Janice Spikes v. Louisiana Commerce & Trade Association

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

13-919

JANICE SPIKES

VERSUS

LOUISIANA COMMERCE & TRADE ASSOCIATION, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 3
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 12-01729
CHARLOTTE A. L. BUSHNELL, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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ELIZABETH A. PICKETT
JUDGE

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Court composed of Elizabeth A. Pickett, James T. Genovese, and Phyllis M. Keaty,
Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Maria Anna Losavio
Losavio Law Office, LLC
1821 MacArthur Drive
Alexandria, LA 71315
(318) 767-9033
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT:
Janice Spikes

Stephen Edward Broyles
Glusman, Broyles & Glusman, LLC
P. O. Box 2711
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
(225) 387-5551
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES:
Tri-Parish Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC d/b/a Rehabilitation Hospital
of Dequincy
Louisiana Commerce & Trade Association Self Insurer’s Fund

PICKETT, Judge.

A workers’ compensation claimant appeals a judgment rendered that denies

her claims for medical treatment, penalties, and attorney fees. The claimant’s

employer and its workers’ compensation insurer answer the appeal and assign

errors. Finding no errors, we affirm the judgment in all respects and deny the relief

sought on appeal.

FACTS

On February 25, 2008, Janice Spikes injured her back in the course and

scope of her employment with Tri-Parish Rehabilitation Hospital, LLC d/b/a

Rehabilitation Hospital of DeQuincy. She underwent a bilateral lumbar

laminectomy at L3-4 by Dr. Clark Gunderson in July 2011. Dr. Gunderson

referred Ms. Spikes to psychologist James W. Quillin in August 2011 to help her

adjust to pain she continued to suffer after the surgery.

In January and June 2012, Dr. Quillin submitted requests to her employer’s

insurer, Louisiana Commerce and Trade Association Self Insurer’s Fund

(LCTASIF), for treatment in the forms of biofeedback, group psychotherapy,

psychological testing, and individual psychotherapy to address Ms. Spikes’ pain

syndrome. LCTASIF denied the requested treatment. He then filed Disputed

Claims for Medical Treatment with the Office of Workers’ Compensation

Administration Medical Services (Medical Services), appealing the denied

treatment. Medical Services denied the appeals.

Dr. Quillin also recommended that Ms. Spikes see a pain management

specialist. Ms. Spikes scheduled an appointment with Dr. Michael Dole, a pain

management specialist, but the defendants would not approve payment for the

appointment.

In March 2012, Ms. Spikes filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation against

the defendants, asserting bona fide disputes existed concerning: 1) the medical

treatment recommended by Dr. Quillin; 2) referral to a pain management

specialist; 3) failure to authorize treatment; and 4) penalties, attorney fees, court

costs, and expenses. Thereafter, Dr. Gunderson sought approval from the

defendants for a referral of Ms. Spikes to pain management specialist, Dr. Stephen

Katz, for one visit, which was denied. Dr. Gunderson appealed the denial to

Medical Services; his appeal was denied.

The defendants filed an exception of no cause of action regarding

Ms. Spikes’ claim that pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1121(B), she has the right to

consultation with a pain management specialist regardless of whether La.R.S.

12:1203.1 and the MTG apply to her request.

At trial, Ms. Spikes argued La.R.S. 23:1203.1 and the Medical Treatment

Guidelines (MTG)1 do not apply to her claims because she was injured prior to the

adoption of the statute. She also asserted the defendants’ denial of her claims was

arbitrary and capricious and sought penalties and attorney fees. Alternatively,

Ms. Spikes asserted that if La.R.S. 23:1203.1 was deemed applicable to her claims,

the clear and convincing standard of review provided in Section K 2 of the statute

1
The Louisiana Legislature passed La. R.S. 23:1203.1 in 2009, and the Medical
Treatment Guidelines became effective on July 13, 2011. The MTGs were promulgated
pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1203.1(B), which provides for the establishment of a Medical Treatment
Schedule.
2
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1203.1(J)(1) directs any party aggrieved with a payor’s
action on a medical provider’s request for authorization to file an appeal with the medical
director or associate director. Section K provides for an appeal of the medical director or
associate medical director’s decision and that such decision may be overturned if clear and
convincing evidence shows it was “not in accordance with the provisions of this Section.”

