Junius Robinson v. Capital Staffing Services, Inc.

STATE OF LOUISIANA
COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

WCA 18-990

JUNIUS ROBINSON

VERSUS

CAPITAL STAFFING SERVICES, INC., ET AL.

**********

APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION - DISTRICT 3
PARISH OF CALCASIEU, NO. 15-06229
CHARLOTTE A. L. BUSHNELL, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

**********

JOHN E. CONERY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Ulysses Gene Thibodeaux, Chief Judge, Billy Howard Ezell,
and John E. Conery, Judges.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; SANCTIONS IMPOSED.

Michael B. Miller
Jacqueline K. Becker
Miller & Associates
Post Office Drawer 1630
Crowley, Louisiana 70527-1630
(337) 785-9500
COUNSEL FOR PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT:
Junius Robinson

Errol J. King, Jr.
Eric E. Pope
Brett W. Tweedel
Pamela N. Molnar
Blue Williams, L.L.P.
3421 North Causeway Boulevard, Suite 900
Metairie, Louisiana 70002
(504) 831-4091
COUNSEL FOR INTERVENOR/APPELLEE:
South East Personnel Leasing, Inc.

CONERY, Judge.

This case has a long and twisted procedural history. It is once again before

this court on an appeal by the claimant, Mr. Junius Robinson, of the Workers’

Compensation Judge’s (WCJ) June 11, 2018 judgment granting Mr. Robinson’s

employer, South East Personnel Leasing, Inc.’s motion to enforce a judgment

issued by this court in the case of Robinson v. Capital Staffing, 17-114 (La.App. 3

Cir. 10/18/17), 230 So.3d 643 (Robinson I). For the following reasons, we affirm

in part, reverse in part, and impose sanctions.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On October 2, 2015, Mr. Robinson filed an LDOL 1008 claim seeking

workers’ compensation indemnity benefits, alleging he was injured while in the

course and scope of his employment. Once his employer situation was resolved,

he began to receive indemnity benefits from his employer South East, who

assumed the defense in this case.

After South East began paying workers’ compensation indemnity benefits to

Mr. Robinson, it scheduled a November 30, 2015 appointment for him to be

examined by Dr. Harold Granger. Mr. Robinson missed the appointment, and it

was rescheduled by South East for January 11, 2016. Mr. Robinson arrived at Dr.

Granger’s office more than forty-five minutes late and was informed that Dr.

Granger had left for the day. Based on Mr. Robinson’s failure to attend the second

appointment with Dr. Granger, South East suspended Mr. Robinson’s indemnity

benefits pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1124 and La.R.S. 23:1201.1(A)(4) and (5). 1

Ultimately, after Mr. Robinson was finally examined by Dr. Granger, South East

1
The panel in Robinson I engaged in an extensive discussion of the requirements of
La.R.S. 23:1124 and La.R.S. 23:1201.1(A)(4) and (5). La.R.S. 23:1201.1(A)(4), discussed infra.

reinstated Mr. Robinson’s indemnity benefits on approximately April 14, 2016.

The amount of the suspended indemnity benefits totaled $5,133.26.

In June 2016, Mr. Robinson filed a motion seeking penalties and attorney

fees for South East’s suspension of his indemnity benefits. After a hearing, the

WCJ found that South East had violated the workers’ compensation law by failing

to first obtain an order compelling his attendance at the medical examinations with

Dr. Granger. The WCJ issued a judgment awarding Mr. Robinson $8,000 in

penalties and $6,000 in attorney fees.

South East filed a writ application with this court challenging the WCJ’s

ruling. Another panel of this court concluded that the WCJ’s judgment was a final

and appealable judgment and converted the writ application to an appeal. See

Robinson v. Capital Staffing, 16-829 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/1/16) (unpublished writ

decision.)

