Amy Duplechin v. St Landry Parish School Board

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

17-748

AMY DUPLECHIN

VERSUS

ST. LANDRY PARISH SCHOOL BOARD, ET AL.

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APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION – DISTRICT 4
PARISH OF EVANGELINE, NO. 14-03930
ANTHONY PALERMO, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

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MARC T. AMY
JUDGE

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Court composed of John D. Saunders, Marc T. Amy, and D. Kent Savoie, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Richard E. Smith
The Law Office of Richard E. Smith, APLC
1022 LaSavanne Drive
Breaux Bridge, LA 70517
Lafayette, LA 70501
(337) 247-4400
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Amy Duplechin

Courtney T. Joiner
Hammonds, Sills, Adkins & Guice, LLP
2431 S. Acadian Thruway, #600
Baton Rouge, LA 70808
(225) 923-3462
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE:
St. Landry Parish School Board

AMY, Judge.

The claimant school teacher reported a worsening of her underlying

respiratory condition after alleged exposure to mold in her middle school

classroom. The employer denied her claim. After the claimant filed a disputed

claim form and the parties submitted the matter on briefs and exhibits, the workers’

compensation judge denied benefits upon a finding that the claimant failed to

sustain her burden of proof as to causation. The claimant appeals, questioning the

denial of benefits and seeking an award of benefits, penalties and attorney fees.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

The record in this workers’ compensation matter indicates that the claimant,

Amy Duplechin, began employment as a teacher with the St. Landry Parish School

Board in 2000. During her employment, Ms. Duplechin suffered from respiratory

symptoms which resulted in periodic absences from her work. These absences

included a month-long period of extended sick leave in 2001,1 a 2005 semester-

long medical sabbatical,2 and another semester-long medical sabbatical in 2011. In

the physician’s statement accompanying this latter sabbatical, Dr. Jose Santiago,

indicated a February 9, 2011 diagnosis of sarcoidosis. The School Board

subsequently granted the claimant an extended sick leave from January 14, 2013,

through February 25, 2013. Dr. Santiago again noted sarcoidosis as the claimant’s

1
The extended sick leave is commemorated in the record by a physician’s statement
reflecting diagnoses of pyelonephritis, allergies, and bronchitis.
2
The claimant’s sabbatical medical leave application from the Spring 2005 semester
includes a physician’s statement reporting the claimant’s diagnosis as: ―Headache, Viral
Syndrome, Chronic Fatigue 2° Viral Syndrome[.]‖

diagnosis. By February 28, 2013, however, Dr. Santiago indicated that the

claimant was ―ready to return‖ to ―her full duties[.]‖

The claimant alleges that the present matter arose when she returned to

prepare her classroom for the fall 2013 semester on July 31, 2013. She explained

in her deposition that, upon moving a shelf in the classroom, she discovered black

mold on the back of the shelf and a type of ―mushroom growth all along the side of

[the] air conditioner unit.‖ Notes submitted into evidence by the School Board

indicate that both the claimant and custodial staff cleaned the visible condition.

The notations further reveal that the claimant was moved to a different classroom

and was provided with an air filtration device. 3 By the end of August 2013

however, the air filtration device was removed.

The claimant explained in the deposition entered into evidence that she last

worked on October 1, 2013 ―[b]ecause of [her] sarcoidosis and the effects that it

has on [her] body.‖ Additionally, in the claim form instituting this matter, she

alleged that she ―discovered the mold in the classroom and as a result of working

in the mold infested classroom has developed an aggravation of her condition of

lung sarcoidosis.‖ By the proceeding, the claimant suggested that the School

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The record indicates that the School Board engaged Poché Prouet Associates to conduct
an evaluation of samples taken from both classrooms. Noting that the classroom materials had
been cleaned and discarded, the firm explained that ―through visual observation it appeared that
there were several issues that could contribute to poor air quality and contribute to mold growth.‖
It noted that:

It is common for mold spores to be present in buildings. However, the level or
count of these spores should be much lower than that of those present outside. Air
samples were taken inside and outside for comparison. As you will find in the attached
analyzed sample results, mold spores were found. The type of mold spores found inside
are common in the outside air and typically found indoors due to the circulation of the
outdoor air to the indoor areas by the regular opening of doors and windows.

The report proposed certain corrective measures, which included cleaning air
conditioning coils and systems as well as repairing damaged walls in order to stop moisture
infiltration.

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Board ―failed to timely pay indemnity benefits and failed to timely authorize/pay

medical benefits.‖ In turn, she sought payment of penalties and attorney fees due

to a failure to reasonably controvert her claim.