2

does not apply because Medical Services’ reviews of her claims were not

performed by the medical director as provided in Section J(1) of the statute.

The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) issued a Judgment which held that

the decisions issued by Medical Services that were rendered by a physician other

than the medical director did not comply with the provisions of the MTG and that

the denial of Ms. Spikes’ request for a consultation with Dr. Katz was

“inappropriate.” The WCJ’s Judgment did not address Ms. Spikes’ other claims or

the defendants’ exception of no cause of action.

Ms. Spikes appealed the Judgment. On appeal, she assigns four errors with

the Judgment and requests attorney fees for work performed on appeal. The

defendants answered the appeal and assign five errors with the Judgment.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

Ms. Spikes assigns the following errors:

1. The trial court’s judgment is silent as to the issue regarding medical
treatment with psychologist Dr. Quillin; therefore, it is presumed to
have been rejected by the trial court. The trial court erred in not
ordering defendants to authorize medical treatment with Dr. Quillin,
in particular, Behavioral Pain Management (group therapy, coping
skills, biofeedback-peripheral blood flow, biofeedback-SEMG
directed to specific sight of pain) with psychologist Dr. Quillin and
psychological testing (MPI and MMPI tests), and psychotherapy post
treatment follow-up as recommended by Dr. Quillin.

2. The trial court judgment is silent as to Janice Spikes’ request for
penalties and attorney[] fees; therefore, it is presumed to have been
rejected by the trial court. The trial court erred in not awarding
penalty and attorney[] fees for defendants’ refusal to authorize
medical benefits with her choice of pain management and
psychological treatment recommended by Dr. Quillin.

3. The trial court’s judgment is silent as to Janice Spikes’ request for
costs; therefore, it is presumed to have been rejected by the trial court.
The trial court erred in not awarding Janice Spikes’ costs.

4. [La.R.S. 23:1203.1] is substantive in nature and therefore it applies
prospectively only.

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The defendants assign the following errors with the WCJ’s judgment:

1. The Office of Workers’ Compensation failed to rule on the appeals
of the medical director’s decisions and should have denied the request
for treatment recommended by Dr. Quillin.

2. The Office of Workers’ Compensation erred in overruling
appellees’ objections to the admissibility of evidence not submitted to
the medical director.

3. The Office of Workers’ Compensation erred in not taxing as costs
payable by the appellant expenses associated with the depositions of
Dr. Fenn3 and Dr. Datz.

4. The Office of Workers’ Compensation erred in not denying outright
the claims for penalties and attorney[] fees sought by the appellant.

5. The Office of Workers’ Compensation erred in denying appellees’
exception of no cause of action to the appellant’s request for choice
for approval of choice of physician.

DISCUSSION

Central to this appeal is whether La.R.S. 23:1203.1 applies to claims for

medical treatment submitted by claimants who were injured before the statute

became effective. Because cases pending before the Louisiana Supreme Court

presented the same issue when this appeal was lodged, we issued a Stay Order in

this matter on January 27, 2014, staying the appeal until the supreme court decided

those cases. Spikes v. Louisiana Commerce & Trade Ass’n Tri-Parish Rehab.

Hosp., LLC d/b/a Rehab. Hosp. of Dequincy, 13-919 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1/27/14)

(unpublished order). In Church Mutual Insurance Co. v. Dardar, 13-2351, p. 13

(La. 5/7/14), ___ So.3d ___, ___, the supreme court determined that

“La.R.S. 23:1203.1 is a procedural vehicle . . . for enforcing a substantive right . . .

[and] does not impinge on or lessen the substantive right to necessary medical

treatment conferred by La.R.S. 23:1203.” Section 1203.1 is procedural in nature;

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Dr. Fenn was deposed in connection with Dr. Gunderson’s request for approval to refer
Ms. Spikes to a pain management specialist.

