Phillip Sensat v. Washington Group International, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

12-654

PHILLIP SENSAT

VERSUS

WASHINGTON GROUP INTERNATIONAL, INC.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - DISTRICT 03
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 10-08402
SAM L. LOWERY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

**********

SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Oswald A. Decuir, and Shannon J. Gremillion,
Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

Marcus Miller Zimmerman
Attorney at Law
4216 Lake Street
Lake Charles, LA 70605
(337) 474-1644
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLEE:
Phillip Sensat

Charles W. Farr
Lawrence & Associates
225 St. Ann Drive
Mandeville, LA 70471
(985) 674-4446
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLANT:
Washington Group International, Inc.

GREMILLION, Judge.

This case answers the question of whether the office of Workers’

Compensation properly exercised jurisdiction over the plaintiff/appellee’s claim

for benefits. Washington Group International, Inc. (WGI), appeals the judgment in

favor of Phillip Sensat that awarded Sensat “disability indemnity payments under

the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act for any period of time after termination

of Florida workers’ compensation benefits on August 24, 2010 when Phillip Sensat

was unemployed and not receiving unemployment compensation benefits,”

medical benefits in the form of knee replacement surgery, $2,000.00 in penalties,

and attorney fees of $12,300.00. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and

reverse in part.

FACTS

Sensat was an ironworker rigger employed by WGI at a nuclear power plant

in Crystal River, Florida, on February 7, 2010, when he injured his right knee. The

parties stipulated that the injury occurred in an accident that arose from and was in

the course and scope of Sensat’s employment with WGI.1 Despite his knee injury,

Sensat continued to work until June 18, 2010.

Sensat’s knee had been operated on in 1986. After the accident, Sensat was

treated by Dr. Lynn Foret, a Lake Charles orthopedic surgeon, who recommended

that his right knee be replaced.

Before the February 2010 accident, Sensat worked on twelve to fifteen

projects for WGI. These jobs spanned the United States. In his fourteen years in

the nuclear industry, Sensat qualified for a “red badge,” which he explained one

1
There is some question about precisely by what entity some of the players in this drama
were employed. It appears that WGI and a French company, AREVA, each owned a half
interest in “Steam Generator Team,” for which the gentlemen actually worked, but there is no
indication that Steam Generator Team was separately incorporated. The distinction appears to
make no difference, because there appears to be no controversy that Sensat was employed by
WGI.

earns through extensive radiation training. The “red badge” allows a worker entry

into the most sensitive areas of a nuclear power plant, the reactor building and

spent fuel pool. A “red badge” employee, then, is a valuable asset because from

day one on the job he can begin working in sensitive areas without having to be

trained.

Sensat first heard of the Crystal River job while working for WGI at the

Three Mile Island nuclear plant in Middletown, Pennsylvania. His supervisor at

Three Mile Island, Ed Phelps, informed Sensat of the Crystal River project during

the waning days of the Three Mile Island project. Sensat returned home to Lake

Charles and contacted the ironworkers’ union local2 in Tampa, Florida, to have his

name placed on its rolls.

On January 28, 2010, Sensat received a call from Jack Jarrell, the business

manager of the Tampa local, who advised Sensat to be at the Crystal River plant on

February 1. Sensat testified that he thought at that point that he had the job;

otherwise, he would not have driven to Tampa. However, Sensat confirmed that

Jarrell did not hire him for the Crystal River job

When he arrived at the plant, Sensat completed a job application with WGI.

He then completed a federal W-4 withholdings form. Sensat completed the two-

day training to familiarize himself with the layout of the plant and started work.

Had he not completed this training, Sensat would not have been allowed to enter

the plant.

While at Three Mile Island, Phelps was informed of a problem at Crystal

River that WGI wanted him to oversee. Phelps’s recollection of the conversation

he had with Sensat at Three Mile Island was clear:

2
Local 397 of the International Association of Bridge, Structural, Ornamental and
Reinforcing Iron Workers, AFL/CIO.
2

As soon as they [WGI] called me and told me they had a problem here,
I talked to him [Sensat] about his availability to come down here. It’s
something that we do fairly regular [sic]; folks that have worked with
us before will come to another job with us. As soon as I found out
that I was probably going to go down here, I started to talk to Phil to
see if he was interested in coming with me.

