Juan Carlos Allen v. Affordable Home Furnishings

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-176

JUAN CARLOS ALLEN

VERSUS

AFFORDABLE HOME FURNISHINGS

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 4
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 07-08002
SHARON MORROW, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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PHYLLIS M. KEATY
JUDGE

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Court composed of Sylvia R. Cooks, Marc T. Amy, and Phyllis M. Keaty, Judges.

Cooks, J., dissents in part and assigns written reasons.

AFFIRMED.

Michael B. Miller
Miller & Miller
Post Office Box 1630
Crowley, Louisiana 70527-1630
(337) 785-9500
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant:
Juan Carlos Allen

Joseph J. Bailey
David E. Boraks
Provosty, Sadler, deLaunay, Fiorenza & Sobel
Post Office Drawer 1791
Alexandria, Louisiana 71309-1791
(318) 445-3631
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee:
Affordable Home Furnishings

KEATY, Judge.

Employee appeals from a judgment rendered by the workers’ compensation

judge (WCJ) pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by his former employer. For the

following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Juan Carlos Allen (Allen) injured his low back and left leg while pulling up

carpet in conjunction with his employment with Affordable Home Furnishings

(AFH). On May 4, 2005, the WCJ signed a consent judgment decreeing that Allen

was injured in the course and scope of his employment with AFH on July 19, 2003,

and that he was entitled to temporary total disability benefits (TTDs) beginning on

July 20, 2003, at the rate of $410 per month, subject to a credit for all previously

made weekly compensation payments.1

In April of 2012, Allen filed a motion and order for penalties and attorney

fees based on AFH’s failure to guarantee payment of a memory foam mattress

prescribed by his physician.2 Following a hearing, the WCJ rendered judgment in

open court in favor of Allen ordering AFH to pay him a penalty of $2,000 and

attorney fees of $1,500. Written judgment to that effect was signed on June 18,

2012. The judgment, which the WCJ had ordered Allen’s attorney to prepare, also

referenced docket numbers 03-07165, 06-06892, and 07-08002. Approximately

one month later, Allen sent AHF a satisfaction of judgment stating that the June 18,

2012 judgment providing for penalties and attorney fees had been “paid and

satisfied;” docket numbers 03-07165, 06-06892, and 07-08002 were again

1
The judgment further provided that AFH pay a penalty of $3,700 and attorney fees of
$5,000.
2
Docket numbers 03-07165, 06-06892, and 07-08002 were referenced at the top of the
motion.

referenced at the top of the document. Thereafter, AHF filed a motion to dismiss

alleging that “all disputes in the above referenced docket numbers [3] have been

fully and completely resolved” and seeking to have those docket numbers

dismissed with prejudice. The satisfaction of judgment was attached to AFH’s

motion. On August 21, 2012, the WCJ signed an order decreeing that “all claims

subject to” the above-referenced docket numbers were dismissed with prejudice,

“reserving all future disputes between the parties.” The words “all claims subject

to” were handwritten into the order by the WCJ.

Allen appealed and is now before this court assigning two errors. First, he

asserts that the WCJ erred in assigning multiple docket numbers to his single claim.

Next, he asserts that the WCJ erred in ordering the dismissal of all his claims

without a hearing or without evidence that all of his claims should be dismissed.

DISCUSSION

In Derouen v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 09-278 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/7/09), 23

So.3d 389, a workers’ compensation claimant appealed from a decision of the WCJ

which granted a partial satisfaction of judgment in favor of the employer. She

questioned whether any authority existed for a partial satisfaction of judgment,

whether her employer had proved the total amount payable under the judgment,

and whether the judgment was overbroad. In analyzing the issues presented, we

noted:

A necessary adjunct of the power to render a judgment is the
authority to determine whether a party has complied with its dictates.
“A court possesses inherently all of the power necessary for the
exercise of its jurisdiction even though not granted expressly by law.”
La.Code Civ.P. art. 191. Necessity dictates that a party against whom

3
The docket numbers referenced on the motion to dismiss were the same three numbers
that were referenced on the satisfaction of judgment.

2

a judgment has been rendered and who has paid the judgment is
afforded some method of having that fact recognized by the courts.
We, therefore, find that the WCJ had legal authority to enter the
partial satisfaction of judgment.