On appeal, a panel of this court in Robinson I reversed the ruling of the WCJ

and found that the notice to Mr. Robinson’s counsel by facsimile of the termination

of his indemnity benefits for failure to attend a scheduled medical appointment was

sufficient to satisfy the requirements of La.R.S. 23:1201.1(A)(4) and (5) as

required by Section 1124. The court stated, “Having determined that South East

complied with the requirements of La.R.S. 23:1124 and La.R.S. 23:1201.1(4) and

(5) when it suspended Mr. Robinson’s [indemnity] benefits, we reverse the WCJ’s

awards of penalties and attorney fees.” Robinson I, 230 So.3d at 650-51. All costs

were assessed to Mr. Robinson.

Meanwhile, shortly before the panel in Robinson I decided the case, South

East paid the penalties and attorney fees with interest to Mr. Robinson as had been

2

ordered by the WCJ’s judgment.2 The payment of the amounts owed during the

devolutive appeal was not communicated to the panel in Robinson I, which issued

its opinion on October 18, 2017. Mr. Robinson sought rehearing of the October 18,

2017 appellate ruling in Robinson I, which was denied by that panel on December

6, 2017. Mr. Robinson did not apply for writs to the supreme court, and the

Robinson I ruling became final on December 6, 2017.

Mr. Robinson and his attorney, Mr. Michael Miller, did not refund the

penalties and attorney fees pursuant to the panel’s ruling in Robinson I. Nor did

they refund the Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits South East had paid to

Mr. Robinson. On April 5, 2018, South East filed a Motion to Enforce Judgment,

seeking an order from the Office of Workers’ Compensation to enforce this court’s

appellate ruling in Robinson I. South East claimed it had paid the WCJ’s judgment

in full, including the penalties, attorney fees, and the amount of suspended benefits

with interest, but had not received Mr. Robinson’s reimbursement payment after

amicable written demand. In response, Mr. Robinson filed an exception of res

judicata wherein he asserted South East never requested any reimbursement of the

funds paid toward the penalties and attorney fees paid by South East while the case

was on appeal in Robinson I.

After a hearing, on May 23, 2018, the WCJ issued a judgment dated June 11,

2018, which denied Mr. Robinson’s exception of res judicata and granted South

East’s motion to enforce judgment for the repayment of the penalties and attorney

fees. The WCJ ordered Mr. Robinson to repay the penalties to South East in the

2
The record includes two checks dated October 3, 2016 to Junius Robertson in the
amount of $8,037.10 and to Michael Miller, Attorney at Law, in the amount of $6,020.23, from
Lion Insurance Company.

3

amount of $8,027.10. At Mr. Robinson’s counsel’s request, the parties stipulated

in open court and the WCJ ordered the $8,027.10 in penalties would be paid by a

reduction of fifty percent of Mr. Robinson’s weekly indemnity benefits until the

entire sum had been paid. Counsel for South East asked the WCJ if “The attorney

fees will be repaid in a lump sum?” To which counsel for Mr. Robinson, Mr.

Miller replied, “I’m going to pay that in a lump sum, Judge.” (Emphasis added.)

Counsel for South East was ordered by the WCJ to prepare a judgment ordering

Mr. Robinson to repay the penalties of $8,027.10 by reducing his weekly

indemnity benefits by fifty percent, and ordering Mr. Miller to repay the attorney

fees of $6,020.33 to South East in a lump sum payment. When questioned about

the “issue of the TTD benefits,” the WCJ responded, “That’s not before the Court

today.” Therefore, no ruling on the issue of TTD benefits was included in the June

11, 2018 judgment.

On June 21, 2018, Mr. Robinson filed a Motion and Order for New Trial.

Following a July 23, 2018 hearing, the WCJ denied the motion on August 9, 2018.