....

I asked him if he was interested in coming down here, and he said yes.
I told him that I’d like to get him on here as soon as I could. From
what he said, he had some stuff that he had to take care of at home,
that he wouldn’t be available for a couple of weeks. I said, well, I’ll
get you on there as soon as you’re ready to go.

Phelps contacted Sensat at his home not only because he knew Sensat was dealing

with a personal tragedy, the death of his mother, but also to determine whether he

was still interested in working at Crystal River.

Phelps was asked whether he had authority to hire. He testified that Allen

Anderson, the project director, was responsible for contacting the union local about

hiring. However, Phelps also testified that Anderson “gets me the people that have

worked with us before, you know what I mean. The kind of common practice is to

drag around some of the boomers that you’ve worked with before.”

Anderson explained that at the present time, WGI no longer exists as a legal

entity, its interests having been acquired by URS and AREVA, two separate

companies. Anderson is a project director for URS. He also explained that URS

acquired the WGI interests at about the time of the subject accident involving

Sensat.

The Crystal River plant had experienced cracking in its containment room.

URS was hired to manage the repair work. It assigned Anderson to direct the

project. URS is signatory to a national labor agreement, the General Presidents’

Project Maintenance Agreement, which it entered into with several unions. URS

prioritizes its hires: highest preference is for workers who are “badged;” next

3

come workers with previous experience in the nuclear power industry; and third

would be those with no previous nuclear industry experience. Those workers have

to be requested at least three days in advance so that FBI background checks can

be run. Anderson was also required to factor the amount of time needed for on-site,

site-specific training, in addition to a full FBI background check dating back at

least five years or to the past year if the worker has been employed by URS within

that year.

Anderson does not request workers by name, and more specifically he did

not request Sensat by name. Indeed, the letter sent by Anderson to the union local

simply requested ten journeymen for one date and twenty for another, with current

or previous qualifications and badging. The union only has responsibility to refer

workers to URS; URS does the hiring. Under the terms of the labor agreement, all

workers are on probationary status until they satisfy the nuclear facility’s

requirements in terms of drug and alcohol screening, background checks, plant

access training, and other basic training courses.

Jarrell testified that he was a business agent for the union local in 2010. He

was responsible for the manpower call-outs for the Crystal River project. He

would receive a manpower request from Anderson. Jarrell would first vet local

ironworkers for qualified individuals. If there were too few qualified local workers,

Jarrell would reach out to other qualified workers. He contacted Sensat about a

referral to the Crystal River project. Jarrell would have been contacted first by

Sensat, who would have asked that his name be placed on the local’s list. Jarrell

testified, “When people hear that there’s a project in that circuit, that particular

circuit, [the local’s phone] rings off the hook.” However, Jarrell did not have

authority to hire workers for the Crystal River project.

4

WGI did not request any particular worker on that project. He had no

recollection of either Phelps or Anderson specifically requesting that Sensat be

referred to the Crystal River project. Jarrell had to be satisfied himself that the

workers he referred to the job were qualified, so he had all “travelers” complete a

personal history questionnaire, or PHQ. He would have contacted Sensat about

completing a PHQ and faxing it back to the local before Sensat would be referred

to the job.

The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) also heard from Richard Flodman,

who at the time was Steam Generator Team and WGI’s Labor Relations and

Human Performance Manager. Flodman testified that the ironworkers’ local does

not have authority to hire. All “referrals” from the local have to meet WGI’s

qualifications. An employee’s records do not follow him from one nuclear plant

job to the next. An experienced worker has to go through much the same

application process and training as would an inexperienced worker. Only the site

manager and the project manager have the authority to hire an employee; Phelps

was neither and had no authority to hire. Flodman was somewhat familiar with

Sensat and knew that he had worked for WGI in South Carolina, Three Mile Island,

and another job in Florida before Crystal River. However, he has no control over

whom the ironworkers’ local refers to the site. Local members who meet the labor

requisition qualifications are given preference over those from outside the area.

All employees must pass background checks performed by the plant

operator. The operator of the Crystal River plant was Progress Energy. The

operator conducts the site-specific training; however, according to Flodman, a

prospective referral from the local is hired before he receives the training, but if he

fails to pass he is terminated.

