Clint Ashworth v. Big Easy Foods of Louisiana, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-650

CLINT ASHWORTH

VERSUS

BIG EASY FOODS OF LOUISIANA, LLC, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - # 3
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 12-02105
SAM L. LOWERY, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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ULYSSES GENE THIBODEAUX
CHIEF JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Marc T. Amy, and J.
David Painter, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Gregory Paul Allen Marceaux
Marceaux Law Firm
2901 Hodges Street
Lake Charles, LA 70601
Telephone: (337) 310-2233
COUNSEL FOR:
Plaintiff/Appellee – Clint Ashworth

Azelie Ziegler Shelby
Shelby Law Firm
3070 Teddy Drive
Baton Rouge, LA 70809
Telephone: (225) 223-6961
COUNSEL FOR:
Defendants/Appellants - LUBA Casualty Insurance Company, Inc. and
Big Easy Foods of Louisiana, LLC

THIBODEAUX, Chief Judge.

Clint Ashworth filed a workers’ compensation claim against his

employer, Big Easy Foods of Louisiana, LLC, and its insurer, LUBA Casualty

Insurance Company (collectively, “Big Easy”), after he severed the tip of his finger

while cleaning a meat grinder. Though Big Easy initially paid for and approved

benefits for Mr. Ashworth, the company later terminated benefits and alleged that

Mr. Ashworth had intentionally injured himself. Following a trial, the workers’

compensation judge (WCJ) entered judgment in favor of Mr. Ashworth, awarding

past medical expenses, indemnity benefits, penalties, and attorney fees.

Big Easy appeals. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment.

I.
ISSUES

We must determine whether the trial court:

(1) applied a higher evidentiary standard on Big Easy’s burden of
proving an intentional injury;

(2) erred in finding that Big Easy did not prove that Mr. Ashworth
committed an intentional injury;

(3) erred in finding that Big Easy was arbitrary and capricious in
terminating Mr. Ashworth’s benefits; and

(4) erred in the amount of penalties and attorney fees awarded.

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Mr. Ashworth was employed at Big Easy−a sausage making

company. His duties included grinding meat and cleaning the equipment after each

use. At the start of his employment, Mr. Ashworth received two days of on-the-job

training. As part of the training, Mr. Ashworth was taught how to clear the end

plate of the grinder of excess meat and place that meat into a container. Big Easy

instructed Mr. Ashworth to wipe off the excess meat with his bare hands.

Approximately one week after beginning work with Big Easy, Mr.

Ashworth was injured at work. After completing the grinding process with a

section of meat, Mr. Ashworth allegedly turned off the meat grinder. He then

attempted to clean the end plate of the grinder of excess meat. During the cleaning

process, the blades of the meat grinder severed the tip of Mr. Ashworth’s left index

finger.

Following the incident, Mr. Ashworth’s co-worker transported him to

the hospital where a surgeon performed a partial amputation of Mr. Ashworth’s

index finger. Doctors deemed Mr. Ashworth temporarily and totally disabled from

February 9, 2012 to April 30, 2012. His indemnity benefits began on February 17,

2012. Additionally, Big Easy initially paid for and approved medical benefits for

him. On March 15, 2012, however, Big Easy terminated payment of all medical

and indemnity benefits. Big Easy informed Mr. Ashworth that it believed he

intentionally injured himself. Mr. Ashworth denied Big Easy’s accusations and

filed suit.

Following a trial, the WCJ entered judgment in favor of Mr.

Ashworth, finding that he did not intentionally injure himself. The WCJ awarded

past medical benefits, penalties in the amount of $8,000.00 for arbitrary

termination of benefits and penalties in the amount of $2,000.00 for Big Easy’s

failure to pay the first week of indemnity benefits. He also awarded $17,768.25 in

attorney fees.