The WCJ also denied South East’s motion for sanctions, but its succinct ruling

contained no analysis, findings, or reasons. Mr. Robinson then filed an appeal of

the WCJ’s judgment denying a new trial. South East responded by filing a motion

to dismiss Mr. Robinson’s appeal of the denial of a new trial on the basis that a

judgment denying a new trial is interlocutory, and not normally appealable

In Robinson v. Capital Staffing, 18-990 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/27/19), 269 So.3d

823 (Robinson II), another panel of this court denied South East’s motion to

dismiss the appeal. The panel agreed with South East “that a judgment denying a

motion for new trial is an interlocutory order and is normally not appealable.” Id.

at 825. However, the Robinson II panel quoted Edwards v. Southeastern Freight

4

Lines, Inc., 14-871, p. 3 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/15/14), 149 So.3d 1020, 1021, and

stated:

[I]n cases in which the motion for appeal states that the appeal is
being taken only from the judgment on a motion for new trial[,]
but the appellant exhibits the intent to appeal the judgment on the
merits, this court has held that the appeal can, nonetheless, be
considered as an appeal of the judgment on the merits. McClure [v.
City of Pineville, 05-1460 (La.App. 3 Cir. 12/6/06) ], 944 So.2d
805, [writ denied, 07-43 (La. 3/9/07), 949 So.2d 446]; Thompson v.
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 95-258 (La.App. 3 Cir. 10/4/95), 663
So.2d 191.

Robinson II, 269 So.3d at 825.

The court in Robinson II further found that:

In this case, it is clear from Mr. Robinson’s assignments of
error that he seeks to appeal the judgment of June 11, 2018, which
granted [South East’s] motion to enforce judgment, denied
Robinson’s exception of res judicata and ordered Robinson to repay
[South East] by reducing his indemnity benefits by fifty percent. In as
much as Robinson has demonstrated his intent to appeal the
underlying judgment, we find that the appeal should be considered as
an appeal of that judgment. Therefore, we deny [South East’s] motion
to dismiss the appeal.

Id.

South East filed an Answer to Mr. Robinson’s appeal seeking the imposition

of sanctions based on Mr. Robinson’s allegedly frivolous motion for a new trial

pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(B)(1), which was denied by the WCJ in its

August 9, 2018 judgment at issue in Robinson II.

The panel in Robinson II did not address South East’s request for sanctions

for Mr. Robinson’s frivolous appeal, pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(B)(1), or

the WCJ’s denial of his motion for new trial, but instead converted the entire case

to an appeal of the June 11, 2018 judgment. As such South East continues to

assign as error in the matter now before this court that the WCJ failed to award

sanctions based on Mr. Robinson’s filing of a meritless motion for new trial.

5

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR ON APPEAL

Mr. Robinson filed the following assignments of error on appeal:

1.) The workers’ compensation judge erred in ordering Junius
Robinson to repay his employer by reducing his indemnity
benefits by 50%.

2.) It was error to deny Junius Robinson[’s] exception of res
judicata.

South East filed the following assignments of error on appeal:

1. The denial of a motion for new trial and the denial of an
exception of res judicata are non-appealable non-final
interlocutory judgments.3

2. The trial court erred in failing to award sanctions against
Appellant for filing a meritless motion for new trial.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

In this case, Mr. Robinson has raised the res judicata effect of the prior

judgment in Robinson I, which is a question of law that is reviewed on appeal de

novo. Fogleman v. Meaux Surface Prot., Inc., 10-1210 (La.App. 3 Cir. 3/9/11), 58

So.3d 1057, writ denied, 11-712 (La. 5/27/11), 63 So.3d 995.

Denial of the Exception of Res Judicata

Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4231 governs the application of res judicata

and provides:

Except as otherwise provided by law, a valid and final
judgment is conclusive between the same parties, except on appeal or
other direct review, to the following extent:

(1) If the judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, all causes of
action existing at the time of final judgment arising out of the
transaction extinguished and merged in the judgment.

3
These issues were addressed in Robinson II.

6

(2) If the judgment is in favor of the defendant, all causes of
action at the time of final judgment arising out of the transaction
or occurrence that is the subject matter of the litigation are
extinguished and the judgment bars a subsequent action on those
causes of action.

(3) A judgment in favor of either the plaintiff or the
defendant is conclusive, in any subsequent action between them,
with respect to any issue actually litigated and determined if its
determination was essential to that judgment.

(Emphasis added.)