5

After his accident, Sensat was placed on light duty, but felt obligated to

defer to an able-bodied iron worker. He told Phelps that the next time there was a

lay-off, he wanted his name placed on the lay-off list so that an able-bodied worker

could keep his job. Sensat’s last day on the Crystal River job was June 18, 2010.

He was paid workers’ compensation benefits under the auspices of Florida law

until August 24, 2010.

Sensat continued to work, though. His next job was at the Waterford plant

near New Orleans from November 20, 2010 through mid-February 2011, when he

left for higher wages at the S.T.P. plant in Bay City, Texas. That job was

completed in May 2011. Between jobs, Sensat has drawn unemployment benefits.

He has also worked at jobs outside iron working. Sensat has turned down no work

whatsoever since he left Crystal River, in fact. He testified, though, that his knee

inhibits his ability to climb and perform other activities required of an iron worker.

Sensat labored under the impression that WGI would request that certain

individuals be referred by the union. According to Sensat’s reading of the labor

agreement, the contractor, such as WGI, could name fifty percent of the workers

for a project and the union local was forced to accept those people. He also

apparently believed that his name was one of those WGI would have requested.

Following trial, the WCJ reasoned that the intent of the parties is of

paramount consideration in determining whether a Louisiana contract for hire had

been effected. Given Sensat’s almost unique qualifications in a technically

demanding, specialized industry, it was reasonable for him to have assumed when

he left for Florida that he had the Crystal River job in hand. He was repeating a

process he had gone through many, many times. The WCJ was cognizant of the

fact that “[u]nions are notoriously protective of their turfs.” He doubted that the

local would have tolerated Sensat being called into the Crystal River job if that was
6

not a standard practice. The local, in short, was, according to the WCJ, WGI’s

agent. The WCJ termed WGI’s argument that Sensat was not hired under a

Louisiana contract a “reconstruction and re-invention of what was obviously its

original intentions and actions . . . conceived only after this man was disabled by a

work injury and the company found itself facing a workers’ compensation suit.”

The WCJ further stated:

I’m not certain what the company’s formal definition of the term
“employee” is, but I think it more than likely covers an individual
who is on the job site and is being paid handsomely to be there.
Of course, the reason the company paid Mr. Sensat is that it,
like him, thought he had been hired in Louisiana and was sent directly
to work. I think both were correct in their assumptions. The evidence
fully supports their assumptions.
....
Having heard the testimony, I am struck with the notion that
had Mr. Sensat had [sic] never hurt his knee in Florida, the technical
issue of the precise shining moment in time when he was actually
officially hired would have never arisen. The company’s post-
accident posturing is clever, but it flies squarely in the face of the long
employment relationship of Mr. Sensat and Washington Group.

The WCJ then ruled in favor of Sensat, finding that he was hired under a Louisiana

contract of employment, and ordered that WGI pay all reasonable medical

expenses including knee replacement surgery, weekly indemnity for any period

Sensat was unemployed or not receiving unemployment benefits, and a $2,000.00

penalty and $12,300.00 in attorney fees. WGI then filed this appeal.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

WGI asserts the following errors:

1. Because WGI did not offer employment to Sensat while he was in
Louisiana, it was error for the trial judge to find that he was
working under a Louisiana contract of hire at the time of his
accident,

2. Because there is no evidence that Sensat has suffered a wage loss
as a result of this accident, and because it is speculative to assume
that any future periods of unemployment are the result of his injury
and not other factors, it was error for the trial judge to award

7

disability indemnity benefits for periods during which Sensat was
unemployed and not receiving unemployment benefits.

3. Regardless of whether WGI ultimately prevails in its jurisdictional
argument, the decision to deny payment of benefits and medical
expenses pursuant to Louisiana law was reasonable, and thus, it
was error for the trial judge to award penalties and attorney fees on
the basis that WGI failed to “reasonably controvert” the claim.

ANALYSIS

Assignment of error number 1: An employee working outside Louisiana

who is injured, and would be entitled to benefits under Louisiana law if he is

injured in Louisiana, may recover benefits if, at the time of his injury, his

employment was “principally localized in this state,” or he was working under a

contract of hire made in this state. La.R.S. 23:1035.1. Extraterritorial coverage

has been extensively litigated even before Section 1035.1 was enacted in 1975.