The parties submitted the matter to the workers’ compensation judge on

briefs and exhibits. After consideration, the workers’ compensation judge

determined ―that the law and evidence favors the defendant for the reasons

assigned in open court.‖

The claimant appeals, asserting that:

[1.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was
clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN did not prove a
causal connection between her current physical condition and
exposure to mold.

[2.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was
clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN is not entitled to
indemnity or medical benefits.

[3.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was
clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN is not entitled to
indemnity or medical benefits.[4]

[4.] The Trial Court committed manifest error and was
clearly wrong in finding that AMY DUPLECHIN is not entitled to …
penalties or attorney’s fees.

Discussion
With regard to the type of claim for occupational disease advanced in this

case, La.R.S. 23:1031.1 provides that:

A. Every employee who is disabled because of the contraction
of an occupational disease as herein defined, or the dependent of an
employee whose death is caused by an occupational disease, as herein
defined, shall be entitled to the compensation provided in this Chapter
the same as if said employee received personal injury by accident
arising out of and in the course of his employment.

4
We note that duplication of Assignments 2 and 3 occurs in the appellant’s brief.

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B. An occupational disease means only that disease or illness
which is due to causes and conditions characteristic of and peculiar to
the particular trade, occupation, process, or employment in which the
employee is exposed to such disease. Occupational disease shall
include injuries due to work-related carpal tunnel syndrome.
Degenerative disc disease, spinal stenosis, arthritis of any type, mental
illness, and heart-related or perivascular disease are specifically
excluded from the classification of an occupational disease for the
purpose of this Section.

Noting that the above-provision includes broad and expansive wording in its

definition of a compensable occupational disease, the supreme court has explained

that, by definition, ―an occupational disease is one in which there is a demonstrated

causal link between the particular disease or illness and the occupation.‖ Arrant v.

Graphic Packaging Int’l, Inc., 13-2878, p. 21 (La. 5/5/15), 169 So.3d 296, 309.

Notwithstanding any arguments regarding a link between the disease and the

occupation that could exist in this case, the issue of causation of the claimant’s

alleged disability was the primary focus of the workers’ compensation ruling.

Causation

By her first two assignments of error, the claimant globally addresses certain

factual findings expressed in the workers’ compensation judge’s oral reasons for

ruling. In particular, the claimant challenges the workers’ compensation judge’s

rejection of her contention that her pre-existing condition of sarcoidosis was

exacerbated by her exposure to mold in the classroom which, in turn, caused the

resulting disability. She suggests that the factual determination was manifestly

erroneous, pointing to medical records from Dr. Santiago in the preceding months

that purportedly reveal no significant complaints. She further suggests that her

contemporaneous reporting to him of an increase in complaints—as she asserts

were demonstrated in records from that office beginning on August 1, 2013—

support a finding of a causal connection between her exposure and the ensuing

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disability. She suggests that this increase in her reported symptoms undermined

the trial court’s factual determination that:

While the Court finds that it is possible that her sarcoidosis was
exacerbated by the mold present in the classroom, the Court finds that
Ms. Duplechin has not proven that that exacerbation was what has
caused her disability. Her condition was not dormant prior to this
alleged exposure. There’s been no showing as to exactly what the
mold was, and there has been no further showing as to a causal
connection between her current physical condition and this alleged
incident. Ms. Duplechin has not worked since October of 2013 for St.
Landry Parish School Board. Yet, her testimony is that her condition
continues to deteriorate.

Therefore, the Court finds that there’s no causal connection
between her current physical condition and the alleged aggravating
event. The Court, therefore, does not find that Ms. Duplechin is
entitled to indemnity benefits or medical benefits.

On review, we first note that a workers’ compensation judgment and its

reasons for ruling are distinct documents. Lestage v. Nabors Drilling Co., 10-728

(La.App. 3 Cir. 12/8/10), 54 So.3d 133, writ denied, 11-0088 (La. 2/25/11), 58

So.3d 458. It is the former from which appeals are taken, not the reasons for

ruling. Id. Furthermore, whether this court focuses upon a targeted factual

finding, such as the exacerbation argument advanced by the claimant, or even the

general issue of causation, our review of the record and the documentary evidence

reveals no manifest error in the denial of benefits. See Clay v. Our Lady of

Lourdes Reg’l Med. Ctr., 11-1797, p. 11 (La. 5/8/12), 93 So.3d 536, 543

(providing ―that factual findings in workers’ compensation cases are subject to the

manifest error or clearly wrong standard of review.‖).