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therefore, it “applies prospectively to all requests for medical treatment and/or

disputes arising out of requests for medical treatment arising after the effective

date of La.R.S. 23:1203.1 and the medical treatment schedule, regardless of the

date the accident.” Id. See also Cook v. Family Care Services, Inc., 13-2326, 13-

2351 (La. 5/7/14), ___ So.3d ___.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Ms. Spikes contends the clear and convincing standard of review provided in

La.R.S. 23:1203.1(K) is not applicable here because a Medical Services Reviewer,

not the medical director himself, reviewed Dr. Quillin’s appeals of the defendants’

denials for behavioral pain management. The WCJ did not directly address the

issue of whether the clear and convincing standard of review applied to

Ms. Spikes’ claims. Rather, the WCJ held that because the medical director did

not consider Dr. Quillin’s appeals and render the decisions thereon, the decisions

did not comply with the MTG. Therefore, the WCJ did not consider them to be

appeals.

When a medical provider appeals the action taken on a request for

authorization of medical treatment, Subsection (J)(1) specifies: “The medical

director or associate medical director shall render a decision . . . .” That such

decisions are to be made by the “medical director or associate medical director” is

reiterated in Section K which further provides:

After the issuance of the decision by the medical director or
associate medical director of the office, any party who disagrees with
the decision, may then appeal by filing a “Disputed Claim for
Compensation”, which is LWC Form 1008. The decision may be
overturned when it is shown, by clear and convincing evidence, the
decision of the medical director or associate medical director was not
in accordance with the provisions of this Section.

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The legislature specified in these provisions that reviews of requests for

authorizations for medical treatment are to be made by the medical director or

associate medical director and defined who these individuals are. La.R.S.

23:1203.1(A)(1), (4). The individual who reviewed Dr. Quillin’s appeals of the

defendants’ denials of authorization for the medical treatment he requested is

neither the medical director nor the associate medical director. Accordingly, we

find no error with the WCJ’s determination that the decisions of Medical Services

on Dr. Quillin’s appeals do not comply with the MTG and conclude that the clear

and convincing standard of review does not apply to Dr. Quillin’s appeals to

Medical Services or to this appeal.

The manifest error/clearly wrong standard of review applies to the factual

findings made by the WCJ. Clay v. Our Lady of Lourdes Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc., 11-

1797 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 536. Accordingly, we will review the record in its

entirety to determine not whether the WCJ was wrong, but whether the record

reflects a reasonable basis for the WCJ’s decision. Id.

Evidentiary Issue

The defendants assign error with the WCJ’s admission of certain medical

evidence. We address this issue at the outset because it determines whether the

evidence is properly before this court for consideration. Ms. Spikes deposed

Drs. Quillin and Gunderson in preparation for trial. The defendants objected to

the admission of those depositions and certain medical records she offered into

evidence at trial because they were not submitted to and considered by Medical

Services when it reviewed the defendants’ denials of the doctors’ requests for

treatment. The WCJ allowed the evidence to be admitted; the defendants assert the

WCJ erred in doing so.

6

Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 702 governs the admissibility of expert

testimony. It provides, “[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge

will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in

issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or

education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.” However,

WCJs are not “bound by technical rules of evidence other than as herein provided,

but all findings of fact must be based upon competent evidence.”

La.R.S. 23:1317(A).

Though workers’ compensation judges are accustomed to reviewing medical

records in connection with claims they must decide, they are not medical experts,

and expert testimony could reasonably be needed to assist them in the

understanding of the application of the newly-applicable MTG to the medical

evidence at issue. Additionally, the defendants were not prejudiced by the

admission of the depositions because the WCJ rejected Ms. Spikes’ claims for the

treatment recommended by Dr. Quillin. Furthermore, the supreme court’s decision

in Dardar, ___ So.3d ___, had not been rendered and the possibility that the MTG

did not apply to Ms. Spikes’ claims existed at that time. For these reasons, we find

no error with the admission of Dr. Quillin’s deposition and medical records.

We also find no error with regard to Dr. Gunderson’s deposition and medical

records because, as discussed below, uncertainty surrounded the issue of whether

or not a claimant’s right to choose a treating physician in any specialty was

affected by La.R.S. 23:1203.1(I).