Identifying whether a Louisiana contract of hire has been confected is

largely a matter of applying certain fundamental precepts of contract law,

principally the tenet that the purpose of the inquiry is to divine the intent of the

parties. See, e.g., McKane v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 199 So. 175 (Orl.App.

1940). This court, as well as other circuits, has long held that in an effort to

discern the intent of the parties, courts should consider the domiciles of the parties,

the place of performance of the contract, and the nature of the work to be done.

Milligan v. Glenburney Nursing Home, 408 So.2d 40 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1980).

While this represents a fact-intensive, case-specific inquiry, previous

holdings do lend guidance. In Jepson v. B-Con Construction Company, Inc., 475

So.2d 112 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1985), an employee domiciled in Caddo Parish

previously worked there for the construction company, which was also domiciled

in Caddo Parish. He contacted his former supervisor to inquire about potential

work. The supervisor told the employee to come to Memphis, Tennessee, and he

8

would put him to work. The employee traveled to Memphis and was hired by the

supervisor while his application was processed in Shreveport.

The supervisor was instructed by home office to transport some equipment

to Shreveport, as it was needed on another job. The employee was asked whether

he would travel to Shreveport to assist with this task. After successfully delivering

the equipment to Shreveport, the employee was killed in a traffic accident near

Little Rock, Arkansas.

The parents of the employee sought death benefits under the Louisiana

Workers’ Compensation Act. The employer argued that the Act did not apply.

The court of appeal found that the record made it clear that the acceptance of the

employee’s application was “a mere formality. . . of no legal significance.” Id. at

115. It found that a Louisiana contract of hire had been confected and Louisiana

law applied.

In Mattel v. Pittman Construction Co., 248 La. 540, 180 So.2d 96 (1965),

the employee, a member of the New Orleans ironworkers local, reported to the

union hall looking for work. The union local’s business manager had received a

work order for two men at a job in Gulfport, Mississippi from the prospective

employer. Mattel was referred by the business manager to the Gulfport job. He

was injured that day.

The construction company argued that Louisiana law did not apply. The

supreme court disagreed:

As a general rule, in bargaining or in other dealings with
employers, a union represents only its members. However, when it
and an employer enter into an arrangement such as is evidenced here
the union becomes the agent of the employer (for employment
purposes) and is authorized to make a job offer for the latter.
Accordingly, the acceptance of the offer by a prospective employee
completes the contract of hiring.

9

We do not agree with the defendants’ contention that, because
Pittman had the right to reject any person sent to it by the union, the
offer made by the New Orleans Local to the plaintiff constituted a
mere proposal for him to apply in Gulfport for a job; that plaintiff
applied in Gulfport and there he was accepted by the foreman; and
that; and that, therefore, the contract is not one over which Louisiana
courts have jurisdiction.

To begin with the plaintiff was not rejected; he was
immediately put to work at the Gulfport job for which his services had
been solicited in New Orleans. Moreover, the record is barren of any
evidence that it was contemplated that plaintiff was going to Gulfport
merely to apply for work. Furthermore, there is no proof of any kind
that plaintiff made an application for employment. To the contrary it
was shown that he did not go to Pittman's office, did not fill out a
written application form, and did not make any oral request for
employment. In fact, it does not even appear that the foreman had the
authority to r[e]ject any employee sent as a result of Pittman's order
for ironworkers (in this connection we think that Pittman's failure to
call its foreman to testify-or to explain the reason for such failure-
weakens its contention immeasurably). Also noted is the absence of
any suggestion that Pittman had ever rejected a union employee sent
to a construction site at its request.

Id. at 544-45.

In Welch v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 555 So.2d 647 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1989),

writ denied, 558 So.2d 603 (1990), Welch was contacted by his local union and

told that there was an opening with the defendant, a New Jersey contractor with no

connection to Louisiana, for a heavy equipment operator. He traveled to New

Jersey and reported to the union hall there. He was hired and injured in New

Jersey. The fourth circuit distinguished the Mattel case on the basis that the local

in Mattel was acting as the agent for the employer, whereas the local merely

advised Welch of the job opening. It also found that the fact that Mattel did not

have to report to the local union hall in Mississippi was a key distinguishing factor.