Notably, the claimant explained in her deposition that upon her return to

work after the February 2013 extended sick leave, she was ―sure that there were

some symptoms but they were manageable[.]‖ However, and while the claimant

makes reference to particularized visits with Dr. Santiago immediately before and

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after the purported exposure, those documents are not contained within the

appellate record. 5 In fact, while the exhibits contain numerous pages of Dr.

Santiago’s records, they do not include the documents to which the claimant refers.

Even if these exhibits had been presented to the workers’ compensation judge, an

event that is not reflected by the record, an appellate court cannot consider

evidence that has not been properly and officially offered and introduced into the

record. Denoux v. Vessel Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 07-2143 (La. 5/21/08), 983 So.2d 84.

While the exhibits introduced certainly reflect the claimant’s underlying condition,

as well has her later reporting of increased symptoms, they reveal neither her

general condition prior to July 2013, nor her reporting of worsening symptoms

immediately thereafter to the degree suggested by her brief. Thus, her assertion

that the trial court erred in not presuming that the exposure caused her disability is

without evidentiary support.

Rather, the record supports the trial court’s ultimate determination that she

otherwise failed to bear her burden of proving a causal connection between the

exposure and her present alleged disability. Of the records presented to this court,

Dr. Santiago’s 2014 records reveal that she was experiencing ―an exacerbation of

her sarcoidosis[,]‖ not that the exacerbation was attributable to a work-related

exposure. Similarly, an August 2014 letter from Dr. Santiago to the claimant’s

attorney revealed only the claimant’s condition and inability to return to work, not

5
The claimant’s brief attributes these exhibits to ―Claimant’s Exhibit No. 2 (Records of
Acadiana Medicine Clinic).‖ The record before the court, however, includes only exhibits
submitted by the School Board and those jointly introduced by the parties. The limited exhibits
attached to the claimant’s trial memorandum do not include the medical records cited by the
claimant. While the exhibits include records of the Acadiana Medicine Clinic as ―Joint Exhibit
M-1[,]‖ review of that exhibit indicates that it does not include records from the dates referenced
by the claimant in her brief to this court.

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a statement as to causation. At most, the records demonstrate that, in May 2015,

Dr. Santiago composed a letter in which he advised that:

[The claimant] has had multiple respiratory infections that she relates
to exposure to mold in her classroom as well as exposure to sick
children in the Fall and Winter initially and now throughout the
school year. This has caused her to miss work and file for disability.
In my medical opinion, her sarcoidosis was not caused by her school
environment. However, its therapy predisposes her to infection so it
is more probable than not her condition is aggr[a]vated by exposure to
the work environment and children. At present, she has not had an
allergic sensitization conversion to molds or environmental allergens.

Similarly, by a note entered in the records and addressed ―To Whom It May

Concern,‖ Dr. Santiago reported that he was treating the claimant and that: ―I feel

her respiratory symptoms are aggreviated [sic] by exposure to mold.‖ Again,

neither of these statements contain the type of evidence as to causation required by

La.R.S. 23:1031.1. Rather, they are only limited opinion as to whether exposure

aggravates the claimant’s condition.

In fact, the only definitive statement as to causation in this case was

submitted by the School Board in the form of a December 2015 report apparently

obtained as a second medical opinion. Therein, Dr. J. Darvin Hales reported the

alleged exposure and explained that:

[The claimant’s] old records were extensive and have been reviewed.
At no time could I tell that she had an exacerbation of sarcoidosis.
Although she has complained of shortness of breath and cough on a
continual basis since 2011, she has preserved pulmonary function,
both preserved FVC and FEV1. Furthermore, the mold investigation
done by Poche Prouet Associates failed to confirm any clear excess
level of mold in the classroom, and the mold exposure she complains
about occurred over a short period of time intermittently for less than
three months over two years ago. I do not see any evidence that she
has suffered any worsening of her sarcoidosis secondary to mold
exposure. From the records available, her sarcoidosis has been free of
any significant recurrence since at least 2012.

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Given the paucity of evidence regarding causation, and in light of the

workers’ compensation judge’s factual findings, we leave the underlying ruling as

to causation undisturbed. This finding pretermits consideration of the claimant’s

remaining prayer for indemnity benefits, as well as penalties and attorney fees.

DECREE

For the foregoing reasons, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed. Costs of

this proceeding are assessed to the claimant/appellant, Amy Duplechin.

AFFIRMED.

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