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Ms. Spikes’ Assignments of Error

Behavioral Pain Management

Ms. Spikes first assigns error with the WCJ’s failure to address her claim for

behavioral pain management as recommended by Dr. Quillin. As Ms. Spikes

noted, claims presented but not addressed in the Judgment are presumed denied.

M.J. Farms, Ltd. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 07-2371 (La. 7/1/08), 998 So.2d 16.

Dr. Gunderson referred Ms. Spikes to Dr. Quillin who first saw her on

September 6, 2011. Testing by Dr. Quillin showed she had “rather severe

depression with anxiety” and substantial dysfunctional pain adjustment

complicated by some underlying paranoia. He treated her depression and anxiety

with medication. Dr. Quillin indicated early in his treatment that Ms. Spikes might

need behavioral pain management if her pain adjustment was poor, and he initiated

some cognitive behavioral therapy to provide her some of relief. In general, his

notes discussed her depression more than her pain, though he regularly referenced

the need for behavioral pain management, and in November 2011, he referred

Ms. Spikes to Dr. Dole, a pain management specialist.

Dr. Quillin filed requests with the defendants on January 10, 2012, and June

27, 2012, for Group Psychotherapy/Coping Skills; Biofeedback Peripheral Blood

Flow; Biofeedback SEMG; Psychological Testing Post Treatment MMPI and MPI,

and Psychotherapy Post Treatment Follow-Up. Dr. Geralyn Datz, a psychologist,

performed a utilization review of Dr. Quillin’s request. She contacted Dr. Quillin

to discuss his initial request. After speaking with him, Dr. Datz recommended that

a portion of the requested treatment, i.e., one-half of the Biofeedback Peripheral

Blood Flow and one-half of the Biofeedback SEMG, be approved, and it was. The

remainder of the recommended treatment was denied. The denial referenced the

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MTG and identified specific reasons why only a portion of the requested treatment

was approved. The defendants denied the second request on the basis that it lacked

objective evidence of demonstrated progress with the previously approved

treatment. The denial noted that the MTG recommend ongoing treatment to

address anxiety and depressive issues provided the patient meets specific criteria of

a functional objective improvement and that no objective evidence demonstrated

Ms. Spikes had progressed with the previously approved biofeedback.

Dr. Quillin appealed the denials; Medical Services denied his appeals. With

regard to Dr. Quillin’s January 2011 request, the denial noted the previously

approved treatment and determined the request went beyond the MTG for

psychological intervention. Specifically, the denial observed that some patients

require treatment beyond the provisions contained in the MTG, but approval of

such treatment requires documentation by a treating physician that focuses “on

objective functional gains afforded by further treatment.” Medical Services’ denial

of Dr. Quillin’s second request identified in more detail specific MTG applicable

to the request and documentation required to justify the treatment recommended

for a patient in Ms. Spikes’ circumstances.

There is no indication in the record that any documentation, other than his

notes, accompanied Dr. Quillin’s request to the defendants for implementation of

the behavioral pain management he recommended for Ms. Spikes. When

appealing the second denial, Dr. Quillin did, however, quote a portion of the

defendants’ denial of his request then noted:

It appears that the review confused pharmacologic and CBT treatment
rendered for management of injury related depression with a request
for behavioral pain management. Please be advised that this patient
has never received either behavioral pain management or
biofeedback, at this clinic or any other clinic previously.

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He requested the denial be overturned because “the stated reason for the denial

[was] based on erroneous facts or assumptions.” He also stated “that the requested

services are appropriate under the OWCA Medical Guidelines . . . under Chapter

21, Subsection A, #9(a), (c) and (e) ii.-iv.”

We have reviewed Ms. Spikes’ medical records, the denials of treatment by

the defendants and Medical Services, the cited portions of the MTG, and the

depositions of Drs. Quillin and Datz. The only documents in the record pertaining

to Dr. Quillin’s requests for treatment are his notes and the letter quoted above.

Dr. Quillin’s notes do not cite the MTG substantiating his requests. In his note

dated February 2, 2012, Dr. Quillin referenced the approval of four biofeedback

units instead of the behavioral pain management he requested and explained: “We

are not initiating biofeedback at this time as this patient needs behavioral pain

management. Without same, her prognosis for effective management is essentially

nil given the multiple psychologic complications to her condition.” Dr. Quillin

also observed that he believed the lack of approval “may have resulted from a

misunderstanding of the medical treatment guidelines.” There is no indication,

however, that he specifically addressed the issue in his appeal to Medical Services

or his second request for treatment.