The burden of proving the facts essential to sustaining the exception of res

judicata is on the party pleading the objection, in this case Mr. Robinson. Palermo

v. Century Indem. Co., 17-825 (La.App. 3 Cir. 5/23/18), 248 So.3d 462.

Mr. Robinson argues that South East had the opportunity to inform the

appellate panel in Robinson I that the amount of penalties and attorney fees with

interest awarded by the WCJ had been paid prior to the ruling of this court issued

on October 18, 2017. Further, he argues that there is no language in the Robinson I

ruling that specifically required the repayment of the amounts paid by South East.

Accordingly, he argues that res judicata prevents South East from seeking to

enforce the judgment in Robinson I.

For the reasons stated on the record after a hearing held on May 23, 2018,

the WCJ did not agree, as she overruled Mr. Robinson’s exception of res judicata

and stated:

As to the motion to enforce judgment, the judgment of this
court was reversed by the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeal. On page 11,
the 3rd Circuit Court of Appeal said, “having determined that South
East complied with the requirements of R.S. 23:1124 and
23:1201.1[4] and [5] when it suspended Mr. Robinson’s benefits, we
reverse[] the workers’ compensation -- the WCJ’s award of penalties
and attorney fees.” Therefore, as it relates to penalties and attorney
fees, the motion to enforce judgment is granted.

7

In Silk v. Silk, 29,864 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/24/97), 699 So.2d 1175, the court

discussed the meaning of a final judgment defined in La.Code Civ.P. art. 1841 as

“[a] judgment that determines the merits in whole or in part.” In this case, as in

Silk, the judgment of the WCJ was only devolutively appealed and subject to

execution once the suspensive delays lapsed. The Silk court stated that should the

claimant choose to collect on the judgment, it would be “subject to her implied

obligation, in the event the judgment in her favor was reversed on appeal, to return

to the defendants the proceeds of execution or the voluntary payments made to

avoid execution.” Id. at 1177 (citations omitted). Further, “[a] final judgment

which has been only devolutively appealed and which may be provisionally

executed while the appeal is pending does not become conclusive of the rights of

the parties (or definitive in prior terminology) until the appeal is decided.” Id. As

previously stated, Mr. Robinson did not file a writ with the supreme court after this

court’s ruling in Robinson I, which then became final and “conclusive of the rights

of the parties.” We therefore find that the WCJ did not err in denying Mr.

Robinson’s exception of res judicata and in granting South East’s motion to

enforce this court’s judgment in Robinson I.

Reduction of Indemnity Benefits

Mr. Robinson now makes the disingenuous argument that the WCJ erred in

ordering him to repay South East the amount of the penalty award of $8,027.10 by

“reducing his indemnity benefits by 50%.”

At the time the WCJ issued its ruling at the hearing on the exception,

counsel for Mr. Robinson requested in open court that his client be allowed to

repay the amount owed of $8,027.10 by “giving up half of his weekly checks.”

After a discussion off the record, the WCJ stated, “I think the parties have agreed

8

that the repayment will be made – I will let you all indicate how the repayments

will be made.”

Counsel for Mr. Robinson, Mr. Miller, then stated on the record that the

amount would be paid “by reducing his weekly compensation benefits by 50

percent until the entirety is paid.” Counsel for South East agreed, and the WCJ

“[S]o ordered.” Accordingly, Mr. Robinson’s first assignment of error has no

merit, as the parties stipulated to the manner of repayment of the penalties to South

East by Mr. Robinson.

Mr. Robinson’s counsel, Mr. Miller, also stipulated in open court that he

would pay back the attorney fees, and stated “I’m going to pay that in a lump sum,

Judge.” When questioned about this stipulation at oral argument, Mr. Miller had

the temerity to state that he meant only that he would repay the attorney fees he

received subject to his right to further contest the issue on appeal. The record is

notably silent as to such a reservation of rights

Finally, we note that counsel for Mr. Robinson also contended in brief and

oral argument in this case that La.R.S. 23:1206 was applicable, and that under that

statute, South East was not entitled to recover the penalties and attorney fees

awarded by this court in Robinson I. Mr. Miller had argued that issue at the

hearing on Mr. Robinson’s motion for new trial, but the WCJ correctly found it

was not applicable. We agree that La.R.S. 23:1206 is not applicable to this case.