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III.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Standard of Review

The standard of review by the appellate court of findings of fact by

the WCJ is to determine whether the WCJ committed manifest error or was clearly

wrong. Metoyer v. Roy O. Martin, Inc., 03-1540 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/1/04), 895

So.2d 552, writ denied, 05-1027 (La. 6/3/05), 903 So.2d 467; Wiley v. Grand

Casino Avoyelles, 98-1468 (La.App. 3 Cir. 4/21/99), 731 So.2d 518, writ denied,

99-2032 (La. 11/5/99), 750 So.2d 180. As long as the record supports the findings

of fact of the WCJ, and these findings of fact are reasonable, then an appellate

court cannot overturn those findings of fact. Metoyer, 895 So.2d 552.

Standard of Proof of an Intentional Injury

Big Easy contends that the WCJ committed legal error and placed a

higher burden of proof on it than the law requires. Specifically, Big Easy asserts

that the Louisiana Workers’ Compensation Act requires defendants to prove the

affirmative defense of intentional injury by a preponderance of the evidence but

that the WCJ committed legal error by requiring it to introduce direct and medical

evidence to prove its claim. While we agree with Big Easy as to the appropriate

standard of review, we disagree with its assertion that the WCJ legally erred and

held it to a higher standard.

Indeed, Big Easy is correct in stating that the burden of proving an

intentional injury in a workers’ compensation case is the normal burden of proof in

civil cases−a preponderance of the evidence. Brunet v. State of Louisiana, 442

So.2d 638 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1983). Big Easy is incorrect, however, in its assertion

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that the WCJ held it to a higher standard than the law requires. In his oral reasons,

the WCJ correctly set forth the burden of proof placed on Big Easy for the

affirmative defense that Mr. Ashworth intentionally injured himself. As stated by

the WCJ: “So, the basic question to be answered in this litigation is whether the

defense can prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Ashworth

formulated the willful intent to mutilate himself.” He then proceeded to

exhaustively discuss the circumstantial evidence presented by Big Easy. The one

phrase uttered by the WCJ that Big Easy embraces in support of its argument is the

WCJ’s statement that the employer’s decision was “based purely on speculation

and suspicion and had no medical foundation whatsoever.”

Big Easy urges us to ignore the totality of the WCJ’s reasons and

instead find that his utterance of the words “medical foundation” indicates that the

WCJ applied the wrong legal standard. Thus, a de novo review is required. We

decline to do so. It is clear that the WCJ possessed a firm grasp of the legal

standard and of the evidence. The WCJ’s reference to the lack of a “medical

foundation” was only one of the factors that the WCJ considered in its overall

judgment in the case. Thus, we find no merit in Big Easy’s argument that the WCJ

applied the wrong legal standard to the case.

Defendants’ Lack of Proof of an Intentional Injury

Big Easy also contends that the WCJ erred in finding that it did not

meet its burden of proving that Mr. Ashworth intentionally severed his finger. We

find no merit in its argument and find that the WCJ was not manifestly erroneous

in awarding judgment to Mr. Ashworth.

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Louisiana law provides that no compensation is owed to an employee

who intentionally injures himself. La.R.S. 23:1081(1)(a). An employer bears the

burden of proving that the employee had a willful and wanton intent to injure

himself. King v. Grand Cove Nursing Home, 93-779 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/94), 640

So.2d 348, writ denied, 94-865 (La. 5/13/94), 641 So.2d 204.

Before reaching judgment in favor of Mr. Ashworth, the WCJ heard

extensive testimony from several witnesses. Big Easy and its witnesses alleged

that Mr. Ashworth was motivated to intentionally injure himself because he was

stressed financially. Moreover, they alleged that Mr. Ashworth was aware that

another employee received a settlement when the employee injured himself while

cleaning a meat grinder, and this knowledge motivated Mr. Ashworth to injure

himself.

Mr. Ashworth testified at trial and specifically denied inserting his

finger into the end plate with the intent of cutting off the end of his finger. Instead,

Mr. Ashworth states that he was merely cleaning excess meat from the end plate as

he was instructed to do. He testified that he was unaware that the grinder was

spinning and that it was dangerous to insert his finger into it. The testimony of Mr.