More recently, the second circuit dealt with the issue of union agency and

found that Louisiana law did not apply in Hughes v. T.G. Mercer Consulting

Serv’s., 44,908 (La.App. 2 Cir. 12/9/09), 26 So.3d 954, writ denied, 10-0361 (La.

4/23/10), 34 So.3d 267. Hughes was a commercial truck driver who belonged to

10

the Teamsters. She lived in Goodwill, Louisiana. The shop steward with Mercer

contacted Hughes about hauling pipe for Mercer from Granbury, Texas, to

Hillsboro, Texas. Hughes and her fiancé, also a driver, traveled to Texas and

began driving for Mercer. He was injured in a collision and argued that Louisiana

law should apply because she was employed under a Louisiana contract of hire.

Mercer’s Executive Vice-President of Operations testified that Mercer hired

its drivers through a referral system that included shop stewards. However, not all

drivers who report for work are hired. All drivers are required to complete an

application, pass drug tests, and demonstrate their driving abilities before they are

hired. This testimony was corroborated by that of the shop steward.

The WCJ found that she had jurisdiction because the shop steward had

apparent authority to hire and did not extend conditions of hire, such as applying,

passing drug screens, or demonstrating driving ability. Hughes was therefore

justified in believing that she was hired. The second circuit disagreed. It

undertook a thorough analysis of cases involving union representatives and others

who were clothed with apparent authority, and concluded that the shop steward in

this case was not an actual or apparent agent for the employer. Hughes knew of

the referral network by which drivers were hired. No paperwork had been sent to

her in Louisiana. She performed no work before completing paperwork in Texas.

Her travel expenses were not reimbursed. There was no evidence that she and

Mercer had agreed on wages and hours. Mercer had the right to reject a union

worker sent in response to a request for workers. There was no evidence that

Mercer had not rejected drivers sent by the union in the past. And federal law

mandated that Mercer subject drivers to testing before they could be hired.

This case bears many of the hallmarks of Hughes. The out-of-state union

local in the present case contacted Sensat in Louisiana. The local referred Sensat
11

to WGI, which did not request him specifically. Sensat was at least marginally

aware of the means by which nuclear plant employees were hired. WGI had the

authority to reject an employee who was referred by the union. Sensat, like

Hughes, had to meet qualifications such as drug screening and testing before he

could enter the job site. However, unlike Hughes, Sensat completed paperwork in

Louisiana. Further, he operated within an industry that prizes highly-trained,

highly-specialized, select employees that are routinely employed at locations

across the country.

There is another major distinction between the present case and others we

have discussed: Sensat had been hired by WGI many times in the past and had

never not been hired by it. This represented a salient distinction to the WCJ, and it

is to this court, too. The overall tenor of the testimony established that, Sensat was

virtually guaranteed work at Crystal River. That tenor sounded through from the

testimony of Sensat and every other witness including Anderson, who had little

familiarity with Sensat, and Flodman, who was familiar with him. Phelps, who

lacked actual authority to hire but was intimately familiar with the hiring process,

certainly implied to Sensat that his hiring was a certainty. And while it was a very

close case, we are unable to conclude that the WCJ manifestly erred in finding that

a Louisiana contract of hire was confected.

We, however, disagree with the WCJ’s finding that this was some sham

attempt by WGI to dodge its responsibilities to Sensat, as we will more fully

discuss in conjunction with WGI’s assignment of error number three regarding the

award of penalties and attorney fees.

Assignment of error number 2: WGI asserts that it was error for the trial

court to award indemnity benefits to Sensat. The Act establishes schedules of

payments depending upon the nature of the disability the employee has suffered.
12

See La.R.S. 23:1221. The WCJ made no finding as to whether Sensat was

temporarily totally disabled, permanently totally disabled, permanently partially

disabled, or entitled to supplemental earnings benefits.