The statute provides as follows, “Any voluntary payment or unearned

wages paid by the employer or insurer either in money or otherwise, to the

employee or dependent, and accepted by the employee, which were not due and

payable when made, may be deducted from the payments to be made as

compensation.” La.R.S. 23:1206 (emphasis added). The payments made by South

9

East in this case were hardly “voluntary,” as the payments were due as a result of

the WCJ’s judgment and no suspensive appeal had been filed. Louisiana Revised

Statutes 23:1206 would apply to an overpayment of TTD benefits and the ability of

an employer to recover TTD benefits. The WCJ in its June 11, 2018 judgment

clearly stated that TTD payments were not before the court at that hearing, stating

“no ruling was made as to the TTD payment as the Court did not find that issue to

be before the Court.”

The WCJ was correct in ruling that La.R.S. 23:1206 has no application to

the issues presently before this court involving the enforcement of a final judgment.

In Shatoska v. International Grain Transfer, Inc., 634 So.2d 897 (La.App. 1 Cir.

1993), both the appellants and the appellee argued that La.R.S. 23:1206 applied.

However, the court in Shatoska, found that La.R.S. 23:1206 and the cases

interpreting it were inapplicable to the facts of that case and stated:

This statute provides for deductions from benefits for “voluntary”
payments made by an employer or insurer, when such payments
“were not due and payable when made.” This statute is designed to
reimburse an employer (or insurer) who makes voluntary payments,
overpayments or wages equal to or exceeding the amount of
compensation after an accident, prior to a judicial determination of
disability. . . . The payments made to the plaintiff by Rockwood were
not “voluntary payments” within the contemplation of the statute; they
were made pursuant to a judicial order. The fact that a technical error
caused the payments to be made in excess of that ordered does not
bring such payments within the scope of this statute.

Id. at 899.

South East’s Request for Repayment of TTD Benefits

In a colloquy with the WCJ after the parties stipulated to the manner of

repayment of the penalties and attorney fees to South East, counsel for South East

raised the issue of the repayment of the “TTD benefits” paid in error to Mr.

Robinson. The WCJ responded, “That’s not before the court today.” The June 11,

10

2018 judgment stated: “[N]o ruling was made as to the TTD payments as the Court

did not find that that issue to be before the Court.”

In its original appellee brief, South East discusses the issue of the repayment

of the TTD benefits paid to Mr. Robinson for South East’s termination of his

indemnity benefits as a result of his failure to keep his appointments with Dr.

Granger. South East asks this court to reverse the WCJ’s June 18, 2018 judgment

and grant the repayment to South East of $5,133.62 in TTD benefits.

However, South East did not file a separate appeal of the WCJ’s June 18,

2018 judgment, as to this issue. The WCJ found the issue of the TTD benefits was

not before the court. Nor did South East raise that issue in its answer to the appeal

of Mr. Robinson. In a case such as this, we find that La.Code Civ.P. art. 2133(A)

controls:

An appellee shall not be obliged to answer the appeal unless he
desires to have the judgment modified, revised, or reversed in part or
unless he demands damages against the appellant. In such cases, he
must file an answer to the appeal, stating the relief demanded, not
later than fifteen days after the return day or the lodging of the record
whichever is later. The answer filed by the appellee shall be
equivalent to an appeal on his part from any portion of the judgment
rendered against him in favor of the appellant and of which he
complains in his answer.

