Cited by
Opinions in Louisiana that cite Ellis v. Prevost, 13 La. 230.
- City of New Orleans v. New Orleans Canal, Inc. 412 So. 2d 975 La. 1982
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Liner v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co.
319 So. 2d 766
La. 1975
(1839); Dodeman v. Barrow, 11 La.Ann.
- Bunn v. A. J. Hodges Industries, Inc. 279 So. 2d 268 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1973
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Parker v. Stewart
185 So. 2d 825
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1966
Inter alia, the opinion contains the following applicable pronouncements : “ * * * , decided in 1839, clarifying all of the contradictory provisions of our codes treating of possession, the character of possession necessary to maintain the possessory action has been considered settled and the jurisprudence of this state has been that once vested with possession, the intention to continue therein is
- Broussard v. Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. 164 So. 2d 84 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
- Broussard v. Wisner 164 So. 2d 99 La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1964
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Loeblich v. Garnier
113 So. 2d 95
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1959
The codal requirement of a real and actual possession for a year preceding the trespass has since Ellis v. Prevost, 1839, and (second opinion) 1841, 19 La.
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Wright v. Holder
72 So. 2d 529
La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1953
The cited case points out the type of possession required in order to sustain such an action: “ , decided in 1839, clarifying all of the contradictory provisions of our codes treating of possession, the character of possession necessary to maintain the possessory action has been considered settled and the jurisprudence of this state has been that once vested with possession, the intention to continue therein is
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Lee v. Harris
25 So. 2d 448
La. 1946
decided in 1839, clarifying all of the contradictory provisions of our codes treating of possession, the character of possession necessary to maintain the possessory action has been considered settled and the jurisprudence of this state has been that once vested with, possession, the intention to continue therein is
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Pittman v. Bourg
153 So. 22
La. 1934
The right is taken for the fact, and the buyer is seized of the thing corporally by the execution of the title.’ .
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Barnett v. Botany Bay Lumber Co.
133 So. 446
La. 1931
Code, art. 3487; ; Wilcoxon v. Rogers, 16 La.
- Miller v. Utley-Holloway Sawmill Co. 123 So. 625 La. 1929
- Crichton v. Giddens 88 So. 236 La. 1921
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Liles v. Pitts
82 So. 735
La. 1919
The right is taken for the fact, and he is seized of the thing corporeally.” .
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Wells v. Blackman
46 So. 437
La. 1908
425 ; ; Roe, Wid., v. Heirs of Bundy, 45 La.
- Ramos Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Labarre 40 So. 898 La. 1905
- Levy v. Gause 36 So. 684 La. 1904
- Ashley Co. v. Bradford 33 So. 634 La. 1902
- Davis v. Dale 2 La. Ann. 205 La. 1847
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Egerton v. Third Municipality of New Orleans
1 La. Ann. 435
La. 1846
In the case of . , the former Supreme Court said that, the statutory provisions of the Code were often at variance with the definitions it contains, and that, in those cases, it was a sound rule of interpretation to consider the definitions as limited or modified by the clear intent of the positive enactments.
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Barnes v. Gaines
5 Rob. 314
La. 1843
civil, as well as to the natural possession, provided the defendant in a petitory action, contradictorily with whom the question of title is to be settled, be really pretending to possess the property as owner; and without its being necessary to enter into any new discussion upon the different kinds of possession recognized by our *319 laws, , and 9 La.