Ashworth’s supervisor gave credence to Mr. Ashworth’s case. He testified that

Big Easy’s employees were required to clear excess meat from the end plate of the

grinder with their bare hands.

To support its contention that Mr. Ashworth intentionally injured

himself, Big Easy offered the testimony of the three co-workers who were present

at the time of Mr. Ashworth’s injury. Those individuals testified that Mr.

Ashworth was acting suspicious on the day of the injury and that he admitted that

he “did it.”

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The WCJ weighed the testimony presented and clearly believed the

testimony of Mr. Ashworth. In his oral reasons, the WCJ called Big Easy’s

evidence “pretty thin,” and he doubted that Mr. Ashworth’s utterance of “I did it”

was a confession of a crime. Moreover, the WCJ opined that any reasonable

person would be interested to hear about a former employee who injured himself

with a meat grinder−the very piece of equipment being used at the time of the

discussion. We find no error in the WCJ’s judgment that Big Easy failed to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Ashworth intentionally injured

himself in the workplace.

Unlawful Termination of Mr. Ashworth’s Benefits

Big Easy argues that the WCJ: (1) erred by requiring it to prove Mr.

Ashworth intentionally injured himself before terminating his benefits and (2)

erred in finding that they were arbitrary and capricious in terminating Mr.

Ashworth’s benefits. We find no merit in either of Big Easy’s arguments.

Big Easy’s assertion that the WCJ required it to prove that Mr.

Ashworth intentionally injured himself before it terminated benefits has no support

in the record. Big Easy once again takes the WCJ’s words out of context to fit its

argument. Specifically, Big Easy points to the WCJ’s statement: “The termination

of benefits was not sufficiently supported by the record, even with using the

preponderance of the evidence standard.” Nothing in the WCJ’s reasons for

judgment, however, indicate that he applied the wrong legal standard. Instead, he

clearly found that Mr. Ashworth proved that the termination of benefits was

arbitrary and capricious. See La.R.S. 23:1201(I).

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Moreover, we find that the WCJ did not manifestly err when he found

that Big Easy arbitrarily and capriciously terminated Mr. Ashworth’s benefits. As

discussed previously, the WCJ considered the testimony of Mr. Ashworth as well

as the other employees who were present at the time of Mr.

Ashworth’s injury. This testimony also formed the basis of Big Easy’s

investigation. We find no need to repeat the facts here. It is evident that the WCJ

placed more weight on Mr. Ashworth’s version of the events, and we find no error

in his conclusion.

Penalties and Attorney Fees

Big Easy argues that the penalties and attorney fees imposed in this

matter were inordinately high. It argues that the WCJ erred by imposing a penalty

for Big Easy’s failure to pay the first week of benefits.

The amount of penalties and attorney fees awarded by the trial court is

entitled to great discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.

Williams v. Tioga Manor Nursing Home, 09-417 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/18/09), 24

So.3d 970, writ denied, 10-298 (La. 4/9/10), 31 So.3d 389. Here, we find no abuse

of discretion in the trial court’s award.

Turning first to the alleged erroneous $2,000.00 penalty, the WCJ

properly awarded this penalty under La.R.S. 23:1201(F). Section 1201(F) awards

penalties of up to $8,000.00 for failure to timely pay benefits when a defendant

fails to reasonably controvert a claim. At trial, Big Easy stipulated that it failed to

pay indemnity benefits for the first week following Mr. Ashworth’s injury. Since

Big Easy failed to reasonably controvert Mr. Ashworth’s claim, he is entitled to a

$2,000.00 penalty for its failure to pay the first week of benefits. Thus, we find no

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merit in Big Easy’s argument that the WCJ erred by imposing that penalty.

Moreover, we find no error in the amount awarded in attorney fees, and we award

an additional $4,500.00 in attorney fees to Mr. Ashworth’s attorney for work done

on this appeal.

IV.

CONCLUSION

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. Costs of this appeal are

assessed against Defendants.

AFFIRMED.

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