Id. at 392. “The WCJ possesses inherent authority to determine whether the

judgments he renders have been satisfied. That finding is reviewed, as any other

finding of fact, under the manifest error standard.” Id.

Allen asserts that the WCJ erred in assigning multiple docket numbers to his

single claim. He contends that the system used by the Office of Workers’

Compensation (OWC) whereby multiple docket numbers are assigned to claims

arising out of ongoing cases does nothing but cause delay and confusion. More

specifically, he contends that often the records from old claims that have become

final judgments are filed in Baton Rouge and are, thus, unavailable for future

hearings. No jurisprudence is cited by Allen in support of this assignment of error.

AFH counters that there is no merit to Allen’s assertion. First, it contends

that this court should permit the OWC to control its docket as it sees fit. Further,

AFH submits that the workers’ compensation scheme provides for continuing

jurisdiction over workers’ compensation cases and expressly provides that

judgments or awards may be subject to a claim for modification, thus, maintaining

order. See La.R.S. 23:1310.8 and Madere v. W.S. Life Ins. Co., 03-110 (La.App. 5

Cir. 4/29/03), 845 So.2d 1222.

“The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct, absent any
evidence in the record which would indicate to the contrary.”
Steinhoff v. Steinhoff, 03-24, p. 5 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/30/03), 843 So.2d
1290, 1294. Moreover, appellate courts generally will not consider
issues that were not addressed by the trial court and which are raised
for the first time on appeal. Mendoza v. Grey Wolf Drilling Co., LP.,
46,438 (La.App. 2 Cir. 6/22/11), 77 So.3d 18, writ denied, 11-1918
(La.11/14/11), 75 So.3d 943.

3

Montgomery v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 12-320, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 3 Cir.

11/14/12), 103 So.3d 1222, 1229, writ denied, 12-2711 (La. 2/8/13), 108 So.3d 91.

After thorough review of the record, we can find no indication that Allen

presented argument to the WCJ that it erred in assigning multiple docket numbers

to his claim before asserting this error on appeal. Accordingly, we will not

consider Allen’s first assignment of error. See Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal,

Rule 1‒3.

Allen next contends that the WCJ erred in dismissing all of his claims

without a hearing or evidence that all of his claims should be dismissed. He

contends that the order of dismissal signed by the WCJ is overbroad and includes

claims that were not subject to the satisfaction of judgment that he filed after AHF

paid the June 18, 2012 judgment. Because Allen fears that the order of dismissal is

unclear and could later be interpreted to include prior judgments and orders issued

by the WCJ, he requests that this court limit the dismissal to the June 18, 2012

judgment.

On the other hand, AHF submits that the order is clear in that it “reserv[es]

all other disputes between the parties.” It further contends that the WCJ handwrote

the phrase “all claims subject to” into the order of dismissal “to very specifically

tailor the effect” of the judgment and to eliminate any confusion concerning the

use of multiple docket numbers in this case. According to AHF, each workers’

compensation dispute is given a separate docket number in order to make any

judgment resolving that dispute appealable. Thus, AHF contends that it was

proper for the WCJ to close the docket numbers that Allen listed on the satisfaction

of judgment because those disputes were resolved. Finally, as a practical matter,

4

AHF submits that it is necessary for each dispute that is the subject of a Form 1008

Disputed Claim for Compensation to be closed because the counsel assigned to

defend that dispute may no longer be counsel of record and, thus, should not

continue to receive and be responsible for responding to time-sensitive demands

when no dispute is pending before the OWC.

Allen asserts that the order of dismissal should have been limited to the

June 18, 2012 judgment which awarded him penalties and attorney fees and for

which he provided a satisfaction of judgment. The appellate record indicates that

Allen’s motion for penalties and attorney fees, the judgment on the motion for

penalties and attorney fees, the satisfaction of judgment signed by Allen’s attorney,

and AHF’s motion to dismiss each contained all three docket numbers. In addition,

the order of dismissal references the satisfaction of judgment and specifically

“reserv[es] all other disputes between the parties.”

While Allen now complains that the judgment of dismissal is ambiguous and

that the insertion of the phrase “all claims subject to” serves to broaden the

possible effect of the dismissal, he did not file a motion for new trial or for

clarification of the judgment. Because Allen failed to raise the issue of possible

ambiguity in the judgment before the WCJ, we will not consider this aspect of his

second assignment of error for the first time on appeal. See Uniform Rules—

Courts of Appeal, Rule 1‒3.

