Darrellyn Hayes on Behalf of Fabeka Hayes v. Church's Chicken

STATE OF LOUISIANA

COURT OF APPEAL, THIRD CIRCUIT

22-395

DARRELLYN HAYES
ON BEHALF OF FABEKA HAYES

VERSUS

CHURCH’S CHICKEN

**********

ON APPEAL FROM THE
OFFICE OF WORKERS’ COMPENSATION, DISTRICT 9
PARISH OF IBERIA, NO. 20-07410
ELIZABETH C. LANIER, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION JUDGE

**********

JONATHAN W. PERRY
JUDGE

**********

Court composed of Candyce G. Perret, Jonathan W. Perry, and Charles
G. Fitzgerald, Judges.

AFFIRMED.

Roger A. Javier
The Javier Law Firm, LLC
1340 Poydras Street, Suite 2100
New Orleans, Louisiana 70112
(504) 599-8570
COUNSEL FOR CLAIMANT/APPELLANT:
Darrellyn Hayes

Philip J. Borne
Kyle D. Anderson
Christovich & Kearney, LLP
601 Poydras Street, Suite 2300
New Orleans, Louisiana 70130
(504) 561-5700
COUNSEL FOR EMPLOYER/APPELLEE:
Cajun Operating Company
d/b/a Church’s Chicken

PERRY, Judge.

In this workers’ compensation case, the issue before us is whether the

employee’s death arose out of her employment, which would entitle the deceased

employee’s mother to benefits under Louisiana’s workers’ compensation statutes.

For the reasons stated below, we find her death did not.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On May 12, 2020, Fabeka Hayes (“Fabeka”) was working as a manager of

Church’s Chicken located at 601 West Saint Peter Street, New Iberia, Louisiana. At

approximately 10:00 p.m., Fabeka was in the process of closing the restaurant when

Clarence Joseph Payton (“Payton”) entered the establishment and fatally shot her.

Darrellyn Hayes (“Appellant”), Fabeka’s mother, filed a disputed claim for

compensation on December 16, 2020. Therein, Appellant sought death benefits,

burial expenses, penalties, attorney fees, costs, and judicial interest.

Fabeka’s employer, Cajun Operating Company doing business as Church’s

Chicken (“Church’s Chicken”), answered asserting an affirmative defense.

Specifically, it alleged “[t]he death of employee, Fabeka Hayes, on May 12, 2020[,]

is not compensable pursuant to La.R.S. 23:1031(E)” which provides:

An injury by accident should not be considered as having arisen
out of the employment and thereby not covered by the provisions of this
Chapter if the employer can establish that the injury arose out of a
dispute with another person or employee over matters unrelated to the
injured employee’s employment.

Following trial on February 15, 2022, the workers’ compensation judge

(“WCJ”) found Fabeka’s death did occur within the course and scope of her

employment with Church’s Chicken on May 12, 2020, but Fabeka’s death did not

arise out of her employment duties with Church’s Chicken. Specifically, the WCJ

concluded that “the death of [Fabeka] revolved around a domestic dispute with

Clarence Payton, [Fabeka]’s estranged boyfriend/domestic partner, and thus was a

dispute with another person over matters unrelated to the employee’s job.” As a

result, judgment was rendered in favor of Church’s Chicken, dismissing Appellant’s

claims with prejudice.

APPELLANT’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

On appeal, Appellant contends:

The trial court erred in dismissing Appellant’s claims for death
benefits, funeral expenses, attorney fees, costs[,] and judicial interest.
Defendant did not meet its burden of proving Fabeka Hayes[] was
engaged in a “dispute” at the time she was fatally shot by Clarence
Payton during the course and scope of her employment. Therefore, the
trial court’s Judgment finding was manifestly erroneous in light of the
evidence and should be reversed.

APPELLANT’S ARGUMENT

Appellant contends the evidence proves there was no altercation or dispute,

but rather a unilateral violent, physical attack on Fabeka. Thus, Appellant argues

the judgment of the WCJ denying workers’ compensation benefits was manifestly

erroneous.

APPELLEE’S POSITION

Church’s Chicken contends the evidence proves Fabeka’s death arose out of

a domestic dispute with Payton and was a matter unrelated to her employment. Thus,

Church’s Chicken argues the WCJ properly found Fabeka’s death did not arise out

of her employment duties and, therefore, Appellant is not entitled to benefits under

Louisiana’s workers’ compensation statutes.

LAW AND DISCUSSION

To establish entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits, a claimant must

show that a personal injury was sustained by an accident arising out of and in the

course and scope of employment. La.R.S. 23:1031(A). Factual findings in workers’

compensation cases are subject to the manifest error standard of review. Buxton

v. Iowa Police Dep’t, 09-520 (La. 10/20/09), 23 So.3d 275.