In his deposition, Dr. Quillin explained what MTG applied to his requests

and why the denial of his requests was not justified under the MTG in light of the

medical evidence submitted. He testified that based on the defendants’ denials of

his requests, he believed they “did not understand what we were asking and/or

what had been done.” Yet, he did not clearly state in his appeal to Medical

Services what treatment had been provided to Ms. Spikes and why the treatment he

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sought to have approved was necessary, and there is no evidence he explained that

in his second request for treatment to the defendants.

Dr. Quillin recognized that the MTG regarding behavioral pain management

can be confusing because not all the components of the treatment he recommended

are addressed in one location, and various components of the treatment are

contained in different sections. He explained that Section 2111(C)(2)(d) of the

MTG provides that “biofeedback treatment must be done in conjunction with the

patient’s psychosocial intervention.” Further, he acknowledged that Ms. Spikes

received brief psychotherapy, as referenced in the defendants’ denial, but asserted

that it was to address her anxiety and depression, not her pain syndrome.

According to Dr. Quillin, treating Ms. Spikes’ depression is “not going to do the

trick itself” because an integrated treatment plan that addresses her chronic pain

and her depression is needed.

Dr. Datz controverted Dr. Quillin’s testimony, explaining why the

requests were denied and what evidence was lacking to substantiate the requests.

Dr. Datz testified that although Dr. Quillin’s notes seem to address Ms. Spikes’

problems with depression more than her pain, she clearly understood, after

speaking with him, that he was suggesting treatment for chronic pain. She further

testified that she explained to him why his documentation was an issue and that a

modified approval would be suggested because no functional evidence “of any

type of psychological and/or pharmacological treatment being effective” for

Ms. Spikes had been presented. Dr. Datz also testified that she suggested to

Dr. Quillin that he document “how the intervention would help” Ms. Spikes and

that if the documentation was provided, the request would probably be approved.

Dr. Datz discussed more examples of why Dr. Quillin’s request for treatment were

11

deficient and identified more than one way in which he could have addressed those

deficiencies to have his request approved.

The WCJ is afforded considerable discretion in evaluating expert testimony,

and the decision to accept the testimony of one expert witness over the conflicting

testimony of another “can virtually never be manifestly erroneous.” Rosell v.

ESCO, 549 So.2d 840, 845 (La.1989). We find no manifest error in the WCJ’s

rejection of Ms. Spikes’ claim that the denials of Dr. Quillin’s requests for

behavioral pain management were improper because they were based on

competent medical evidence and expert testimony.

Ms. Spikes further contends that the MTG do not address behavioral pain

management; therefore, the defendants’ and Medical Services’ denials of

Dr. Quillin’s request for such treatment were improper. As Dr. Quillin testified,

while the MTG do not include a specific guideline that includes all the components

for behavioral pain management in one section, they do provide guidelines for

treating patients such as Ms. Spikes. Importantly, both Dr. Quillin and Dr. Datz

testified regarding MTG applicable to the conditions identified in Ms. Spikes’

medical records.

Ms. Spikes contends the WCJ erred in not awarding her penalties and

attorney fees for the defendants’ refusal to authorize the requests for behavioral

pain management with Dr. Quillin. The defendants argue the opposite: the WCJ

erred in not denying Ms. Spikes’ request for penalties and attorney fees. We have

considered Ms. Spikes’ arguments and found the WCJ’s rejection of her claims

regarding the treatment requested by Dr. Quillin appropriate. Therefore, the

WCJ’s refusal to award attorney fees and penalties was not erroneous, and the

defendants effectively received the result they seek.

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Referral to Pain Management Specialist

Dr. Gunderson referred Ms. Spikes to Dr. Katz for pain management in

December 2011 because she continued to suffer pain as a result of her 2008 injury.

Ms. Spikes contends the defendants’ refusal to authorize treatment with Dr. Katz

violated La.R.S. 23:1121(B)(1), which gives workers’ compensation claimants

“the right to select one treating physician in any field or specialty.”