This court has held that the “WCJ possesses inherent authority to determine

whether the judgments he renders have been satisfied.” Derouen, 23 So.3d at 392.

A logical corollary to that authority is the additional authority of a WCJ to render a

judgment of dismissal when it is presented with a satisfaction of a judgment. As

5

we previously noted, “The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct, absent

any evidence in the record which would indicate to the contrary.” Montgomery,

103 So.3d at 1229 (quoting Steinhoff, 843 So.2d at 1294). Allen has not pointed to

any record evidence to indicate any error in the judgment of dismissal. In fact, the

evidence fully supports the judgment of dismissal rendered by the WCJ.

Accordingly, the August 21, 2012 judgment is affirmed in its entirety.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed. Costs of

this appeal are assessed against Juan Carlos Allen.

AFFIRMED.

6

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-176

JUAN CARLOS ALLEN

VERSUS

AFFORDABLE HOME FURNISHINGS

COOKS, J., dissenting.

I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority’s opinion that refuses

to consider the Claimant’s assignment of error asserting the WCJ’s order of

dismissal is overbroad and could possible serve to dismiss claims that were not

subject to the Satisfaction of Judgment filed after AHF paid the June 18, 2012

judgment. The justification for the majority’s refusal to consider this assignment

of error is that “[b]ecause Allen failed to raise the issue of possible ambiguity in

the judgment before the WCJ, we will not consider this aspect of his second

assignment of error for the first time on appeal.”1 I find this court most certainly

has the authority to consider this issue on appeal, and feel it is an abrogation of our

duty to simply dismiss Claimant’s argument.

Contrary to the Louisiana Constitution Article 5, section 10 (emphasis

added) sets forth an appellate court’s scope of review of administrative agency

proceedings as follows:

(B) Scope of Review. Except as limited to questions of law by this
constitution, or as provided by law in the review of administrative
agency determinations, appellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal
extends to law and facts. In the review of an administrative agency
determination in a worker’s compensation matter, a court of appeal
may render judgment as provided by law, or, in the interest of
justice, remand the matter to the administrative agency for further
proceedings. In criminal cases its appellate jurisdiction extends only
to questions of law.

1
In his brief to this court, counsel for Claimant contends the order “was signed even though an objection was made
to the Order of Dismissal submitted to the workers’ compensation judge.” The record before us, however, does not
include any objection made.

Any concerns the majority might have as to the record being inadequate to amend

the judgment, is not, in my view, a valid basis for an outright rejection of

Claimant’s assignment of error. As set forth above, La.Const. art. 5, § 10(B)

specifically grants the appellate courts the authority to, “in the interest of justice,

remand the matter to the administrative agency for further proceedings.”

Therefore, rather than dismissing Claimant’s assignment of error because of a lack

of clarity as to what went on below at the administrative agency level, it would

seem both prudent and fair to, at a minimum, remand the case back to the Office of

Workers’ Compensation for further proceedings.

I find reasonable Claimant’s concerns that the Order of Dismissal is unclear,

overbroad and could be interpreted to exclude future claims and rulings by the

WCJ. The Satisfaction of Judgment provided by Claimant to AHF was specific,

and indicated that only the Judgment rendered on June 18, 2012 was “paid and

satisfied.” AHF’s Motion to Dismiss stated that “all disputes in the above

referenced docket numbers have been fully and completely resolved,” (emphasis

added) and asked that the “above referenced docket numbers be dismissed, with

prejudice, reserving all other disputes between the parties.” An Order of Dismissal

was then signed by the WCJ ordering “that all claims subject to the above

referenced docket numbers be and are hereby dismissed, with prejudice, reserving

all other disputes between the parties.” The words “all claims subject to” was

handwritten and inserted into the order. Claimant contends it objected to the order

prior to its signing, and further notes there was no hearing on the order.

It is difficult to dispute Claimant’s argument that the Motion to Dismiss and

Order of Dismissal are much broader than the Satisfaction of Judgment. The

Satisfaction of Judgment only pertained to the penalties and attorney fees awarded

for the failure to approve a memory foam mattress. Thus, the Claimant’s argument

that the Order of Dismissal should have been limited to the June 18, 2012

judgment is compelling.