The Louisiana Supreme Court in Matthews v. Consolidated Companies, Inc,

95-1925, pp. 1-2 (La. 12/8/95), 664 So.2d 1191, 1191-92 (citations omitted),

discussed the application of La.Code Civ.P. art. 2133 and stated:

Since only plaintiff appealed, and defendants did not appeal or
answer plaintiff’s appeal, the total amount of damages awarded by
the jury to plaintiff cannot be reduced by the appellate court because
to so do would result in a modification in favor of the non-appealing
defendant, contrary to Louisiana law. La.CCP art. 2133 . . . . While a
defendant who has not appealed or answered the appeal and who did
not seek modification, revision or reversal of that judgment may
assert in support of that judgment any argument supported by the

11

record under La.CCP art. 2133, he may not obtain a modification of
the judgment without appealing or answering the appeal.

The WCJ’s June 11, 2018 judgment at issue granted only a part of the relief

sought by South East, the repayment of the penalties and attorney fees paid to Mr.

Robinson and his counsel while the case was on appeal before this court.

Accordingly, the WCJ intentionally did not address the issue of the repayment of

the TTD benefits improperly received by Mr. Robinson. Without a separate appeal

or answer to the appeal of Mr. Robinson by South East requesting that portion of

the WCJ’s June 18, 2018 judgment on the issue of the TTD benefits be reversed,

this court finds it is without jurisdiction to review or grant South East’s requested

relief, as that issue must first be raised in a filing by South East with the WCJ.

South East’s Request for Sanctions

We find that when the judgment of this court in Robinson I became final on

December 6, 2017, Mr. Robinson and his attorney had a legal obligation to return

the awards previously made by the WCJ based on the court’s final ruling reversing

those awards for penalties and attorney fees in Robinson I. Louisiana Civil Code

Article 2299 states, “A person who has received a payment or a thing not owed to

him is bound to restore it to the person from whom he received it.” Though the

language of the panel’s opinion in Robinson I did not include a direct order to

return monies prematurely paid as a result of the WCJ’s overturned judgment, the

effect of the Robinson I final judgment created a legal obligation to do so on the

part of both Mr. Robinson and especially his attorney, who well understood the

legal effects of the panel’s Robinson I opinion. Silk, 699 So.2d 1175; Shatoska,

634 So.2d 897.

There certainly should have been no need for South East to have to file a

12

“Motion To Enforce Judgment” before the WCJ. Instead in response, Mr.

Robinson’s counsel, still resisting the final judgment of this court in Robinson I,

filed an exception of res judicata with the WCJ, prompting yet another hearing.

The WCJ entered its June 11, 2018 judgment in favor of South East ordering Mr.

Robinson and his attorney to return the monies previously paid by South East, and

even accepted Mr. Miller’s stipulation that the penalties owed be repaid over time

by reducing Mr. Robinson’s indemnity benefits by half until repaid and the

stipulation that Mr. Miller would repay the attorney fees.

In response to the June 11, 2018 judgment, Mr. Robinson’s counsel then

filed a motion for a new trial. South East responded by filing a motion for

sanctions pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(B)(1). That Article states in

pertinent part:

B. Pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit or
certificate, except as otherwise provided by law, but the signature of
an attorney or party shall constitute a certification by him that he has
read the pleading, and that to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief formed after reasonable inquiry, he certifies all of the
following:

(1) The pleading is not being presented for any improper purpose,
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the
cost of litigation.

(2) Each claim, defense, or other legal assertion in the pleading is
warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.

(3) Each allegation or other factual assertion in the pleading has
evidentiary support or, for a specifically identified allegation or
factual assertion, is likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.

(4) Each denial in the pleading of a factual assertion is warranted
by the evidence or, for a specifically identified denial, is reasonably
based on a lack of information or belief.

13

The WCJ promptly denied Mr. Robinson’s motion for new trial. The WCJ

denied South East’s requested sanctions, but stated no reasons for doing so.

Instead of complying with the judgment and stipulations as to repayment of

penalties and attorney fees, Mr. Robinson and his attorney then filed an appeal of

the denial by the WCJ of his motion for a new trial. South East filed a motion to

dismiss the appeal

The appeal of the motion for new trial by Mr. Robinson resulted in a ruling

by this court in Robinson II wherein another panel of this court denied South East’s

motion to dismiss Mr. Robinson’s appeal of the denial of a new trial, but only

because it found it was interlocutory. The panel found instead that Mr. Robinson

intended to also appeal the judgment on the merits dated, June 11, 2018, and

ordered that an appeal order be issued. The appeal allowed by Robinson II, based

on the WCJ’s June 11, 2018 judgment in favor of South East and the denial of Mr.