In their exception of no cause of action, the defendants urged that

Ms. Spikes had no cause of action to choose a pain management specialist because

she had not established that such treatment was medically necessary as required by

the MTG. The WCJ denied the exception before the trial began.

The evidence shows confusion arose after the adoption of La.R.S. 23:1203.1

regarding what, if any, impact it had on a claimant’s right to choose a treating

physician in any field or specialty as provided in Section 1121(B)(1).

Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:1203.1 provides in pertinent part:

I. After the promulgation of the medical treatment schedule,
throughout this Chapter, and notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, medical care, services, and treatment due, pursuant to
R.S. 23:1203, et seq., by the employer to the employee shall mean
care, services, and treatment in accordance with the medical treatment
schedule. Medical care, services, and treatment that varies from the
promulgated medical treatment schedule shall also be due by the
employer when it is demonstrated to the medical director of the office
by a preponderance of the scientific medical evidence, that a variance
from the medical treatment schedule is reasonably required to cure or
relieve the injured worker from the effects of the injury or
occupational disease given the circumstances.

In March 2013, the Office of Workers’ Compensation Administration issued a

bulletin to clarify “an injured employee’s right to his/her choice of physician

without prior approval through the 1010 Form, Utilization Review Process.” See

Medical Treatment Guidelines and Choice of Physician − Clarifications;

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http://www.laworks.net/Downloads/OWC/COP_Bulletin.pdf. The bulletin

specifically notes that confusion existed regarding a claimant’s right to choose a

physician without the need for a 1010 Form. It provides, in pertinent part:

R.S. 23:1121(B)(1) gives an injured worker the right to his/her choice
of physician in any field or specialty (including pain management),
without the necessity of prior approval for the evaluation/consultation
via a 1010 Form. However, all medical care provided to the injured
worker, which may result from the evaluation, is subject to the
requirement that it be medically necessary as per R.S. 23:1203(A).
Any and all non-emergency medical care in excess of $750 which
may be requested by the injured workers’ choice of physician must be
submitted in accordance with the Medical Treatment Guidelines on a
1010 Form per the Utilization Review Rules.

After this clarification was issued, the defendants authorized the requested referral

to Dr. Katz.

Ms. Spikes seeks penalties and attorney fees for the defendants’ failure to

authorize the visit when requested. Penalties and attorney fees are not warranted

because of the uncertainty caused by the whether La.R.S. 23:1203.1 affected her

right to choose a physician as provided in La.R.S. 23:1121(B)(1) and because the

defendants authorized the referral once the issue was clarified.

Costs

Lastly, Ms. Spikes assigns error with the WCJ’s failure to award her costs.

Whether to award costs was within the discretion of the WCJ. La.R.S. 23:1317(B).

The WCJ denied most of Ms. Spikes’ requests for relief; accordingly, we find no

abuse of discretion with the WCJ’s denial of her request for costs.

The Defendants’ Assignments of Error

No Cause of Action

The defendants contend the WCJ erred in denying their exception of no

cause of action. They assert they denied Ms. Spikes’ request for referral to a pain

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management specialist on the basis that she did not establish treatment in that field

is medically necessary for her work injury and, therefore, was not in accordance

with the MTG. In light of the OWC’s March 2013 clarification that an injured

worker’s choice of physician must be submitted in accordance with the MTG only

if the evaluation or treatment sought exceeds $750, we find no error with the

WCJ’s denial of the exception.

Costs of Depositions and Medical Records

The defendants contend the WCJ should have assessed Ms. Spikes with the

costs they incurred taking the depositions of Dr. Datz and Dr. Paul E. Fenn in order

to defend their denials of Drs. Quillin’s and Gunderson’s requests for treatment.

We have determined the WCJ did not err in admitting the evidence; therefore, we

find no abuse of discretion with the WCJ’s failure to assess payment of the costs

associated with the depositions as payable by Ms. Spikes. La.R.S. 23:1317(B).

DISPOSITION
For these reasons, we find no error in the WCJ’s Judgment, and it is

affirmed. Each party is responsible for their own costs.

AFFIRMED.

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