What was adduced at trial was that Sensat has certainly been capable of

working and has in fact worked on many occasions since the accident. However,

he testified, and the records of Dr. Foret corroborate, that he is unable to climb,

which is a requirement of his trade. In fact, Dr. Foret’s records state, “I do not

know how he is walking now.” This was not a question of Sensat’s mechanical

gait, but rather a remark about his pain tolerance. Clearly, Sensat’s knee has been

significantly damaged or exacerbated by this accident.

The employee bears the burden of proving disability by clear and convincing

evidence. La.R.S. 23:1221. Under the statutory scheme, Sensat is not eligible for

temporary or permanent total disability, because he is capable of employment, and

has in fact engaged in employment. La.R.S. 23:1221(1)(b) and (2)(a). Permanent

partial disability is reserved for loss of use of an anatomical part or establishment

of an impairment rating. La.R.S. 23:1221(4). That leaves supplemental earnings

benefits the only indemnity benefit for which Sensat might be eligible.

Sensat offered no evidence of his post-accident wages. He did, however,

prove to the WCJ’s satisfaction that he was unable to perform iron work. The

record adequately supports this finding. But that is not the nature of the inquiry;

rather, the questions is whether he proved that he cannot work at all.3

Sensat contends that at the time of trial WGI owed him no indemnity

benefits. According to Sensat, “The effect of this judgment is that no monetary

amount of indemnity benefits were awarded to claimant, just the entitlement to it.”

3
Section 1221(3)(a) provides that the disability must result in the employee’s inability
to earn wages equal to ninety percent of his pre-accident wages.
13

But the WCJ’s task is to determine actual controversies and not issue judgments

based upon hypotheticals.

In Desselle v. Dresser Indus. Valve, 96-374 (La.App. 3 Cir. 2/5/97), 689

So.2d 549, writ denied, 97-618 (La. 4/25/97), 692 So.2d 1086, we faced an

analogous situation. The injured employee was given work with modifications.

He sought a declarative judgment that he would be eligible for SEBs in the future

if he should be unable to work due to his injury. We affirmed the WCJ’s refusal to

endorse such a procedure. The employee had no claim for SEBs until such time as

he was unable to earn at least 90% of his pre-accident wages. This ruling guides

our consideration here. While Sensat is gainfully employed he has no claim for

temporary total disability benefits. It was premature for the WCJ to award

indemnity benefits, and we reverse that award.

Assignment of error number 3: Louisiana Revised Statute 23:1201 governs

the time and place an employer is obligated to pay his employee for work-related

injury benefits. The award of penalties and attorney fees for failing to comply with

the employer’s obligation to provide reasonable related medical treatment is

established by Subsection (F). The penalties and attorney fees, however, do not

apply if the claim is “reasonably controverted” or if non-payment results from

conditions beyond the employer’s or insurer’s control. La.R.S. 23:1201(F)(2).

A claim has been reasonably controverted when the employer “engaged in a

nonfrivolous legal dispute or possessed factual and/or medical information to

reasonably counter the factual or medical information presented by the claimant

throughout the time he refused to pay all or part of the benefits allegedly owed.”

Brown v. Texas-LA Cartage, Inc., 98-1063, p. 9 (La. 12/1/98), 721 So.2d 885, 890.

In Pettigrew v. Abacus Capital Corp., 07-405, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 5 Cir. 12/11/07),

974 So.2d 692, 697, now-Justice Guidry wrote, “[T]he cases considering the issue
14

of whether there was an in state contract of hire are fact specific, and [the insurer]

is not without support for its position. Thus, it is impossible to find that the claim

was not reasonably controverted.”

As noted above, the WCJ stated that the issue of where Sensat was hired

would never have arisen had he not been injured. This goes without saying; the

only time such a dispute would arise is in the context of an employment-related

dispute such as workers’ compensation. Such a statement is akin to saying that the

question of whether Sensat had been hurt would never have arisen but for the fact

that he was hurt. The evidence demonstrates that the WCJ clearly erred in

awarding penalties and attorney fees. WGI’s legal argument was far from

frivolous. This was a very close question.

The WCJ’s award of penalties and attorney fees are reversed.

CONCLUSION

The WCJ’s finding that subject matter jurisdiction lies with Louisiana is

affirmed. The award of indemnity benefits is reversed as premature. The award of

penalties and attorney fees is reversed. Costs of this appeal are taxed to defendant,

Washington Group International.

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART.

15