That’s not to say it’s untrue; however,
Mr. Schoeffler’s rather unique story, in order to be accepted as
either viable or accurate, needs to be accompanied by some
substantial proof, buttressed by compelling medical evidence
and discernibly credible testimony.

Now, while the perceived credibility of a claimant at trial
is no doubt one of the least reliable evaluators in determining
the validity of a workers’ compensation claim, in situations
involving unwitnessed accidents, credibility is simply essential.
Now, it’s not at all uncommon for an injured worker to have
less than perfect recall as to the exact circumstances
surrounding or following an accident. And the jurisprudence
makes allowances for that particular human failing. And it’s not
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unheard of for a claimant, under intense, pointed questioning by
an experienced defense attorney to give answers that are at
some variance with the testimony given later on the stand at
trial.

But that having been said, a claimant still must establish
more than the mere possibility that a work event produced
disability.

The primary question here is, “did either or both of these
incidents result from Mr. Schoeffler’s being disabled to the
point where he was unable to engage in any employment or
self-employment?” The answer, both the live testimony and
otherwise, indicates that he never missed work or a paycheck
for that matter after either accident. Rather, he was fired, not for
flagging physical prowess, but for what he called code of
conduct issues.

I gather from his testimony that he did not provide the
company’s headquarters with standard reports that were an
essential part of his managerial duties. There was no evidence
at all to suggest that his employer fired him in order to dodge a
workers’ compensation claim. It appears to be a straight out
termination for cause.

After he was fired, he started his own company, doing
precisely the same type of work that he did for Ecolab. The
term “temporary total disability” does not seem to be a
particularly apt descriptor for this particular scenario.

I suppose, in an expansive moment, one could consider
that his November 17 incident was an exacerbation of his
earlier March 10th injury, redefining his cause as a “developing
injury”. But that’s a leap even Mr. Schoeffler cannot make. He
referred to the November injury as a quote, “one day flare-up”
of the earlier accident. The term “flare-up” is not a technical
medical term; but if it were, I’m pretty sure it would not be
used interchangeably with the term “subsequent accident” or
even “exacerbation”.

And even if it were, the fact remains he just didn’t miss
work.

I listened carefully at length to his testimony and reread
the transcript. Try as I might, I cannot meaningfully juxtapose
his live testimony with the deposition he gave earlier, even
allowing for memory lapses. And the medical records don’t
seem to mesh either with the testimony or the transcript.

I just do not see how he could have possibly not
remembered, when asked directly, that he had been regularly,
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faithfully taking painkillers, Hydrocodone to be exact, for many
years before the accident.

And, looking at the medical records, it occurs to me that
Mr. Schoeffler probably was not at all times stringently
accurate with the information he gave his treating and
examining physicians. At one time or the other, he gave more
than one version of practically everything he said happened to
him.

But on a more fundamental basis, I am hard-pressed to
understand his rationale for asking for indemnity payments
when he himself testified he didn’t miss any work. And even
after he was fired, he kept on working doing the same job that
he says he was disabled from.

Putting all this data and documents into some coherent
package, it seems that Mr. Schoeffler was injured to some
degree or another in March of 2008 and more than likely had a
flare-up in November. And if that’s the case, and it certainly
looks to be, the petition for medical benefits have simply
prescribed.

I am not without sympathy for this man. I do not think he
is overtly dishonest. He is not engaged in some nefarious
attempt to illegally obtain workers’ compensation benefits.

He sounds more confused than conniving. He has
obviously many serious physical problems. But he has not
proven that either the March 10, 2008, or the November 17,
2008 incident caused his current condition, either by medical
evidence or by his own uncontradicted testimony.

The statutory admonition to liberally construe workers’
compensation law in favor of an injured worker simply cannot
be stretched wide enough for the most sympathetic, fair-minded
person to find merit in his claim.

Accordingly, the claim is dismissed in its entirety.

As this court stated in Russell v. H & H Metal Contractors, Inc., 11-

27, p. 9 (La.App. 3 Cir. 6/1/11) 65 So.3d 806, 814:

[A] workers’ compensation judge’s factual findings, including
the credibility of the employee’s testimony and whether the
employee met his burden of proof, are not to be disturbed on
appeal absent manifest error. Rivers v. Bo Ezernack Hauling
Contractor, Inc., 09-991 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/10/10), 32 So.3d
1091
, writ denied, 10-807 (La.6/4/10), 38 So.3d 309.
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The WCJ’s decision herein is based primarily on a credibility

evaluation. After reviewing the record herein, we find that it supports his

evaluation of Claimant’s credibility. Claimant gave different answers in the

deposition, at the hearing, and even within the space of the hearing. Based

on the records of the treating physicians, he apparently gave different

information to each of his doctors. Further, while Claimant asserts that he is

entitled to medical benefits, including payment for an MRI ordered by Dr.

Randy Miller, we cannot find sufficient support in the medical records to

establish a link between the services and the injuries sustained. As a result,

we cannot say that the WCJ erred manifestly in finding that Claimant did not

carry his burden of proof herein. Accordingly, the judgment of the WCJ is

affirmed.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the judgment of the WCJ dismissing Claimant’s

action is affirmed. Costs of this appeal are assessed to Claimant, Stacey

Schoeffler.

AFFIRMED.

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