Joel Guzman v. Jago Solutions, LLC

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-340

JOEL GUZMAN

VERSUS

JAGO SOLUTIONS, LLC, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – District 04
PARISH OF LAFAYETTE, NO. 16-03228
ANTHONY PAUL PALERMO, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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SHANNON J. GREMILLION
JUDGE

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Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Sylvia R. Cooks and
Shannon J. Gremillion, Judges.

REVERSED.

Kirk Lindsay Landry
Keogh, Cox & Wilson, Ltd.
P. O. Box 1151
Baton Rouge, LA 70821
(225) 383-3796
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
LCI Workers’ Comp

Jeffrey Waltz
The Waltz Law Group, L.L.C.
1100 Poydras St., Suite 2620
New Orleans, LA 70163
(504) 264-5260
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
Jago Solutions, LLC

William H. Beaumont
Roberto Luis Costales
Beaumont Costales, LLC
3801 Canal St., Suite 207
New Orleans, LA 70119
(504) 483-8008
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Joel Guzman

GREMILLION, Judge.

Plaintiff/appellant, Joel Guzman, appeals the dismissal of his workers’

compensation claim on an exception of no right of action. For the reasons that follow,

we reverse.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

On May 19, 2016, Mr. Guzman filed a Disputed Claim for Compensation (1008)

against Jago Solutions, LLC and LCI Workers’ Comp alleging that he was injured on

September 10, 2015, in Evergreen, Alabama, when he fell fifteen feet from a ladder.

On September 9, 2016, LCI filed exceptions of lack of procedural capacity, vagueness

and ambiguity, and insufficiency of service of process. These exceptions were

mirrored by those filed by Jago Solutions. However, Jago Solutions asserted in its

exception of lack of procedural capacity that it was no longer a juridical person

because it had been dissolved by the filing of an Affidavit of Dissolution filed with

the Louisiana Secretary of State on May 23, 2016.1

On October 13, 2016, LCI filed peremptory exceptions of extinguishment of

debt by confusion and no right of action. It asserted that, by operation of La.R.S.

12:1335.1, Mr. Guzman, as a member of Jago, personally assumed all obligations of

the limited liability company upon its dissolution. Therefore, under La.CivCode art.

1903, the obligee and obligor were “united in the same person.”2 Thus, the obligation

was extinguished. Jago followed with identical exceptions.

The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) heard the exceptions on November 4,

2016, and granted the exceptions by Judgment signed on November 7, 2016. Mr.

Guzman thereafter perfected this appeal and argues that the WCJ erred in granting the

exceptions because parties are precluded from presenting evidence in support of an

1
In support of its exception, Jago attached a printout from the Louisiana Secretary of State’s
website that showed Mr. Guzman as the manager of Jago and the filing of the Affidavit of
Dissolution.
2
Louisiana Civil Code Article 1903 reads, “When the qualities of obligee and obligor are
united in the same person, the obligation is extinguished by confusion.”

exception of no right of action and from asserting affirmative defenses in such an

exception.

ANALYSIS

“On the trial of the peremptory exception pleaded at or prior to the trial of the

case, evidence may be introduced to support or controvert any of the objections

pleaded, when the grounds thereof do not appear from the petition.” La.Code Civ.P.

art. 931. However, “[n]o evidence may be introduced at any time to support or

controvert the objection that the petition fails to state a cause of action.” Id. Evidence

is admissible to support or controvert an exception of no right of action. Howard v.

Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 07-2224 (La. 7/1/08), 986 So.2d 47.

“The function of the exception of no right of action is to determine whether the

plaintiff belongs to the class of persons to whom the law grants the cause of action

asserted in the suit.” Reese v. State, Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr., 03-1615, p. 2-3

(La. 2/20/04), 866 So.2d 244, 246. Accordingly:

[t]he focus in an exception of no right of action is on whether the
particular plaintiff has a right to bring the suit, but it assumes that the
petition states a valid cause of action for some person and questions
whether the plaintiff in the particular case is a member of the class that
has a legal interest in the subject matter of the litigation.

Id.

Mr. Guzman rightly points out that this court has previously held that

affirmative defenses are not appropriately raised or considered in exceptions of no

right of action. See Beslin v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 11-1523 (La.App. 3 Cir.

4/4/12), 87 So.3d 334; Madisonville State Bank v. Glick, 05-1372 (La.App. 3 Cir.

5/3/06), 930 So.2d 283; and Dugas v. Dugas, 01-669, (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/26/01), 804

So.2d 878, writ denied, 02-0652 (La. 5/24/02), 816 So.2d 307.

“[E]xtinguishment of the obligation in any manner” represents an affirmative

defense. La.Code Civ.P. art. 1005. Accordingly, that issue was inappropriately urged

before the WCJ in an exception of no right of action.

2

The judgment of the WCJ maintaining the exceptions of no right of action is

reversed. All costs of this appeal are assessed as costs to Appellees, Jago Solutions,

LLC, and LCI Workers’ Comp.

REVERSED.

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