Robinson and Mr. Miller’s motion for new trial, is now before this court yet again.

Therefore, based on a full record review and the facts as found above, we

find that the WCJ abused her discretion by failing to award sanctions. We reverse

that finding and find that the refusal by Mr. Robinson and his counsel, Mr. Miller,

to abide by the stipulated judgment entered at the hearing on January 11, 2018 is in

direct violation of La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(B)(1)-(4). These sanctions are

warranted based on the continued refusal of Mr. Miller, as counsel for Mr.

Robinson, to return the penalties and attorney fees that were due and owing from

December 6, 2017, when the Robinson I panel’s opinion became a final judgment,

in spite of his stipulation in open court before the WCJ that he would do so.

Further, the award of sanctions to South East, pursuant to La.Code Civ.P. art.

863(D), is a result of Mr. Miller’s continued filing of pleadings which this court

14

finds were presented for the “improper purpose” of “harassing,” causing

“unnecessary delay,” and needlessly increasing “the cost of litigation.” La.Code

Civ.P. art. 863(B)(1).

Based on the filing of the motion for new trial and later appeal of the denial

of the motion for new trial by Mr. Miller, we hereby award sanctions representing

our calculation of reasonable attorney fees based on our record review as requested

by South East against Mr. Miller personally and fix that sum at $7,500.00.

La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(B)(1)-(4); La.Code Civ.P. art. 863(D); La.Code Civ.P. art.

2164;4 Blanchet v. Boudreaux, 15-60 (La.App. 3 Cir. 8/19/15), 175 So.3d 460,

writ denied, 15-2156 (La. 1/25/16), 185 So.3d 749; Mendonca v. Tidewater, Inc.,

11-318 (La.App. 4 Cir. 9/7/11), 73 So.3d 407, writ denied, 11-2333 (La. 12/2/11),

76 So.3d 1179.

CONCLUSION

After a thorough de novo review of the record, and for the foregoing reasons,

we affirm the June 11, 2018 ruling of the Workers’ Compensation Judge. We

further affirm the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s August 9, 2018 ruling in its

denial of the Motion for New trial.

This time LET US BE CLEAR. As soon as this judgment becomes final, it

is Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that Mr. Junius Robinson is hereby ordered to

pay unto South East Personnel Leasing, Inc., the sum of $8,037.10, plus legal

interest from December 6, 2017, the date of the final judgment in Robinson I,

4
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure Article 2164 provides:

The appellate court shall render any judgment which is just, legal, and
proper upon the record on appeal. The court may award damages, including
attorney fees, for frivolous appeal or application for writs, and may tax the costs
of the lower or appellate court, or any part thereof, against any party to the suit, as
in its judgment may be considered equitable.

15

payable by forfeiting fifty percent of his weekly indemnity benefits until paid. It is

further hereby Ordered, Adjudged and Decreed that Mr. Michael Miller is hereby

ordered to pay unto South East Personnel Leasing, Inc. the sum of $6,020.33, plus

legal interest from December 6, 2017, the date of the final judgment in Robinson I.

For the foregoing reasons, we further reverse the Workers’ Compensation

Judge’s August 9, 2018 ruling to the extent it denied sanctions to South East

Personnel Leasing, Inc. and hereby impose sanctions against Mr. Michael Miller in

the sum of $7,500.00. It is further Ordered, Adjusted and Decreed that Mr.

Michael Miller shall pay unto South East Personnel Leasing, Inc. the sum of

$7,500.00, legal interest from December 6, 2017, the date of the final judgment in

Robinson I, and the costs of the Motion for New Trial below, as well as all costs on

appeal.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; SANCTIONS IMPOSED.

16