2

Appellant argues Church’s Chicken did not meet its burden of proving that

Fabeka was engaged in a dispute at the time she was fatally shot by Payton. Rather,

Appellant contends the evidence shows Fabeka had ended the relationship and

severed all ties with Payton days before she was killed. Appellant further asserts

video surveillance of the event clearly shows Fabeka did not actively engage or fight

back with Payton before being fatally shot. Therefore, Appellant argues the WCJ

was clearly wrong in finding Fabeka was engaged in a dispute with Payton at the

time of her death.

Church’s Chicken argues Fabeka’s death did not arise out of her employment;

rather, Fabeka’s death at Payton’s hands regrettably arose out of a domestic dispute

which coincidentally occurred at Fabeka’s place of employment. Church’s Chicken

notes that, in its Reasons for Judgment, the WCJ found “this was a domestic dispute”

and further declared “[d]omestic violence is or consists of matters unrelated to

employment.” To support its contention that Fabeka’s death did not arise out of her

employment, Church’s Chicken relies on the holding in Guillory v. Interstate Gas

Station, 94-1767 (La. 3/30/95), 653 So.2d 1152. Therein, the supreme court noted,

“[t]he principal objective of the ‘arising out of employment’ requirement is to

separate accidents attributable to employment risks, which form the basis of the

employer’s obligation under the compensation system, from accidents attributable

to personal risks, for which the employer should normally not be responsible.” Id.

at 1154. Church’s Chicken also points to Appellant’s testimony as the evidence

most supportive of its contention that Fabeka’s death arose out of a dispute with

Payton over matters unrelated to Fabeka’s employment. We agree.

In the instant case, Appellant testified that Fabeka and Payton lived together

for approximately twelve years, and, on at least two occasions, Payton threatened or

attempted to kill Fabeka. The first incident occurred while Payton and Fabeka lived

3

with Appellant. Payton threatened to kill Fabeka, and members of Fabeka’s family

physically attacked Payton. The second incident occurred only four days before

Fabeka was killed by Payton. According to Appellant, on May 8, 2020, Payton

choked and tried to kill Fabeka, which caused Fabeka to leave the home she shared

with Payton and move into Appellant’s home. Appellant recalled that the last time

she saw Fabeka was May 10, 2020, on the morning Appellant travelled out of state

and, according to Appellant, no communication occurred between Fabeka and

Payton from May 8, 2020, until May 10, 2020.

Although Appellant argues the WCJ erred in concluding that an ongoing

domestic dispute with Payton existed when Fabeka was fatally shot, the record

before us proves otherwise. In fact, we find the following colloquy, with Appellant

under cross-examination, significant:

Q. Now, what happened on May 8, 2020?

A. He had her in a chokehold.

Q. How do you know that?

A. Because I seen her neck, and she came to my house and she told
me and I seen where he had -- where her neck was all bruised up.

Q. And did he threaten to kill your daughter?

A. Yes, he threatened to kill her.

Q. So on May 8, 2020, Clarence Payton threatened to kill your
daughter?

A. Yes. He had her in a chokehold, my daughter said, “Mom,
Clarence had me in a chokehold, he was trying to kill me.”

Q. And what did your daughter decide to do at that point?

A. My daughter, when she came to find me, she stayed with me.

Q. And did she tell you that she told Mr. Payton that she was leaving
him?

A. Yeah, she did say that she was leaving him.

4

Q. So, according to your testimony, your daughter was put in a
chokehold by Clarence Payton on May 8, 2020[?]

A. Yes.

Q. And told him that she was going to leave him[?]

A. Yes.

Q. And he said that he was going to kill her[?]

A. Yes.

Q. And that’s what he did five days later?

A. Yes. He already had that plan.

Q. What’s that?

A. I said he already had that plan.

Q. So he already had this plan to kill her and it just so happened to
happen while she was at Church’s Chicken?

A. (Nodding head.) . . . Yes.

Consequently, we find no manifest error in the WCJ’s conclusion that

Fabeka’s death was the result of an ongoing domestic dispute between the couple.

The dispute was in no way connected to Fabeka’s employment except for the fact

that it occurred at her place of employment. Under these facts, Church’s Chicken

has clearly shown that the dispute was unrelated to Fabeka’s employment; thus, her

death is not considered as having arisen out of the employment and is, therefore, not

covered under Louisiana’s workers’ compensation statutes.

DECREE

The judgment is affirmed. All costs are assessed against Claimant/Appellant,

Darrellyn Hayes.

AFFIRMED.

5